A proof of Palamite Panentheism, Idealism, and Acosmism

[Acosmic-Otaku]

First, let’s define these terms.

Panentheism: A doctrine that the universe subsists within God, but that God nevertheless transcends or has some existence separate from the universe.

Idealism: Any doctrine holding that reality is fundamentally mental in nature.

Acosmism: Any theory that denies that the universe possesses any absolute reality or that it has any existence apart from God, holds God to be the sole and ultimate reality, and that there are no finite or contingent things that exist apart from his sustaining power.

There are many sub-variants of all of these philosophies, but I aim to show that some intersection of these worldviews is the only logically possible framework for a consistent theist to hold.

Out of honesty, I feel compelled to note that while I am not a Hermeticist (and am certainly not arguing for Christian Hermeticism), I do borrow the term “The All” from works such as The Kybalion: Hermetic Philosophy. In either context, The All refers to the sum total of all things in nature, supernature, prenature, and preternature and implies a sort of holism uniting these spheres of reality into one existence (hence why The All was also called The One and identified with both The Creator and The Ground of Being). With that out of the way, on to the argument. The argument is as follows-

P1. God exists.
P2. If God is not The All, then either God is greater than The All, or The All is greater than God.
P3. If God is greater than The All, then God is greater than himself for God is part of The All.
P4. A being can not be greater than itself.
C1. Therefore, God cannot be greater than The All.
P5. If The All is greater than God, then there exists a being greater than Maximal Greatness.
P6. To be greater than Maximal Greatness is a contradiction.
C2. Therefore, The All cannot be greater than God.
C3. Therefore, a dichotomy between God and The All is not possible.
C4. Therefore, God is The All.
P7. God is a mind.
C5. Therefore, All is mind.

The format is, once again, deductive. Meaning that if the premises (P1-P7) are true, then their respective conclusions (C1-C5) must necessarily follow. Puts a new spin on Sirach 43:29. Feel free to comment with whatever criticisms you might have.

 

[Vico]

…The All refers to the sum total of all things in nature, supernature, prenature, and preternature and implies a sort of holism uniting these spheres of reality into one existence (hence why The All was also called The One and identified with both The Creator and The Ground of Being). …

Vatican I

1. If anyone denies the one true God, creator and lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema.

2. If anyone is so bold as to assert that there exists nothing besides matter: let him be anathema.

3. If anyone says that the substance or essence of God and that of all things are one and the same: let him be anathema.

4. If anyone says that finite things, both corporal and spiritual, or at any rate, spiritual, emanated from the divine substance; or that the divine essence, by the manifestation and evolution of itself becomes all things or, finally, that God is a universal or indefinite being which by self determination establishes the totality of things distinct in genera, species and individuals: let him be anathema.

5. If anyone does not confess that the world and all things which are contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced, according to their whole substance, out of nothing by God; or holds that God did not create by his will free from all necessity, but as necessarily as he necessarily loves himself; or denies that the world was created for the glory of God: let him be anathema.

 

[adgloriam]

Would any of these anathemas constitute valid reason for a person to be unable to taken Holy Communion?

 

[adgloriam]

Both premises and conclusions are wrong to start with. Then first order logic and natural deduction are applied according to their rules…

 

[Vico]

Would any of these anathemas constitute valid reason for a person to be unable to taken Holy Communion?

They are all dogmas of faith that require assent by the faithful. A person that may not understand them, but that does not dissent against the teaching of the Church on faith and morals, is not committing a sin in not understanding them.

 

[Vico]

…

Creation ex nihilo is the crucial doctrine protecting Christian theism from asserting that God is essentially dependent upon the world. Christian theism and classical panentheism, differ in God’s dependence on the world where Panentheism affirms it.

 

[Acosmic-Otaku]

1. If anyone denies the one true God, creator and lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema.

How does this deny God’s being, or his nature as Lord of All?

1. If anyone is so bold as to assert that there exists nothing besides matter: let him be anathema.

This isn’t materialism, but hard immaterialism. The “matter”, time, space, abstract objects, and lesser conscious agents all arise from God’s consciousness in a similar fashion to how a realistic dream environment can arise from a dreamer’s consciousness.

1. If anyone says that the substance or essence of God and that of all things are one and the same: let him be anathema.

This is a proof of substance monism, not essential monism. The difference being that the former holds that all things share the same ontic substance (be it either matter, mind, or mathematical grounding), while the latter holds that all things share the same essence (i.e. all is god). These positions are independent, such that the former can be held without committing to the latter. God is clearly a conscious agent as we are, so there is some degree of shared substance (mind, spirit, soul), unless you hold that God’s consciousness isn’t really consciousness at all. In which case, he isn’t a personal being at all, which would be absurd.

Saying “God is The All” isn’t the same as saying “All things are God”… That would be Theopanism… All it states is that all things subside within God’s mind in the same way all things within a simulation are coded in a computer and all things within a dream are contained within a mind. None of the individual elements in my dream (for example) share my essence, but they all subsist within my mind via it’s sustaining power, so the parallel is quite striking. Furthermore, if you gave me the power to have nested conscious agents in my dream, or run simulations nested within simulations, the substance of the nested components share that same property as any other element of the simulations or dream (of needing the initial computer or initial mind’s ability to sustain them to continue being).

I suspect that the word for “substance” is being used in different philosophical contexts. I am using the terminology of Cartesian and Analytical philosophy.

 

[Acosmic-Otaku]

1. If anyone does not confess that the world and all things which are contained in it, both spiritual and material, were produced, according to their whole substance, out of nothing by God; or holds that God did not create by his will free from all necessity, but as necessarily as he necessarily loves himself; or denies that the world was created for the glory of God: let him be anathema.

Space, time, mass, energy, lesser consciousnesses, and the like all come from God’s own potency to make such things. Not from anything outside of God, so yes, this still gives us creatio ex nihilo as classically understood. God moves because he freely chooses to move.

So this fits none of the reasonable criteria for anathema that have been given.

I also note that you didn’t address that The All, of a sum total of all things that exist (which includes a Maximally Great Being, a Summum bonum, and a Ground of Being) does itself exist, which is all I needed (along with God’s property of Maximal Greatness) to actually formulate this argument. Nor did you attack the structure of the argument itself.

 

[Acosmic-Otaku]

In what way are the premises wrong? The conclusions at least follow from the premises.

 

[davidv]

In what way are the premises wrong? The conclusions at least follow from the premises.

I seems to me that P2 is false, because of the imprecision of “greater than”. To me the way the terms are being defined is a type of question begging.

 

[Vico]

…
I suspect that the word for “substance” is being used in different philosophical contexts. I am using the terminology of Cartesian and Analytical philosophy.

A substance is what is predicated neither of nor in anything else. For metaphysics a substance is that whose nature it is to exist not in some subject or as a part of anything else, but in itself.

 

[Rhubarb]

I would re-write C3 as a derivation from P2, C1, and C2 via denying the consequent. Makes things more tidy to follow. P3 rightly should be broken up into a sub-argument. But I follow the logic and it’s valid, just enthymematic.

If I were to argue against this from a Catholic perspective, I would object to P3. God exists outside creation, and when you’re dealing with God, the existential quantifier doesn’t seem to apply. (Namely, because of the insistence that God IS existence.) So in Catholic terms, one can’t say God is part of “the all”. At best, “the all” is the set {God, creation} and it’s meaningless to talk of that set being “greater” than anything. Moreover creation has an existential dependence on God. I think you’re running into something akin to Russell’s Paradox - God is the barber that shaves everyone that doesn’t shave themselves.

From my perspective, I would take issue with P1, and that your argument trades on the aspects of a God we have no way of bullet-proof knowing about. A truth-preserving argument doesn’t work well in classic logic with wild variables like that.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

The All refers to the sum total of all things in nature, supernature, prenature, and preternature and implies a sort of holism uniting these spheres of reality into one existence

What do you mean with this “sum total of all things…”? What would be the sum of fifty horses plus the idea of a horse, for instance? Even more: how would you sum those fifty horses plus the idea of a typewriter? Please be so kind to clarify this to me, because at first sight it would seem that you are saying something, but if we look into your post more in detail one piece falls after the other until nothing remains erect.

 

[mkoopman]

This is a reduction of God to things. In essence you make essence, as God is essence, a composite which He is not.
The difference in monism and monads is problematic in the false understanding of moderns.
Substance and essence are differentiable and if you can prove them ordered you can identify the Godhead as deity.
Consider the Eucharist and how it contains Christ and I believe you will find an error in your logic owing to a lower order applied to how God is, as we say it, and as it was identified in an early post, as we say God is Lord of All.
Then, consider how He became Incarnate. Your simple praxis can not come close to containing the truth that is essence, itself.
You state the problem in your proposition by identifying God as having all this stuff inside of Him like a computer core, or, in reference to the Holy God, quite irreverently identifying him as a stuffed balloon or jelly donut. JFK was a Berliner, not God. Check with the party, they may not see the difference, either.

 

[Acosmic-Otaku]

A substance is what is predicated neither of nor in anything else. For metaphysics a substance is that whose nature it is to exist not in some subject or as a part of anything else, but in itself.

This is an oversimplification of what substance refers to in metaphysics. See Substance (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In the metaphysics of ontic substance, there are many theories including-

1. Materialism - all things are material.
2. Idealism - all things are of mental substance. (I’d class hylomorphic dualism in this catagory, tbh)
3. Tegmark’s mathematical monism - all things are of mathematical substance.
4. Substance dualism - there are two separate substances mind or matter.
5. Cartesian dualism - there are three separate substances: God, Mind, and Matter.
6. Penrosian trialism - there are three separate substances: Platonic, Mental, and Material.
7. Jaina hexalism - there are six separate substances: pugdala (matter), jiva (life), dharma (motion), adharma (rest), akasha (space), and kala (time)

I am positing that the substance of all things is mental. That space, time, matter, platonic entities, motion, rest, etc. all arise from conscious agents (specifically the Father, Son and Holy Spirit).

 

[Acosmic-Otaku]

I would re-write C3 as a derivation from P2, C1, and C2 via denying the consequent. Makes things more tidy to follow. P3 rightly should be broken up into a sub-argument. But I follow the logic and it’s valid, just enthymematic.

Does sound better. Thank you for the suggestion.

If I were to argue against this from a Catholic perspective, I would object to P3. God exists outside creation, and when you’re dealing with God, the existential quantifier doesn’t seem to apply. (Namely, because of the insistence that God IS existence.) So in Catholic terms, one can’t say God is part of “the all”. At best, “the all” is the set {God, creation} and it’s meaningless to talk of that set being “greater” than anything. Moreover creation has an existential dependence on God. I think you’re running into something akin to Russell’s Paradox - God is the barber that shaves everyone that doesn’t shave themselves.

This seems strange though, as clearly The All is greater than Creation (since God is part of that set), and as such it seems reasonable to consider the All greater than any of it’s subsequent components. In fact, as God is Being in and of itself (Actus purus), it would seem that The All is the description of being itself. There is a sort of continuum between the Supernatural (God and his angels), the Preternatural, the Natural, and the Prenatural and that continuum is being. In a sense, all being is One, even if there is genuine distinction between its components.

Take the set of all real numbers (ℝ). While ℝ contains all real numbers {0, 1, 2, 3, 4…} it is not the numbers themselves. 1≠ℝ even though it is a part of ℝ. So the essence of the real numbers is not identical to the essence of ℝ, even though they are both platonic (specifically mathematical objects). Similarly, although God (神) is The All, none of the individual created components is 神 (even if they share mental ontology and depend of his sustaining power for their being). Hence we are not committed to pantheism or theopanism, as there is still a distinction between God and Creation in terms of essence.

From my perspective, I would take issue with P1, and that your argument trades on the aspects of a God we have no way of bullet-proof knowing about. A truth-preserving argument doesn’t work well in classic logic with wild variables like that.

The argument came from an exploration of Robert E Maydole’s Modal Perfection Argument and Alvin Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Argument.

 

[Rhubarb]

I haven’t read Maydole. Plantinga’s ontological argument never moved me. I haven’t found an ontological argument that doesn’t seem to beg the question. Not that die hard people would admit it.

 

[Kei]

If one replaces the term The All with the definition of the term, along with God, then it should see obvious there’s a contradiction in terms similar to the argument against omnipotence of if an omnipotent being could create a rock He couldn’t lift.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

P1. God exists.

P2. If God is not The All, then either God is greater than The All, or The All is greater than God.

P3. If God is greater than The All, then God is greater than himself for God is part of The All.

P4. A being can not be greater than itself.

C1. Therefore, God cannot be greater than The All.

P5. If The All is greater than God, then there exists a being greater than Maximal Greatness.

P6. To be greater than Maximal Greatness is a contradiction.

C2. Therefore, The All cannot be greater than God.

C3. Therefore, a dichotomy between God and The All is not possible.

C4. Therefore, God is The All.

P7. God is a mind.

C5. Therefore, All is mind.

As “the All” is defined as the set of all beings, let’s assume as a first attempt, given the fact that @Acosmic-Otaku avoids saying what “greater” means in his argument, that greater means “more numerous”. Then, C1 is obvious; but in P5 God could not be identified as “Maximal Greatness”; and, on the other hand and independently of the meaning of “greater”, “The All” cannot be said to be “a being”, but a set of beings. So, P5 would not provide new information.

C2 would be false.

Therefore, the conclusion of the argument would be false.

This is my first attempt to interpret @Acosmic-Otaku’s argument.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

A substance is what is predicated neither of nor in anything else. For metaphysics a substance is that whose nature it is to exist not in some subject or as a part of anything else, but in itself.

This is an oversimplification of what substance refers to in metaphysics. See Substance (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In the metaphysics of ontic substance, there are many theories including-

1. Materialism - all things are material.
2. Idealism - all things are of mental substance. (I’d class hylomorphic dualism in this catagory, tbh)
3. Tegmark’s mathematical monism - all things are of mathematical substance.
4. Substance dualism - there are two separate substances mind or matter.
5. Cartesian dualism - there are three separate substances: God, Mind, and Matter.
6. Penrosian trialism - there are three separate substances: Platonic, Mental, and Material.
7. Jaina hexalism - there are six separate substances: pugdala (matter), jiva (life), dharma (motion), adharma (rest), akasha (space), and kala (time)

I am positing that the substance of all things is mental. That space, time, matter, platonic entities, motion, rest, etc. all arise from conscious agents (specifically the Father, Son and Holy Spirit).

I was giving the definition used commonly by the Church from works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Yes there are others.