A question concerning the ontological argument

[Kilbourne]

Mornin Ghosty, Peter Plato and all:

Ghosty very steadfastly insists that the OA cannot get off the ground because the truth of the definition must first be proven in the manner of an a posteriori proof. Until then, the definition is not assertable.

You need to first prove to me that such a being exists for the truth of the definition to be asserted. If you have to prove it through some other means then the ontological argument is not a proof of God and fails in its purpose.

I don’t think so. First, let’s assume that we prove, by some means acceptable to Ghosty ,that one of God’s attributes is unsurpassable greatness. What is to prevent me from arguing from there to the conclusion that God exists necessarily? To be sure, we don’t then have a strictly a priori proof, but then I’ve conceded that no strictly a priori proof is possible. So I don’t see how the OA, even then, fails. (We haven’t begun to address the other steps in the argument.)

All I and Anselm are asking is that you suppose, for the sake of argument, that God is TTWNGCBT and that the definition is not nonsensical. Then see where that takes us.

 

[Ghosty]

Mornin Ghosty, Peter Plato and all:

Ghosty very steadfastly insists that the OA cannot get off the ground because the truth of the definition must first be proven in the manner of an a posteriori proof. Until then, the definition is not assertable.

I don’t think so. First, let’s assume that we prove, by some means acceptable to Ghosty ,that one of God’s attributes is unsurpassable greatness. What is to prevent me from arguing from there to the conclusion that God exists necessarily? To be sure, we don’t then have a strictly a priori proof, but then I’ve conceded that no strictly a priori proof is possible. So I don’t see how the OA, even then, fails. (We haven’t begun to address the other steps in the argument.)

All I and Anselm are asking is that you suppose, for the sake of argument, that God is TTWNGCBT and that the definition is not nonsensical. Then see where that takes us.

Anselm’s argument is entirely a priori, as are all ontological arguments by definition. An ontological argument argues from the very definition of God alone to prove the existence of God, and this will always be an a priori argument even if some a posteriori information is used to supplement the argument, for example using some creature to highlight what “greatness” is. If the argument boils down to “God means ‘this’, and ‘this’ exists necessarily”, then it is a failed argument because we can never truly say by human knowledge what the “thisness” of God is.

There are “greatness” arguments that are a posteriori, such as the Argument from Degree (Aquinas’ Fourth Way), which essentially says that greatness is found from lesser to greater degree in the world, and every particular perfection has a greater archetype, and there must be a being that is the archetype of being itself, and that is what we call God. Notice that it doesn’t argue from the definition of God, but rather argues that the created world is missing an ultimate archetype of being, and that must be God. It doesn’t try to say that we should be able to understand that archetype, or understand what “perfect being” is, only that there must be a perfect being. I don’t find this argument compelling, but it is an example of a “greatness” argument that at least isn’t self-defeating.

Ontological arguments, on the other hand, would say in some manner “perfect being means ‘this’, and ‘this’ necessarily exists”. They fail because they expect us to work with a definition of the indefinable, and do so with our limited rational minds.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Kilbourne]

But are you willing, just for the sake of conversation, to assume the following?

1. God is TTWNGCBT.
2. The preceding definition is not nonsensical.

 

[Ghosty]

But are you willing, just for the sake of conversation, to assume the following?

1. God is TTWNGCBT.
2. The preceding definition is not nonsensical.

I can’t grant #1 even for the sake of argument because TTWNGCBT is not transcendent and therefore must be a creature. God can’t be a creature, therefore TTWNGCBT can’t be God. If I were to assume that God is non-transcendent then I would have to admit that God’s being isn’t necessary, and if His being isn’t necessary then His actual existence doesn’t necessarily follow from the definition.

In short, by defining God as TTWNGCBT, I am defeating the ontological argument. TTWNGCBT is not self-contradictory, it just doesn’t include necessary being since such a thing can’t be conceived in the human mind.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Kilbourne]

Well, in case you are inclined to humor me, I am going to proceed to take for granted 1 and 2, just so we can see what happens with the rest of the proof.

 

[Ghosty]

Well, in case you are inclined to humor me, I am going to proceed to take for granted 1 and 2, just so we can see what happens with the rest of the proof.

Ok, we’ll get to the other objections then.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Kilbourne]

I am going to set forth the argument in its second, stronger, form, and in a little different fashion than above.

1. God is TTWNGCBT.
2. The preceding definition is not nonsense.
3. Anything that exists does so either contingently or necessarily.
4. To exist necessarily is greater than to exist contingently.
5. Suppose God exists contingently. But then that leads to a contradiction, because I could then conceive of that which exists necessarily, which is greater.
6. So God can’t exist contingently.
7. Therefore God exists necessarily.
8. Therefore God exists.

Given steps 1 and 2–and I know you vehemently do not accept them-- isn’t this a logically valid argument?

 

[Ghosty]

I am going to set forth the argument in its second, stronger, form, and in a little different fashion than above.

1. God is TTWNGCBT.
2. The preceding definition is not nonsense.
3. Anything that exists does so either contingently or necessarily.
4. To exist necessarily is greater than to exist contingently.
5. Suppose God exists contingently. But then that leads to a contradiction, because I could then conceive of that which exists necessarily, which is greater.
6. So God can’t exist contingently.
7. Therefore God exists necessarily.
8. Therefore God exists.

Given steps 1 and 2–and I know you vehemently do not accept them-- isn’t this a logically valid argument?

#5 and onward doesn’t work because even if you conceived of a being that exists necessarily, it would still be a conception and not a separate reality. There is no point in which conception necessarily converts to actual reality.

I can admit to conceiving of necessary existence (which I actually can’t, but we’re ignoring that problem for the sake of argument), but there is nothing in the notion, the conception, of a necessary existence that makes it logically necessary for a necessarily existing thing to actually exist. The notion remains merely a concept in the mind. The statement is logically true, but does not imply actual existence.

For example it is logically true that a necessary triangle would necessarily exist, and I can conceive (according to our concession) of a necessary triangle, but it is not necessarily true that a necessary triangle actually exists, only that for it to be conceptually sound it must be internally consistent. So it would be a contradiction to say that an actual necessary triangle doesn’t exist necessarily, or that something that actually exists doesn’t actually exist, but it is not a contradiction to say that the conceived of necessary triangle does not actually exist.

Now you might object that an actually existing necessary being would be greater than the thought of a necessary being, and that’s true, but in both cases we’re still only speaking of conceptions in the mind. I can conceive of a necessary, great being that exists only in the mind, and I can conceive of a necessary, great being that exists actually, but both remain actually just mental concepts, one greater than the other. In order to successfully argue that the great, necessary being actually exists you need to leave the mind and deal with actual reality, but that would mean proving that the great being actually exists before using the mental demonstration, and that defeats the whole point of the ontological argument and is merely begging the question.

In short, since you’re dealing only with mental constructs the “proven being” remains merely a mental construct. You haven’t produced the necessary, greatest being by making me think of it, you’ve merely provided a mental construct of one, and we’re stuck where we began with nothing but mental constructs and no actual reality.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Kilbourne]

#5 and onward doesn’t work because even if you conceived of a being that exists necessarily, it would still be a conception and not a separate reality. There is no point in which conception necessarily converts to actual reality.

I can admit to conceiving of necessary existence (which I actually can’t, but we’re ignoring that problem for the sake of argument),

No I have only assumed the truth of steps 1 and 2.

but there is nothing in the notion, the conception, of a necessary existence that makes it logically necessary for a necessarily existing thing to actually exist. The notion remains merely a concept in the mind. The statement is logically true, but does not imply actual existence.

If something exists necessarily it must exist, period. To deny the possibility of necessary existence is to make the absolute statement that all existence is contingent, or that everything is necessarily contingent. But if everything exists contingently, then it is conceivable that absolutely nothing could exist, a “state of affairs” which is, if you really think about it, inconceivable. And if absolutely nothing existed, and nuttin can come from nuttin, then why is there something? We can only conclude that something or other exists necessarily, and Step 3 stands.

For example it is logically true that a necessary triangle would necessarily exist, and I can conceive (according to our concession) of a necessary triangle, but it is not necessarily true that a necessary triangle actually exists, only that for it to be conceptually sound it must be internally consistent. So it would be a contradiction to say that an actual necessary triangle doesn’t exist necessarily, or that something that actually exists doesn’t actually exist, but it is not a contradiction to say that the conceived of necessary triangle does not actually exist.

This step in the argument doesn’t say that anything in particular (triangles, islands, etc.) exists necessarily; it just says something or other (nonspecified) exists necessarily. And when you think about it, it doesn’t make any sense to attach the adjective “necessary” to any contingent thing (e.g. an island or mah huntin dawg) or to something established by convention (e.g. a triangle).

Now you might object that an actually existing necessary being would be greater than the thought of a necessary being, and that’s true, but in both cases we’re still only speaking of conceptions in the mind. I can conceive of a necessary, great being that exists only in the mind, and I can conceive of a necessary, great being that exists actually, but both remain actually just mental concepts, one greater than the other. In order to successfully argue that the great, necessary being actually exists you need to leave the mind and deal with actual reality, but that would mean proving that the great being actually exists before using the mental demonstration, and that defeats the whole point of the ontological argument and is merely begging the question.

Here you are importing elements from the first argument which is not under discussion.

In short, since you’re dealing only with mental constructs the “proven being” remains merely a mental construct. You haven’t produced the necessary, greatest being by making me think of it, you’ve merely provided a mental construct of one, and we’re stuck where we began with nothing but mental constructs and no actual reality.

Given our givens, if you concede the possibility of necessary existence, the conclusion is inevitable. Unless you don’t trust the rules of logic.

Peace and God bless yerself!

 

[Ghosty]

No I have only assumed the truth of steps 1 and 2.

Yes, but I don’t believe we can properly conceive of a necessary existence as it’s beyond our level of existence, but I’m ignoring those reservations for the sake of argument.

If something exists necessarily it must exist, period. To deny the possibility of necessary existence is to make the absolute statement that all existence is contingent, or that everything is necessarily contingent.

I’m not denying the possibility of necessary existence, but I’m not assuming it either. Remember, the point of this proof is precisely to prove that this necessary existence is indeed real; we can’t assume it in order to prove it. A necessary thing exists by necessity, but you haven’t yet established that there really IS a necessary thing, only that it can be imagined in some manner and isn’t self-contradictory.

But if everything exists contingently, then it is conceivable that absolutely nothing could exist, a “state of affairs” which is, if you really think about it, inconceivable. And if absolutely nothing existed, and nuttin can come from nuttin, then why is there something? We can only conclude that something or other exists necessarily, and Step 3 stands.

This is Aquinas’ Third Way, and does not apply to the Ontological Argument. It’s a sound proof for God, but it’s not the one you’re arguing for here.

Remember, the Ontological Argument is essentially that if I can conceive of the greatest possible being, then the being must really exist because existence is greater than mental existence. The Ontological Argument is an argument based on the very definition of God, not an argument from the contingency of real things.

This step in the argument doesn’t say that anything in particular (triangles, islands, etc.) exists necessarily; it just says something or other (nonspecified) exists necessarily. And when you think about it, it doesn’t make any sense to attach the adjective “necessary” to any contingent thing (e.g. an island or mah huntin dawg) or to something established by convention (e.g. a triangle).

You’re right that it doesn’t make sense to attach “necessary” to any contingent thing, which is precisely why you can’t attach it to the idea of God: my idea of a necessary being is not itself necessary, but contingent, and the Ontological Argument is asking me to work only with contingent ideas. The Ontological Argument never makes it passed contingent things, namely ideas, and therefore can’t be a proof of God (this goes back to my original objections in previous posts).

The Ontological Argument does argue for a particular necessary thing, however, and that is TTWNGCBT. It’s saying that this “greatest thing”, which is God, must really exist because it is greater to exist necessarily than contingently. This doesn’t establish the actual existence of this thing, however. All it does is state that it is greater to exist necessarily than contingently. I can concede that and still not admit to the actual existence of the thing in question because all you’re asking me to do is think of an “actual greatest thing” rather than a “mental greatest thing”, which I can do but it remains a thought only.

Here you are importing elements from the first argument which is not under discussion.

I’m not importing elements from the first discussion. Remember, I said in our first discussion that I don’t accept the premise that we can conceive of necessary existence, and here I’m admitting it and showing how even with that admission the Ontological Argument fails to do what it claims to do, which is carry over from the mental definition to actual reality.

Again, even if I can conceive of a necessary reality that doesn’t prove that the necessary reality exists outside of the mind. Since my thought of a necessary reality is itself merely a contingent reality it doesn’t logically follow that a real necessary being exists just because I can formulate a contingent thought I call “necessary”.

Where this form of the argument really comes completely undone is #7, because you’ve gone from speaking of a contingent idea, namely the idea of a necessary being, to a necessary reality. I can admit that God must be logically necessary without admitting that that God is really necessary. A contingent God is self-contradictory, and any definition of God includes necessary existence, but this remains nothing more than a contingent idea within my own mind; we haven’t bridged the gap between my admitting the logical necessity of God being necessary, to the reality of a necessary God.

Given our givens, if you concede the possibility of necessary existence, the conclusion is inevitable. Unless you don’t trust the rules of logic.

As I pointed out above, I can admit that a necessary triangle is necessary, and that a necessary triangle is logically possible, but this is not the same as admitting that a necessary triangle actually exists or is actually possible. Since all of my thoughts are merely contingent there is no actual necessity given to my ideas; if my thoughts had any kind of necessity then I wouldn’t need to be led through argument, but my thoughts are contingent upon my understanding and reasoning things through (not to mention actually conjuring them up in my mind), and therefore you can’t argue from them (contingent as they are) to actual necessity.

In the end all this does is argue the logical necessity that any definition of God include necessity, but as with the “necessary triangle” it does not prove actual existence of the idea, only a self-consistent (and contingent) thought.

Peace and God bless!

 

[damscott]

Just a thought, original with me.
Assuming duality, that both mind and objective reality exist; That which is “greater” because it is both in the mind and real in Anslem’s argument is not God Himself, but rather, just a concept of a greater concept (of God). Like Russian dolls.
This whole argument string here is all in our minds. All arguments are in the mind only. We can’t make an idea itself become an objective, real thing or an entity; i.e., make a god from a concept of a God. Or can we? New age physics? Apparently, God did so.
Cheers
Don

 

[Kilbourne]

Yes, but I don’t believe we can properly conceive of a necessary existence as it’s beyond our level of existence, but I’m ignoring those reservations for the sake of argument.

I’m not denying the possibility of necessary existence, but I’m not assuming it either. Remember, the point of this proof is precisely to prove that this necessary existence is indeed real; we can’t assume it in order to prove it. A necessary thing exists by necessity, but you haven’t yet established that there really IS a necessary thing, only that it can be imagined in some manner and isn’t self-contradictory.

This is Aquinas’ Third Way, and does not apply to the Ontological Argument. It’s a sound proof for God, but it’s not the one you’re arguing for here.

To be sure, I cannot conceive of or grasp exactly how a necessary being exists (is actualized). But we can demonstrate that there are two modes of existing, necessary and contingent. So we don’t need to assume Step 3. It has been demonstrated, thanks to St. Tom of Aquino.

Remember, the Ontological Argument is essentially that if I can conceive of the greatest possible being, then the being must really exist because existence is greater than mental existence. The Ontological Argument is an argument based on the very definition of God, not an argument from the contingency of real things.

No, you are confusing the first form of the argument with the second. The second or modal form attempts to demonstrate that only necessary existence is compatible with Greatness. The first utilizes the different “greater than” principle, namely existence in reality is greater than existence in the mind alone.

You’re right that it doesn’t make sense to attach “necessary” to any contingent thing, which is precisely why you can’t attach it to the idea of God: my idea of a necessary being is not itself necessary, but contingent, and the Ontological Argument is asking me to work only with contingent ideas. The Ontological Argument never makes it passed contingent things, namely ideas, and therefore can’t be a proof of God (this goes back to my original objections in previous posts).

Here you are stating the creed of the logical positivists, whose core belief is that all meaningful propositions are necessarily not necessary.

The Ontological Argument does argue for a particular necessary thing, however, and that is TTWNGCBT. It’s saying that this “greatest thing”, which is God, must really exist because it is greater to exist necessarily than contingently. This doesn’t establish the actual existence of this thing, however. All it does is state that it is greater to exist necessarily than contingently. I can concede that and still not admit to the actual existence of the thing in question because all you’re asking me to do is think of an “actual greatest thing” rather than a “mental greatest thing”, which I can do but it remains a thought only.

I’m not importing elements from the first discussion. Remember, I said in our first discussion that I don’t accept the premise that we can conceive of necessary existence, and here I’m admitting it and showing how even with that admission the Ontological Argument fails to do what it claims to do, which is carry over from the mental definition to actual reality.

Again, even if I can conceive of a necessary reality that doesn’t prove that the necessary reality exists outside of the mind. Since my thought of a necessary reality is itself merely a contingent reality it doesn’t logically follow that a real necessary being exists just because I can formulate a contingent thought I call “necessary”.

Where this form of the argument really comes completely undone is #7, because you’ve gone from speaking of a contingent idea, namely the idea of a necessary being, to a necessary reality. I can admit that God must be logically necessary without admitting that that God is really necessary. A contingent God is self-contradictory, and any definition of God includes necessary existence, but this remains nothing more than a contingent idea within my own mind; we haven’t bridged the gap between my admitting the logical necessity of God being necessary, to the reality of a necessary God.

As I pointed out above, I can admit that a necessary triangle is necessary, and that a necessary triangle is logically possible, but this is not the same as admitting that a necessary triangle actually exists or is actually possible. Since all of my thoughts are merely contingent there is no actual necessity given to my ideas; if my thoughts had any kind of necessity then I wouldn’t need to be led through argument, but my thoughts are contingent upon my understanding and reasoning things through (not to mention actually conjuring them up in my mind), and therefore you can’t argue from them (contingent as they are) to actual necessity.

In the end all this does is argue the logical necessity that any definition of God include necessity, but as with the “necessary triangle” it does not prove actual existence of the idea, only a self-consistent (and contingent) thought.

Peace and God bless!

What the argument does is establish that unsurpassable greatness entails necessary existence. But we don’t know that at the beginning of the argument, just at the end. Remember, the definition isn’t “God is a necessarily existing TTWNGCBT.”

You also are going to have to rid yourself of your logical positivism, an utterly discredited school of philosophy. LP denies the possibility of metaphysical truth. As with any form of relativism, it fails to pass muster under its own criteria: Only empirical propositions (e.g. Black swans do not exist.) and rational propositions (based on arbitrary definitions, e.g. all triangles have only 3 sides.) are meaningful.

 

[Kilbourne]

Just a thought, original with me.
Assuming duality, that both mind and objective reality exist; That which is “greater” because it is both in the mind and real in Anslem’s argument is not God Himself, but rather, just a concept of a greater concept (of God). Like Russian dolls.
This whole argument string here is all in our minds. All arguments are in the mind only. We can’t make an idea itself become an objective, real thing or an entity; i.e., make a god from a concept of a God. Or can we? New age physics? Apparently, God did so.
Cheers
Don

Hi Don,

Yes, any idea of something is not the thing itself. The real thing is always greater than any ideas about it. The question is whether we can nevertheless entertain meaningful and true thoughts about God, however partial and limited they may be.

 

[Ghosty]

First off let me say that I reject logical positivism, and my points don’t reflect that perspective. A logical positivist would reject metaphysical truth, like necessary existence, which I not only accept but advocate.

My argument is not that a necessary being can’t be proven to exist, but rather that it can’t be proven to exist from its definition or an idea. Every form of the ontological argument tries to prove God a priori by saying “here’s the definition of God, which includes necessary existence, and since necessary existence requires actual existence, God actually exists”. The problem is that while the statement is true from an internal consistency perspective, that internal mental consistency does not compel one to accept the actual existence of the thing. God is necessary, but every possible idea of God is contingent, including the “God” of the Ontological Argument, even the modal version.

As with the necessary triangle, which I don’t think you’ve addressed yet, I can admit that a necessary triangle is possible, and I can admit that a necessary triangle would necessarily exist actually, but this doesn’t compel me to admit the actual existence of this triangle. What I have defined in my head is an actual necessary triangle, but in actuality it remains a contingent being, a thought in my head, and will remain as such no matter how you refine the definition. What does your argument do that forces me, on pain of logical contradiction, to admit the actual existence of my contingent idea?

Taking the argument modal doesn’t help, either. The problem remains that admitting of a definition doesn’t admit to actuality, even of a particular necessary being. I’m compelled only to admit a tautology, namely that a necessary being must be defined as necessary, and that being greatest is better than being almost greatest. This compels me to think of an actual greatest being and readily admit that it is greater than my idea of mental greatest being, but admitting this doesn’t transform my idea of actual greatness into actual actual greatness. We can go on forever, thinking of an actually actually actually actual greatest being, but every time we are back to the fact that my idea will always be a contingent idea and not the thing itself.

It would be logically inconsistant to say that an actual necessary being does not exist, but it is not logically inconsistant to say that the idea of an actual necessray being is contingent, and since all you’ve produced to my mind is an idea, you haven’t demonstrated an actual necessary being.

Now, if you import the Third Way here then you’ve abandoned the ontological argument. You are no longer seeking to prove God, but make statements about an already proven being. The argument then becomes mere tautology, because you’re saying nothing more than “the being we know must exist, must exist”. The ontological argument is supposed to get a non-believer to admit the actual existence of God, but if God must already be demonstrated and proven through the Third Way then the argument fails at its task. You are refining the understanding of necessary being, but not proving its existence through the ontological argument.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Cicero54]

We had a unit in my philosophy class where we discussed the existence of god, and later wrote a paper discussing one of the arguments (cosmological, teleological, etc.). In my paper, I criticized the ontological argument

Anselm’s Ontological argument for the existence of God begins by citing god as a being that which no greater can be conceived in respect to the great making qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, etc. Therefore, if you conceive of a being, and then conceive of one greater, the first being you conceived would not be god. He states that this sort of being can at least be conceived in the mind. However, since a being that can exist both in the mind and in reality would be greater than one that just exists in the mind, God must really exist in reality to be a truly great being, or else we could imagine a being greater than god, which is impossible. Furthermore, a being that exists necessarily is greater than a being that does not exist necessarily. Therefore, by the above logic, God must exist necessarily.
Guanilo presents a counterargument to Anselm’s Ontological argument. This counter is known as Guanilo’s Island . Guanilo asks us to use parallel logic for the idea of a perfect island. Guanilo says that we can conceive of a perfect island in our minds i.e. an island that which no greater can be conceived. This island can be conceived in the mind, but an island that existed both in the mind and reality would be greater than an island that just existed in the mind. Therefore, Guanilo concludes by parallel logic, a perfect island must exist in the reality. However, Guanilo states that it is unlikely that such an island really does exist. Therefore, the argument for the existence of the perfect island must be incorrect, and by parallel, so must Anselm’s argument for the existence of god. Anselm rebuffs Guanillo by stating that since an island is a physical thing, a greater can always be conceived (an island with one pineapple isn’t as great as an island with two pineapples). However, God is, by definitition, that than which no greater can be conceived, and therefore the ontological argument works once and only once to prove the existence of god. While I do not believe Guanilo did a very good job of explaining why the Ontological Argument is flawed, I do believe that the argument does have its problems. Namely, I question whether existence is actually a great making quality. I shall explore this question in the following paragraphs.
Anselm states that existence is a great making property, but I contest that existence is not a great making property at all. Rather, it is a state of being in much the same way that ice is a state of water. For our purposes, a great making quality will be defined as a nonphysical quality that can be measured on a continuous scale of increasing magnitudes, while a state will be defined as different forms of an object that can only be measured on noncontinuous tiers. To clarify the latter, we can use the states of matter as an example. Matter can be defined as a solid, liquid, or a gas. Since there is no transition period between solids, liquids, and gases where the object is half liquid, half solid, we consider these forms of matter as mutually exclusive. Furthermore a transformation in state will not change the essence of the object. For example, water is still water even if it freezes or evaporates.

Current scholastic/thomistic thought doesn’t regard this arguement of Anslem defensable due to the remote possibility of causing the intellect to bear the full burdon of reality in it’s conceiving. This can, and has, run the risk of devolving into a pure idealism. The idea that all of reality is in the mind bearing no real relation to intelligible reality in a transpersonal sense.

The current argument keeps the intellect firmly in the transpersonal realm through it’s process of precinding from reality by means of the species impressa which reality imposses upon that faculty capable of that impression i.e. the intellect. The intellect in it’s reflex movements then abstracts that which is proper to itself in the form of non material elements, or those elements proper to it’s nature. These elements are called the intelligable species. And it is this that starts it’s motions even with respect to divine proof. For the intellect can only take from the data of experience in the first place in order to build up those notional properties that will lead to proofs about non material reality including by analogy it’s proofs of God’s existence and those properties called the exemplars in God.

Now in as far as existence and non existence is concerned, the constitutive ontological elements necessary for being in this sense comprise prime matter and substantial form. Skipping over for the moment proof of God’s existence, God is pure and unique form lacking (by analogy) prime matter so necessary for material reality.

Cosmologically we can discuss if you like by way of a pause what internally and externally extended being is. For now I’ll leave it at that,

Cicero54

 

[Ghosty]

Just a thought, original with me.
Assuming duality, that both mind and objective reality exist; That which is “greater” because it is both in the mind and real in Anslem’s argument is not God Himself, but rather, just a concept of a greater concept (of God). Like Russian dolls.
This whole argument string here is all in our minds. All arguments are in the mind only. We can’t make an idea itself become an objective, real thing or an entity; i.e., make a god from a concept of a God. Or can we? New age physics? Apparently, God did so.
Cheers
Don

I think we’re making a similar point. Every idea, owing to our limited and contingent nature, is contingent and limited. We can’t ontologically prove a necessary and unlimited being through a limited and contingent thought process; no matter how many steps of “actualness” we work through, the idea remains limited and contingent and bears no clear representation of an unlimited and noncontingent being.

Since the idea can’t even exist truly in the mind, we can’t use its mental existence to demonstrate its actual existence. Even in demonstrating its actual existence we have no true mental reality of God as He is. If we can’t even go from actual reality to mental reality, it is surely impossible to go from mental reality to actual reality. This not merely philosophical conjecture, but is borne out by Divine Revelation as well, such as when Paul indicates that it is not possible to relate his direct experience of Beatitude; it is not translatable into human thought in any true manner.

Peace and God bless!

 

[Kilbourne]

First off let me say that I reject logical positivism, and my points don’t reflect that perspective. A logical positivist would reject metaphysical truth, like necessary existence, which I not only accept but advocate.

My argument is not that a necessary being can’t be proven to exist, but rather that it can’t be proven to exist from its definition or an idea. Every form of the ontological argument tries to prove God a priori by saying “here’s the definition of God, which includes necessary existence, and since necessary existence requires actual existence, God actually exists”. The problem is that while the statement is true from an internal consistency perspective, that internal mental consistency does not compel one to accept the actual existence of the thing. God is necessary, but every possible idea of God is contingent, including the “God” of the Ontological Argument, even the modal version.

As with the necessary triangle, which I don’t think you’ve addressed yet, I can admit that a necessary triangle is possible, and I can admit that a necessary triangle would necessarily exist actually, but this doesn’t compel me to admit the actual existence of this triangle. What I have defined in my head is an actual necessary triangle, but in actuality it remains a contingent being, a thought in my head, and will remain as such no matter how you refine the definition. What does your argument do that forces me, on pain of logical contradiction, to admit the actual existence of my contingent idea?

Taking the argument modal doesn’t help, either. The problem remains that admitting of a definition doesn’t admit to actuality, even of a particular necessary being. I’m compelled only to admit a tautology, namely that a necessary being must be defined as necessary, and that being greatest is better than being almost greatest. This compels me to think of an actual greatest being and readily admit that it is greater than my idea of mental greatest being, but admitting this doesn’t transform my idea of actual greatness into actual actual greatness. We can go on forever, thinking of an actually actually actually actual greatest being, but every time we are back to the fact that my idea will always be a contingent idea and not the thing itself.

It would be logically inconsistant to say that an actual necessary being does not exist, but it is not logically inconsistant to say that the idea of an actual necessray being is contingent, and since all you’ve produced to my mind is an idea, you haven’t demonstrated an actual necessary being.

Now, if you import the Third Way here then you’ve abandoned the ontological argument. You are no longer seeking to prove God, but make statements about an already proven being. The argument then becomes mere tautology, because you’re saying nothing more than “the being we know must exist, must exist”. The ontological argument is supposed to get a non-believer to admit the actual existence of God, but if God must already be demonstrated and proven through the Third Way then the argument fails at its task. You are refining the understanding of necessary being, but not proving its existence through the ontological argument.

Peace and God bless!

Hi Ghosty,

Yes, I am willing to let St. Thomas demonstrate the truth of Step 3. No, I haven’t abandoned the ontological argument in the sense that it, in the second form, merely attempts to show that greatness entails necessary existence. I admit no purely a priori argument is possible. So the argument really becomes: Greatness exists; there are two modes of existing, necessary and contingent; necessary existence is greater than contingent existence; only necessary existence is compatible with greatness; therefore God exists. This argument is not tautological.

 

[Ghosty]

Hi Ghosty,

Yes, I am willing to let St. Thomas demonstrate the truth of Step 3. No, I haven’t abandoned the ontological argument in the sense that it, in the second form, merely attempts to show that greatness entails necessary existence. I admit no purely a priori argument is possible. So the argument really becomes: Greatness exists; there are two modes of existing, necessary and contingent; necessary existence is greater than contingent existence; only necessary existence is compatible with greatness; therefore God exists. This argument is not tautological.

The conclusion should be “therefore God is great”, not “therefore God exists”. You’ve already obliquely assumed the existence of God when you said that necessary existence is real, so saying it at the end is a tautology.

In order to prove, and not just assert, the reality of a necessary being we utilize the Third Way, thus proving God exists. With that already proven your argument merely refines our understanding of God and proves His greatness, His actual being having already proven/admitted.

As Aquinas pointed out, the ontological argument only proceeds when the actual existence of God is already accepted, which makes it useless as a proof.

Peace and God bless!

P.S. Out of curiosity, are you Catholic, Kilbourne? I’ve noticed that ontological arguments are typically used only by non-Catholics, and I’m interested in seeing if my impression holds true here.

 

[Kilbourne]

Hi Cicero,

We had a unit in my philosophy class where we discussed the existence of god, and later wrote a paper discussing one of the arguments (cosmological, teleological, etc.). In my paper, I criticized the ontological argument.

Anselm’s Ontological argument for the existence of God begins by citing god as a being that which no greater can be conceived in respect to the great making qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, etc.

No, Anselm merely defines God as TTWNGCBT. Period. Plantinga adds these other attributes to his version of the argument.

Therefore, if you conceive of a being, and then conceive of one greater, the first being you conceived would not be god.

yes

He states that this sort of being can at least be conceived in the mind. However, since a being that can exist both in the mind and in reality would be greater than one that just exists in the mind, God must really exist in reality to be a truly great being, or else we could imagine a being greater than god, which is impossible.

Yes, this is the “greater than” principle employed by the first version of the argument in Proslogion II.

Furthermore, a being that exists necessarily is greater than a being that does not exist necessarily. Therefore, by the above logic, God must exist necessarily.

Yes, this is the “greater principle” employed by the second (stronger, IMHO) version found in Prosl. III.

sorry, gotta go put the steaks on.

 

[Kilbourne]

The conclusion should be “therefore God is great”, not “therefore God exists”. You’ve already obliquely assumed the existence of God when you said that necessary existence is real, so saying it at the end is a tautology.

In order to prove, and not just assert, the reality of a necessary being we utilize the Third Way, thus proving God exists. With that already proven your argument merely refines our understanding of God and proves His greatness, His actual being having already proven/admitted.

As Aquinas pointed out, the ontological argument only proceeds when the actual existence of God is already accepted, which makes it useless as a proof.

Peace and God bless!

P.S. Out of curiosity, are you Catholic, Kilbourne? I’ve noticed that ontological arguments are typically used only by non-Catholics, and I’m interested in seeing if my impression holds true here.

Hi Ghosty,

Yup, I be Catlick.