A cosmological argument for the existence of God

[Matthias123]

1. 
   *]Particular entities that are not necessary, but are possible, necessarily have a cause for their existence.
   *]Particular metalaws of a multiverse exist, therefore they are possible particular entities.
   *]A particular set metalaws of a mutliverse are not necessary particular entities.
   *]Therefore these particular metalaws need a cause for their existence.
   *]If the cause for the existence of these metalaws was an infinite regress, the particular affections in these particular metalaws would remain unexplained.
   *]It is necessary that the particular affections in these particular metalaws don’tremain unexplained. (PoSR)
   *]Therefore there needs to be a singular cause for the existence metalaws in the multiverse.
   *]This cause is necessarily separate from the multiverse. (1-7)
   *]It is necessary that this cause be from an intelligent entity with a will. (6-7)
   
   Let particular entities be ξ
   Let caused to exist be C
   Let a particular set of metalaws be Ф
   Let a particular affective property be A
   Let the property of being unexplained be Ʊ
   Let the property of being intelligent be İ
   Let the property of having a will be Ŵ
   1. ((~□ξ⦁◊ξ)→ □C ξ)
   2. (∃ ξФ→◊ Ф)
   3. ~□ Ф
   4. ((~□Ф ⦁◊ Ф)→ CФ)
   5. CCФ →∃AƱ
   6. (□~(□∃AƱ) )
   7. (□~CCФ)
   8. (□~(C ξ ∈М))
   9. C ξ → ₦ □(∃₦İ⦁∃₦Ŵ)
   Note: The first step in step 9 is just a cast to a variable that is easier use in expressing the notation, there is no meaning to it other than that.
   
   For those who are not up to date in their theoretical physics, metalaws are physical laws of the multiverse that govern the generation of universes. For those who do not know what an affective property is, it is a qualitative property of an entity that affects the surrounding world. Just as we might say the affective quality of a set human made laws is cruelty, because the specifics of a laws in this set can affect the human popular cruelly so too do physical laws affect entities external to themselves in particular ways, that we must, by holding to the principle of sufficient reason, know why each particular law has a particular affective property, and not some other particular affective property, that would result in different affects on external entities.

 

[Voice_of_Reason_1]

Good work, now we need only to explain God.

 

[RobNY]

Good work, now we need only to explain God.

Can you please explain what you mean?

-Rob

 

[Matthias123]

I will offer some criticism to my own argument in saying that this does not prove the existence of God, but merely demonstrates (if successful) that completely explaining the metalaws generating universes in the multiverse, implies the existence of some cosmic designer, that is intelligent, and has some means to do it (a will – but perhaps asserting that this cause has a will, over another means to determine the specific affective properties of such an entity is non sequitur.). Thus such an argument can demonstrate that a theistic position is at least highly likely.

 

[Matthias123]

Correction to premise 6: (□~(C ξ ∈М)) should be (□~(C Ф∈ М))

The cause of an entity is not necessarily not a member of the multiverse, but the cause of the metalaws is necessarily not a member of the mulitverse.

Criticism greatly appreciated.

 

[Voice_of_Reason_1]

Admittedly, the wording and symbols are a bit arcane for me. Nevertheless, my complaint is that even if it does imply a God (which i’m sceptical of, not ever having been convinced in renditions more intelligible than this), then we are still left to explain this obscure and unknowable God who, Himself, has no cause.

Allow me to be charitable and extend further, the benefit of the doubt:

1. If God exists and we must rely on obscure, inconsistent, and archaic conjectures as to his nature, then we surely cannot be fully certain of his existence (Not to mention God could certainly make his existence known in an equal proportion to which he’s made us known of physical things in the universe; however he has not). It is not logically consistent that a fully just God can hold finite humans to full accountability where there is not full certainty.

2.No gratitude can be given to God based on his mere existence (we knowing nothing else in all perspicuity about the alleged Father): in praising him for his very being we are assuming that God is able to not exist.

1. No gratitude can be given to God based on our existence because we cannot prove logically that it is definitely better to exist than not to exist (especially given the didactic afterlife sinners are hereafter condemned, if they should be so unfortunate)
2. A God who desires such feelings as are imputed to him in any sacred script ought first to give humankind certainty as to his existence. People, aside from being unable to know perfectly or even fragmentally, the Will of the Father, cannot be blamed for acting in ways which God, being time-transcendent, is able to forsee at the outset of creation. This is not well-aligned with our idea of justice.
3. There is no experiential component which aligns with God (except for that which exists in our minds). A love (given by humans) that relies on speculations as to the affections it receives in return is understandable, but a love the relies on speculations as to whether God exists is foolishness.
4. If God exists, than he is not only existentially unexplainable but forever outside of our comprehension.

 

[Oreoracle]

*]It is necessary that the particular affections in these particular metalaws don’t remain unexplained. (PoSR)

How so? The principle of sufficient reason states that everything has a cause, not that those causes are explicable (or, in this case, traceable).

The best way to prove God, as it always has been and always will be, is to provide evidence.

 

[Matthias123]

I must apologise for an aggressive rebuttal “voice of reason”, but your objections are quite nonsensical.

Admittedly, the wording and symbols are a bit arcane for me. Nevertheless, my complaint is that even if it does imply a God (which i’m sceptical of, not ever having been convinced in renditions more intelligible than this),** then we are still left to explain this obscure and unknowable God who, Himself, has no cause.**

Now this would only follow if one held an erroneous ontological position. For consider if one concluded through study of being qua being, that there is an essence-existence distinction within being per se. If there exists such a distinction, and one can produce a sound argument for the existence of this distinction (which I can – but it would take us off-topic), then God does not need a cause, as he exists by virtue of his own essence.

If God exists and we must rely on obscure, inconsistent, and archaic conjectures as to his nature, then we surely cannot be fully certain of his existence

You are going to have to elaborate on your current epistemological position. Do you consider all of metaphysics meaningless? If so, I would so kindly ask that you present a sound argument as to why this should be so.

(Not to mention God could certainly make his existence known in an equal proportion to which he’s made us known of physical things in the universe; however he has not)

Strawman –you can do better.

It is not logically consistent that a fully just God can hold finite humans to full accountability where there is not full certainty.

What are you referring to when you are using the word certainty. If you are speaking of certain knowledge of the existence of God, then this is non sequitur – if you are speaking of something else then you’re are committing a fallacy of equivocation – please clarify.

No gratitude can be given to God based on his mere existence (we knowing nothing else in all perspicuity about the alleged Father):

This is** self-refuting **my friend – if you know that a God-like entity exists, then you necessarily have knowledge of this entity possessing God-like attributes.

in praising him for his very being we are assuming that God is able to not exist.

Non-sequitur – you have not refuted my argument that God is necessary to explain metalaws, nor have you given positive evidence that God is indeed not necessary, which is a prerequisite to accepting your premise as sound.

No gratitude can be given to God based on our existence because we cannot prove logically that it is definitely better to exist than not to exist (especially given the didactic afterlife sinners are hereafter condemned, if they should be so unfortunate)

I must reject this premise my friend. I assert to you that the notion that non-being is a privation of being is indeed self-evident.

. A God who desires such feelings as are imputed to him in any sacred script ought first to give humankind certainty as to his existence. People, aside from being unable to know perfectly or even fragmentally, the Will of the Father, cannot be blamed for acting in ways which God, being time-transcendent, is able to forsee at the outset of creation. This is not well-aligned with our idea of justice.

Strawman– I am not even sure if you are giving me an argument, as this premise seems identical to your first premise. Again I must reject such an argument as God, being internally perfect, with complete freedom of will , does not “ought” to commit any actions. The mere conception of God implies an entity that does not commit any action with necessity.

There is no experiential component which aligns with God (except for that which exists in our minds). A love (given by humans) that relies on speculations as to the affections it receives in return is understandable, but a love the relies on speculations as to whether God exists is foolishness

You are again picking at straws – it really doesn’t matter to me if we can communicate with God – as I am not currently arguing for a theistic position (I want to stay on topic). I am arguing for at least deism.

If God exists, than he is not only existentially unexplainable but forever outside of our comprehension.

I reject your conclusion due to premises 1,2,4,5 being fallacious, and premise 3 being unsound.

How so? The principle of sufficient reason states that everything has a cause, not that those causes are explicable (or, in this case, traceable).

I apologise for my vagueness – the particular disimilar affective properties of a particular set of metalaws need an explanation for their existence. Why should these particular affective properties be present in this particular metalaw? It is possible that in particular set of metalaws X, that there be perhaps an infinite number of dissimilar affective properties. What should say metalaw X contain affective property Y, and not affective property Z? They both have presumably are equally possible – why should it contain this particular affective property? Now there can be an infinite number of identical affective properties, but this is not what I am arguing. I am talking about dissimilar affective properties – there needs to be an explanation for why we have the affective properties that we do. I admit that I am perhaps straying into the SPoSR.

The best way to prove God, as it always has been and always will be, is to provide evidence.

The trumpet of the materialist sounds through the fog of war.

 

[Oreoracle]

The trumpet of the materialist sounds through the fog of war.

My suggestion is not prompted by materialism. It’s just that you aren’t going to convince people using the dubious principles metaphysicians have adopted, and even if you did prove that there was a first cause, he wouldn’t be proven to be intelligent. In fact, the first cause wouldn’t even require a personality at all.

Evidence speaks for itself, however, and you need not defend the veracity of whatever deductive system you’re using if you offer it. I recently created a thread where I challenged the metaphysical notion of modality. In it, I essentially ask how someone can prove an outcome that hasn’t been actualized is possible. I also note that if determinism is true, possibility is just a mental construct. For example, assuming determinism is true, if a flipped coin lands on tails, we know that it couldn’t have possibly landed on heads, even though the assertion that either outcome was possible is true from our perspective. The coin would either land on tails or it wouldn’t, however, so only one outcome was possible all along: the one that actually happened. Modality, then, would only be used for its utility, not its truth.

 

[Voice_of_Reason_1]

No need to apologize; I’m sure you and everyone here understands that I was merely speaking candidly, rather than in convoluted jargon. Also – just to clear up – what you may have interpreted as a line of argumentation was actually me just numbering my points. I can’t really say that I feel like getting into a copy and paste war with different arguments, so let me just stick to the most salient concerns:

I reject premise 1. You haven’t proven to me that the universe (or the particular entities therein) necessitate a cause, esspecially not a cause which is intelligent (premise 9).

Also, I am dubious of any argument that suggests that God exists by virtue of his essence because no matter what way you frame it, you’re saying that God is an exception to the rule, simply by our conjuring of Him. If you feel you have a case for God existing by his own essence, you’d better show it (I’ll permit the tangent; there’s not a lot of traffic in this forum anyway).

 

[RobNY]

Also, I am dubious of any argument that suggests that God exists by virtue of his essence because no matter what way you frame it, you’re saying that God is an exception to the rule, simply by our conjuring of Him. If you feel you have a case for God existing by his own essence, you’d better show it (I’ll permit the tangent; there’s not a lot of traffic in this forum anyway).

To what rule is God the exception on the theist reading?

 

[Oreoracle]

To what rule is God the exception on the theist reading?

The typical cosmological argument works like this:

1. All entities need to be caused.
2. If we search for the causes of each individual entity, we’d have to search forever unless at least one entity is exempt from this rule. (In other words, “I don’t want an infinite regression, so there is no infinite regression.”)
3. And here we have the classic logical leap: This uncaused cause is my personal god of choice.

The exception is that all things are said to have causes except God. This is meant to avoid an infinite regression, though nothing about an infinite regression has been proven to be absurd.

Also, Occam’s Razor would suggest that a theory positing the necessity of some entity in the universe would be more economical than a theory positing an entity outside of the universe. The uncaused cause could be a magical stone for all we know.

 

[RobNY]

1. All entities need to be caused…The exception is that all things are said to have causes except God. This is meant to avoid an infinite regression, though nothing about an infinite regression has been proven to be absurd.

I have never seen a cosmological argument, written by a philosopher, espouse premise 1. I do not espouse premise 1. There is good evidence that the OP does not espouse premise 1, based on his alternate premise 1. Who here has? Just the atheists?

I’ll be provocative here for a moment: are you sure you haven’t been reading too much Richard Dawkins?

Also, Occam’s Razor would suggest that a theory positing the necessity of some entity in the universe would be more economical than a theory positing an entity outside of the universe. The uncaused cause could be a magical stone for all we know.

Ockham’s Razor suggests no such thing. Quite literally, it is merely (in one version) that ‘plurality is not to be posited without necessity.’ Hyman and Walsh’s introduction to Ockham’s philosophy notes rather incisively that

“the Razor… was common in the Middle Ages, and so is hardly distinctive of Ockham. Indeed, where Ockham employs the Razor against Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus himself employs it against St. Thomas Aquinas. Realist and Nominalist alike believed that entities should not be posited without necessity-- the deeper issue arose over what counts as necessary, and why.” (Hyman and Walsh, pg. 650, in Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed.)

The question over the ‘necessity’ of an entity is decided precisely by evaluating certain arguments, the sort of which are the subject of this thread. It does you no good to appeal to Ockham’s Razor, then.

I like Bertrand Russell very much, but quite frankly, the invisible teapot argument he made-- which seems to have spawned many such copycat arguments in the presence of the new atheists, like your ‘magic rock’ rebuttal-- is below his usual standards.

-Rob

 

[Matthias123]

My suggestion is not prompted by materialism. It’s just that you aren’t going to convince people using the dubious principles metaphysicians have adopted, and even if you did prove that there was a first cause, he wouldn’t be proven to be intelligent. In fact, the first cause wouldn’t even require a personality at all.

I understand your objections, and I share and embrace the burden of the ambiguousness of the metaphysics, – to an extent. For me, the problem with the metaphysics can be solved by clearing up the language, by using modern analytical techniques, to prevent the “word chopping” that everyone so loathes. The problem is that you cannot limit inquiry to just that of sense, as this to me is basically an admission of defeat for the whole philosophical enterprise. For the philosophical enterprise has always been focused on an attempt to know all things – now it can be admitted that there are metaphysical concepts that are better left alone, for prudence guides us to work on, and increase the clarity of the concepts that are applicable to our day, but casting the entirety of metaphysics “into the flames” is a self-limiting of reason. You expect the theist to establish the existence of God by merely supplying empirical evidence – but the problem is there is no necessary empirical evidence for the existence of God in our cosmos, as God does not have to do anything by necessity. So what are we left with? We are either to remain in a state of perpetual agnosticism, or we are to develop new ways to resolve our present difficulties with the metaphysics. I am encouraged at the prospects of this, after the fall of logical positivism from prominence, and the potential of modern analytical techniques clear up our problems in language. Now in the meantime, these concepts, although admittedly vague, and rather unpleasing to the ear, are often completely sound in my opinion (At least I agree for my own metaphysical position). Calling these concepts “vague” is often times accurate, but this is not because of the “dubiousness” of the concepts, but the limitations of language.

In addition I must add a challenge to you – I have never been presented with a compelling sound argument as to why the metaphysics should be abandoned. Every time I ask, I also get a response like “I thought you could discern fact from fiction”, as if it were in same way a self-evident epistemological position. At this point in time – I see it as an unfounded opinion, due to a dislike of “word chopping”.

I and even if you did prove that there was a first cause, he wouldn’t be proven to be intelligent. In fact, the first cause wouldn’t even require a personality at all.

Then by all means, engage my argument in my original post.

No need to apologize; I’m sure you and everyone here understands that I was merely speaking candidly, rather than in convoluted jargon. Also – just to clear up – what you may have interpreted as a line of argumentation was actually me just numbering my points. I can’t really say that I feel like getting into a copy and paste war with different arguments, so let me just stick to the most salient concerns:

I apologise – I really should have interpreted you more charitably – mea culpa

I reject premise 1. You haven’t proven to me that the universe (or the particular entities therein) necessitate a cause, esspecially not a cause which is intelligent (premise 9).

Premise 1 is merely the axiom of causality – if you have several non-necessary possible entities, and one of these entities exists, there needs to be an explanation as to why this entity exists – a cause for its existence. What I find astounding is the atheist’s contempt of self-evident principles.

Also, I am dubious of any argument that suggests that God exists by virtue of his essence because no matter what way you frame it, you’re saying that God is an exception to the rule, simply by our conjuring of Him

This is not the case, as we say that everthing that exists has an explanation for it’s existence. When we say that God exists by virtue of his own essene, we are saying that he is existence per se – he is His own explanation for His existence. God is not an “exception to the rule” – God explains Himself.

 

[Matthias123]

If you feel you have a case for God existing by his own essence, you’d better show it (I’ll permit the tangent; there’s not a lot of traffic in this forum anyway).

http://img405.imageshack.us/img405/2094/argumetn.png

http://img685.imageshack.us/img685/5915/thirdway.png

Given an essence-existence distinctions, these two arguments demonstrate it. (They are in image format because I posted it on another forum that did not have the fonts for the symbols.)

For the First Way, “essentially moved” is referring to an entity being moved in a chain of essential subordinated efficient causes. In such a chain, each entity’s causality is dependent on the essential nature of the previous mover.

For example supose we have a metal chain, connected to a roof holding a pallet of bricks 5 feet off the ground. Each link on this chain is essentially dependent on the previous link in order to maintain the effect (the pallet of bricks in the air) in act. So if we remove one of these links anywhere in the chain, the pallet of bricks falls to the ground. Yet none of these chains can move themselves from potency to act, therefore even if the chain has an actual infinite number of links in the chain, it is metaphysically impossible for the pallet to be above the ground without there being a first mover (the link on the ceiling) to move the particulars in the set.

Now the link on the ceiling, being in this chain, and also not being able to move itself, cannot be the final explanation because the problem just regresses to infinity – but as I said earlier ever if the particular entities regress to actual infinity, there still needs to exist a Prime Mover. Thus in order to explain why the particulars are in motion, we need to postulate the existence of a metaphysically necessary Prime Mover, that is pure act – which means that it is the fullness existence. Now this entity will be being per se due to the existence essence distinciton – and this meets our definition of God as written in scripture through the Sacred Authors.

The Third Way runs rather similar to the first but deals with possibility and necessity. This deals with anything that becomes necessary, even in reference to something else.

So even say the particular walls of a particular house, that are not necessary when a particular roof is not on the house, but are necessary for the sustaining of the roof on the house after it is placed there – is subjected to this argument.

 

[Oreoracle]

I have never seen a cosmological argument, written by a philosopher, espouse premise 1. I do not espouse premise 1. There is good evidence that the OP does not espouse premise 1, based on his alternate premise 1. Who here has? Just the atheists?

Premise (1) is just a rephrasing of the principle of sufficient reason. If you think events can occur without causes, then this discussion is pretty much over. You might as well assert that something can come from nothing.

I’ll be provocative here for a moment: are you sure you haven’t been reading too much Richard Dawkins?

I haven’t read any of Dawkins. I heard one member here call him a “one-trick horse” and I agree. He seems overwhelmingly proud of himself for seeing through religious indoctrination and the tenuous arguments for the existence of deities, but those accomplishments aren’t terribly impressive. Teenagers can accomplish the same thing.

In any case, a person doesn’t need help from other philosophers or scientists who believe themselves to be proficient at philosophy in order to consider the cosmological argument unconvincing.

Ockham’s Razor suggests no such thing. Quite literally, it is merely (in one version) that ‘plurality is not to be posited without necessity.’ Hyman and Walsh’s introduction to Ockham’s philosophy notes rather incisively that

Yes, Occam’s Razor holds that between two theories with equal explanative power, the one with fewer entities is to be preferred. Theists posit the material universe and a necessary being outside of it, God. It is possible to posit the material universe as being necessary in itself, however, so this theory would be more economical while being just as explanative as its competitor.

I like Bertrand Russell very much, but quite frankly, the invisible teapot argument he made-- which seems to have spawned many such copycat arguments in the presence of the new atheists, like your ‘magic rock’ rebuttal-- is below his usual standards.

My suggestion wasn’t inspired by Russell’s Teapot, though I do find his analogy accurate. I’m only saying that proving a necessary entity isn’t enough. For all we know, the necessary entity could lack sapience, sentience, consciousness, and be altogether inanimate. Proving the existence of a personality is much different than proving the existence of an ambiguous entity.

 

[JDaniel]

No need to apologize; I’m sure you and everyone here understands that I was merely speaking candidly, rather than in convoluted jargon. Also – just to clear up – what you may have interpreted as a line of argumentation was actually me just numbering my points. I can’t really say that I feel like getting into a copy and paste war with different arguments, so let me just stick to the most salient concerns:

I reject premise 1. You haven’t proven to me that the universe (or the particular entities therein) necessitate a cause, esspecially not a cause which is intelligent (premise 9).

Also, I am dubious of any argument that suggests that God exists by virtue of his essence because no matter what way you frame it, you’re saying that God is an exception to the rule, simply by our conjuring of Him. If you feel you have a case for God existing by his own essence, you’d better show it (I’ll permit the tangent; there’s not a lot of traffic in this forum anyway).

1.) All beings, objects or things are caused, or created. (Positively stated) There are no beings, objects or things that are not caused or created. (Negatively stated) The refutation would be the exposition of one, or more, beings, objects or things that were not caused, or created.

2.) The beginning being, object or thing must be the only exception to this or else we have not discovered the beginning being, object or thing. Furthermore, in every case of a finite procession or recession, at any point in time, there must be a beginning thing and an ending thing, even if the procession or recession is expanding or contracting.

3.) Regardless of what we call this beginning, or ending, being, object or thing, it must be something that is itself uncaused, or else we have either not traversed far enough back so as to arrive at that which is the first being, object, or thing that is the beginning, or, we have missed it in our presumptuousness going forward. Further, because there is no existing infinity of beings, objects or things, it is impossible to attribute said beginning being, object or thing to something which exists at either end of some absurd, enormous string of things.

4.) Now, even as absurd, dim-witted human beings, there is no doubt that the first cause must be far greater than we are and there is nothing greater than us on earth. To cause or create the universe or multi-verse, if the latter exists, the first cause/creator cannot be absurd or dim-witted, no matter what absurd or dim-witted statement(s) we might make to the contrary. Therefore, the beginning cause/creator must be intelligent.

5.) Finally, creating is not the same as causing, per se*. To say that something causes is to infer that that something possesses something contemporaneously with which to work, except in a widest sense. Thus, this being, object of thing which is the beginning being, object or thing, had to create ex nihilo. If it did not create ex nihilo, then, once again, we have not found the beginning being, object or thing and have found ourselves trapped by finitude in our own absurdity and dim-wittedness.

jd*

 

[RobNY]

Premise (1) is just a rephrasing of the principle of sufficient reason. If you think events can occur without causes, then this discussion is pretty much over. You might as well assert that something can come from nothing.

The principle of sufficient reason is not the principle of sufficient causation, and most certainly does not imply that all things must be caused. Anything which has its own sufficient reason has no need to be caused. Only things which lack their own sufficient reason need causation, for causation is the sufficient reason for something which needs something other than itself as its reason for existence. Surely I-- and every other classical theist-- affirm that God is the sufficient reason of His own existence.

Yes, Occam’s Razor holds that between two theories with equal explanative power, the one with fewer entities is to be preferred. Theists posit the material universe and a necessary being outside of it, God. It is possible to posit the material universe as being necessary in itself, however, so this theory would be more economical while being just as explanative as its competitor.

There is no question of “economy” when we disagree over necessity. The question, as you point out, is whether or not the universe is such that it requires explanation or not. This is where the theism question turns, and not on considerations of ‘economy.’

My suggestion wasn’t inspired by Russell’s Teapot, though I do find his analogy accurate. I’m only saying that proving a necessary entity isn’t enough. For all we know, the necessary entity could lack sapience, sentience, consciousness, and be altogether inanimate. Proving the existence of a personality is much different than proving the existence of an ambiguous entity.

God proofs prove only a ‘slice’ of the rich object of religious belief. I don’t disagree with you in principle; a God proof can be valid and still tell us relatively little.

God bless,
Rob

 

[Matthias123]

Premise (1) is just a rephrasing of the principle of sufficient reason. If you think events can occur without causes, then this discussion is pretty much over.

What can you say to a man who denies self-evident first principles? I believe Avicenna expressed his frustration the best, when several philosophers denied the law of non-contradiction:
*
“Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned”*

Perhaps those that deny the axiom of causality should be slapped until they are forced to admit that being slapped implies a slapper. Yet there are those who try to have it both ways, but do not produce any sound arguments of why we should not hold to the axiom that an effect necessarily implies a cause.

You might as well assert that something can come from nothing.

Funny – this is what you are asserting.

 

[Voice_of_Reason_1]

As per the first argument, I reject your first premise: an observed effect may be essentially moved but that doesn’t mean that they all are (as physicists have asserted, some matter comes into and out of existence completely of its own volition).I also reject your last premise that there must be a first mover. The universe could have come into being per se, in a like manner. Based on the same line of reasoning, I reject your 4th premise in the second argument.

The axiom of causality is the answer to why one thing follows another (as in the relation between particular entities under the effect of metalaws), not the answer to why there are metalaws. In necessitating an answer to the question “why?” you’ve smuggled in the very thing you’re trying to prove: that there is an answer to the question. We don’t have sentient motivations (or at least any access to them) lurking behind questions which only have descriptive and observatory evidence in their stead. We may ask why carbon is not helium but our answer as to why will only be why carbon is not like helium (descriptive; that they’re different in elemental composition). Similarly, we may ask why there is something rather than nothing, but there is nothing further to be said about why it is.

You may argue that God is the sufficient reason for his own existence, but there is nary an argument to be made about how such a thing can be. These two arguments don’t prove either that God must exist for observed effects to exist, nor why He exists, as is proper to the very question of cause I was demanding from you earlier in the discussion.