A Priori Proof for God's Existence

[Wesrock]

Oops, I linked the wrong article in my last post. I meant this one: edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/11/anselms-ontological-argument.html?m=1

 

[Wesrock]

To clarify something I’ve said, if the objection is that “Anselm is trying to define God into existence,” then you don’t understand the ontological argument. It may be a faulty argument, or insufficient argument, or wrong argument. But to say such an objection is to just have it go over your head entirely.

 

[reggieM]

To clarify something I’ve said, if the objection is that “Anselm is trying to define God into existence,” you don’t understand the ontological argument. It may be a faulty argument, or insufficient argument, or wrong argument. But to say such an objection is to just have it go over your head entirely.

True. But it is interesting also, that Anselm’s definition is one that comes from other arguments and it would be a major challenge to prove that some other definition is better.

And that’s kind of an interesting point. To reject God, you have to know what God is.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Vera,

I agree there are difficulties with the definition of God as TTWNGCBT. However, I don’t want to get into them in this thread, or at least not yet. Rather, let’s focus on necessity.

The other problem is the “necessity”. What is necessary existence? Usually it is defined as “something that cannot NOT exist”. In other words, something that is present in ALL possible worlds. A possible world is a logically possible state of affairs, which is different from the existing reality in some aspect or another. In order to establish that something exists “necessarily” you need to examine ALL the possible worlds, and prove that this being “X” is present in all of them. An impossible task.

On the other hand, to refute the concept of necessary existence is very simple. All you need is to consider two different possible worlds, which have nothing in common.

How would one go about “examining” a possible world to see if the particular X (whose existence we are positing) exists therein?

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Wasn’t Anselm’s original argument not based on necessity but on the idea that an actual “greatest being” is greater than a potential “greatest being”? Which, to my understanding led to a catch-22 where if you did not acknowledge the existence of God, then you weren’t actually conceiving the greatest possible being, but something less than it. Granted, I’ve barely dabbled into Anselm’s argument, so my understanding may be off.

Hi Wes,

There are two arguments in Anselm’s Proslogion. They both work the same way and start with the definition of God as TTWNCBT. The first version from Prosl II operates on the “greater than” principle that it is greater to exist in the mind and reality than to exist in the mind alone. The second form from Prosl. III operates on a different principle, namely that to exist necessarily is greater than to exist contingently.

With regard to the second form, critics, like Vera, deny necessary existence. They dogmatically assert that every existential proposition is contingent (could be true or false). Kant would say that all existential propositions are synthetic, and none could be analytic.

 

[Darryl_B]

Hi Darryl,

I agree that if there can’t be an a priori proof for God’s existence, then there also can’t be an a priori disproof. But I am unwilling to leave it at that because I think Anselm was on to something.

It is also true that the two premises, perfection and necessity, are highly abstract notions and remote from concrete human experience, but not totally. I wouldn’t say they begin a vacuum.

You emphasize the inner path to God, and it is essential in one’s spiritual quest, but I wouldn’t deny the value of reason. Reason should be pushed as far as it can go. I agree with Peter Kreeft that there can be no mathematical demonstration of the Christian God. All we can do, in the end, is demonstrate that belief is reasonable. Maybe we can prove small slices of the Christian God. Maybe one of them is that Greatness exists. There is value in that.

But ultimately faith is the most important thing, and we ultimately seek a Person. In one of his lectures Kreeft joked about the philosopher went to heaven and wanted to attend a lecture about God rather than meet Him in person!

I agree with you that reason should be pushed as far as it can go. I would just add that sometimes we tend to arrive at what is reasonable through the path of what we find unreasonable. Which is why I meet so many people who are not so much atheist, but rather anti-theist, for they mingle their own life experiences into the evaluation of reason and would prefer it, if God simply didn’t exist. I believe it comes down to a perception of character rather than perception of existence. God is often imaged with anthropomorphic character projected onto Him, and we all seem to be born with anarchist tendencies.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

As long as anything exists, there must be necessary existence to explain this.

If all existence was unnecessary and could, possibly, not exist - then nothing would exist (over an infinite span of time).

That would be St. Tom of Aquino’s 3rd way. Apart from that, how can one argue that one can consistently posit that which cannot fail to exist?

I once wondered if Parmenides had the answer. His great insight, I think, is that it is impossible to conceive of nothing, except in a relative sense. Absolute nothingness is nonsense. Given that, something or other must exist. But Brian Leftow puts the emphasis on the “or other.” It doesn’t have to be one certain thing, he says. E.g. Reality could be a series of contingent beings, say penguins. It would be one penguin coming into being and then going out of existence, followed by another penguin, ad infinitum.

But my rejoinder is that, just because an infinite series of contingent and finite beings is possible, doesn’t mean that necessary existence can’t be exemplified by one being.

And all we need to make the argument work is that necessary existence in this sense is possible.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

No, but no need.

Yes, it is needed. You said that “logically possible” and “metaphysically possible” are not the same. So, prove it. What is the difference?

Your positron and electron universe can be argued as logically inconsistent in a posteriori arguments.

Not just incorrect, but these two worlds are physically possible. Let’s start with the existing world, which is clearly possible, since it exists. Taking any possible world, we can freely remove any subset of the world, without a logical impossibility “creeping in”. For example, we could remove the Magellan cloud, and the remaining world would still be possible. Or all the galaxies, except the Milky Way. Using this “removal” method, we can arrive at any “sub-world”. One of them can result in a “single-electron” world, the other one can result in a “single-positron” world. Or, if you prefer (because positrons are “rare”) the other end-world could be one with a “single-neutron” world.

So, we have two, physically possible worlds, without any intersection. Ergo: “no necessary being”.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

How would one go about “examining” a possible world to see if the particular X (whose existence we are positing) exists therein?

Good observation. Since it is impossible to examine all the non-existent possible worlds, the existence of a “necessary” being cannot be demonstrated directly. However, the lack of the necessary being can. Just look at the post directly above.

A simplistic analogy: “it is impossible to prove that Mr. X is the father of a child. However it is easy to prove that Mr. X cannot be the father of this child.” To refute a proposition is always easier than to prove it.

 

[reggieM]

His great insight, I think, is that it is impossible to conceive of nothing, except in a relative sense. Absolute nothingness is nonsense. Given that, something or other must exist. But Brian Leftow puts the emphasis on the “or other.” It doesn’t have to be one certain thing, he says. E.g. Reality could be a series of contingent beings, say penguins. It would be one penguin coming into being and then going out of existence, followed by another penguin, ad infinitum.

But my rejoinder is that, just because an infinite series of contingent and finite beings is possible, doesn’t mean that necessary existence can’t be exemplified by one being.

And all we need to make the argument work is that necessary existence in this sense is possible.

Yes to all of the above.
I think we have an additional problem however, that is glossed over.

First - if we can agree that absolute nothing is impossible, then we have the basis to also agree that an infinite series of contingent and finite beings is impossible.

The reason for this hinges on the terms “possible and impossible”. Those terms are measurements within a range with parameters. We determine something “possible” because there is at least one chance in an infinite number that it could happen.
We determine “impossible” as zero chances in an infinite number.

First, with absolute nothing - there are no possibitlies, no chances, no number. We can’t even talk about infininty (which is a measure that requires something). There are no properties, no being at all. So, if “possibility” has meaning, then absolute nothing is nonsense and irrational.

The same is true of an infinite regress. All of the arguments around that actually can lead to the conclusion that something which has no beginning cannot ever exist in a present moment. Beyond that, there is no way to measure what is possible in an infinite sequence of finite beings. So, an infinite sequence of penguins, the present day penguin we observe today, is impossible.

It all boils down to the impossibility of traversing an infinite span to arrive at a single fixed point (today).

Since absolute nothing is impossible and a sequence of infinite beings is impossible, then this proves a necessary being exists.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Since absolute nothing is impossible and a sequence of infinite beings is impossible, then this proves a necessary being exists.

Not really, but you have a good starting point. Absolute “nothing” is just an abstraction, like the mathematical “null-set”, or “empty set”. Excellent abstractions, which have no ontological referents. So far, so good. But from that it does NOT follow that there is some unspecified entity which exists across ALL the possible worlds. What DOES follow is that “something MUST exist”. We are aware that in our world there is STEM (space, time, energy, matter). So we can say that STEM exists - because (as you correctly said) “nothing” does not and “cannot” exist.

Two PHYSICALLY possible worlds are the “single electron world” and the “single neutron world”. So, yes, SOMETHING physical MUST exist, but that is all. Maybe there is a possible world in which there is one “ghost”, or an “angel”, or a “demon”. It does not help you to establish that the SAME actual entity must exists across all the possible worlds, much less that this hypothetical “something” is the Christian God.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Vera,

You deny that X can exist in all possible worlds because it is conceivable that there be two possible worlds with nothing in common. One could contain only X, and another with only Y and no X. We can debate whether, even in possible world semantics, there can be two worlds with absolutely nothing in common, but let that go.

My point is that you have posited only one possible state of affairs, considering all possible worlds at once, namely the one in which there is one world in which “only X exists” is true and another in which “only Y exists” is true. This state of affairs exists within the set of all possible worlds in which “X exists” is true in some possible worlds (at least one). But, considering all possible worlds, there are two other possible states of affairs, namely (1) “X exists” is true in no possible world, and (2) “X exists” is true in all possible worlds.

So I think you will have show necessary existence to be illogical on other grounds.

 

[reggieM]

So, yes, SOMETHING physical MUST exist, but that is all.

As you pointed out later, just because an absolute nothing is not possible does not mean a physical thing must exist.

If all possible worlds are existent finite beings, then the cause of the concept of existent finite beings must necessarily exist in all possible worlds.

There are the cosmological arguments (which we avoided here) that explain other aspects of possible worlds.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Two PHYSICALLY possible worlds are the “single electron world” and the “single neutron world”. So, yes, SOMETHING physical MUST exist, but that is all. Maybe there is a possible world in which there is one “ghost”, or an “angel”, or a “demon”. It does not help you to establish that the SAME actual entity must exists across all the possible worlds, much less that this hypothetical “something” is the Christian God.

I agree. But once it is conceded that the same actual entity could exists across all possible worlds the second premise of Hartshorne’s version of the OA is established. Assuming the first premise (perfection), the argument works. One has to conclude that God (defined as TWNGCBT) exists.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

If all possible worlds are existent finite beings, then the cause of the concept of existent finite beings must necessarily exist in all possible worlds.

Yes. This is why there cannot be two possible worlds which have nothing in common. As we think about possible worlds, no matter how different, there is always some abstract residuum which they all have in common. To deny that is to deny that there are necessary or universal truths, and we know what nonsense that is.

 

[reggieM]

Yes. This is why there cannot be two possible worlds which have nothing in common. As we think about possible worlds, no matter how different, there is always some abstract residuum which they all have in common. To deny that is to deny that there are necessary or universal truths, and we know what nonsense that is.

Good point. Along those lines it can be argued that more than one “world” is impossible.
The fact that they are analyzed under the same criterion of possibility, and as you said, they necessarily share something in common – they are all merely one world.

 

[STT]

Not really, but you have a good starting point. Absolute “nothing” is just an abstraction, like the mathematical “null-set”, or “empty set”. Excellent abstractions, which have no ontological referents. So far, so good. But from that it does NOT follow that there is some unspecified entity which exists across ALL the possible worlds. What DOES follow is that "something MUST exist". We are aware that in our world there is STEM (space, time, energy, matter). So we can say that STEM exists - because (as you correctly said) “nothing” does not and “cannot” exist.

How do you get that “nothing” cannot be a state of affair?

 

[CHRISTINE77]

I agree with you that reason should be pushed as far as it can go. I would just add that sometimes we tend to arrive at what is reasonable through the path of what we find unreasonable. Which is why I meet so many people who are not so much atheist, but rather anti-theist, for they mingle their own life experiences into the evaluation of reason and would prefer it, if God simply didn’t exist. I believe it comes down to a perception of character rather than perception of existence. God is often imaged with anthropomorphic character projected onto Him, and we all seem to be born with anarchist tendencies.

Atheist also means “against God” which is what most of the atheists on this forum seem to be.

“Those that deny a God, destroy man’s nobility; for certainly man is of kin to the beasts, by his body; and, if he be not of kin to God, by his spirit, he is a base and ignoble creature. It destroys likewise magnanimity, and the raising of human nature. So man, when he resteth and assureth himself, upon divine protection and favor, gathered a force and faith, which human nature in itself could not obtain. Therefore, as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself, above human frailty.” from “On Atheism” by Francis Bacon

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

You deny that X can exist in all possible worlds because it is conceivable that there be two possible worlds with nothing in common. One could contain only X, and another with only Y and no X.

This is not just an empty assertion, but also a constructive method of HOW these two worlds can be physically possible. In mathematics there are two kinds of proofs, one is the “existential proof” and the other one is the “constructive proof”. If you need some examples, see here: zimmer.csufresno.edu/~larryc/proofs/proofs.construct.html

But, considering all possible worlds, there are two other possible states of affairs, namely (1) “X exists” is true in no possible world, and (2) “X exists” is true in all possible worlds.

(1) is impossible, since the possible world encompasses ALL logical possibilities. If “X” does not exist in any possible world, then it must be a logical impossibility (like a four sided triangle). And (2) is incorrect, as the proof shows.

I agree. But once it is conceded that the same actual entity could exists across all possible worlds the second premise of Hartshorne’s version of the OA is established. Assuming the first premise (perfection), the argument works. One has to conclude that God (defined as TWNGCBT) exists.

I have no idea what you mean by “perfection” and what does it have to do with anything. But the proof I gave above is a mathematical one.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

As you pointed out later, just because an absolute nothing is not possible does not mean a physical thing must exist.

I did not anything about “must”. But we all experience directly one world where there is physical existence.

If all possible worlds are existent finite beings, then the cause of the concept of existent finite beings must necessarily exist in all possible worlds.

The concept of possible worlds is about ontological existence. (God is also supposed exist ontologically). “Concepts” do not exist as ontological entities, they are abstractions. And abstractions only exist in those worlds, which contain some beings who are able to conceptualize.