A Priori Proof for God's Existence

[ferdgoodfellow]

Is an a priori proof for God’s existence even possible? IOW, can we prove that God must exist just by examining the meaning of our terms and without resorting to causal or cosmological (a posteriori) arguments?

Anselm thought so, but Aquinas thought not.

For a long time I have been considering Charles Hartshorne’s modal form of the ontological argument and offer it as a successful a priori argument. It begins with Anselm’s definition of God as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” Our major premise is that we can think of God in these terms without contradiction. IOW, our concept of of God as TTWNGCBT is thinkable.

Our next premise is that we can conceive of that which cannot fail to exist. IOW, necessary existence is possible.

Given the conceivability of both perfection (TTWNGCBT) and necessary existence, Anselm’s argument works. Greatness requires necessity. Put differently, greatness strictly implies its necessary existence.

But what I am wondering about is how one can forcefully argue for the second premise. I don’t want to debate Anselm’s definition. Can we support necessary existence without resorting to cosmological arguments (primarily Aquinas’s third way)?

 

[Darryl_B]

It is impossible to reason the existence of God, that I concede. It is impossible to reason the non-existence of God, that I also concede. Both those premises begin in a vacuum, outside our human experience. They belong in hypothetical courtrooms, with hypothetical judges, hypothetical lawyers, and hypothetical suits.

God’s existence is individually and personally known, it is individually experienced, in many diverse ways and many diverse forms, tailored to our individual needs, such that there cannot be a generic philosophical catch-all formula.

God is not think. God is taste.

 

[Darryl_B]

I should also state the observation that historically philosophy has begun with God but ultimately ends up turning inwards and finds within itself man, for that is always an easier route of existence.

 

[grannymh]

Human’s knowledge of the existence of God dates back to early legends and the shaman. Obviously, there was the inherent human sense that something other themselves existed. That “other” was recognized as the super-natural. Understanding of the “super-natural” other developed into a variety of faiths from One God to many gods.

It is the human recognition of something “super-natural” that is proof of God’s existence.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Darryl,

I agree that if there can’t be an a priori proof for God’s existence, then there also can’t be an a priori disproof. But I am unwilling to leave it at that because I think Anselm was on to something.

It is also true that the two premises, perfection and necessity, are highly abstract notions and remote from concrete human experience, but not totally. I wouldn’t say they begin a vacuum.

You emphasize the inner path to God, and it is essential in one’s spiritual quest, but I wouldn’t deny the value of reason. Reason should be pushed as far as it can go. I agree with Peter Kreeft that there can be no mathematical demonstration of the Christian God. All we can do, in the end, is demonstrate that belief is reasonable. Maybe we can prove small slices of the Christian God. Maybe one of them is that Greatness exists. There is value in that.

But ultimately faith is the most important thing, and we ultimately seek a Person. In one of his lectures Kreeft joked about the philosopher went to heaven and wanted to attend a lecture about God rather than meet Him in person!

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Mornin Granny!

You sed: “It is the human recognition of something “super-natural” that is proof of God’s existence.”

It does seem to be innate in humans that something greater, transcendent, and more excellent than themselves exists. But with Jews and Christians (and probably Muslims) this notion is pushed to the ultimate. We aren’t content with lesser gods as the object of our worship. The only fitting object of worship, that which we exalt above all things, has to be the Greatest (in Anselm’s words, That Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Thought).

So, while our primitive human recognition leads us to something supernatural, it is Anselm, I believe, who completes this trajectory of thought and provides the formal proof of its object.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Is an a priori proof for God’s existence even possible? IOW, can we prove that God must exist just by examining the meaning of our terms and without resorting to causal or cosmological (a posteriori) arguments?

Anselm thought so, but Aquinas thought not.

For a long time I have been considering Charles Hartshorne’s modal form of the ontological argument and offer it as a successful a priori argument. It begins with Anselm’s definition of God as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” Our major premise is that we can think of God in these terms without contradiction. IOW, our concept of of God as TTWNGCBT is thinkable.

Our next premise is that we can conceive of that which cannot fail to exist. IOW, necessary existence is possible.

Given the conceivability of both perfection (TTWNGCBT) and necessary existence, Anselm’s argument works. Greatness requires necessity. Put differently, greatness strictly implies its necessary existence.

But what I am wondering about is how one can forcefully argue for the second premise. I don’t want to debate Anselm’s definition. Can we support necessary existence without resorting to cosmological arguments (primarily Aquinas’s third way)?

The basic problem with this approach is that the “greatest conceivable being” (or GCB for short) is subjective and undefined. Greatness is not a simple attribute. You cannot even define objectively what a “great dinner” might be, much less what the “greatest conceivable dinner” might be. Even a simple attribute is problematic. What would be the “fattest conceivable being”. Moreover, the different sub-attributes can be mutually exclusive, for example the “tallest conceivable being” and the “prettiest conceivable being” are not necessarily the same.

Greatness is a “composite” attribute, and not everyone will agree what are its “sub-attributes”. Chances are that MY GCB is totally different from YOUR GCB. What to do in this case?

The other problem is the “necessity”. What is necessary existence? Usually it is defined as “something that cannot NOT exist”. In other words, something that is present in ALL possible worlds. A possible world is a logically possible state of affairs, which is different from the existing reality in some aspect or another. In order to establish that something exists “necessarily” you need to examine ALL the possible worlds, and prove that this being “X” is present in all of them. An impossible task.

On the other hand, to refute the concept of necessary existence is very simple. All you need is to consider two different possible worlds, which have nothing in common.

 

[Wesrock]

On the other hand, to refute the concept of necessary existence is very simple. All you need is to consider two different possible worlds, which have nothing in common.

One thing I must add is that just because I can imagine a world in which a being doesn’t exist doesn’t make such a world a real possibility. The phrase is “all possible worlds”, not “all imaginable worlds.”

However, this would require us to establish what is possible, which leads us to a posteriori arguments.

Wasn’t Anselm’s original argument not based on necessity but on the idea that an actual “greatest being” is greater than a potential “greatest being”? Which, to my understanding led to a catch-22 where if you did not acknowledge the existence of God, then you weren’t actually conceiving the greatest possible being, but something less than it. Granted, I’ve barely dabbled into Anselm’s argument, so my understanding may be off.

Perhaps I’ve answered my own question in how it is a priori demonstrated that God is necessary without jumping into “all possible worlds” thinking.

(1) A man can conceive that there is a greatest possible being.
(2) An actual being is greater than a potential being.
(3) If a man says he can conceive of the greatest possible being who could possibly not exist, he is not conceiving the greatest possible being.
(4) Therefore the greatest possible being must exist.

I am terrible at constructing syllogisms, though.

 

[reggieM]

You cannot even define objectively what a “great dinner” might be, much less what the “greatest conceivable dinner” might be.

This argument is commonly used but it is easily refuted because it misunderstands the point. It’s a simple failure to understand the argument. The idea of greatness of being is based on a hierarchical model.

When you talk about any object - a dinner, an island (Hume’s attempt to argue) you measure it’s “greatness of being”. To say “the greatest dinner” is measuring against “all dinners”. But that’s where it’s easily shown to be a false comparison. We’re measuring against “all possible being”, not dinners, not islands, not ice cream cones.

“A dinner” cannot be the greatest conceivable being. I shouldn’t have to explain the reasons why, but we perhaps could look.

1. Any being that depends on something else for its existence (a chef, a restaurant, food quality, temperature) - is not as great as something that does not.
2. Any being that was created by something else, has a limitation of being. It is less perfect. It is only as good as that chef at that time.
3. A being that can exist for a while, but then disappear is less perfect. A dinner that could last forever and never disappear is more perfect. A dinner that was never exhausted is more perfect. A dinner that never lost its taste is more perfect.
4. But no matter - a dinner only serves one, limited purpose. You cannot use a dinner to fly to Los Angeles on. You cannot use it as a house. It is imperfect in being.
5. I want to see and taste the “perfect dinner” – but it lacks perfection of persistence in time, or omni-presence. I cannot even see it. It has degraded and is gone. I can only hear about it.

Ok, we could go on, but it’s obvious. A dinner cannot be the greatest conceivable being. In fact, no contingent being can be - since a greater being is one that does not depend on others for its own existence.

In order to establish that something exists “necessarily” you need to examine ALL the possible worlds, and prove that this being “X” is present in all of them. An impossible task.

No, it remains the same. If there are an infinite number of worlds, they all remain dependent upon some reason for their existence. Those worlds are not necessary beings. But they trace their existence back to a necessary being that explains the existence of everything that follows. The ultimate necessary being is that which cannot not exist, in order for anything else to exist.

All you need is to consider two different possible worlds, which have nothing in common.

Where did those worlds come from? How did they get there? What sustains them in existence? Where did the properties of those universes come from?

They depend on something else to explain their existence. So, they require a necessary being for their explanation.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

One thing I must add is that just because I can imagine a world in which a being doesn’t exist doesn’t make such a world a real possibility. The phrase is “all possible worlds”, not “all imaginable worlds.”

A possible world only needs to be logically consistent. It may not have to be physically possible. For example a world which contains only one electron and one positron is not physically possible (due to mutual annihilation) but there is no logical contradiction in it.

On the other hand, two possible worlds, one containing just electrons and the other one containing positrons are both physically and logically possible. And they have nothing in common.

Wasn’t Anselm’s original argument not based on necessity but on the idea that an actual “greatest being” is greater than a potential “greatest being”?

Exactly. Anselm considered “existence” as another attribute, which is either present or absent. Later philosophers discarded this idea as untenable.

 

[reggieM]

But what I am wondering about is how one can forcefully argue for the second premise. I don’t want to debate Anselm’s definition. Can we support necessary existence without resorting to cosmological arguments (primarily Aquinas’s third way)?

As long as anything exists, there must be necessary existence to explain this.

If all existence was unnecessary and could, possibly, not exist - then nothing would exist (over an infinite span of time).

 

[Wesrock]

A possible world only needs to be logically consistent. It may not have to be physically possible. For example a world which contains only one electron and one positron is not physically possible (due to mutual annihilation) but there is no logical contradiction in it.

On the other hand, two possible worlds, one containing just electrons and the other one containing positrons are both physically and logically possible. And they have nothing in common.

This seems to be Hume’s error, if I understand you right. The phrase is possible world, not logically consistent world, or imaginable world. If a world can’t be without God, it’s not a possible world. Granted, that God is necessary needs to be demonstrated, but simply saying “I imagine the universe as it is now without God, therefore God isn’t necessary” doesn’t demonstrate anything, either.

And the possible worlds argument can get things backwards for more classical thinkers anyway, to quote Ed Feser: “A common procedure is to characterize the essence of a thing as the set of properties it has in every possible world, a necessary truth as one that is true in every possible world, and so forth. For A-T, this gets things backwards. It is the essence of a thing that determines what will be true of it in every possible world, not what is true of it in every world that determines its essence.”

If the essential properties are different in a different world, it’s a different type of being altogether.

Exactly. Anselm considered “existence” as another attribute, which is either present or absent. Later philosophers discarded this idea as untenable.

Classical philosophy is actually rearing its head again in the community. Aristotlean concepts are making a re-emergence.

Even so, that it became popular to disregard certain notions doesn’t make them incorrect. That there’s a difference between something actual and something not is hardly untenable.

 

[tonyrey]

This seems to be Hume’s error, if I understand you right. The phrase is possible world, not logically consistent world, or imaginable world. If a world can’t be without God, it’s not a possible world. Granted, that God is necessary needs to be demonstrated, but simply saying “I imagine the universe as it is now without God, therefore God isn’t necessary” doesn’t demonstrate anything, either.

And the possible worlds argument can get things backwards for more classical thinkers anyway, to quote Ed Feser: “A common procedure is to characterize the essence of a thing as the set of properties it has in every possible world, a necessary truth as one that is true in every possible world, and so forth. For A-T, this gets things backwards. It is the essence of a thing that determines what will be true of it in every possible world, not what is true of it in every world that determines its essence.”

If the essential properties are different in a different world, it’s a different type of being altogether.

Classical philosophy is actually rearing its head again in the community. Aristotlean concepts are making a re-emergence.

Even so, that it became popular to disregard certain notions doesn’t make them incorrect. That there’s a difference between something actual and something not is hardly untenable.

Hume abandoned philosophy because he realised his view that the self doesn’t exist is untenable.

 

[tonyrey]

As long as anything exists, there must be necessary existence to explain this.

If all existence was unnecessary and could, possibly, not exist - then nothing would exist (over an infinite span of time).

Irrefutable! If there is no reason why anything exists there is no reason for anything and reasoning itself is a utter waste of time and energy.

 

[reggieM]

If a world can’t be without God, it’s not a possible world.

I’m not sure I followed that (double-negative with possiblity?). I would say, since God is the fullness of being and source of all contingent beings, then a world without God is not a possible world.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

“A dinner” cannot be the greatest conceivable being.

No one said otherwise, so you argue against a windmill . I was only talking about the concept of the “greatest conceivable dinner within the set of all possible dinners” - NOT the “greatest conceivable being”. The word “being” is just a generic term for something that exists.

I shouldn’t have to explain the reasons why, but we perhaps could look.

So now you started to enumerate a few aspects of YOUR concept of greatness. And here the problem arises. YOUR concept of greatness does not necessarily coincide with someone else’s concept of greatness. There is no collection of attributes that would constitute an objective measurement of “greatness”.

Ok, we could go on, but it’s obvious. A dinner cannot be the greatest conceivable being. In fact, no contingent being can be - since a greater being is one that does not depend on others for its own existence.

Again, your subjective opinion. Also you use the words “necessary” and “contingent” (or dependent) in a different context. The “contingent” or “dependent” existence does not imply a causative relationship. It only says that this being exists in some possible worlds, not in all of them. Similarly, the concept of necessary existence is simply: “something that exists in all possible worlds”, not something that “needs” to exist to “explain” the existence of something else.

Where did those worlds come from? How did they get there? What sustains them in existence? Where did the properties of those universes come from?

Who cares? We are only talking about logical possibilities, not the actual physical reality. One more time: “a possible world is a state of affairs, which is different from our existing reality is SOME respect”. The only restriction is that this hypothetical world cannot have logical contradictions.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

I’m not sure I followed that (double-negative with possiblity?). I would say, since God is the fullness of being and source of all contingent beings, then a world without God is not a possible world.

Are you serious? The whole mental exercise is about to prove God’s existence - by way of contemplating the “greatest conceivable being”. You cannot “smuggle in” God by stipulating that a “world without God is not a possible world”.

As long as anything exists, there must be necessary existence to explain this.

No explanation is stipulated, only simple existence. We are not talking about physics.

If all existence was unnecessary and could, possibly, not exist - then nothing would exist (over an infinite span of time).

That does not follow.

 

[reggieM]

Who cares?

Ok, you don’t want to answer the questions. I could tell you that I care, but I think you’re saying that you don’t care.

Secondly, I think you’re struggling with the very basics of metaphysics. You assume first principles, that you haven’t explained.

We start with what is true and what is false. Do you think the difference between those terms is subjective?

 

[reggieM]

Are you serious? The whole mental exercise is about to prove God’s existence - by way of contemplating the “greatest conceivable being”. You cannot “smuggle in” God by stipulating that a “world without God is not a possible world”.

My comment was for Wesrock, understanding that he already accepts the sequence of logic that makes God the necessary first cause.

If I was talking to you, I know I’d have to get some validation on the very basics of reality. As I’ve just asked - do you think the difference between true and false is subjective?

 

[tonyrey]

A possible world only needs to be logically consistent. It may not have to be physically possible. For example a world which contains only one electron and one positron is not physically possible (due to mutual annihilation) but there is no logical contradiction in it.

On the other hand, two possible worlds, one containing just electrons and the other one containing positrons are both physically and logically possible. And they have nothing in common.

Exactly. Anselm considered “existence” as another attribute, which is either present or absent. Later philosophers discarded this idea as untenable.

If existence isn’t an attribute why do you believe you or anyone or anything else exists? It is easy to spout nonsense but to justify it requires your existence as a rational being. Descartes realised “cogito ergo sum”. Thought doesn’t occur in a dream unless you believe life is a dream. The obsession with logical possibility ignores reality. Our only basis for rational conclusions is** this **universe not the countless imaginary ones. We don’t solve our problems with speculations but by facing facts - otherwise we are living in a dream world.