Where? You still haven’t asserted anything but the dogmatic “experience is required for knowledge”. Switching synonyms still doesn’t change anything, it is still a proposition which is a logical contradiction as BR pointed out. You still don’t have any evidence for it, and so on.
I have asserted a non-contradictory empiricism, and have evidenced it. This continued discussion about rationalism fits in with point 2 above on evidence for empiricism. You are objecting to the idea that reason alone provides no knowledge, and I am countering. As such, you are already addressing empiricism
as a hypothesis, and are challenging it based on evidence.
I am not sure what SoG said, but it is clear to me that the universe bends itself to the mathematical forms which transcend it. A triangle does not need the universe to exist, the universe needs the triangle to exist. G-d is a mathematician.
(Then G-d does not deal with the empirical world)
If it is clear to you, then would you provide some evidence? The universe is describable using numbers, but one can hardly say that it bends itself to mathematical forms. Also, triangles do not exist, whereas the universe does. You cannot have knowledge about triangles, you can only elaborate geometry self-consistently.
James1215: ‘Can you use pi for the earth? Maybe, but only after you ascertain empirically the shape.’
What does that have to do with anything? Pi was the ratio of a circles circumference to its diameter long before the earth was formed and will be long after.
It has everything to do with epistemology. Pi is not knowable; it is stateable. The circumference of the earth is knowable, but pi will not tell you it. You have to first look at the earth and find out (empirically, need I say?) that it is not spherical. As a result, pi will not be accurate. This is the same as saying that euclidean geometry may help you, it may not. One has to be dealing with an empirical arrangement that fits the specific models of maths for those models to assist with knowledge.
Mathematics can tell you about hypothetical geometry all day without empirical comparison.
Precisely. There is no overlap. Maths can be true, but does it give knowledge? That is the real question we should turn to.
Now you are back to the long refuted verificationism. We need no empirical reality to verify mathematical truths.
As I have said before, and as is obvious, being able to verify something does not make that thing false. Even if the principle of verification cannot be verified; other things still can.
Only in so far as you are still making the “absence of evidence is evidence of absence claim” You say there is no alternative to empiricism and then we demonstrate there is.
No, deliberately missing the point here I think. Where there is only evidence in favour of a proposition and none against, it is reasonable to assent to the proposition.
[evidence] could all be a dream as well.
This is the non-problem of the reliability of perception.
Where and how? [Has it been shown that dubito is a paradox]
I have already told you. If we are to consciously engage in a project of doubt, we have to doubt that we are doubting; therefore if successful we are not certain of anything, and we have nothing about which to gain knowledge. You forget who you are and what you’re doing, you don’t think you exist… If that’s the hallmark of reason (which it isn’t) that’s what you’re throwing at empiricism with dubito.
Reality obviously conforms to math as I demonstrated. The universe depends on them, not the other way around.
Reality can be described using numbers, that is all we know. How does the universe depend upon numbers exactly? Or how does the universe follow logic? One might say: ‘Something cannot be in two places at once’, as if that proves the universe is governed by logic. However, things can be in two places at once… Think about subatomic stuff. As Krauss says, we should learn from the universe, not impose our ideas onto it about what it can and cannot do.
How do you know you are experiencing reality again? That’s right, you don’t.
The non-problem of the reliability of perception.