A question concerning the ontological argument

[Ghosty]

Mornin Ghosty,

Anselm’s definition focuses on just one divine attribute, namely His unsurpassable greatness. No theist I know denies that God is unsurpassably great, for no lesser god is worthy of worship.

So the definition, while it only addresses this one divine attribute, nevertheless makes a true statement about God. It doesn’t completely define God, but it captures one aspect of God’s nature.

And the argument proceeds to show that God’s unsurpassable greatness entails His necessary existence. This is especially explicit in the second form of the argument.

So, just because the definition doesn’t completely capture God (admittedly an impossibility), that doesn’t mean that we can’t draw conclusions about God’s other attributes from our definition.

The definition doesn’t even capture God’s unsurpassable Greatness, because that very Greatness is tied up in His simplicity and his transcendent Being. His Greatness is beyond any human thought or comprehension, just as every Divine Attribute is; we can’t say that His “being” is beyond comprehension, but His Greatness is not.

There is no aspect of the Divine Nature that can be comprehended by the human mind, and therefore it’s impossible to prove the existence of God from the existence of a human concept. Whether it’s Greatness, or Power, or Love, or Energy, every human concept will fall short not only of the Divine Nature as a whole, but of that particular aspect being thought of. No matter how Great my thought, that “Greatness” is infinitely removed from God’s Greatness, so saying that a “real Greatness” would be greater than my “mental Greatness”, with no other differential between the two beyond actual vs. mental, would only demonstrate the actuality of that mental Greatness, not the infinite, inconceivable Greatness of God.

To put it another way, we can agree that God must be infinitely great, but it is impossible to make any kind of true mental construct about that Greatness. If I can’t have a true mental construct about that Greatness, I can’t argue for the reality of God following from a mental construct. We can say “God must be infinite”, but since we can’t even conceive of such a thing we can’t be sure that such a thing potentially exists based on that statement alone, since that statement is empty of true mental content. You end up having to assume precisely what you’re trying to prove, namely that a Greatness beyond any possible mental construct exists, but this is begging the question. Since you can’t ask someone to imagine God, or any aspect of God, since that is utterly impossible, you can’t lead someone from that idea to the real existence of God.

The strength of Aquinas’ Five Ways is that they don’t rely on begging the question, nor on arguing actual reality from mental constructs, but rather argue for a nebulous definition of God based on observable facts about the universe; the universe is thus, and this indicates a transcendent being.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

Mornin belorg,

I think Anslem’s definition is perfectly fine. It makes a positive, definite statement about God, namely that God is unsurpassably great. What is wrong with that? You seem to think there is no conception of God. You haven’t explained why that is true.

It’s not a true positive statement, it’s a remotion from the greatness we can think of. It is not based on any real idea of God, but on the fact that anything we can think of, God must be greater. It is, in effect, a negative statement that can be reformulated: “whatever greatness you can imagine, God is not”.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Peter_Plato]

No, I am not.

The classic theist’s claim is that God is omnipresent, so there can be no ‘where nothing exists before’. So it seems to me it’s the calssic theist who is abusing logic.

“Where” is an aspect of space, so before the Big Bang there was no “where.” God can only be called omnipresent as an attribute from within space-time. Independent of space-time there was no “where.”

So it is totally appropriate to claim that God created the universe “where” no thing existed before precisely because the “where” was also created in the act of God creating the universe.

Where in a musical piece is the time signature found while the piece is being played?

 

[Kilbourne]

Anselms’s definition is vague. What exactly is “unsurpassably great”?

We cannot conceive of anything greater.

Is being personal “greater” than being impersonal?

yes. A personal God knows me and cares about me. In impersonal god doesn’t know me and couldn’t give a rip.

Is being “good” greater than being “evil”?

Of course. Do you admit that “goodness” exists? If so, why would you ask such a question?

None of these questions is answered by Anselm’s definition, because
1 we do not know what “greatness” entails
2 unsurpassable “greatness” by definition means “as great as possible”. And since we have no way of knowing what is or isn’t possible, the definition is useless.

'snot true that we don’t know what greatness entails. For one, it entails necessary existence (if the definition is consistent and coherent). Unsurpassable greatness means none is greater. Period. That much we know for sure from the definition.

 

[Kilbourne]

The definition doesn’t even capture God’s unsurpassable Greatness, because that very Greatness is tied up in His simplicity and his transcendent Being.

The definition doesn’t capture God’s unsurpassable Greatness; it merely asserts it as a fact. Do you deny that God is unsurpassably great?

His Greatness is beyond any human thought or comprehension, just as every Divine Attribute is; we can’t say that His “being” is beyond comprehension, but His Greatness is not.

God’s divine attributes do not exist as a datum of human consciousness, except that we assert their truth.

There is no aspect of the Divine Nature that can be comprehended by the human mind,

Not even in the slightest little bit?

and therefore it’s impossible to prove the existence of God from the existence of a human concept. After all, we can only do so from human concepts.Whether it’s Greatness, or Power, or Love, or Energy, every human concept will fall short not only of the Divine Nature as a whole, but of that particular aspect being thought of. No matter how Great my thought, that “Greatness” is infinitely removed from God’s Greatness, so saying that a “real Greatness” would be greater than my “mental Greatness”, with no other differential between the two beyond actual vs. mental, would only demonstrate the actuality of that mental Greatness, not the infinite, inconceivable Greatness of God.

So I guess we shouldn’t try and prove God’s existence at all. After all, we can only do so from human concepts.

To put it another way, we can agree that God must be infinitely great,

Does “infitinitely great” even make sense?

but it is impossible to make any kind of true mental construct about that Greatness.

I cannot make a mental picture of that greatness (it doesn’t exist as a “datum of my consciousness”), to be sure, by I can affirm that it exists.

If I can’t have a true mental construct about that Greatness, I can’t argue for the reality of God following from a mental construct. We can say “God must be infinite”, but since we can’t even conceive of such a thing we can’t be sure that such a thing potentially exists based on that statement alone, since that statement is empty of true mental content.

Then you deny the possibility of metaphysics, statements about all being that are true about everything. They just don’t attempt to say true things about things concretely and specifically.

You end up having to assume precisely what you’re trying to prove, namely that a Greatness beyond any possible mental construct exists, but this is begging the question. Since you can’t ask someone to imagine God, or any aspect of God, since that is utterly impossible, you can’t lead someone from that idea to the real existence of God.

I can’t speak meaningfully about God’s unsurpassable greatness, knowledge, power, goodness…?

The strength of Aquinas’ Five Ways is that they don’t rely on begging the question, nor on arguing actual reality from mental constructs, but rather argue for a nebulous definition of God based on observable facts about the universe; the universe is thus, and this indicates a transcendent being.

Anselm’s argument, in either form, doesn’t argue from the definition to God’s concrete actuality, just to his general, unspecified existence (in the manner uniquely appropriate for Deity). God necessarily exists, we deduce from his unsurpassable greatness. Exactly how he exists we cannot know, and won’t until we see Him face to face.

Peace and God bless!

et cum spiritu tuo

 

[Kilbourne]

It’s not a true positive statement, it’s a remotion from the greatness we can think of.

God is TTWNGCBT. Sounds like a positive statement to me… God is unsurpassably great, which sounds like a positive statement to me. But…yet, it invites one to conjure up candidates for greatness and then admit that they are not as great as God. So maybe you are right.

It is not based on any real idea of God, but on the fact that anything we can think of, God must be greater. It is, in effect, a negative statement that can be reformulated: “whatever greatness you can imagine, God is not”.

It is not based on any mental picture I can have of God, but it still is true of God, isn’t it?

 

[Kilbourne]

Ghosty and belorg,

Both of you (each from your respective and opposite points of view) maintain that TTWNGCBT is vague, and you are right about that. But I am tired and will have to address your mutual concerns on that score in the morning. God bless you both and thank you for the conversation.

Yours very truly,

Kilbourne

 

[Ghosty]

The definition doesn’t capture God’s unsurpassable Greatness; it merely asserts it as a fact. Do you deny that God is unsurpassably great?

I don’t deny it, but I also can’t assert it as a self-evident truth for the sake of argument. I can’t assert it as self-evident because God’s Nature is beyond my comprehension and understanding, so while I know it to be true, I know it only by Grace or by some other circuitous argument based on what I can know by my own nature. This eliminates the ontological argument aspect, however, as we’re no longer talking about God’s Nature as it can be known and understood in Itself.

God’s divine attributes do not exist as a datum of human consciousness, except that we assert their truth.

If they don’t exist as a datum in the human consciousness then the ontological argument fails. I can assert things that are beyond my reckoning, but I can’t prove them without understanding. I can assert that .99999~ = 1, but I can’t myself prove it because I don’t know the mathematical equations. In the case of God it is much harder because no one can know God’s Nature as It is without Grace, and therefore we can’t make arguments for His existence based on His “properties”, because His properties are utterly beyond us in and of themselves.

Not even in the slightest little bit?

Nope, not even the slightest little bit. Think about it: if it could be comprehended by the human mind then it would be proportioned to the human mind. It would have to be on the level of the creature, rather than transcendent, and if it is on the level of the creature then it less then Divine and therefore not an aspect of the Divine Nature. We can be elevated to the Divine Nature through Grace, which is a sharing of the Divine Nature with us “giving us ears to hear and eyes to see”, but without such a share in the Divine Nature God Himself is utterly dark to us. This isn’t because God is not utterly real and knowable in Himself, but because we are utterly unequipped to experience Him in our own nature; we can see His “fingerprints”, but not Him.

This isn’t just a philosophical truth, but an article of Faith attested to repeatedly in Scripture, such as Moses being only able to see “God’s back”, and John’s statement that in the next life we will “be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is”.

So I guess we shouldn’t try and prove God’s existence at all. After all, we can only do so from human concepts.

There’s a difference between proving God from things that are proportioned to human reason, like our knowledge of the universe, and trying to prove God through the existence of a human concept itself. In proving the existence of a transcendent being through the evidence of the imminent, we are fixing our minds not on God, but on the world, and seeing that the world requires God. We are not trying to fit God into our minds, but showing that the world we can know and see does not explain itself and requires a transcendent being that is beyond our experience and natural contemplation.

Does “infitinitely great” even make sense?

On a human level, no, and that’s the point. God is infinite, and therefore infinitely Great, but such a concept is beyond the capability of the human mind even though it’s true. We are like a blind man trying to discuss colors with other blind men; we can assert the reality of colors in various ways and possibly through various analogies, but we can’t prove them through any kind of direct mental experience or idea because we lack the faculties to work with the concept of color in any direct manner.

I cannot make a mental picture of that greatness (it doesn’t exist as a “datum of my consciousness”), to be sure, by I can affirm that it exists.

If you can’t make a mental picture, or abstract concept, of that greatness then you have two problems. The first is that you can’t utilize the concept as a proof, because you can’t say “it’s like this, but it’s actually real and not simply a mental concept” since you don’t have a mental concept in the first place. Secondly, you are admitting that “TTWNGCBT” isn’t God at all, because God is greater than “TTWNGCBT”, not just because of His actual reality, but by His very nature.

Then you deny the possibility of metaphysics, statements about all being that are true about everything. They just don’t attempt to say true things about things concretely and specifically.

Metaphysics involves concepts that are proportionate to the human mind, like cause and effect, motion, true and false, ect. I don’t deny our ability to work with such concepts at all; on the contrary I think they’re the foundation of all abstract thinking. We work with metaphysical concepts based on our experience of the world, and we extrapolate from our experience to underlying laws of reality that are none the less still proportionate to our understanding. God is all-together different, however, and is utterly beyond metaphysics.

I can’t speak meaningfully about God’s unsurpassable greatness, knowledge, power, goodness…?

You can, but in an indirect and analogical manner. You can’t have proper ideas about God’s Nature (without the Divine Light empowering your mind to know it, which we call ecstasy or the Beatific Vision), but you can know “goodness”, and know that God’s goodness must be greater than that of His creatures, but you can’t know, or even think properly, about God’s Goodness. Since you can’t have a proper idea of God’s Goodness you can’t argue from the idea to the reality, but you can argue from the reality (not experienced directly, but shown from Its effects), in an indirect and analogical manner, to an idea that you call God’s goodness but which you know isn’t really proportionate to God’s Goodness.

continued…

 

[Ghosty]

Anselm’s argument, in either form, doesn’t argue from the definition to God’s concrete actuality, just to his general, unspecified existence (in the manner uniquely appropriate for Deity). God necessarily exists, we deduce from his unsurpassable greatness. Exactly how he exists we cannot know, and won’t until we see Him face to face.

If it doesn’t argue from the definition, or comprehended idea, then you can’t prove God from it. The whole point is that the idea is proportioned to the reality, lacking only actual existence. Since the idea “TTWNGCBT” is not proportioned to God, nor to any transcendent being, this idea can’t be used to argue the existence of a transcendent being.

Both of you (each from your respective and opposite points of view) maintain that TTWNGCBT is vague, and you are right about that. But I am tired and will have to address your mutual concerns on that score in the morning. God bless you both and thank you for the conversation.

My problem with TTWNGCBT isn’t necessarily that it’s vague, but that it can’t possibly be God. It’s a poor definition of God, since TTWNGCBT is automatically less than God since the mind can think of it. It would be like saying “I define God as the biggest thing in the universe”, since God is obviously transcendent of the universe and all concepts of “size” or He is not God.

Now here’s something to ponder, our “TTWNGCBT” can’t be God, and can’t be a proof for God, but God’s “TTWNGCBT” not only is God, but is an ontological proof. That “proof” is the Word, the Second Person of the Trinity, the “idea of God, that is the Living God indeed”. The Father, in knowing Himself fully and comprehensively, knows Himself not only to the point of a mental construct, but to the point of actual existence, and this “logos” we call the Son.

Thank you for your thoughts and conversation!

Peace and God bless!

 

[belorg]

We cannot conceive of anything greater.

But man’s ability to conceive is limited, so, all this means is that God is greater than we can conceive of but not necessrily greater than some alian species can concieve of.

yes. A personal God knows me and cares about me. In impersonal god doesn’t know me and couldn’t give a rip.

That’s great for you, but the question is: is this objectively great?
For all we know, Anselm’s neing could be some sort of automaton.

Of course. Do you admit that “goodness” exists? If so, why would you ask such a question?

Actually, I have no idea whether goodness exists or not.

'snot true that we don’t know what greatness entails. For one, it entails necessary existence (if the definition is consistent and coherent). Unsurpassable greatness means none is greater. Period. That much we know for sure from the definition.

It entails necessary existence. And that is part of the problem. Necessary existence is not just a tag you can put on anything you like. “X is necessary” means that "X does not exist "is logically impossible, but we do not know if it os possible for something to be necessary. If it’s not, then greatness does not entail necessary existence.

 

[Kilbourne]

I don’t deny it, but I also can’t assert it as a self-evident truth for the sake of argument. I can’t assert it as self-evident because God’s Nature is beyond my comprehension and understanding, so while I know it to be true, I know it only by Grace or by some other circuitous argument based on what I can know by my own nature. This eliminates the ontological argument aspect, however, as we’re no longer talking about God’s Nature as it can be known and understood in Itself.

OK, what you are saying has finally sunk in. This is part of what St. Tom of Aquino said in his criticism of the argument (the definition is not self-evident). Actually Charles Hartshorne, the great champion of the OA, late in life moved in that direction. He came to understand that no purely a priori argument for God’s existence is possible because the premises are all justified, ultimately, by human experience. So let me try and explain from human experience and what I can know by my own nature and human thought in general why the definition TTWNGBT is reasonably held to be true of God.

First, the definition squares with the logic of worship. The object of worship is always the greatest (if we are rational). If I worship X and then discover that Y is greater than X, then I must make Y the object of my worship. To do otherwise is to be guilty of idolatry, exalting a lesser god.

Second, here is a quote from St. Anselm in his response to Gaunilo:

You say that upon hearing of TTWNGCBT you cannot think of it as a real object known either generically or specifically or have it in your mind, on the grounds that you neither know the thing itself nor can you form an idea of it from other things similar to it. But obviously this is not so. For since everything that is less good is similar insofar as it is good to that which is more good, it is evident to every rational mind that, mounting from the less good to the more good we can from those things than which something greater can be thought conjecture a great deal about TTWNGCBT. Who, for example, cannot think of this (even if he does not believe that what he thinks actually exists), namely, that if something that has a beginning and end is good, that which, although it has had a beginning, does not, however, have an end, is much better? And just as this latter is better than the former, so also that which has neither beginning or end is better again than this, even if it passes always from the past through the present to the future. Again, whether something of this kind actually exists or not, that which does not lack anything at all, nor is forced to change or move, is very much better still. Cannot this be thought? Or can we think of something greater than this? Or is not this precisely to from an idea of TTWNGCBT? There is, then, a way by which one can form an idea of TTWNGCBT.

Anselm’s point is that there is a way to think of God (rooted in our experience, to be sure) which, although it doesn’t totally capture God as He is, still is true of God. As you have already pointed out, this is the way of negation, the via negativa. James Cutsinger, a proponent of the first form of the argument, puts it this way. “Beginning with some contingent and therefore deficient thing, our minds can ascend, through a series of denials, to something which is in no sense contingent, but instead absolute. Moving up the Great Chain of Being and KNowing, our awareness passes from the mortal to the immortal to the aeviternal and thence to what is truly eternal.”

So I concede your point that the definition is not self-evident, but I believe it is warranted. And given the truth of the definition, the proof works in either form.

 

[Peter_Plato]

My problem with TTWNGCBT isn’t necessarily that it’s vague, but that it can’t possibly be God. It’s a poor definition of God, since TTWNGCBT is automatically less than God since the mind can think of it. It would be like saying “I define God as the biggest thing in the universe”, since God is obviously transcendent of the universe and all concepts of “size” or He is not God.

Recall that the definition for TTWNGCBT is an extensible one. It doesn’t mean that which nothing greater is presently conceived or being thought, it means CAN BE thought. If your definition is true that the mind’s capacity to think of God is impossible, then does that not mean the beatific vision by the mind is not possible?

It seems to me that what Paul is getting at when he speaks of the Church having the “mind” of Christ is that it is Christ in us who makes it possible for our minds to come to know God. This capacity comes from God because it is God doing the thinking in us. So it is the mind that is given, by grace, the power to conceive or think of God beyond its natural capacity because God makes that possible through sanctifying grace.

Another point is that to “conceive of” or “think of” is not and need not be the same as “fully grasp.”

*The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. For who among men knows the thoughts of a man except the man’s spirit within him? In the same way no one knows the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. We have not received the spirit of the world but the Spirit who is from God, that we may understand what God has freely given us. This is what we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit, expressing spiritual truths in spiritual words. The man without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. The spiritual man makes judgments about all things, but he himself is not subject to any man’s judgment:

“For who has known the mind of the Lord
that he may instruct him?”
But we have the mind of Christ.
(1 Cor 2:10-16)
*

The biggest thing in the universe is limited spatially by the size of the universe. So the universe is the biggest “thing” in the universe. Nothing bigger can be thought, so size is a limitation. Any being contingent in some way on another thing could not be greater than the second, but necessarily limited in “greatness” by it.

 

[Ghosty]

OK, what you are saying has finally sunk in. This is part of what St. Tom of Aquino said in his criticism of the argument (the definition is not self-evident). Actually Charles Hartshorne, the great champion of the OA, late in life moved in that direction. He came to understand that no purely a priori argument for God’s existence is possible because the premises are all justified, ultimately, by human experience. So let me try and explain from human experience and what I can know by my own nature and human thought in general why the definition TTWNGBT is reasonably held to be true of God.

First, the definition squares with the logic of worship. The object of worship is always the greatest (if we are rational). If I worship X and then discover that Y is greater than X, then I must make Y the object of my worship. To do otherwise is to be guilty of idolatry, exalting a lesser god.

This isn’t a proof of God, it’s simply saying that we should worship what is greatest, and we worship God, therefore God is the greatest. It doesn’t prove that God exists, nor that God is the greatest. If a giant elephant is the greatest, then we should worship the giant elephant, if Galactus is the greatest then we should worship Galactus, ect. It says nothing about the actual existence of the being in question, nor of it actually being the greatest. Furthermore, my worship depends on me already acknowledging the existence of this being.

Second, here is a quote from St. Anselm in his response to Gaunilo:

You say that upon hearing of TTWNGCBT you cannot think of it as a real object known either generically or specifically or have it in your mind, on the grounds that you neither know the thing itself nor can you form an idea of it from other things similar to it. But obviously this is not so. For since everything that is less good is similar insofar as it is good to that which is more good, it is evident to every rational mind that, mounting from the less good to the more good we can from those things than which something greater can be thought conjecture a great deal about TTWNGCBT. Who, for example, cannot think of this (even if he does not believe that what he thinks actually exists), namely, that if something that has a beginning and end is good, that which, although it has had a beginning, does not, however, have an end, is much better? And just as this latter is better than the former, so also that which has neither beginning or end is better again than this, even if it passes always from the past through the present to the future. Again, whether something of this kind actually exists or not, that which does not lack anything at all, nor is forced to change or move, is very much better still. Cannot this be thought? Or can we think of something greater than this? Or is not this precisely to from an idea of TTWNGCBT? There is, then, a way by which one can form an idea of TTWNGCBT.

I would answer to Anselm “no, it can’t be thought”. We can’t think of something that doesn’t begin nor end, nor of something that can’t change. We can assert, but we can’t know or experience such a thing through our natural, rational powers. If we can’t even think of such a thing, we can’t argue that an actual example of this thought is greater, nor that such a thing even exists. If it can’t exist in our mind, how can we prove it must exist in actuality through an ontological argument?

Anselm’s point is that there is a way to think of God (rooted in our experience, to be sure) which, although it doesn’t totally capture God as He is, still is true of God.

It is true of God, but it doesn’t exist in our mind. If it can’t exist in my mind, how can you prove to me (a hypothetical non-believer) that such a thing must exist in reality? You haven’t even conjured it into my mind, and would never be able to.

As you have already pointed out, this is the way of negation, the via negativa. James Cutsinger, a proponent of the first form of the argument, puts it this way. “Beginning with some contingent and therefore deficient thing, our minds can ascend, through a series of denials, to something which is in no sense contingent, but instead absolute. Moving up the Great Chain of Being and KNowing, our awareness passes from the mortal to the immortal to the aeviternal and thence to what is truly eternal.”

I disagree. Our mind never climbs to such concepts, but rather asserts them. If it can’t be conjured in the mind, it can’t be the basis of an ontological argument.

So I concede your point that the definition is not self-evident, but I believe it is warranted. And given the truth of the definition, the proof works in either form.

You need to first prove to me that such a being exists for the truth of the definition to be asserted. If you have to prove it through some other means then the ontological argument is not a proof of God and fails in its purpose.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

Recall that the definition for TTWNGCBT is an extensible one. It doesn’t mean that which nothing greater is presently conceived or being thought, it means CAN BE thought. If your definition is true that the mind’s capacity to think of God is impossible, then does that not mean the beatific vision by the mind is not possible?

It seems to me that what Paul is getting at when he speaks of the Church having the “mind” of Christ is that it is Christ in us who makes it possible for our minds to come to know God. This capacity comes from God because it is God doing the thinking in us. So it is the mind that is given, by grace, the power to conceive or think of God beyond its natural capacity because God makes that possible through sanctifying grace.

Another point is that to “conceive of” or “think of” is not and need not be the same as “fully grasp.”

*The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. For who among men knows the thoughts of a man except the man’s spirit within him? In the same way no one knows the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. We have not received the spirit of the world but the Spirit who is from God, that we may understand what God has freely given us. This is what we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit, expressing spiritual truths in spiritual words. The man without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. The spiritual man makes judgments about all things, but he himself is not subject to any man’s judgment:

“For who has known the mind of the Lord
that he may instruct him?”
But we have the mind of Christ.
(1 Cor 2:10-16)
*

The biggest thing in the universe is limited spatially by the size of the universe. So the universe is the biggest “thing” in the universe. Nothing bigger can be thought, so size is a limitation. Any being contingent in some way on another thing could not be greater than the second, but necessarily limited in “greatness” by it.

We can experience the infinite by Grace which gives us the Divine Nature. Philosophy, however, deals in rational arguments and thought on a human level. If a thought requires the Spirit to formulate then it is beyond philosophical argument.

Not all proofs of God require Grace, but the ontological argument does, and is therefore invalid as a rational proof.

Peace and Bless!

 

[Peter_Plato]

We can experience the infinite by Grace which gives us the Divine Nature. Philosophy, however, deals in rational arguments and thought on a human level. If a thought requires the Spirit to formulate then it is beyond philosophical argument.

Not all proofs of God require Grace, but the ontological argument does, and is therefore invalid as a rational proof.

Peace and Bless!

I am not clear that the terms “can be thought” have the condition “by philosophical or rational argument” attached to them otherwise Anselm’s definition would be “that than which no greater can be thought and established to exist by rational means” or TTWNGCBTAETEBRM. A rather longish definition which would require proof for its referent before it could be considered a definition of it.

 

[Kilbourne]

This isn’t a proof of God, it’s simply saying that we should worship what is greatest, and we worship God, therefore God is the greatest. It doesn’t prove that God exists, nor that God is the greatest. If a giant elephant is the greatest, then we should worship the giant elephant, if Galactus is the greatest then we should worship Galactus, ect. It says nothing about the actual existence of the being in question, nor of it actually being the greatest. Furthermore, my worship depends on me already acknowledging the existence of this being.

I didn’t offer the logic of worship as proof of God, just as justification for the definition. The definition fits what we religious folk intuitively know about worship. It only makes sense to worship the absolute greatest. Worship requires the unqualified exaltation of its object beyond all possible rivalry.

 

[Kilbourne]

I would answer to Anselm “no, it can’t be thought”. We can’t think of something that doesn’t begin nor end, nor of something that can’t change. We can assert, but we can’t know or experience such a thing through our natural, rational powers. If we can’t even think of such a thing, we can’t argue that an actual example of this thought is greater, nor that such a thing even exists. If it can’t exist in our mind, how can we prove it must exist in actuality through an ontological argument?

Please explain what it means to think of something.

 

[Ghosty]

The whole point of Anselm’s proof is to rationally demonstrate the existence of God. He’s speaking to humans, not God, and our thoughts are rational. He uses argument based on natural human reason, so it goes without saying that he’s speaking of rational ideas. Someone who has seen God face to face doesn’t need a proof for His existence.

Again, this is not to say that rational arguments for God’s existence can’t be made; as an atheist I was convinced by rational arguments. I’m it’s just that God’s nature is beyond reason and ingraspable through reason, so any rational argument that requires a concept of God’s Nature is impossible for the human faculties. Rational arguments for God must be based on things humans can know, and then demonstrate that these things require a transcendent explaination. This transcendant explanation will then be expressed negatively, in how it must be different from what we know.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

I didn’t offer the logic of worship as proof of God, just as justification for the definition. The definition fits what we religious folk intuitively know about worship. It only makes sense to worship the absolute greatest. Worship requires the unqualified exaltation of its object beyond all possible rivalry.

I don’t think it’s a good justification for the definition because, again, the God we worship must be greater than “the greatest thing that can be thought of”, at least according to our Faith and Scripture.

Perhaps “the greatest thing that can be thought of” is worthy of worship, perhaps it is not. Simply saying we worship it does not make the definition applicable to God, and doesn’t mean the thing in question is worthy of worship.

Please explain what it means to think of something.

To think of something is to hold an idea in your head about something. It can also mean working through a process of thought with an idea, like planning or reasoning out an argument. Regardless, the thinking involves concrete ideas that can be “manipulated”, though not necessarily imagined in a “picture” sense.

When it comes to God we don’t think properly of God with our natural ability, but rather “around” God. We think of His effects, or His imprint on creatures, but we can’t abstract His Essence and work with It as an idea in the mind. Whatever we do think of God is most certainly not God, because what we think of is contained in the mind, and God is not circumscribed by creatures.

Now Anselm is thinking “towards” God but not properly “of” God because his idea is not a concrete thing with proper qualities and attributes (as the human mind can’t think directly of God’s properties and attributes since they are utterly beyond us), but a kind of place-holder, an empty notion that merely points in the presumed direction of the Divine. You can’t argue for the real existence of of an empty notion that lacks qualities based on its “existence” in the mind; there’s nothing concrete about this “God”, and so nothing concrete to give existence to. Assuming that the notion is concrete and can be said to really exist, it wouldn’t be the God we’re trying to prove.

Through partaking of the Divine Nature, however, we can indeed see God and think of God, because our power of “thought” at that point is Divine and not merely human, and the thought is not an empty place-holder but God Himself united to our Divinely-enhanced mind.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Ghosty]

I am not clear that the terms “can be thought” have the condition “by philosophical or rational argument” attached to them otherwise Anselm’s definition would be “that than which no greater can be thought and established to exist by rational means” or TTWNGCBTAETEBRM. A rather longish definition which would require proof for its referent before it could be considered a definition of it.

My post, #58, was directed at this post. I’ll just add here that your last statement is the other major problem with the ontological argument, namely that it requires one to assume the existence of that which you’re trying to prove. This was Aquinas’ second, and most direct, argument against the ontological argument.

Peace and God bless!