A proof of Palamite Panentheism, Idealism, and Acosmism

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P1. God exists.

P2. If God is not The All, then either God is greater than The All, or The All is greater than God.

P3. If God is greater than The All, then God is greater than himself for God is part of The All.

P4. A being can not be greater than itself.

C1. Therefore, God cannot be greater than The All.

P5. If The All is greater than God, then there exists a being greater than Maximal Greatness.

P6. To be greater than Maximal Greatness is a contradiction.

C2. Therefore, The All cannot be greater than God.

C3. Therefore, a dichotomy between God and The All is not possible.

C4. Therefore, God is The All.

P7. God is a mind.

C5. Therefore, All is mind.
Let’s assume now that “greater” means “more perfect”. So, if we have a set of two horses, each horse having the same degree of perfection as the other, it would happen that one horse would have the same degree of perfection as the set of two horses.

As the Creator possesses in maximum degree the perfection of each one of its creatures, then the Creator possesses at least the same degree of perfection as “The All”. So, P2 is false, because each of its disjuncts is false. Therefore, C4 does not follow. So, the argument is invalid.

This is my second attempt of interpretation.
 
Maydole’s argument can be summarized as a defense of Plantinga’s first premise in his ontological argument.


From there he continues on another argument in defense of God’s existence based on the style of Ontological argument pioneered by Godel, but the paper seems to be hidden behind a paywall, atm, but if you’d like to read about other varieties of the OA they’re discussed in brief in the following article-

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/
 
I seems to me that P2 is false, because of the imprecision of “greater than”. To me the way the terms are being defined is a type of question begging.
“Greater than” here refers to degrees of perfection, hence why God is described as (“Maximally Great”). Perfection entails such properties, from a Christian perspective at least, of Power (Omnipotence), Love (Agape), Being (Actus Purus), Self-Sufficiency (Aseity), Presence (causal Omnipresence), Goodness (Omnibenevolence), Mercy, Justice, Grace, Honor, etc.

I should probably rewrite this to be more clear on that.
 
If the disjunct in P2 is false then the conditional’s antecedent’s negation can be derived by modus tollens. The negation in this case being “God is The All”. The whole argument depends on P2 failing. Though I think you’re right that it appears to be a false dichotomy. That would renders the premise unsound, not invalid.
 
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If the disjunct in P2 is false then the conditional’s antecedent’s negation can be derived by modus tollens. The negation in this case being “God is The All”. The whole argument depends on P2 failing. Though I think you’re right that it appears to be a false dichotomy. That would renders the premise unsound, not invalid.
Both disjunts in P2 are false, and so P2 is false. That renders the whole argument invalid, but being unsound is enough to reject it.
 
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I was giving the definition used commonly by the Church from works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Yes there are others.
I suspected that it might be a definition from something like Thomistic or Occamic philosophy, but I don’t know enough about them to really comment on them, so I refrain from doing so. I’m more used to analytical philosophy, and Eastern philosophy such as from Buddhism, Taoism, Mohism (Mozi is a personal hero of mine, btw), etc. I am more familiar with Platonism and Islam than Aquinas, tbf.

I am quite new to the Catholicism thing, admittedly, so I’m going to at time to time need clarification on what the Church and Thomistic vocabulary means.

Nevertheless, since the vocabulary is fundamentally different I don’t see how I fall under the citation given earlier.
 
You are forgetting how proofs and derivations work.

In a proof, if you come across A⊃B (in this case, A⊃B&C) and demonstrate ~B (~[B&C]), you may then infer ~A. This is called Denying the Consequent, or Modus Tollens. The fact that the premise is false is what makes the whole argument work, and it doesn’t invalidate the argument. Validity depends on the structure of the argument, not any truth values. The SENTENCE A⊃B false in P2, sure. But like I said, the argument depends on P2 being false. That’s what makes us able to derive P4. P4 is the ~A part we get after finding ~B ([~B&C]}.

For example… uh…

If I went to Disneyland, I would have an ear hat.
I do not have an ear hat.
Therefore, I did not go to Disneyland.

This is perfectly valid, though not sound (as it’s perfectly possible to go to Disneyland and not get an ear hat.) The first premise is false, but it doesn’t hurt the validity. Now if it went like this…

If I went to Disneyland, I would have an ear hat.
I have an ear hat.
Therefore I went to Disneyland.

This is called Affirming the Consequent, and it’s an invalid form. It might very well be a true conclusion, and the premises might be true (though again 1 is pretty false) but it’s still invalid.
 
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This is a reduction of God to things. In essence you make essence, as God is essence, a composite which He is not.
How does this reduce God to things? Nothing in The All is equal to The All except the The All itself.
The difference in monism and monads is problematic in the false understanding of moderns.
Could you explain. I’d like to avoid the modernist trappings if at all possible.
Substance and essence are differentiable and if you can prove them ordered you can identify the Godhead as deity.
We can prove them ordered with basic foundationalist epistemology.

P1. The terms in conclusions must be found in their premises.
P2. The terms of first principles only refer to objects with mental ontology.
P3. Conclusions using first principles as premises must only be about objects with mental ontology.
P4. Everything that is must have explanations that logically follow from first principles.
C1. Therefore, everything must have mental ontology.
P5. Things outside myself exist.
C2. Therefore, those things outside myself must still reside in a mind.
C3. Therefore, God (a mind that contains all things) exists.

Hence, even though there is only one substance (mind) there is still a fundamental distinction between the God and his creation.
Consider the Eucharist and how it contains Christ and I believe you will find an error in your logic owing to a lower order applied to how God is, as we say it, and as it was identified in an early post, as we say God is Lord of All.
Every quark and lepton of the Eucharist contains Christ, yes, but my view is in line with that of Tipler’s view described in chapter 9 of his Physics of Christianity. I’d also like to note that God is Lord of All could easily affirm that his is both master of himself and everything else.
Then, consider how He became Incarnate. Your simple praxis can not come close to containing the truth that is essence, itself.
Just as a man can create an avatar of himself in a dream, so too it would seem that God could easily do the same thing in the medium in which minds interact. His body is still more real than any of ours, but it’s still composed of mental substance as all matter is.
You state the problem in your proposition by identifying God as having all this stuff inside of Him like a computer core, or, in reference to the Holy God, quite irreverently identifying him as a stuffed balloon or jelly donut. JFK was a Berliner, not God. Check with the party, they may not see the difference, either.
The infinite cannot expand or contract. ∞-1 where ∞ is God and 1 is creation is still ∞ unchanged. A better analogy is a dreamer in relation to his dream. All elements of a dream are within the dreamer, even if no individual element of the dream is identical to the dreamer themself.
 
If one replaces the term The All with the definition of the term, along with God, then it should see obvious there’s a contradiction in terms similar to the argument against omnipotence of if an omnipotent being could create a rock He couldn’t lift.
A better definition would’ve been “the set of all things that exist”, so I’ll admit this mistake.
 

I suspected that it might be a definition from something like Thomistic or Occamic philosophy, but I don’t know enough about them to really comment on them, so I refrain from doing so. I’m more used to analytical philosophy, and Eastern philosophy such as from Buddhism, Taoism, Mohism (Mozi is a personal hero of mine, btw), etc. I am more familiar with Platonism and Islam than Aquinas, tbf.

I am quite new to the Catholicism thing, admittedly, so I’m going to at time to time need clarification on what the Church and Thomistic vocabulary means.

Nevertheless, since the vocabulary is fundamentally different I don’t see how I fall under the citation given earlier.
God is radically different from the world – the apophatic source of all being.

In a nutshell, the Council of Lateran IV opposed the belief:
  • of the world being eternal, as proposed by many Aristotelians.
  • of the visible material world not being within God’s power (counter the Manichees)
  • that the world was not created solely by God’s omnipotent power (counter the the medieval Neo-Platonists)
 
You are forgetting how proofs and derivations work.

In a proof, if you come across A⊃B (in this case, A⊃B&C) and demonstrate ~B (~[B&C]), you may then infer ~A. This is called Denying the Consequent, or Modus Tollens. The fact that the premise is false is what makes the whole argument work, and it doesn’t invalidate the argument. Validity depends on the structure of the argument, not any truth values. The SENTENCE A⊃B false in P2, sure. But like I said, the argument depends on P2 being false. That’s what makes us able to derive P4. P4 is the ~A part we get after finding ~B ([~B&C]}.

For example… uh…

If I went to Disneyland, I would have an ear hat.
I do not have an ear hat.
Therefore, I did not go to Disneyland.

This is perfectly valid, though not sound (as it’s perfectly possible to go to Disneyland and not get an ear hat.) The first premise is false, but it doesn’t hurt the validity. Now if it went like this…

If I went to Disneyland, I would have an ear hat.
I have an ear hat.
Therefore I went to Disneyland.

This is called Affirming the Consequent, and it’s an invalid form. It might very well be a true conclusion, and the premises might be true (though again 1 is pretty false) but it’s still invalid.
Oh!, have you tried to symbolize the “argument”, @Rhubarb? Do your best and you will see. To make things easier for you, you can try to conclude just that “God is The All” (Let’s use “S” to symbolize this proposition). Among your premises you would have

P: God is more perfect than The All.
Q: The All is more perfect than God. (This proposition has to be Q and not the negation of P, because these propositions are not contradictory)
R: God is the most perfect being.

If you need, you could also use the negation of

T: God is more perfect than God

And (in case you feel the necessity):

U: God exists

Naturally, if you prefer, you can also help @Acosmic-Otaku and form better propositions, so that you can symbolize the resulting argument more easily. Whatever you prefer. Oshiete kudasai…
 
Everything is not mental, this implies God is not pre-existent, that is, omnipresent with the understanding that this means inclusive of all time. More appropriately of all being. God is existence, itself, true essence. This is much as you describe The Eucharist but in knowing, not in discrete fact. The argument must be understood to relate in metaphysics, not some psuedo-physics where we cut corners on the sensitive soul until heavenly presence of the Godhead is unknowable. In modernist classicism these require thirty days crawling to The Host under the gun sights of the commissar. Don’t expect that because I was never honored to take down a lynched member of Lam Cham’s family that I do not know what a fish truck full of newspaper means. I never drove tigers on a quick boat and I greatly resent your clandestine implication upon my person. I don’t doubt that in terms of social circles it may be apropos, and so, I hope to rise to the occassion in not reflecting upon your political slant personally.
You can wink and make indistinct references to special point theories which make the Real distinction about how I must have green teeth and the monsterously big God of whom I attempt to speak has clearly the most green pointy teeth of all behemoths but this in no way asserts that you are correct. The mind of God is a poor figure of speech that finite creatures use to depict a knowing far beyond our comprehension. God’s mind is not the greatest power of sensitive and rational spirit; He is not the biggest sprite of the bunch.God’s knowing is perfect and not reliant upon the sensitive powers we express, and squeeze hard, eh?
This is how I understand the church triumphant to rationalize although most do not possess glorified, nor any body, presently. Can you see how the God of the living does not hamper the knowing of the faithful departed, including the martyr who fed upon The Host for thirty days of crawling before being murdered? They have entered into the knowing of God and remain rational in Him, in Christ Jesus, as we of the church militant depend on Him for our daily bread. Quarks in The Eucharist are not critical, not the key, that key of David which let’s the light of Christ shine from The True Presence. The electron spin does not provide The Logos. Christ is The Logos and the light of Christ enables the electrons to step, as He has from the beginning.
 
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Yes I did. And propositional logic does not do it well. You need to use predicate logic. It’s all valid. But as I said, there are easy ways to attack the soundness of the argument. An argument can be valid and unsound. It can be sound and invalid, too.
 
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Yes I did. And propositional logic does not do it well. You need to use predicate logic. It’s all valid. But as I said, there are easy ways to attack the soundness of the argument. An argument can be valid and unsound. It can be sound and invalid, too.
It would be good if you present the argument using predicate logic. I would love to see it.
 
This argument can be further abstracted by removing constants and doing everything as generalizations and breaking apart two place predicates into complicated conjunctions and conditionals. That being said, you don’t seem to understand how modus tollens works so I don’t know what a symbolization will do to help.

g=God
a=The All

Gxy = x is greater than y
Mx = x is (a) mind

P1. ~(g=a) ⊃ Gga v Gag
P2. Gga ⊃ Ggg
P3. ~Ggg
C1. ~Gga via 2, 3, Modus Tollens
P4. Gag ⊃ ∃x Gxg
P5. ~(∃x Gxg)
C2. ~Gag via 4, 5, Modus Tollens
C3. g=a via C1, C2, Modus Tollens
P6. Mg
C4 Ma via C3, 6. QED
 
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This argument can be further abstracted by removing constants and doing everything as generalizations and breaking apart two place predicates into complicated conjunctions and conditionals. That being said, you don’t seem to understand how modus tollens works so I don’t know what a symbolization will do to help.

g=God
a=The All

Gxy = x is greater than y
Mx = x is (a) mind

P1. ~(g=a) ⊃ Gga v Gag
P2. Gga ⊃ Ggg
P3. ~Ggg
C1. ~Gga via 2, 3, Modus Tollens
P4. Gag ⊃ ∃x Gxg
P5. ~(∃x Gxg)
C2. ~Gag via 4, 5, Modus Tollens
C3. g=a via C1, C2, Modus Tollens
P6. Mg
C4 Ma via C3, 6. QED
Thank you, @Rhubarb! The argument form you have built is definitely valid. If in an interpretation g=a means “God and The All are equally perfect” the resulting argument would be sound as well (except for C4). But in @Acosmic-Otaku’s argument g=a means “God and The All are one and the same being”. So, P2 would need to be replaced with

P2. If God is not The All, then either God and The All are equally great or God is greater than The All, or The All is greater than God.

And so the argument becomes invalid.
 
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g=a means God is the All. That those objects are one and the same.

To say “God and the all are equally perfect” you would say Pg&Pa - that God and the All share the predicate/property “Perfect”

MY P2 says If God is greater than The All, then God is greater than Himself.

Also my C4 must be sound if the premises are sound - first-order logic is truth preserving. If the premises are true, the conclusions must be true in a valid argument.

That being said, g=a is exactly what Acosmic-Otaku means it to mean.
 
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g=a means God is the All. That those objects are one and the same.

To say “God and the all are equally perfect” you would say Pg&Pa - that God and the All share the predicate/property “Perfect”
A perfect circle and a perfect square share the predicate “Perfect”, but they are not “Equally perfect”; so, I do not agree.
 
That’s a semantic fight that can be worked out. Also, you were the one that said “perfect”. Perfect isn’t a predicate in my argument. That was an example you brought up.
 
MY P2 says If God is greater than The All, then God is greater than Himself.
That is right, but I was talking about @Acosmic-Otaku’s argument. As I said, the form you built is valid; and if in an interpretation the premises are true, the conclusion will be true.
 
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