A serious logical problem

[R_Daneel]

Doesn’t the very word “contingent” need to be placed inside time though? Contingent, to me, implies a causal relationship which doesn’t really make sense outside time. If God is indeed “outside time” his knowledge of events being created precisely as they happen can’t be a causal relationship.

Of course, we are really incapable of fathoming how a being can interact with anything non-sequentially - so I’ll use that phrase for things that go beyond our intellectual capacity: mystery.

I say be logical. An effect (God’s knowledge) cannot precede its cause (man’s action). Therefore, there is no causal relationship between God’s knowledge and our actions. God does not come to know as man does in time (see previous post). He is knowledge before man exists.

Your argument is a confusion of categories. If you argue about the attribute of the eternal Being then you must take all the terms which relate to the passage of time from your argument (they are irrelevant to the eternal) and restate it.

You both argue the same thing, and you are both wrong. The causal relationship does not require that the cause would preceed the effect, they can be simultaneous.

Before this thread came around, there were many others where the believers argued, that the solution to the omniscience-free will problem is not a big deal: their solution was that God knows what we do, becuse we do it. (Case 2 in my analysis). Of course, they were not aware or forgot the Church’s simplicity dogma. Now that it is pointed out, you guys are in bad shape.

 

[R_Daneel]

Oh, you’re silly. Of course there are other solutions. It’s called compatibilism. Give this link a careful read.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

These are some of the main solutions of the contemporary compatibilist that you don’t think exist. It’s time for you to learn otherwise.

Denettian Free Will- he is a noted atheist and secular humanist, but don’t let that get in the way of the value of his contributions to philosophy.

Hierarchical Compatibilism- Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical mesh theory, circa. 1971. Central to this is the hierarchical theory of free will, which has been categorized as a Real Self Theory. Incidentally, his most successful publication has a title that, if printed here, would consist of “On Bull” followed by four of these *. It spent 27 weeks on the New York Times bestseller list and landed him an interview on The Daily Show…I think in 2005. thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-march-14-2005/harry-g–frankfurt There’s something very satisfying about seeing a Princeton professor get bleeped this much.

There’s also the Reason View, which Susan Wolf is responsible for. The Asymmetry Thesis plays a notable role in this theory. She’s currently at Chapel Hill teaching at NC, but before that…Harvard, Maryland, and Johns Hopkins. BA from Yale, Ph.D from Princeton. Her book having to do with compatibilism is Freedom Within Reason. But hey, I guess you can just ignore all that and say “There are no other solutions.”

Then there’s Reasons-Response Compatibilism, which can be Agent-based or Mechanism-based. And finally, there’s Strawsonian Compatibilism.

What was it you were saying just now? “There are no other solutions.” Yes, that was it.

These are just the contemporary philosophical theories on compatibilism. Don’t let that fool you into thinking compatibilist theories only came into existence in the last 50 years. It’s been around for at least as long as incompatibilism, and probably longer than Christianity’s been around. This isn’t limited to Catholics, to Christians, or even to religion. The first contemporary philosopher that comes up in the source is a guy who’s been listed among the “Four Horsemen,” those being Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, and our main man Dennett. Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism is an issue that transcends Christianity and religion in general. This debate is one that takes place among philosophers, and as I’m sure you well know, various philosophies have had a profound impact on Christianity throughout its history. Some of these philosophies- especially when applied by Aquinas- are treated as if they were handed down from the apostles themselves. In reality, though, this (as it is with the others) is a philosophical argument that has spilled into our backyards.

Anyway, the main point is this. Before you do anything else, I need to see you admit that there are “other solutions.” Compatibilism offers a solution to the “free will problem,” and it’s something that underlies the Catholic teaching on predestination as well as the analogous doctrines of most Protestant traditions.

We aren’t working with something that doesn’t exist.

I have not used the libertarian definition of free will. What I said is valid for both the libertarian and the compatibilist scenarios.

 

[R_Daneel]

But these options are not comprehensive. Consider: God can, for all we know, cause the existence of beings with free will. The fact that He would know our choices in advance does not entail that the choices are not free. There is no “ongoing equivalence” between God’s knowledge and our action, because God’s knowledge is not contingent upon our action,

In the highlighted text you deny God’s omniscience. Is that intentional?

I don’t see how randomness requires time. Can you explain this to me?

I did not say that randomness requires time, rather that any “action” presupposes a before, a during and an after. Timeless action without result is an oxymoron. This is why the supposed timeless and yet active concept of God is just another contradiction. And that contradiction cannot be resolved by creating yet another meaningless phrase: “eternally willed”.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

In the highlighted text you deny God’s omniscience.

No, I don’t. The key word is “ongoing”. The equivalence between God’s knowledge and our action is a priori; it is a necessary truth, unaffected by time. To call it “ongoing” is to misunderstand it.

I did not say that randomness requires time, rather that any “action” presupposes a before, a during and an after.

An “action” may be merely the relation between an intelligent cause and a result. This requires an “after”, but not a “before” or “during”. Now you could claim that “all actions have befores or durings”, but I do not see the reason to accept such a premise.

This is why the supposed timeless and yet active concept of God is just another contradiction. And that contradiction cannot be resolved by creating yet another meaningless phrase: “eternally willed”.

I will agree that it seems very unlike timeless beings to act. You don’t often see the number 5 playing backgammon. However, the only sensible explanation of the existence of reality appeals to a timeless being acting. This is not contradictory, unless you adopt an* a priori* principle that excludes it. If I didn’t have what I believe to be direct experience of God, I probably wouldn’t accept the cosmological argument, so I don’t necessarily blame you for your skepticism. But you’re pointing out “things that don’t make sense to you”, not blatant contradictions.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

If God violates his nature, he would not be perfect and also not even be God. God does not lie, therefore cannot lie. He who lies, cannot also be God.

{although such hardly precludes people from presumptuously *thinking *they have been lied to.)

As I said before, though, it’s a matter of semantics. For example, I would agree that “God cannot lie”, insofar as the description of the set of things a perfect being does will never include lying. However, I want to say that God is *free to *lie. Or perhaps I want to say that “if the ability to lie is a power, then God possesses it”, but then I want to say that the ability to lie is not a power. Maybe that’s the answer: no human being is in fact “free” to lie, because lying is indicative of weakness, and freedom is a power.

 

[R_Daneel]

No, I don’t. The key word is “ongoing”. The equivalence between God’s knowledge and our action is a priori; it is a necessary truth, unaffected by time. To call it “ongoing” is to misunderstand it.

Well, which one is “first”? A-priori has a temporal connotation. Our actions are definitely within a temporal framework.

An “action” may be merely the relation between an intelligent cause and a result. This requires an “after”, but not a “before” or “during”. Now you could claim that “all actions have befores or durings”, but I do not see the reason to accept such a premise.

There are two possibilities here: an action without a result, and an action with a result. The first one cannot really be called an “action”. If there is a result, then the action produced something which was not there “before”. Therefore the very concept of an action presupposes a time, a “before” the action, the “during” the action (which may be a zero length) and an “after” the action. Therefore any action - by its very definition - must occur in some “time” (not necessarily in “our” time), it must have a “before” and an “after”. Without these categories, the notion of “action” is a meaningless phrase.

I will agree that it seems very unlike timeless beings to act. You don’t often see the number 5 playing backgammon. However, the only sensible explanation of the existence of reality appeals to a timeless being acting. This is not contradictory, unless you adopt an* a priori* principle that excludes it. If I didn’t have what I believe to be direct experience of God, I probably wouldn’t accept the cosmological argument, so I don’t necessarily blame you for your skepticism. But you’re pointing out “things that don’t make sense to you”, not blatant contradictions.

I really have no idea what you are saying here. Timeless action is a contradiction in terms, or - if you prefer - it is a meaningless utterance.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well, which one is “first”? A-priori has a temporal connotation. Our actions are definitely within a temporal framework.

A priori, as it has come to be used in philosophy, actually doesn’t always carry its etymological implication of time. It means “without experience.” Thus, you can know something *a priori *without your knowledge being caused by any observation or experience. Perhaps humans have no pure a priori knowledge, but any simple omniscient being would know a priori, not from experience.

There are two possibilities here: an action without a result, and an action with a result. The first one cannot really be called an “action”. If there is a result, then the action produced something which was not there “before”. Therefore the very concept of an action presupposes a time, a “before” the action, the “during” the action (which may be a zero length) and an “after” the action. Therefore any action - by its very definition - must occur in some “time” (not necessarily in “our” time), it must have a “before” and an “after”. Without these categories, the notion of “action” is a meaningless phrase.

I don’t follow your reasoning. I will agree to call only things with results “actions”. But your statement “if there is a result, then the action produced something that was not there before” presumes something: namely, that the before would exist without the after. I agree that, once the first action has been taken, it is meaningful to speak of “time” before that first action, but only in the negative sense. Think of it this way: if you have a book in front of you, you *can *talk about the page before the cover, and be understood. But there is no such page.

The alternative is this argument: Either there was a first action, or there was not a first action. If there was not a first action, then there are no actions now. If there was a first action, then this was either the action of God or some other sentient being. Suppose it was some other sentient being; then God does not exist. Suppose it was God that first acted. Then time preceded God, time coceded God (God and time are one), or time was inaugurated by the first action of God. If time preceded God, then God is not God, so we’ll scrap that one.

So we’re left with either a) God and time coexisted infinitely, or b) time was begun by God. Neither of them lead to contradictions, so far as I can tell.

I really have no idea what you are saying here. Timeless action is a contradiction in terms, or - if you prefer - it is a meaningless utterance.

Computer programmers make programs that inaugurate “time” – a succession of events in a closed system – upon the world of their programs. Perhaps you’re implying that we ought to say that God exists in “metatime”? If so, perhaps there is something to be said for that, although his “time” does not look anything like our time.

 

[o_mlly]

You both argue the same thing, and you are both wrong. The causal relationship does not require that the cause would preceed the effect, they can be simultaneous.

…

There you go again…using terms involving time – “simultaneous” – when arguing about the attribute of a Being in eternity. You continue to argue illogically.

Even in time, an effect cannot be simultaneous with its cause. Coincidence is not causality. Prior to being effected, that which is effected must contain the potential to acquire the effect and the cause must be actuated. For instance, wood contains the potential for heat. The flame is actual heat. After the flame combines with the wood, then and only then is the potential in the wood for heat effected.

Normally, to disprove a hypothesis, one must only show one flaw: an ambiguous term, a false premise, or a logical error. You have all three going for you in this thread.

 

[R_Daneel]

A priori, as it has come to be used in philosophy, actually doesn’t always carry its etymological implication of time. It means “without experience.” Thus, you can know something *a priori *without your knowledge being caused by any observation or experience. Perhaps humans have no pure a priori knowledge, but any simple omniscient being would know a priori, not from experience.

That makes no sense at all, if “knowledge” is to have any meaning. Knowledge is information about something. One cannot speak of information, if there is no object the information pertains to. It is meaningless to speak of the contents of a nonexistent book.

I don’t follow your reasoning. I will agree to call only things with results “actions”. But your statement “if there is a result, then the action produced something that was not there before” presumes something: namely, that the before would exist without the after. I agree that, once the first action has been taken, it is meaningful to speak of “time” before that first action, but only in the negative sense. Think of it this way: if you have a book in front of you, you *can *talk about the page before the cover, and be understood. But there is no such page.

And to speak of the “page before the cover” is a syntantically correct, but semantically meaningless proposition. Just like the point in space which is to the north from the North Pole. Not all propositions are meaningful.

The alternative is this argument: Either there was a first action, or there was not a first action. If there was not a first action, then there are no actions now. If there was a first action, then this was either the action of God or some other sentient being. Suppose it was some other sentient being; then God does not exist. Suppose it was God that first acted. Then time preceded God, time coceded God (God and time are one), or time was inaugurated by the first action of God. If time preceded God, then God is not God, so we’ll scrap that one.

It is not that simple. “First” anything presupposes that the elements of the set can be mapped to the natural numbers. Not all sets have this property. For example, the set of all positive numbers does not have a “first” element, but the numbers exist. They just cannot be mapped onto the sequence of “1, 2, …” etc.

Computer programmers make programs that inaugurate “time” – a succession of events in a closed system – upon the world of their programs. Perhaps you’re implying that we ought to say that God exists in “metatime”? If so, perhaps there is something to be said for that, although his “time” does not look anything like our time.

That is agreeable. Whatever “meta-time” God has, it is still a “time”, though it can can be completely different from our time. No problem at all. However, our time must be mapped onto God’s time, and if something does not exist in our time, then it cannot be mapped onto God’s time, therefore it is meaningless to say that God can have knowledge about something that does not exist in our time.

 

[Nan_S]

Suppose it was God that first acted. Then time preceded God, time coceded God (God and time are one), or time was inaugurated by the first action of God. If time preceded God, then God is not God, so we’ll scrap that one.

So we’re left with either a) God and time coexisted infinitely, or b) time was begun by God. Neither of them lead to contradictions, so far as I can tell.

Time is not God. Time is also not part of God’s nature, because God is not limited by Time. Quite the opposite is true; God controls and limits Time. God can slow or hasten the passage of time as He wills; there are plenty of accounts of that happening. God is also not limited by Time because God exists outside of Time. In His omniscience He sees all of the events that occur within time simultaneously. (We sometimes describe that, rather poorly, by saying God already knows what you will do before you choose to do it.)

Now part of the definition of God, as Christians understand it, is that God is greater than everything and God is the source of everything. If we said that Time existed simultaneously with God from all eternity, then we would be saying there is something apart from God, which is not God, which coexisted with God from all eternity. We would be saying that there is at least one thing - Time - which is God’s equal in some way. Essentially, we would be elevating Time to the god-level, and we would be saying that God was not greater than nor the source of everything.

Therefore, premise #2 fails. According to Christian theology God and Time can not coincide with each other. Time is instead a created thing of God’s.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Yes, it is getting boring by now, but the problem of omniscience and free will needs to be addressed again. The basic problem is this:

Suppose that God knows all our future decisions, and yet we still have freedom to act on our own volition, that is: “we have free will”. This is what Catholics assert in a unanimous fashion. If this is the case, there are 3 different ways of addressing the interrelationship between these two entities.

1. God’s knowledge is the causative factor in determining our actions. In other words, we do whatever we do, because God knows what we shall do. Obviously this negates our freedom totally and completely. Catholics - naturally - deny this.
2. Our actions are the causative factors in determining God’s knowledge. In other words, God knows what we shall do, because we do those acts. The problem here is that God’s knowledge is logically contingent upon our actions. If we would act differently it would “retroactively” (retroactively is not meant in the temporal sense, rather in the causative one!) change God’s knowledge. However, it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is “simple”, God has no “parts”, God is “indivisible”. God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions. Clearly, that would be contradictory to God’s essence - which is supposed to be uncaused. (It is true, that some Catholics advocate this solution. Of course they fail to think it over, and do not realize the ramification of their stance.)
3. There is a third possibility (for the sake of completeness), which is never discussed or even mentioned. This possibility is that God’s knowledge and our free actions are totally independent, there is no causative relationship either way. In other words, God’s knowledge just “happens” to coincide with our actions, it is mere chance that the two “happen” to be identical. No one advocates this solution. Natually so, since it reduces God’s knowledge (and therefore God’s essence) to something that depends on lucky chances.

Therefore, the conclusion is this:

1. God’s knowledge cannot cause our actions - because that would negate our free will.
2. Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.
3. God’s knowledge cannot be based upon lucky chances - because that would render God’s essence to be the result of random chance.

There are no other solutions. Therefore, omniscience and free will cannot be reconciled. Q.E.D.

the answer is simple.

there is no such thing as time. it is simply an arbitrary measurement of the change that occurs around us. physicists call this the “problem of time”. barbour wrote a book describing it

barbours explanation.
youtube.com/watch_popup?v=WKsNraFxPwk#t=19

this means that all change happens concurrently in the temporal sense. ergo, your action and G-ds knowledge is concurrent.

therefore there is no contradiction between G-ds omniscience and free will.

 

[R_Daneel]

the answer is simple.

there is no such thing as time. it is simply an arbitrary measurement of the change that occurs around us. physicists call this the “problem of time”. barbour wrote a book describing it

barbours explanation.
youtube.com/watch_popup?v=WKsNraFxPwk#t=19

this means that all change happens concurrently in the temporal sense. ergo, your action and G-ds knowledge is concurrent.

therefore there is no contradiction between G-ds omniscience and free will.

Even if that is taken verbatim, it does not solve the problem. Which causes what? Our actions cause God’s knowledge? Or God’s knowledge causes our actions? Or are they both caused by some external agent? Or are they independent, and simply “happen” to coincide? (Besides, your usage of the word “concurrent” imples time. In the language there is no construct to express “timelessness”).

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Time is not God.

I agree. My point, though, was that from a purely logical standpoint, one could derive that either God & time always coexisted (or are the same), or God made time. Revelation tells me the latter is true.

 

[yppop]

It is not that simple. “First” anything presupposes that the elements of the set can be mapped to the natural numbers. Not all sets have this property. For example, the set of all positive numbers does not have a “first” element, but the numbers exist. They just cannot be mapped onto the sequence of “1, 2, …” etc.

R Daneel

I assume by “natural numbers” you mean the positive integers with or without 0, but what do you mean by “positive numbers”? I believe you mean “irrational numbers” because that is the set that doesn’t “map” (I assume you mean put into 1 to 1 correspondence) to the natural numbers. You are wrong when you imply that a set without a “first” element cannot be mapped to the natural numbers. The integers, which range from –n to +n, have no first number since the –n can be infinite, can be put into 1 to 1 correspondence with the natural numbers. Also the rational numbers that have no “first” number and are infinitely dense can still be put into 1 to 1 correspondence with the natural numbers; the irrationals can’t. Natural numbers, integers, and rational numbers all have the same cardinality = aleph(0). The irrational numbers (surds) have a cardinality = aleph(1).

Your example used to counter Prodigal_Son’s argument that God created time is in error and you might want to rethink it or Prodigal_Son wins that point.

Let me give you my thoughts on the nature of time also given on another thread “Does Time Have a Beginning?”:

God always existed; God always thought; God’s thought is a form of change; change is manifested as time; therefore God’s thought is manifested as ontological time.

God’s thoughts created the cosmos; the cosmos consists of constantly changing matter and space; the changes in matter and space that form the cosmos are manifested as cosmological time.

Ontological time is different than cosmological time; ontological time is infinite; cosmological time is finite. Therefore, God exists in ontological time and created cosmological time.

Now for the relationship between God’s omniscience and free will: that is a bit more sticky, but I feel it can be resolved by invoking another form of time, which is associated with changes in a person’s decisions (free will) from one parallel world to the next; I call it radial time.

However, just the mention of parallel worlds (a hypothesis accepted by a large segment to the scientific community) would take too much of my time explaining. Perhaps Warpspeedpetey, having read Barbour’s theory that time does not exist could figure something out.

Yppop

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Even if that is taken verbatim, it does not solve the problem. Which causes what? Our actions cause God’s knowledge? Or God’s knowledge causes our actions? Or are they both caused by some external agent? Or are they independent, and simply “happen” to coincide? (Besides, your usage of the word “concurrent” imples time. In the language there is no construct to express “timelessness”).

there is no screen between our free will and Him that would necessitate His knowledge to be caused if there is no time. G-d is simple, we are not. if you ignore the idea of time and count the intervals of change out by a cause:effect, cause:effect, cause:effect, scheme. G-d as the Maximal State of Being, or as Aquinas might say the Being whose Essence is Existence, lies along every point in that schema. this doesnt mean that G-ds Essence, is the same as our essence, as you seem to imply.

 

[Areopagite]

A good question R Daneel. I don’t know if I have a right answer to it … but I’m pretty sure I do. And, I don’t think anyone so far has answered it at all (on this thread at least).

First of all, I would remark that in Christian theology it is understood that whenever we attribute a word to God, that word is always used analogously to what is commonly meant by that word. For a vivid and perhaps more obvious example, when we talk about God’s “anger” it doesn’t mean that God (in the Old Testament at least) actually experiences an emotion of violent inclination. It rather means that God in that point in time is acting in such a way that only somewhat resembles anger … in that case, God is punishing evil-doers in some dramatic way, for example. Scripture relates this to anger because anger is an emotion that inclines us to change something that we have perceived (or have made ourselves think) is wrong or an obstacle to fulfillment in some way (in short). Such analogous language is even employed when we talk about God’s love. God’s love is different from human love … though there is some comparison or similarity between the two. Pretty much everything we say about God must employ an analogous use of words. Thomas Aquinas … and pretty much any canonized figure in Church History would say this as well.

I think the same can be said about God’s knowledge. One question to ask here is: “What are people really asking when they wonder if God knows what’s going to happen?” Are they merely curious about the question in itself? Or is there some deeper and more specific truth they want to know that actually is important to … human happiness? Why does anyone care whether God knows the future or not?

I think the central reason why the knowledge of God is a question on people’s minds is … they want to know if God will know what to do for us in any given situation. They want to know whether God might drop the ball on something simply because he wasn’t well-informed enough about something. They want to know whether God can be trusted not simply on his good intentions but also on the reliability of his knowledge … including that of the future.

Now, I think we could agree that God (if He exists, of course) knows every possible outcome. That is, He knows everything that could happen in human history … including all possible acts of human free will. Furthermore, I would say (and I don’t think this is unreasonable) that God also knows what interventions must take place to accomplish His divine plan if certain contingent acts of human free will should happen.

Hence, God knows all that might happen … and knows how to deal with all contingencies in a perfect and supremely beneficent way.

Hence, He has knowledge of all possible reality of the future … but does He have knowledge all actual reality of the future … or knowledge of any actual reality of contingent human events whatsoever?

First of all, from a practical matter, does this matter? That is, for example, if God does not have knowledge of actualized contingencies, though He might have the knowledge of how to deal with all possible contingencies, would He nonetheless be unable to do anything about it? Must He know that the thing was actualized in order for He Himself to actually act accordingly?

Well, if God exists and from all eternity acted to bring this universe into existence, it is presumable that He designed it in such a way that certain things would happen (which we call divine interventions) if certain contingent free-will human acts occur. Now, how the mechanics would work in such a case … who knows. But I don’t think this idea requires working out such details (unless someone can prove me wrong). This does not necessitate that the universe is deterministically constructed, however … but merely that it is designed in such a way that certain things comes to pass if certain conditions are fulfilled such that God’s divine plan is fulfilled.

Angels might also have something to do with it … having received commands to do things if certain things happen.

So in the practical matter of God knowing what to do in all circumstances and being able to do it … the question whether God has knowledge of actualized contingencies by human free will is irrelevant.

Might the question be relevant in any other matter? I ask this because answering this question will, I think, always require analogous uses of words … and hence explaining the exact meanings of the words require particular explication that addresses the deeper matter at hand. I think I have shown that, in all practicality of divine guidance of creation, God DOES know what will happen … and that free will is nevertheless preserved. So the question is … in what sense does God NOT know the future? Perhaps there are some ways He doesn’t know the future … I don’t know. But is there a particular sense you’re talking about? What exactly is problematic about the nature of God (as claimed by Catholics) with regard to knowing contingencies actualized by human free will? What exactly is the serious logical problem you speak of?

Now, if I have spoken in error, theologians, I would ask to be corrected with haste.

 

[R_Daneel]

First of all, I would remark that in Christian theology it is understood that whenever we attribute a word to God, that word is always used analogously to what is commonly meant by that word. For a vivid and perhaps more obvious example, when we talk about God’s “anger” it doesn’t mean that God (in the Old Testament at least) actually experiences an emotion of violent inclination. It rather means that God in that point in time is acting in such a way that only somewhat resembles anger … in that case, God is punishing evil-doers in some dramatic way, for example.

I have no problem with this principle, after all we use the concept of analogy all the time. We might say that the property of “loyalty” is applicable to both humans and dogs - but they do not mean the same thing, since humans and dogs are different.

I do have a practical problem, however. Let’s say that the dog’s loyalty needs explanation. We have an “equation” A to B is like C to X (where A is human nature, B is human loyalty, C is the dog’s nature and X is the dog’s loyalty). Having 3 known and one unknown factors the equation can be solved and we can arrive at an understanding about the dog’s loyalty. So far so good.

When we attempt to use the same principle to God, we run into a practical problem. Human goodness to human nature is like God’s goodness to God’s nature. However, God’s nature is at least partly composed of his goodness. Therefore we have A to B is like Y to X… except here we have two known and two unknown factors. Therefore the analogy cannot be “solved”. (And of course God’s simplicity becomes another question, bet we can disregard that here).

Now, I think we could agree that God (if He exists, of course) knows every possible outcome. That is, He knows everything that could happen in human history … including all possible acts of human free will. Furthermore, I would say (and I don’t think this is unreasonable) that God also knows what interventions must take place to accomplish His divine plan if certain contingent acts of human free will should happen.

Hence, God knows all that might happen … and knows how to deal with all contingencies in a perfect and supremely beneficent way.

Hence, He has knowledge of all possible reality of the future … but does He have knowledge all actual reality of the future … or knowledge of any actual reality of contingent human events whatsoever?

Well, here comes another question. Let’s say, you are about to roll die. You can say that you know, that the result will be either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 (or maybe none of the above if the die falls into a tar-pit and lands on one of its corners). That is trivial “knowledge”. Unless you know the actual outcome, your knowledge is incomplete. I hope you agree.

But the problem goes even further. Let’s forget about the future for a second and ponder something else. Suppose there was a human writer who could have been born - if his parents would have met and fallen in love - but they never did. This writer could have written a book - but he never did. Does it make sense that God could “know” the contents of this nonexistent book, which was never written, since its author was never born? Makes no sense at all. Something that does not exist cannot be “known” in any sense of the word “to know”.

Now we can return to the future. Does the future exist as the present or as the past existed? Are there free decisions in the present? Are there (not WERE there!) free decisions in the past? As soon as a free decision is made, the freedom disappears.

What exactly is problematic about the nature of God (as claimed by Catholics) with regard to knowing contingencies actualized by human free will? What exactly is the serious logical problem you speak of?

The problem is the causative nature of God’s knowledge.

If God knows “everything” because we do it (or did it, or shall do it), then God’s knowledge is contingent. Since God’s knowledge is part of God’s nature, if God’s knowledge is contingent, then God’s nature is contingent.

If, however God knows “everything” a-priori, then our actual actions are caused by this knowledge - negating free will.

Finally, if God’s knowledge is independent from our actions, and neither causes the other, then you have either something external causing both (which means that God’s knowledge is still contingent and also we have no free will), or you have a colossal impossibility, where God “just” happens to know all of our actions, neither causing the other.

Now, if I have spoken in error, theologians, I would ask to be corrected with haste.

You just expressed my ultimate desire. I fervently wish that a theologian/scientist would be available for some serious conversation. Preferably a Jesuit. I heard many good things about them. Alas, they have better things to do, I presume.

 

[Areopagite]

Human goodness to human nature is like God’s goodness to God’s nature. However, God’s nature is at least partly composed of his goodness … Therefore the analogy cannot be “solved”.

The problem you bring up is legitimate and theologians admit this. Knowing God’s nature is not naturally possible for humans. Any real knowledge of the divine nature itself requires divinely infused concepts. Even if one has these concepts, it’s not possible to communicate them to another unless the other supernaturally receives those divinely infused concepts himself. On a natural level, we pretty much can only know what God is not (the via negativa). The analogous language to describe God ultimately only makes to those with faith. Oftentimes, hearing the analogous language can be the occasion for one to grow in faith … they can be an aid to faith … but analogous language about God’s nature itself cannot positively reveal the divine essence to someone who possesses purely natural concepts.

But! This doesn’t mean the claims of faith are contradictory to reason. Hence, this conversation can continue. Your objection (well, depending on what exactly it is) can still be disproved by natural reason alone.

Well, here comes another question. Let’s say, you are about to roll die. You can say that you know, that the result will be either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 (or maybe none of the above if the die falls into a tar-pit and lands on one of its corners). That is trivial “knowledge”. Unless you know the actual outcome, your knowledge is incomplete. I hope you agree.

Why is it trivial? What benefit do you gain by knowing the actual outcome? This is an important question.

But the problem goes even further. Let’s forget about the future for a second and ponder something else. Suppose there was a human writer who could have been born - if his parents would have met and fallen in love - but they never did. This writer could have written a book - but he never did. Does it make sense that God could “know” the contents of this nonexistent book, which was never written, since its author was never born? Makes no sense at all. Something that does not exist cannot be “known” in any sense of the word “to know”.

Ah, yes, this argument again.

It depends what you mean by “knowing the non-existent book.” You must specify what you mean by “knowing”, “non-existent”, and also “book.” Obviously, when you said “book” in this example, that term obviously referred to something, otherwise your whole example is meaningless. If it referred to something, presumably you were referring to something that could exist (unlike a square circle). Hence the book has potential existence, and in that sense is not non-existent. As I said before, God would know all potential existence … and hence, He would know the contents of this book because any possible content it could have … God knows it all.

But you are asking … would God know what particular, actual book this guy would have necessarily written if he had written it? Well, then, no. This is because the very idea of a necessary and yet contingent book actually existing in potentiality is completely self-contradictory. The truth is that he could have written all sorts of things … not just necessarily one thing.

But, God can know of all the possibilities of what the book could have been.

So, I disagree with you when you say something that doesn’t (actually) exist cannot be known* in any sense of the word* “to know.” Aristotle especially (if that’s worth anything to you) would disagree with you too. We can know possibilities. But we obviously cannot know pure possibilities as necessary actualities (otherwise they wouldn’t be pure possibilities) … and God cannot overcome that logical shackle either.

Now we can return to the future. Does the future exist as the present or as the past existed? Are there free decisions in the present? Are there (not WERE there!) free decisions in the past? As soon as a free decision is made, the freedom disappears.

Well, obviously, the terms past, present, and future are relative terms. When we say “does the future exist?” … it can mean “do some things that do not actually exist now have the possibility of actually existing afterwards?” In which case, the answer is yes … it is possible that some things will still actually exist after the present point in asking such a question. Or if one says “does the future exist?” and means “Do some things that do not have actual existence now (but have potential existence) nonetheless have actual existence now?” then the answer is no … for you can’t have both actual existence and non-actual existence of the same thing at the same time.

So, does the future exist as the present or as the past existed? No. This is because the past is those things which have been actualized relative to now, whereas the future is things which may be (but are not yet) actualized relative to now. There is the difference.

So, I’m not sure what you’re talking about. Perhaps you don’t know what I’m talking about either.

If God knows “everything” because we do it (or did it, or shall do it), then God’s knowledge is contingent. Since God’s knowledge is part of God’s nature, if God’s knowledge is contingent, then God’s nature is contingent.

This is logical, provided you define God’s “knowledge” in a certain way. I showed in the previous post an analogous use of the word in which neither God’s immutability nor human free will were compromised. Right?

Now, once again, what meaningful and important way can an immutable God not be knowledgeable about the future (or any contingent thing)?

 

[R_Daneel]

Why is it trivial? What benefit do you gain by knowing the actual outcome? This is an important question.

It all depends. if you happen to gamble on the outcome, it matters very much.

Ah, yes, this argument again.

It depends what you mean by “knowing the non-existent book.” You must specify what you mean by “knowing”, “non-existent”, and also “book.” Obviously, when you said “book” in this example, that term obviously referred to something, otherwise your whole example is meaningless. If it referred to something, presumably you were referring to something that could exist (unlike a square circle). Hence the book has potential existence, and in that sense is not non-existent. As I said before, God would know all potential existence … and hence, He would know the contents of this book because any possible content it could have … God knows it all.

But you are asking … would God know what particular, actual book this guy would have necessarily written if he had written it? Well, then, no. This is because the very idea of a necessary and yet contingent book actually existing in potentiality is completely self-contradictory. The truth is that he could have written all sorts of things … not just necessarily one thing.

To clarify: “knowledge is information about something”. If that book was never written, then it makes no sense “to have information about its contents”. I can say that I know all the telephone numbers in the world - but it is an “empty knowledge” - since I don’t know which phone number belongs to whom.

But, God can know of all the possibilities of what the book could have been.

So, I disagree with you when you say something that doesn’t (actually) exist cannot be known* in any sense of the word* “to know.” Aristotle especially (if that’s worth anything to you) would disagree with you too. We can know possibilities. But we obviously cannot know pure possibilities as necessary actualities (otherwise they wouldn’t be pure possibilities) … and God cannot overcome that logical shackle either.

Potential existence is at best a sloppy expression. Something either exists, or does not. Something cannot both exist and not exist. Yes, we use phrases like “the contents of a book I am about to write” - but such phrases are improper.

Well, obviously, the terms past, present, and future are relative terms. When we say “does the future exist?” … it can mean “do some things that do not actually exist now have the possibility of actually existing afterwards?” In which case, the answer is yes … it is possible that some things will still actually exist after the present point in asking such a question. Or if one says “does the future exist?” and means “Do some things that do not have actual existence now (but have potential existence) nonetheless have actual existence now?” then the answer is no … for you can’t have both actual existence and non-actual existence of the same thing at the same time.

You see, “non-actual existence” is a contradiction in terms.

So, does the future exist as the present or as the past existed? No. This is because the past is those things which have been actualized relative to now, whereas the future is things which may be (but are not yet) actualized relative to now. There is the difference.

So, I’m not sure what you’re talking about. Perhaps you don’t know what I’m talking about either.

Yes, and I agree with you. We do use the term “potential existence” sometimes, but it is misleading. Yes, an acorn can grow into an oak tree, given the proper circumstances, but the acorn is just an acorn - not a potential oak tree. Clarity is of utmost impotrance - when one tries a philosophical conversation. Sure, in everyday parlance we can talk about “potential existence”, but not here.

This is logical, provided you define God’s “knowledge” in a certain way. I showed in the previous post an analogous use of the word in which neither God’s immutability nor human free will were compromised. Right?

Now, once again, what meaningful and important way can an immutable God not be knowledgeable about the future (or any contingent thing)?

I am not sure what you mean here. As I said, knowledge is information. If something does not exist, then there can be no information about it. Let’s put it way: the proposition: “I have a nonexistent book and a nonexistent ball on my table” is a syntactically correct but semantically meaningless proposition. This is why one cannot know the contents of a book, which does not exist. And a book which might be written in the future definitely does not exist. Once it will be wriiten then it will exist, and then its contents can be known.

 

[Chiral]

…Before this thread came around, there were many others where the believers argued that the solution to the omniscience-free will problem is not a big deal: their solution was that God knows what we do, becuse we do it. (Case 2 in my analysis). Of course, they were not aware or forgot the Church’s simplicity dogma. Now that it is pointed out, you guys are in bad shape.

Just throwing in my 2-cents. I am one of those who argued the above, and I am very much aware of Church dogma regarding God’s simplicity. Aquinas already handled all of this in the Summa Contra Gentiles. I think you may be confused with regard to what divine “simplicty” means and what constitutes an “attribute”.

Logic: “Knowledge” cannot stand alone, it requires an Object, thus knowledge is in practice “knowledge of”. Knowledge OF an object/event, etc. is therefore logically contingent on (i.e. it cannot exist independently of) that very same object/event, etc.
Thus, God’s knowledge OF our choices is logically contingent upon our making them.
(Note, time has not come in yet)

Here is the kicker: “Knowledge” is NOT an “attribute”. The attribute is the property of knowing which is necessarily contingent upon the existence of precisely one thing, the “knower”. God’s essence remains simple in His property of knowing, His omniscience. This property is “caused” by His own existence as the “knower”, maintaining his simple logical self-sustenance (lack of external contingency).

NOW, God’s simplicity requires that this property of knowing is unchanging. Well, “change” implies time, which His nature transcends. “Omniscience” covers this, the property of knowing all things (logically knowable). Because He transcends time, the knowledge He possesses that is contingent upon non-God entities, He has possessed from all eternity! Thus, the extent of His knowledge, from our point of view, remains unchanging even though it may be logically contingent upon our choices/actions. Neat, huh?

Main point: “Knowledge” is not an attribute. Knowledge is logically contingent upon 2 things: the property of “knowing” in the “knower”, and the object of that precise knowledge.
Again, just my 2-cents, but I believe that should solve your trilemma