A serious logical problem

[R_Daneel]

If you only knew the possible outcomes of a die-toss, then obviously it would be inappropriate to call you omniscient.

But you still haven’t answered my question. Why does it matter if God doesn’t know actual contingencies? You have merely said, rather ambiguously and unhelpfully, that He wouldn’t have “full knowledge.” Elaborate on what you mean by that in a way that shows that it has any importance at all.

I don’t mind it at all. But that is not how omniscience is understood. If you wish to exclude God’s knowledge of the actual outcomes, that is fine by me. But in this case we have to redefine omniscience.

Well, that’s a convenient way to dismiss it. Obviously, if you’re not going to go into specifics on why you think it’s mumbo-jumbo, then it doesn’t convince me that you really looked at it. Can you go into specifics and tell me where it makes a bad or “unnecessarily complicated” distinction?

Do you really want to spen time and effort on this?

What? How is that necessarily useless? I think people who work with cosmetics would find that very helpful (to match skin tones and whatnot). In fact they probably already have a system of categorization for that.

I stand corrected. There can be some uses for a categorization like that, in some very limited sense.

However, I’m curious about the following things (regarding your system):

• Where does “Nothing” fit in?
• Where does “Square Circle” fit in? (under Conceptual Existence? Because square circles cannot really be conceived of … you can’t have a concept of a “square circle”)
• Where does “physical possibility” fit in? (because isn’t what is physically possible rooted in physical existence and reality somehow? Not just conceptual?)
• What about imagination? (imagination pertains to mere mental imaging and not their meaning … that is, not their concepts, because that’s the intellect’s job … so imagination wouldn’t fall under conceptual existence)
• Does the “law of gravity” fall under the conceptual world too? (because our understanding of the gravity … as well as all things in science … are concepts)

All are concepts.

“Nothing” is a concept. It does not “exist” as physical entity.
“Square circle” is also a concept. It has no entity that it actually refers to. But neither does a “married bachelor”, or the “point which is to the north from the North Pole”. The labguage allows us to “create” nonsensical concepts.
“Physical possibility” is also a concept. There is no physical entity that would correspond to a “possibility”.
“Imagination” is process, the activity of brain. Just like “walking” is an activity of the legs. Both are also concepts.
The “law of gravity” is also a concept.

We can subdivide concepts into several categories. Concepts which pertain to physical existence. Concepts which pertain to other concepts. Nonsensical (logically self-contradictory) concepts, like the infamous “square circle”. And probably some others…

 

[Areopagite]

I don’t mind it at all. But that is not how omniscience is understood. If you wish to exclude God’s knowledge of the actual outcomes, that is fine by me. But in this case we have to redefine omniscience.

Very good.

And this is exactly what definition I am proposing for omniscience as it applies to God.

Hence, when we say God “knows everything” this is an analogical use of the word know … because all words that are applied to God are usually analogical (as I said when I brought up God’s “anger”).

Do you really want to spen time and effort on this?

I’ve opened a thread called “Where does Aristotle go wrong?” where we can discuss this (if you want). I would be interested in your comments.

All are concepts.

“Nothing” is a concept. It does not “exist” as physical entity.
“Square circle” is also a concept. It has no entity that it actually refers to. But neither does a “married bachelor”, or the “point which is to the north from the North Pole”. The labguage allows us to “create” nonsensical concepts.
“Physical possibility” is also a concept. There is no physical entity that would correspond to a “possibility”.
“Imagination” is process, the activity of brain. Just like “walking” is an activity of the legs. Both are also concepts.
The “law of gravity” is also a concept.

We can subdivide concepts into several categories. Concepts which pertain to physical existence. Concepts which pertain to other concepts. Nonsensical (logically self-contradictory) concepts, like the infamous “square circle”. And probably some others…

When you said that we can subdivide concepts in several categories, then you won me over, for the most part.

However, regarding physical possibility … is it not true that what is physical possible is grounded in physical existence, independent of our concepts? Doesn’t physical possibility fall under physical existence therefore (or at least fall under “reality”)?

 

[R_Daneel]

Very good.

And this is exactly what definition I am proposing for omniscience as it applies to God.

Hence, when we say God “knows everything” this is an analogical use of the word know … because all words that are applied to God are usually analogical (as I said when I brought up God’s “anger”).

Cool hand, Luke. I don’t know if we can go any further, if we cannot p(name removed by moderator)oint just what does “God’s knowledge” mean.

I’ve opened a thread called “Where does Aristotle go wrong?” where we can discuss this (if you want). I would be interested in your comments.

Thank you, I will go and check it out. Though metaphysics is not my favorite subject, I hold epistemology much more important.

When you said that we can subdivide concepts in several categories, then you won me over, for the most part.

However, regarding physical possibility … is it not true that what is physical possible is grounded in physical existence, independent of our concepts? Doesn’t physical possibility fall under physical existence therefore (or at least fall under “reality”)?

Good question. It is the problem of predicting how something will turn out, given the starting conditions, and the knowledge of the process involved. As usual, the answer is not simple. If we have “full” knowledge of the starting conditions, and if we have “full” knowledge of the process, and if the process is “fully” deterministic, then we can calculate the eventual outcome - therefore we can develop a mental image (knowledge) of how the end result will turn out.

Many times it is not the case. The chaotic processes (like the weather) are very sensitive to the starting conditions (the butterfly effect) so correct prediction of the weather is impossible. Other times the process is much simpler, for example a coin toss, and theoretically the result is predictable. It certainly looks like that most of the natural processes are inherently chaotic, so we must “wait” for them to finish and then - when the result actually exists - we can gain information (knowledge), but not before.

In mathematics there is the Mandelbrot set (check it out, if you don’t happen to know it) the process of calculation is very simple (z = z^2 + c) an iterative process where “z” starts with zero, and “c” is a complex number. The end result for every possible “c” is extremely sensitive to the value of “c”, if we change one digit in the thousandth (or millionth) decimal position, the result can be widely off - it is a chaotic process - therefore unpredictable. And here we deal with the exact science of mathematics.

 

[Areopagite]

Cool hand, Luke. I don’t know if we can go any further, if we cannot p(name removed by moderator)oint just what does “God’s knowledge” mean.

I didn’t mean to sound like like, “Oh, it’s a mystery, so don’t even try.” What I meant was that God’s omniscience must be understood in a slightly different way compared to how human knowledge would be like (or even how “all human knowledge” would be like). On the one hand (so I claim), divine knowledge does not seem to contain what contingencies have been actualized. On the other hand, nonetheless, divine knowledge fulfills all the benefits one would have with the knowledge of what contingencies have been actualized … and hence in all meaningful terms, God does know contingent things.

Once again, this is why (quoting myself in a previous post):

I think the central reason why the knowledge of God is a question on people’s minds is … they want to know if God will know what to do for us in any given situation. They want to know whether God might drop the ball on something simply because he wasn’t well-informed enough about something. They want to know whether God can be trusted not simply on his good intentions but also on the reliability of his knowledge … including that of the future.

Now, I think we could agree that God (if He exists, of course) knows every possible outcome. That is, He knows everything that could happen in human history … including all possible acts of human free will. Furthermore, I would say (and I don’t think this is unreasonable) that God also knows what interventions must take place to accomplish His divine plan if certain contingent acts of human free will should happen.

… if God exists and from all eternity acted to bring this universe into existence, it is presumable that He designed it in such a way that certain things would happen … if certain contingent free-will human acts occur … This does not necessitate that the universe is deterministically constructed, however … but merely that it is designed in such a way that certain things comes to pass if certain conditions are fulfilled such that God’s divine plan is fulfilled.

I hope that makes some sense now. If it doesn’t, then the blame probably falls on me.

Thank you, I will go and check it out. Though metaphysics is not my favorite subject, I hold epistemology much more important.

You can bring up epistemology too if you want. Remember, too, that metaphysics is simply the study of “existence” and how to talk about it.

Good question. It is the problem of predicting how something will turn out, given the starting conditions, and the knowledge of the process involved. As usual, the answer is not simple. If we have “full” knowledge of the starting conditions, and if we have “full” knowledge of the process, and if the process is “fully” deterministic, then we can calculate the eventual outcome - therefore we can develop a mental image (knowledge) of how the end result will turn out.

Many times it is not the case. The chaotic processes (like the weather) are very sensitive to the starting conditions (the butterfly effect) so correct prediction of the weather is impossible. Other times the process is much simpler, for example a coin toss, and theoretically the result is predictable. It certainly looks like that most of the natural processes are inherently chaotic, so we must “wait” for them to finish and then - when the result actually exists - we can gain information (knowledge), but not before.

In mathematics there is the Mandelbrot set (check it out, if you don’t happen to know it) the process of calculation is very simple (z = z^2 + c) an iterative process where “z” starts with zero, and “c” is a complex number. The end result for every possible “c” is extremely sensitive to the value of “c”, if we change one digit in the thousandth (or millionth) decimal position, the result can be widely off - it is a chaotic process - therefore unpredictable. And here we deal with the exact science of mathematics.

I think I agree with everything you said, however, I’m not sure if you answered my question (if you did, I apologize). I was asking whether physical possibility is (at least somewhat) rooted in physical existence (or in “reality” … not just in concepts). I say this because isn’t the thing, which determines what is physically possible, the nature and/or state of physical reality?

 

[raikou]

If there are two events (A - God’s knowledge and B - our free actions) in 100% correlation, then there are four possibilities:

1. A is the causative factor for B.
2. B is the causative factor for A.
3. A and B are both caused by some external entity.
4. A and B happen independently, and it is sheer luck/chance/coincidence that they are in harmony with each other.

In case 1) God’s knowledge causes (somehow) what we do - meaning that there is no free will - contradicted by Catholic theology.
In case 2) our free actions cause God’s knowledge - also contradicted by Catholic theology (about God’s simplicity).

Wait a minute.

First point, I think these issues such as causality, freedom, and God’s simplicity are not really exclusively Catholic in the sense that they are not purely subjects of faith, but can be apprehended by reason in metaphysics.

Second, let’s just replace “God’s knowledge” with “God” for A in the above discussion. With this established, we move to the third point.

Third… doesn’t Catholic theology teach that God is the First Cause, and all things apart from him are his effects? Meaning, our free actions are also considered his effects and God is ALSO a cause of our free actions. In the discussion above, I would like to raise that the Catholic position is actually #1: God is A CAUSE of our free actions.

But where does free will enter the picture? It goes IN BETWEEN. Meaning, God caused/created our free will, and by our own free will, we cause and will our free actions. It’s A causing B, through a secondary cause C. ( A → C —> B) God and our free will are both causes of these actions, but because we willed these actions, we are primarily responsible for them.

Fourth, I suggest that since people here are dealing with metaphysical questions, we should really study Metaphysics. “Metaphysics” by Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo seems to be a good read. I’m still beginning to read it though. The subject deeply interests me.

 

[Chiral]

…Because the internalized information (knowledge) is part of the entity that possess it. When we talk about humans, we even know that the information obtained physically changes the structure of the brain, neurons will develop new connections… Whatever ways and means God uses to store the information, it is (or becomes) a property of God, just like our modified brain structure is a property of us.

To start, neurological studies do NOT show knowledge, they show ACTIVITY. When we love someone, a demonstration is a physical alteration in our brain. It is the same whenever we think, speak, wish, feel, LEARN, etc. It is important to recognize that these are entirely internal activities - the brain modifies itself, requiring no (name removed by moderator)ut from outside the subject. In other words, the change is self-caused.

Next, notice that every activity listed above requires a grammatical object - something thought, spoken, wished, felt, learned, etc. It is again important to recognize that in these activities, the subject acts upon the object, not the other-way-around. The subject’s action is logically contingent upon an object, but again is self-caused. The words spoken do not logically “cause” the speaking.

Now, what again is knowledge? Mentally internalized information corresponding to some object.
What object? The object of the activity which the subject employed to internalize the information - i.e. learning.
What directly caused the internalized information? The activity of internalizing information is caused by the subject (not the object).
So what causes knowledge? The subject, NOT the object.

But isn’t the knowledge still logically contingent upon the object from which it was acquired? And doesn’t this make it, in some sense, a “cause”?
It could not have been acquired by the subject if it did not exist, but neither did it directly “cause” the subject’s knowledge; therefore, it can only be thought of as an indirect cause, or better a contingent cause!
Contingent on what? The subject! The subject, as knower, establishes the logical contingency between the object and the corresponding knowledge. Neat, huh?

Now, why I find it strange to think of specific points of knowledge as “properties”:

Mentally internalized information is as much a “property” of a subject as any thing said, felt, thought, believed, loved, hated, wished, etc. constitutes a “property” of the subject. Knowledge is the object of an internal activity. It, like the object of any other internal activity, is essentially distinct from the subject (except when identical). Grammatically, we require a transitive verb to discuss the relationship between the “knower” and what is known. These are entirely relational. If such relational ideas constitute “properties” then so can ANY adjective, be it word or phrase.
In my thinking, “properties” (or perhaps I should specify them as “essential” properties) are those which can be described without the use of or reference to another noun or object:
“Chiral thinks, knows, lives, breathes, eats, loves, hates…” and so forth. These constitute properties. As gerunds, the properties are “thinking, knowing, living, breathing, eating, loving, hating,” etc.

Let me know if this helps, if I am way off, if you see a contradiction, or just what you think about the above.

 

[greylorn]

Yes, it is getting boring by now, but the problem of omniscience and free will needs to be addressed again. The basic problem is this:

Suppose that God knows all our future decisions, and yet we still have freedom to act on our own volition, that is: “we have free will”. This is what Catholics assert in a unanimous fashion. If this is the case, there are 3 different ways of addressing the interrelationship between these two entities.

1. God’s knowledge is the causative factor in determining our actions. In other words, we do whatever we do, because God knows what we shall do. Obviously this negates our freedom totally and completely. Catholics - naturally - deny this.
2. Our actions are the causative factors in determining God’s knowledge. In other words, God knows what we shall do, because we do those acts. The problem here is that God’s knowledge is logically contingent upon our actions. If we would act differently it would “retroactively” (retroactively is not meant in the temporal sense, rather in the causative one!) change God’s knowledge. However, it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is “simple”, God has no “parts”, God is “indivisible”. God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions. Clearly, that would be contradictory to God’s essence - which is supposed to be uncaused. (It is true, that some Catholics advocate this solution. Of course they fail to think it over, and do not realize the ramification of their stance.)
3. There is a third possibility (for the sake of completeness), which is never discussed or even mentioned. This possibility is that God’s knowledge and our free actions are totally independent, there is no causative relationship either way. In other words, God’s knowledge just “happens” to coincide with our actions, it is mere chance that the two “happen” to be identical. No one advocates this solution. Natually so, since it reduces God’s knowledge (and therefore God’s essence) to something that depends on lucky chances.

Therefore, the conclusion is this:

1. God’s knowledge cannot cause our actions - because that would negate our free will.
2. Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.
3. God’s knowledge cannot be based upon lucky chances - because that would render God’s essence to be the result of random chance.

There are no other solutions. Therefore, omniscience and free will cannot be reconciled. Q.E.D.

Daneel,
You are correct.

The existence of self-contradictions within any logically connected system of ideas usually indicates a false assumption upwind.

One might consider the possibility that God is not omniscient. This will provoke arguments along the line of, “then He cannot be God,” to which one might reply, “Who says?” The Hebrew God was clearly not omniscient, else he’d have foreseen his mistakes and not needed to correct them. The President of the U.S. does not need to know everything (or anything, for that matter) to be the pres. He just needs to control the army.

I like the non-omniscient notion because it also allows God to have creative thoughts, (i.e. to think) which an omniscient God cannot do.

Another alternative is to trash the implicit assumption that God created man. I like this one too, since humans seem the sorriest wart on an otherwise intelligently engineered planet.

 

[simspt]

Cool hand, Luke. I don’t know if we can go any further, if we cannot p(name removed by moderator)oint just what does “God’s knowledge” mean.

Thank you, I will go and check it out. Though metaphysics is not my favorite subject, I hold epistemology much more important.

Good question. It is the problem of predicting how something will turn out, given the starting conditions, and the knowledge of the process involved. As usual, the answer is not simple. If we have “full” knowledge of the starting conditions, and if we have “full” knowledge of the process, and if the process is “fully” deterministic, then we can calculate the eventual outcome - therefore we can develop a mental image (knowledge) of how the end result will turn out.

Many times it is not the case. The chaotic processes (like the weather) are very sensitive to the starting conditions (the butterfly effect) so correct prediction of the weather is impossible. Other times the process is much simpler, for example a coin toss, and theoretically the result is predictable. It certainly looks like that most of the natural processes are inherently chaotic, so we must “wait” for them to finish and then - when the result actually exists - we can gain information (knowledge), but not before.

In mathematics there is the Mandelbrot set (check it out, if you don’t happen to know it) the process of calculation is very simple (z = z^2 + c) an iterative process where “z” starts with zero, and “c” is a complex number. The end result for every possible “c” is extremely sensitive to the value of “c”, if we change one digit in the thousandth (or millionth) decimal position, the result can be widely off - it is a chaotic process - therefore unpredictable. And here we deal with the exact science of mathematics.

RDANEEL
reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=scholarly_articles_divine_omniscience

 

[1holycatholic]

Logical causation can not be considered without Time.

True. Cause can not follow effect in time.

You have not answered the main point I was making. All of eternity is present to God at the same time. His knowing what we will do is known because we are doing it. There is no way that He can not know it as it is happening, all of it, everything, is happening at the same time (to use a Time reference) for God.

Read this from the Summa Theologica on eternity;

Question 10. The eternity of God

True.

God cannot exist in time. God, existing atemporally, does not possess foreknowledge.

The serious logical problem in the OP is the assertion that foreknowledge is part of omniscience.

P. S. The Boethius reference is excellent.

 

[Ingram]

You are forgetting about eternity in your discussion of the problem.

Boethius puts it best, I will have to find the reference, but it is that God is outside of time and everything is avalible to Him at once. That is what eternity is to God. He knows our actions because He sees them as we do them.

You must remove God from time as He is not in it.

Just as you see someone sitting down in a chair, you know they are sitting down but your knowledge is not the cause of their sitting down, is it?

After reading through these posts, I found the initial thread pulled off. I’d like to get back to it. The problem R Daneel posed does not seem to me insurmountable; I believe that ByzCath has the crux of it in his hand with Boethius. First, you cannot speak of this problem without first acknowledging the role that time has within language. Cause and Effect are within the set points of language, but not necessarily within reality. Boethius I believe sat eternity within the palm of uniformity, outside the element of change. God being uniformly eternal is outside time.
BUT, if God (and God being Truth being The Real) is outside time, then time itself is illusory. It does not participate in The Real.
Why then do we see things as participating in time? Because we are made to see it that way. We would be like Moses hidden in the cleft of a rock. To look at the face of God–to look at The Real–would be to die.
So, God sees all things as they are, sees all our decisions, all our actions, but not as an illusion of sequences, but as the real true uniform life of The Now. The problem of free will then becomes, well, not a problem at all.
I will leave you with one little fact: Quantum theory since Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, et al, teaches that time is an illusion. That is to say that modern physics has reached the conclusion that time is not real. I mention this so you do not think the idea has no basis.

 

[mmmcounts]

Either the knowledge of God causes our actions, or our actions cause God’s knowledge, or some unknown factor causes both of them, or we have a coincidence. That is all. Whichever you pick, it will be at odds with the Catholic belief. Result: the Catholic belief is proven to be logically false. Which one do you want to discard, God’s omniscience or our free will? It’s up to you.

Don’t know if you noticed this or not, but I’m not a Catholic. Additionally, are you completely unaware of the existence of compatibilism? I’ve been telling you all about it. Outside the religious context, it’s a philosophical view that harmonizes free will and determinism, stating that the two are compatible. Within the religious context, it’s free will and predestination (divine determinism, if you will).

It’s pretty clear that you’re an incompatibilist who refuses to acknowledge the existence (or at least the relevance) of compatibilism. Now my question for you is this: What kind of incompatibilist are you? Do you get rid of free will or determinism?

 

[Syntax]

Well, first a little correction. No one “knows” these. The word one sould use is “believes”. The point is that we have a 100% correlation between God’s omniscience (assumed) and our free decisions (also assumed). We know (really know) that correlation does not necessarily imply causation. Hence the different scenarios, which are mutually exclusive. One must be true, there is no other possibility.

Either the knowledge of God causes our actions, or our actions cause God’s knowledge, or some unknown factor causes both of them, or we have a coincidence. That is all. Whichever you pick, it will be at odds with the Catholic belief. Result: the Catholic belief is proven to be logically false. Which one do you want to discard, God’s omniscience or our free will? It’s up to you.

This is totally incorrect. The problem of Divine Foreknowledge and human freedom concerns logical (or “accidental”) necessity, not causal necessity. John doing action X cannot cause God’s foreknowledge of John doing X because John doing X hasn’t even happened yet in time, and all causal relations are temporal.

And God’s mere foreknowledge the X will happen cannot “cause” X to happen either, since beliefs alone do not have causal power, only a willed action has power to produce other events.

 

[Chiral]

sigh
It has been a while since R Daneel has posted to this thread, so he may have accepted an error in his logic or he may have grown disinterested.

I would like to reiterate, however, that the OP was really NOT concerned with TIME as everyone seems to be so stuck on.
The issue was one of logical contingency. An event and knowledge of it can occur simultaneously. It was not a question of “which happens first” but of “which is primary”. Does God’s knowledge necessitate our choices into existence, or do we necessitate something in God which would otherwise not be there?
If the former is the case (OP #1), Catholic “freewill” is bogus. If the latter (OP #2), Catholic “divine self-necessity” may be bogus.
Since TIME was not at issue, but great confusion can arise from #2 due to misunderstanding the doctrine of divine unity and simplicity, this is clearly where the discussion should have focused.

I apologize if this seems arrogant, but I have repeated my last post below. Please, let’s not get back into a pointless discussion of time?

To start, neurological studies do NOT show knowledge, they show ACTIVITY. When we love someone, a demonstration is a physical alteration in our brain. It is the same whenever we think, speak, wish, feel, LEARN, etc. It is important to recognize that these are entirely internal activities - the brain modifies itself, requiring no (name removed by moderator)ut from outside the subject. In other words, the change is self-caused.

Next, notice that every activity listed above requires a grammatical object - something thought, spoken, wished, felt, learned, etc. It is again important to recognize that in these activities, the subject acts upon the object, not the other-way-around. The subject’s action is logically contingent upon an object, but again is self-caused. The words spoken do not logically “cause” the speaking.

Now, what again is knowledge? Mentally internalized information corresponding to some object.
What object? The object of the activity which the subject employed to internalize the information - i.e. learning.
What directly caused the internalized information? The activity of internalizing information is caused by the subject (not the object).
So what causes knowledge? The subject, NOT the object.

But isn’t the knowledge still logically contingent upon the object from which it was acquired? And doesn’t this make it, in some sense, a “cause”?
It could not have been acquired by the subject if it did not exist, but neither did it directly “cause” the subject’s knowledge; therefore, it can only be thought of as an indirect cause, or better a contingent cause!
Contingent on what? The subject! The subject, as knower, establishes the logical contingency between the object and the corresponding knowledge. Neat, huh?

Now, why I find it strange to think of specific points of knowledge as “properties”:

Mentally internalized information is as much a “property” of a subject as any thing said, felt, thought, believed, loved, hated, wished, etc. constitutes a “property” of the subject. Knowledge is the object of an internal activity. It, like the object of any other internal activity, is essentially distinct from the subject (except when identical). Grammatically, we require a transitive verb to discuss the relationship between the “knower” and what is known. These are entirely relational. If such relational ideas constitute “properties” then so can ANY adjective, be it word or phrase.
In my thinking, “properties” (or perhaps I should specify them as “essential” properties) are those which can be described without the use of or reference to another noun or object:
“Chiral thinks, knows, lives, breathes, eats, loves, hates…” and so forth. These constitute properties. As gerunds, the properties are “thinking, knowing, living, breathing, eating, loving, hating,” etc.

Let me know if this helps, if I am way off, if you see a contradiction, or just what you think about the above.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

sigh
It has been a while since R Daneel has posted to this thread, so he may have accepted an error in his logic or he may have grown disinterested.

I would like to reiterate, however, that the OP was really NOT concerned with TIME as everyone seems to be so stuck on.
The issue was one of logical contingency. An event and knowledge of it can occur simultaneously. It was not a question of “which happens first” but of “which is primary”. Does God’s knowledge necessitate our choices into existence, or do we necessitate something in God which would otherwise not be there?
If the former is the case (OP #1), Catholic “freewill” is bogus. If the latter (OP #2), Catholic “divine self-necessity” may be bogus.
Since TIME was not at issue, but great confusion can arise from #2 due to misunderstanding the doctrine of divine unity and simplicity, this is clearly where the discussion should have focused.

I apologize if this seems arrogant, but I have repeated my last post below. Please, let’s not get back into a pointless discussion of time?

as far as im concerned accidental necessity collapses into atemporality. my position not only agrees with a significant proportion of the physics, it is also agrees with the metaphysics, there is no being to “time”, it also avoids the silly proposition generated by keeping G-d separate from an assumed temporality, namely the claim that if true G-d couldnt distinguish past from future, because there is no past and future.

so while you may wish the problem to be explained in terms that assume there really is such
a thing as time, ultimately the argument will come back to it.

that said. you are in no way allowed to tell people what they may discuss on a given subject. simply talk about the angle you wish and respect that others have the same right.

 

[Ingram]

sigh
It has been a while since R Daneel has posted to this thread, so he may have accepted an error in his logic or he may have grown disinterested.

I would like to reiterate, however, that the OP was really NOT concerned with TIME as everyone seems to be so stuck on.
The issue was one of logical contingency. An event and knowledge of it can occur simultaneously. It was not a question of “which happens first” but of “which is primary”. Does God’s knowledge necessitate our choices into existence, or do we necessitate something in God which would otherwise not be there?
If the former is the case (OP #1), Catholic “freewill” is bogus. If the latter (OP #2), Catholic “divine self-necessity” may be bogus.
Since TIME was not at issue, but great confusion can arise from #2 due to misunderstanding the doctrine of divine unity and simplicity, this is clearly where the discussion should have focused.

I apologize if this seems arrogant, but I have repeated my last post below. Please, let’s not get back into a pointless discussion of time?

You simply cannot have any discussion within language without the idea of Time: as my previous comment stated, Time is embedded in language, though as modern physics attests, Time is an illusion. Time being illusory, you simply cannot ignore this in hopes that you can then have a “logical” discussion without bringing in the problems of Time. The OP may not have been concerned with Time, but should have been, is my point. And I didn’t think you sounded arrogant.

 

[Syntax]

as far as im concerned accidental necessity collapses into atemporality…

You are right, accidental necessity does collapse into a-temporality. I’m glad you note this, because RDaneel person does not get this. This is why so-called “causal necessity” is not even an objection to the consistency of Divine foreknowledge and human freedom view, because causality is a temporal notion! So the real problem is purely logical and has nothing to do with space or time, namely:

If there is a fact of the matter about God’s knowing what will happen, and his knowledge is infallible, then there is a fact of the matter about what happens. So a person could not do otherwise no matter how hard he tried.

There are, of course, many solutions that compromise either Divine Knowledge or Human Freedom, so some theists will bite the bullet in one of these areas. However, I am a fan of “Molinism” which conserves both and resolves the problem.

 

[Syntax]

Now, what again is knowledge? Mentally internalized information corresponding to some object.
What object? The object of the activity which the subject employed to internalize the information - i.e. learning.
What directly caused the internalized information? The activity of internalizing information is caused by the subject (not the object).
So what causes knowledge? The subject, NOT the object.

But isn’t the knowledge still logically contingent upon the object from which it was acquired? And doesn’t this make it, in some sense, a “cause”?
It could not have been acquired by the subject if it did not exist, but neither did it directly “cause” the subject’s knowledge; therefore, it can only be thought of as an indirect cause, or better a contingent cause!
Contingent on what? The subject! The subject, as knower, establishes the logical contingency between the object and the corresponding knowledge.

The problem of Divine Foreknowledge and human freedom concerns logical (or “accidental”) necessity, not causal necessity. So causal necessity is not an objection to Christians holding the two beliefs, anyway. Here’s why: John doing action X cannot cause God’s foreknowledge of John doing X because John doing X hasn’t even happened yet in time, and all causal relations are temporal.

And God’s mere foreknowledge the X will happen cannot “cause” X to happen either, since beliefs alone do not have causal power, only the event of a willed action has power to produce other events, and there is no event of God’s willing John to do X.

So I wouldn’t even worry about a causal objection at all. Instead, I would worry about “accidental necessity” which is a purely logical entailment notion, not a temporal and causal notion. Here’s the real problem:

If there is a fact of the matter about God’s knowing what will happen, and his knowledge is infallible, then there is a fact of the matter about what happens. This is true because, God’s knowing X *logically entails *that X. So if there is a fact of the matter about a person doing X, then a person could not do not-X no matter how hard he tried.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

. However, I am a fan of “Molinism” which conserves both and resolves the problem.

given the common audience to the argument (people steeped in the scientific method), i tend to use straight atemporality because i can back that with evidence from physics. causal issues arent a problem because all causal activity ultimately takes place as part of the Existence which is G-ds Essence, as soon as something passes from our potentiality to actuality it is no longer separate from G-d, requiring no causal action to be part of His knowledge.

i admit its a simplistic approach, not at all sophisticated, and i may be reinventing an obsolete wheel, but i have a hard time defending Molinism. its hard enough to get that audience to accept bare logical inferences. its really hard to teach people who are already pretty sure they know everything, about something they dont.

 

[Syntax]

given the common audience to the argument (people steeped in the scientific method), i tend to use straight atemporality because i can back that with evidence from physics. causal issues arent a problem because all causal activity ultimately takes place as part of the Existence which is G-ds Essence, as soon as something passes from our potentiality to actuality it is no longer separate from G-d, requiring no causal action to be part of His knowledge.

ahhh! I understand now. That took me a second to get…lol!..

I really like that approach. Unfortunately, I’m not used to dealing with the “potentiality” vs. “actuality” distinction because those tend to be older notions many analytic philosophers have discarded. The reason is that new atheists will typically come at theists with objections that work right passed Aristotelian categories–so, as theistic philosophers, we have to marshall new arguments, so to speak. Nevertheless, that’s pretty cool. It’s interesting we are refuting the causal objection from different angles!

i admit its a simplistic approach, not at all sophisticated, and i may be reinventing an obsolete wheel,

Don’t worry about that! It totally works!

but i have a hard time defending Molinism.

I’m sure you’re right. It does get kind of tricky, especially if the audience is not too familiar with “possible worlds” talk.

its hard enough to get that audience to accept bare logical inferences. its really hard to teach people who are already pretty sure they know everything, about something they dont.

I hear ya, brother!

 

[warpspeedpetey]

ahhh! I understand now. That took me a second to get…lol!..

I really like that approach. Unfortunately, I’m not used to dealing with the “potentiality” vs. “actuality” distinction because those tend to be older notions many analytic philosophers have discarded. The reason is that new atheists will typically come at theists with objections that work right passed Aristotelian categories–so, as theistic philosophers, we have to marshall new arguments, so to speak. Nevertheless, that’s pretty cool. It’s interesting we are refuting the causal objection from different angles!

r daneel claimed there was a violation of Divine Simplicity, i thought the wording apropo if antiquated.