A Priori Proof for God's Existence

[tonyrey]

Ok, you don’t want to answer the questions. I could tell you that I care, but I think you’re saying that you don’t care.

Secondly, I think you’re struggling with the very basics of metaphysics. You assume first principles, that you haven’t explained.

We start with what is true and what is false. Do you think the difference between those terms is subjective?

The name of the game is evasion!

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Ok, you don’t want to answer the questions.

I am not interested in irrelevant questions. The point here is the concept of “possible world” and the concept of “greatness”. No need to go back to Adam and Eve.

The expressions “true” and “false” are logical concepts. They refer to propositions about the external reality.

 

[tonyrey]

Are you serious? The whole mental exercise is about to prove God’s existence - by way of contemplating the “greatest conceivable being”. You cannot “smuggle in” God by stipulating that a “world without God is not a possible world”.

No explanation is stipulated, only simple existence. We are not talking about physics.

That does not follow.

How do you get something from (and for) nothing?

 

[Wesrock]

Who cares? We are only talking about logical possibilities, not the actual physical reality. One more time: “a possible world is a state of affairs, which is different from our existing reality is SOME respect”. The only restriction is that this hypothetical world cannot have logical contradictions.

We’re not saying that the possible world has to actually exist, just that it be metaphysically possible. That you can imagine a world that differs from ours in some respect does not make it a metaphysical possibility.

Granted, I think your imaginary proposed worlds do have logical contradictions, though in the interest of the topic it’d be more interesting to approach this with a priori arguments.

In determining whether God exists in all possible worlds, though, it’s not necessary to first check every possible world to see if He exists. To go back to where I quoted Feser, in classical thinking, a being is not defined by the set of properties it has in every possible world. The properties the being has in all possible worlds will be defined by its essence.

If it is established a priori that God’s existence is necessary (cannot fail to exist) essentially, then God exists in all possible worlds.

Of course, we’d probably have additional background disagreements about essences and such anyway.

 

[tonyrey]

I am not interested in irrelevant questions. The point here is the concept of “possible world” and the concept of “greatness”. No need to go back to Adam and Eve.

The expressions “true” and “false” are logical concepts. They refer to propositions about the external reality.

Propositions presuppose the existence of a rational mind. They are not our starting point. Our primary datum (and sole certainty) is not external reality but our mental activity with which we infer the existence of other minds and physical objects.

 

[grannymh]

Mornin Granny!

You sed: “It is the human recognition of something “super-natural” that is proof of God’s existence.”

It does seem to be innate in humans that something greater, transcendent, and more excellent than themselves exists. But with Jews and Christians (and probably Muslims) this notion is pushed to the ultimate. We aren’t content with lesser gods as the object of our worship. The only fitting object of worship, that which we exalt above all things, has to be the Greatest (in Anselm’s words, That Than Which Nothing Greater Can Be Thought).

So, while our primitive human recognition leads us to something supernatural, it is Anselm, I believe, who completes this trajectory of thought and provides the formal proof of its object.

You added another interesting thought. That is – some of us are not content with lesser gods. Most likely because in many legends and the Roman and Greek versions, lesser gods can fight and argue not only in their realm but in our world. Apparently, when we sense the super-natural, our instinct naturally seeks the “greatest”. As you say, (in Anselm’s words, That Than Which Nothing Greater Can be Thought)

As I continue to think, I now see the possibility that when the super-natural God is the greatest, He has the ability to create humans and interact with humans.

Genesis 1: 27
God created mankind in His image;
in the image of God He created them;
male and female* He created them.

usccb.org/bible/genesis/1

I like to use deductive reasoning regarding basic Catholicism. Apparently, that was what was used, at certain times, in the primary grades of my Catholic School back in the days of dinosaurs. A Priori Proof ???

 

[Wesrock]

I’m not sure I followed that (double-negative with possiblity?). I would say, since God is the fullness of being and source of all contingent beings, then a world without God is not a possible world.

Yes, but this follows from a posteriori arguments, no? Can we establish that the greatest possible being is necessary and therefore exists a priori as Anselm attempted in his ontological argument?

I find the cosmological arguments valid, but for the sake of this topic, if we’re to stay on point (tangents can’t be helped sometimes), those should be out aside.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

We’re not saying that the possible world has to actually exist, just that it be metaphysically possible.

There is no difference between logically possible and metaphysically possible. (If you disagree, explain the difference.) On the other hand, there is a difference between logically possible and physically possible.

In determining whether God exists in all possible worlds, though, it’s not necessary to first check every possible world to see if He exists.

You put the cart in front of the horse. I am not interested in God’s existence. The whole shebang of the GCB is about “greatness” and “necessary” existence. What are the attributes of this “greatest conceivable being”. And how is this being present in all conceivable worlds. But, please do not say that one of the attributes of the GCB that it exists in all the possible worlds. That would be a circular definition.

 

[reggieM]

The name of the game is evasion!

I have to agree!

I asked him a direct question on a basic, fundamental aspect of metaphysics and he did not answer.

You know you have a problem when you feel trapped by the very first principles of reasoning.

(Or, that is, you should know you have a problem. We can see it.).

 

[reggieM]

Can we establish that the greatest possible being is necessary and therefore exists a priori as Anselm attempted in his ontological argument?

I believe Anselm’s argument uses a hierarchy of values to prove this.
Goodness is a relationship to reality. That which possesses more being is greater (more good) than that which possesses less.

When citing this scale of values, another argument is that we have to have some endpoint in which to determine a measurement.

If something is “less good” or “more good” - we’ve placed it on a scale. “Most conceivable good” would be a necessary point on the scale, otherwise we couldn’t measure more or less good.

 

[Wesrock]

There is no difference between logically possible and metaphysically possible. (If you disagree, explain the difference.) On the other hand, there is a difference between logically possible and physically possible.

You need to demonstrate that a possible world could exist, even if only for a moment, without a GCB. Imagining such a world is not a demonstration.

You put the cart in front of the horse. I am not interested in God’s existence. The whole shebang of the GCB is about “greatness” and “necessary” existence. What are the attributes of this “greatest conceivable being”. And how is this being present in all conceivable worlds. But, please do not say that one of the attributes of the GCB that it exists in all the possible worlds. That would be a circular definition.

Greatness obviously has meaning, but you’re correct that there is some ambiguity. Certainly one man can be greater in stature, and you’d understand what is meant by that. I could also say this meal is “greater in providing human nutrition,” and you’d understand that as well. A man could also be of greater intelligence than another. There is obviously a common thread between all of these in whoch greater is being used in the same way.

In regards to being, it could be argued that to be the cause of something is to be, in at least one way, greater than what is caused. To be uncaused is to be greater than caused. To be independent is to be greater than dependent. To be is to be greater than to not be. To exist without corruption (that is, without the possibility of ever not being) is to be greater than to be something that could possibly not be in the future. To essentially be something that cannot fail to exist is to be greater than something that could possibly not have existed.

So the GCB is also a being that cannot fail to exist. To say that the GCB could fail to exist means you’re not talking about the GCB by definition, because there is something conceivably greater. We get to a point by definition that the GCB cannot fail to exist and so must exist. And if the GCB must exist, that holds true in all possible worlds, because the GCB in all possible worlds would be the same thing (uncaused, independent, yadda yadda).

It would also follow that the GCB also have the fullness of all perfections, because if it didn’t, it wouldn’t be the GCB, because I could conceive something that does have it. And by perfections, I would in this case be referring to what is referred to as the transcendentals in classical thought (goodness, truth, unity, etc…)

 

[reggieM]

If it is established a priori that God’s existence is necessary (cannot fail to exist) essentially, then God exists in all possible worlds.

Yes I think I misunderstood previously and I see the agreement now.

Anselm starts with a premise and definition. God is the greatest conceivable being.

If God existed in one world, then a greater conceivable being would be God existing in all possible worlds.

 

[STT]

Is an a priori proof for God’s existence even possible? IOW, can we prove that God must exist just by examining the meaning of our terms and without resorting to causal or cosmological (a posteriori) arguments?

Anselm thought so, but Aquinas thought not.

For a long time I have been considering Charles Hartshorne’s modal form of the ontological argument and offer it as a successful a priori argument. It begins with Anselm’s definition of God as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” Our major premise is that we can think of God in these terms without contradiction. IOW, our concept of of God as TTWNGCBT is thinkable.

Our next premise is that we can conceive of that which cannot fail to exist. IOW, necessary existence is possible.

Given the conceivability of both perfection (TTWNGCBT) and necessary existence, Anselm’s argument works. Greatness requires necessity. Put differently, greatness strictly implies its necessary existence.

But what I am wondering about is how one can forcefully argue for the second premise. I don’t want to debate Anselm’s definition. Can we support necessary existence without resorting to cosmological arguments (primarily Aquinas’s third way)?

God couldn’t be greatest before act of creation since He is the only one who exists. Therefore the argument fails.

 

[Wesrock]

For full disclosure, I’m not sure how I feel about the ontological argument. But I had been thinking on it a few months ago after it felt like I began to understand it, but didn’t have the time to make a topic on it. This provided an opportunity to explore it.

 

[reggieM]

St. Thomas Aquinas’ rejection of the argument seems simple enough.
Just because we can conceive of something does not mean it must exist in reality.

But St. Anselm’s argument gives an interesting spin on that.
I think it’s based on the definition of God, and St. Anselm’s explanation of why it’s “the fool” who says in his heart, “there is no God”.

To say “there is no God”, you must know what it is you are refusing to believe in.

So, it requires an analysis of one’s own thoughts.
If you accept the definition, that God is that which nothing greater than you, the individual, can think of, then it seems this is a solid proof.

But some will reject the first premise and define God in a different way. But on what basis would you define God in this way and not as the greatest possible being?

 

[Wesrock]

St. Thomas Aquinas’ rejection of the argument seems simple enough.
Just because we can conceive of something does not mean it must exist in reality.

A true enough statement from Aquinas, and one I’ve used a variation of in this topic.

Like you, though, I think Anselm wasn’t aiming at simple conception, but of definition. And not an arbitrary definition that “X denotes Y,” but of what is the essential definition of the GCB, a true statement about what it is, not just about how we refer to it.

Whether it succeeds, I don’t know, even for myself, but it is certainly an argument with more depth than I gave it credit for when I first came across it.

 

[StJoseph8]

Here is Feser’s blog post about it:

edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/11/anselms-ontological-argument.html

The takeaway I get from this is that, in the Thomisitc POV, you will reach the same conclusion, but you cannot start with this argument. You start with the 5 ways or some variation of them, then you can go to Anselm’s argument. Look specifically at Feser’s 1st response in the comments section.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

You need to demonstrate that a possible world could exist, even if only for a moment, without a GCB. Imagining such a world is not a demonstration.

That is a very irrational request, since the GCB is undefined - as of yet. You also failed to explain the difference between logically possible and metaphysically possible. Go for it.

Greatness obviously has meaning, but you’re correct that there is some ambiguity. Certainly one man can be greater in stature, and you’d understand what is meant by that. I could also say this meal is “greater in providing human nutrition,” and you’d understand that as well. A man could also be of greater intelligence than another. There is obviously a common thread between all of these in whoch greater is being used in the same way.

That is fine. It makes sense to talk about the maximum of simple attributes. But not speaking of maximizing two or more attributes or composite attributes.

In regards to being, it could be argued that to be the cause of something is to be, in at least one way, greater than what is caused. To be uncaused is to be greater than caused. To be independent is to be greater than dependent. To be is to be greater than to not be. To exist without corruption (that is, without the possibility of ever not being) is to be greater than to be something that could possibly not be in the future. To essentially be something that cannot fail to exist is to be greater than something that could possibly not have existed.

Anselm tried this and that was where he failed. “Existence” is not an attribute, which may of may not be present. Any attribute presupposes existence. Not just philosophers, but also theologians understand this simple principle, and practically no one attempts to use it as a “proof” of God’s existence.

So the GCB is also a being that cannot fail to exist. To say that the GCB could fail to exist means you’re not talking about the GCB by definition, because there is something conceivably greater. We get to a point by definition that the GCB cannot fail to exist and so must exist. And if the GCB must exist, that holds true in all possible worlds, because the GCB in all possible worlds would be the same thing (uncaused, independent, yadda yadda).

Very “nice”, but old trick. You attempt to define something into existence. Plantinga also tries this approach. He said: “if it is possible that something exists necessarily, then it exists necessarily”. Pretty ridiculous. There is no way from possible existence to necessary existence.

It would also follow that the GCB also have the fullness of all perfections, because if it didn’t, it wouldn’t be the GCB, because I could conceive something that does have it. And by perfections, I would in this case be referring to what is referred to as the transcendentals in classical thought (goodness, truth, unity, etc…)

Another subjective collection of attributes. What is “perfection”? In the abstract? One can speak about perfection in a certain respect (a perfect projectile or a perfect shield), but not in a general fashion (a perfect tank). The “classical thought” is just another subjective collection. For example, in the “classical” theory one of God’s alleged attributes is “goodness”, therefore God is NOT free to be evil. I consider another being, who could choose to be evil, but does not - is superior or greater than the once who is unable to choose evil. Of course you will disagree, but that is not important. The important part is that “greatness” cannot be objectively defined.

 

[Wesrock]

That is a very irrational request, since the GCB is undefined - as of yet. You also failed to explain the difference between logically possible and metaphysically possible. Go for it.

No, but no need. Your positron and electron universe can be argued as logically inconsistent in a posteriori arguments. My point shouldn’t be that difficult of a concept, though. That you can imagine a world doesn’t make it logically consistent or possible. It has to actually be possible for it to exist. Your proposition is as possible as a square circle…

That is fine. It makes sense to talk about the maximum of simple attributes. But not speaking of maximizing two or more attributes or composite attributes.

Anselm tried this and that was where he failed. “Existence” is not an attribute, which may of may not be present. Any attribute presupposes existence. Not just philosophers, but also theologians understand this simple principle, and practically no one attempts to use it as a “proof” of God’s existence.

That oranges are orange doesn’t presuppose that any oranges actually exist. Existence is primary to any other attribute being actualized though.

Very “nice”, but old trick. You attempt to define something into existence. Plantinga also tries this approach. He said: “if it is possible that something exists necessarily, then it exists necessarily”. Pretty ridiculous. There is no way from possible existence to necessary existence.

Here you are way off the mark. That an orange is orange is a real statement about oranges (assuming we understand the terms). It’s not a nominal definition, it’s commenting on what’s actually real about a thing. Anselm is not suggesting a nominal definition, but a real and essential one.

It probably doesn’t help that my example is about an accidental attribute about an orange and not necessarily it’s essence. The article by Feser linked previously more clearly explains why your objection misses the point. (edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/11/anselms-ontological-argument.html?m=1) (corrected link), and it’s largely because you don’t understand the Platonic/Augustine/Aristotlean intellectual tradition Anselm is writing from. It’s not just a matter of knowledge, your way of thinking is just so far removed from it you can’t contextualize it (given your posts). That’s not to say you must accept such traditions, but if you understood them it’d be evident in what you’ve said so far.

Another subjective collection of attributes. What is “perfection”? In the abstract? One can speak about perfection in a certain respect (a perfect projectile or a perfect shield), but not in a general fashion (a perfect tank). The “classical thought” is just another subjective collection. For example, in the “classical” theory one of God’s alleged attributes is “goodness”, therefore God is NOT free to be evil. I consider another being, who could choose to be evil, but does not - is superior or greater than the once who is unable to choose evil. Of course you will disagree, but that is not important. The important part is that “greatness” cannot be objectively defined.

Perfection is to have 100% of something, or to essentially be that quality in itself. You can’t speak of a perfect tank, true, but a tank is an accidental arrangement of parts. It’d be better to think of an equilateral triangle, where a triangle drawn with a straightedge and protractor is more perfect that a triangle drawn by freehand (not because of how they are created, but because one is a better triangle). The transcendentals are not argued as subjective qualities either and demomstrations are made in defense of that, but again, you’ve basically little background in this tradition. And from that tradition, considering evil as a privation of good, which is actually a privation of existence itself, pure good is greater than a mix. So is pure actuality over a mix of actual and potential. And God is argued to be the most free being of all, anyway, but here we’ve gone far afield from Anselm’s argument. I’d be better off if I just pointed out that you are begging the question in saying it’s all subjective.

 

[reggieM]

I forgot who it was but I read a good point about how Anselm’s emphasis is on the bolded:

“The fool said in his heart, There is no God”

The fool has to internalize the definition and meaning of God and then reject that.
This lines up with what we can conceive about God.