A serious logical problem

[Syntax]

**Necessity, possibility, and contingency **are nothing but different MODES of truth. They function as operators on propositions, and they function strictly independently of notions like causation or ontological dependency.

And for purposes of philosophical discourse “contingent” does not mean “dependent on” in spite of what so many of you think. If you want to try to express the notion that some event, some thing, or some action is “dependent on” another event, thing, or action, then you need to use some phrase like “causally dependent,” “ontologically dependent,” or “metaphysically dependent.” When the rest of you say things like “God’s knowledge is logically contingent on John doing X” this doesn’t even make any sense! You merely mean to say that “God’s knowledge is caused by John doing X.” That would work much better so we can make sense of these notions.

More Wiki on Modal truth. And the article stands right in line with what I have been saying all along:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic#Alethic_modalities

In classical modal logic, a proposition is said to be

possible if and only if it is not necessarily false (regardless of whether it is actually true or actually false);
necessary if and only if it is not possibly false; and
contingent if and only if it is not necessarily false and not necessarily true (ie. possible but not necessarily true).

In classical modal logic, therefore, either the notion of possibility or necessity may be taken to be basic, where these other notions are defined in terms of it **[like contingency!]**in the manner of De Morgan duality.

For those with difficulty with the concept of something being possible but not true, the meaning of these terms may be made more comprehensible by thinking of multiple “possible worlds” (in the sense of Leibniz) or “alternate universes”; something “necessary” is true in all possible worlds, something “possible” is true in at least one possible world. These “possible world semantics” are formalized with Kripke semantics.

The truth-makers, or ontology, of necessary, possible, and contingent truths:

In the most common interpretation of modal logic, one considers “logically possible worlds”. If a statement is true in all possible worlds, then it is a necessary truth. If a statement happens to be true in our world, but is not true in all possible worlds, then it is a contingent truth. A statement that is true in some possible world (not necessarily our own) is called a possible truth.

Whether this “possible worlds idiom” is the best way to interpret modal logic, and how literally this idiom can be taken, is a live issue for metaphysicians. The possible worlds idiom would translate the claim about Bigfoot as “There is some possible world in which Bigfoot exists”. To maintain that Bigfoot’s existence is possible, but not actual, one could say, “There is some possible world in which Bigfoot exists; but in the actual world, Bigfoot does not exist”. But it is unclear what it is that making this claim commits us to. Are we really alleging the existence of possible worlds, every bit as real as our actual world, just not actual? **Saul Kripke **believes that this is a misnomer – that the term ‘possible world’ is just a useful way of visualizing the concept of possibility.[5] For him, the sentences “you could have rolled a 4 instead of a 6” and “there is a possible world where you rolled a 4, but you rolled a 6 in the actual world” are not significantly different statements.[6] David Lewis, on the other hand, made himself notorious by biting the bullet, asserting that all merely possible worlds are as real as our own, and that what distinguishes our world as actual is simply that it is indeed our world – this world (see Indexicality).

 

[warpspeedpetey]

**Necessity, possibility, and contingency **

the following words will require a $0.25 cent fine in the cuss jar. heck, darn, gosh, modal realism, golly gee, aw nuts, shoot, etc

if i could have used real bad words, i would have

 

[Syntax]

the following words will require a $0.25 cent fine in the cuss jar. heck, darn, gosh, modal realism, golly gee, aw nuts, shoot, etc

if i could have used real bad words, i would have

hahaha!!:thumbsup:

 

[R_Daneel]

“Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.”

I am using the word in the same sense.

 

[R_Daneel]

R Daneel, read that post of mine yet? You thoughts? Should i repost again?

Yes, I read it, and basically I agree with it. Some parts I am still disgesting.

Yes, knowledge is internalized information. Yes, knowledge is always dependent (contingent) upon the object to be known, and the subject who gathers information about it.

 

[surritter]

I am using the word in the same sense.

OK – I guess you are using the same verb, but the application of that verb in the two instances is very different. What I mean is that there is no direct relationship between the two parts of your sentence.

Recall that the sentence was: “Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.”

I claim that our actions do cause God’s knowledge – we have free will and choose something, and He knows of that choice beforehand.

And I claim that God’s essence is uncaused.

The problem is that you try to make a direct correlation between those two ideas. Perhaps you are thinking of the teaching that God’s attributes such as love are not possessed, but they are of His very essence.

That is true, but I don’t think that carries over to mere knowledge of our actions. For instance, we say that the soldiers at the crucifixion caused God to suffer on Good Friday. Does that mean that suffering is part of God’s essence? No.

So again, we can discuss the two halves of your sentence, but the problem lies in trying to equate them in a syllogism form.

 

[Chiral]

Yes, I read it, and basically I agree with it. Some parts I am still disgesting.

Yes, knowledge is internalized information. Yes, knowledge is always dependent (contingent) upon the object to be known, and the subject who gathers information about it…

The point I hope you’ll focus on is the one now brought up by a second person, namely the distinction between the essential information of the object and the corresponding possessed knowledge of the subject.

The essential information of the object is causally inert. It can be “translated” into knowledge by some “knowing” subject, thus the subject is the efficient cause of the knowledge it possesses. The knowledge is essentially distinct from the object-information to which it logically corresponds.

“Jack makes choice X; Jill has knowledge of Jack’s choice X.”
Jack is the efficient cause of “choice X” but NOT of Jill’s knowledge thereof. In Aristotelian terms, one might say “choice X” is the formal cause of Jill’s knowledge in that it provides the object to which her knowledge corresponds… But Jill’s knowledge is actually formed within her own mind by her own powers. She creates the knowledge of material essentially distinct from the actual object, like drawing a picture of something you see.
This is the case for all of those internal activities requiring objects that I listed. In her role as efficient cause, Jill also establishes the logical contingency between her knowledge and its corresponding object by selecting an object outside of herself to gather information about. The object’s existence did not necessitate her knowledge concerning it.

In the case of an omniscient subject, the subject’s “omniscience” logically demands that it possess knowledge corresponding to all possible objects. The existence of a knowable object thus necessitates the subject’s knowledge thereof, but the object did not effect this necessity, the subject did! The subject’s own nature establishes both the over-arching contingency and the necessity demanded by logic.

So if all of this is the subject’s doing, would one really want to say that the subject is contingent upon the object?

The rest of my original post is simply questioning the use of “property” to mean “any means by which a subject can be described, including non-essential relations.”
What that boils down to is, if God knows what Jack chose at time X, would God cease to exist if there were no Jack? Can God’s relations to external objects be ascribed as properties? If it is a “property” of God that He is more loving than Jim, does that make His “loving” contingent on Jim’s existence or is simply the truth of the sentence contingent on Jim’s existence?

 

[Syntax]

The point I hope you’ll focus on is the one now brought up by a second person, namely the distinction between the essential information of the object and the corresponding possessed knowledge of the subject.

I strongly suggest to start making a distinction between necessary and sufficient causal conditions. For instance, one could say that God’s essence and existence are both a necessary and sufficient causal condition for his own existence and essence, but then say that the existence of the object is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the content of God’s belief and knowledge about it. It would greatly simplify, improve, and clarify what you are trying to say. I took liberty of editing the crucial part of your post.The rest, quite honestly, is very confusing. But first, here’s the difference between necessary and sufficient causal conditions I already mentioned in post #138:

Necessary causes:

If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the presence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.

Sufficient causes:

If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the presence of x.

The essential information of the object is -]causally inert/-] [No. Though the cause (the object) is not a sufficient condition for God’s having all the informaton about the object, the object is still a necessary condition THAT God knows X, because, without this condition, God’s would not believe the proposition X as opposed to the proposition Y about the object. God believes proposition X instead of proposition Y because proposition X is true of the object to which God’s intentionality is directed. It can be “translated” into knowledge by some “knowing” subject **[sure, but this information is not entirely causally disconnected from God’s own interpretation of the object with His own intellect. God’s belief that X is not made true by God’s believing it, but by the object itself. So the existence of the object is a necessary causal condition for God’s beliefs about it], ****thus the -]subject/-] [the object] is the -]efficient/-] **[necessary] **cause of the knowledge -]it/-] [God] possesses. -]The knowledge is essentially distinct from the object-INFORMATION to which it logically corresponds /-][you mean to say that the content of God’s belief (or knowledge) that X and the properties of the object logically (or essentially) correspond, even though the act of knowing is distinct from the object that knowing is about–they have to correspond, otherwise God would believe something false about the object.]

 

[Syntax]

More editing, but you’r definitely on the right track.

“Jack makes choice X; Jill has knowledge of Jack’s choice X.”
Jack is the -]efficient/-] [sufficient] cause of “choice X” -]but NOT of /-] [and is a necessary but not sufficient cause of] Jill’s knowledge thereof. In Aristotelian terms, one might say “choice X” is the-] formal /-] [necessary] cause of Jill’s knowledge in that it provides the object to which her knowledge corresponds** [yes!]… **But [the content of] Jill’s -]knowledge/-] [belief] is actually formed within her own mind by her own powers. She -]creates the knowledge of material essentially/-] [constructs the content her belief] -]distinct/-] **[that corresponds to] ** -]from /-]the actual object, like drawing a picture of something you see.

This is the case for all of those internal activities requiring objects that I listed. In her role as -]efficient/-] **[sufficient] **cause, Jill -]also establishes/-] [constructs] the -]logical contingency between her knowledge /-] [content of her belief so that it logically corresponds to the object, so that here own capacities partly cause her belief to be KNOWLEDGE about the object] -]and its corresponding object by /-]-]selecting an object /-] **[Jill doesn’t select anything] **-]outside of herself to gather information about./-] The object’s existence did not -]necessitate/-] [sufficiently cause] her knowledge concerning it.

In the case of an omniscient subject, the subject’s -]“omniscience”/-] [capacity for knowing] logically demands that it possess knowledge corresponding to all possible objects.** [Yes] ** The existence of a knowable object thus -]necessitates/-] [is a necessary causal condition for] the subject’s knowledge thereof, but the object did not -]effect/-] **[sufficiently cause] **this -]necessity,/-] [knowledge]–the subject did! -]The subject’s own nature establishes both the over-arching contingency and the necessity demanded by logic./-] [You mean that God is the sufficient causal condition for having knowledge that X, and that his omniscience (which is different than Jill’s logically contingent knowledge that X) makes His KNOWLEDGE logically necessary even though the existence of the object (not its properties) is ONE OF MANY necessary condtions for God’s knowing-that X.] So if -]all /-] [some] of this is the subject’s doing, would one really want to say that the -]subject /-] [object] is -]contingent /-] **[both a necessary and sufficient causal condition for the subject’s own knowledge of the] **-]upon the /-]object? [the answer is, ‘No’]

 

[Betterave]

Some suggested editing of the editing, if I may:

“Jack makes choice X; Jill has knowledge of Jack’s choice X.”
Jack is the [sufficient] cause of “choice X” [and is a necessary but not sufficient cause of] Jill’s knowledge thereof. -]In Aristotelian terms,/-] one might say “choice X” is the [necessary] cause of Jill’s knowledge in that it provides the object to which her knowledge corresponds [yes!]… But [the content of] Jill’s [belief] is actually formed within her own mind by her own powers. She -]constructs/-] abstracts the content her belief] [that corresponds to] the actual object, like drawing a picture of something you see.

This is the case for all of those internal activities requiring objects that I listed. In her role as -]sufficient/-] [necessary but not sufficient]] cause, Jill -]constructs/-] [abstracts]] the [content of her belief **[from the object] so that it logically corresponds to the object, so that her own capacities partly cause her belief to be KNOWLEDGE about the object] by -]selecting /-] [perceiving and selectively attending to (with her intellect)] -]an/-] [the] object [Jill doesn’t select anything **[at least, such an expression could be misleading] ]. The object’s existence did not [sufficiently cause] her knowledge concerning it. [Both she and the object were partial necessary causes, and jointly are the sufficient cause, of her knowledge.]

In the case of an omniscient subject, the subject’s “omniscience” [capacity for knowing] logically demands that it possess knowledge corresponding to all possible objects. [Yes] The existence of a knowable object thus [is a necessary causal condition for] the subject’s knowledge thereof, but the object did not [sufficiently cause] this [knowledge]—]the subject did!/-] [God is [-]the sufficient/-] a necessary causal condition for **his own having knowledge that X, and his omniscience (which is different than Jill’s logically contingent knowledge that X) makes His KNOWLEDGE logically necessary even though the existence of the object (not its properties) is ONE OF MANY necessary condtions for God’s knowing-that X.] So if [some] of this is the -]subject’s /-][object’s]**doing, would one really want to say that the -]object/-] subject] -]is [both a necessary and sufficient causal condition for the subject’s own knowledge of the] object?/-] **[does *not **know its object with necessity, just because its object is contingent] [The answer is, ‘No’] [Both God and the object are partial necessary causes, and jointly are the sufficient cause of God’s knowledge, while God is also the necessary but not sufficient-in-all-orders-of-causality cause of the contingent object of his knowledge. (God’s concurrence with a free act is also a necessary and sufficient cause (in the primary order of causality) of that free act - though not sufficient in the secondary order of causality, where the free act is caused by the finite free agent, even while God remains through and through (somehow!) its necessary and sufficient ontological ‘ground.’)]

Man, that was onerous! Is that even right? Remind me not to do that again!

 

[Syntax]

Some suggested editing of the editing, if I may:

“Jack makes choice X; Jill has knowledge of Jack’s choice X.”
Jack is the [sufficient] cause of “choice X” [and is a necessary but not sufficient cause of] Jill’s knowledge thereof. -]In Aristotelian terms,/-] one might say “choice X” is the [necessary] cause of Jill’s knowledge in that it provides the object to which her knowledge corresponds [yes!]… But [the content of] Jill’s [belief] is actually formed within her own mind by her own powers. She -]constructs/-] abstracts the content her belief] [that corresponds to] the actual object, like drawing a picture of something you see.

This is the case for all of those internal activities requiring objects that I listed. In her role as -]sufficient/-] [necessary but not sufficient]] cause, Jill -]constructs/-] [abstracts]] the [content of her belief **[from the object]

so that it logically corresponds to the object, so that her own capacities partly cause her belief to be KNOWLEDGE about the object] by -]selecting /-] [perceiving and selectively attending to (with her intellect)] -]an/-] [the] object [Jill doesn’t select anything **[at least, such an expression could be misleading] ]. The object’s existence did not [sufficiently cause] her knowledge concerning it. [Both she and the object were partial necessary causes, and jointly are the sufficient cause, of her knowledge.]

In the case of an omniscient subject, the subject’s “omniscience” [capacity for knowing] logically demands that it possess knowledge corresponding to all possible objects. [Yes] The existence of a knowable object thus [is a necessary causal condition for] the subject’s knowledge thereof, but the object did not [sufficiently cause] this [knowledge]—]the subject did!/-] [God is [-]the sufficient/-] a necessary causal condition for **his own having knowledge that X, and his omniscience (which is different than Jill’s logically contingent knowledge that X) makes His KNOWLEDGE logically necessary even though the existence of the object (not its properties) is ONE OF MANY necessary condtions for God’s knowing-that X.] So if [some] of this is the -]subject’s /-][object’s]**doing, would one really want to say that the -]object/-] subject] -]is [both a necessary and sufficient causal condition for the subject’s own knowledge of the] object?/-] **[does *not **know its object with necessity, just because its object is contingent] [The answer is, ‘No’] *[Both God and the object are partial necessary causes, and jointly are the sufficient cause of God’s knowledge, while God is also the necessary but not sufficient cause of the contingent object of his knowledge. (God’s concurrence with a free act is also a necessary but not sufficient cause of that free act qua free act, though he *is *its necessary and sufficient ontological ground.)]

Man, that was onerous! Remind me not to do that again!

Yeah, cut it out! It was onerous for me the first time around!.

I just hope you haven’t made it worse for the guy by adding “jointly sufficient,” even though that’s technically implied by two different causes being necessary for one and the same effect…on second thought, that should make things more clear.

But did you really need to interject the difference between the spontaneous mental activities of “abstraction” and “construction” in there? sheesh…you geek

We are such Kantians, are we not?

It’s good that you brought back the passage to the topic of the OP with your last remark. That was nice.

 

[Syntax]

Some suggested editing of the editing, if I may:

“Jack makes choice X; Jill has knowledge of Jack’s choice X.”
Jack is the [sufficient] cause of “choice X” [and is a necessary but not sufficient cause of] Jill’s knowledge thereof. -]In Aristotelian terms,/-] one might say “choice X” is the [necessary] cause of Jill’s knowledge in that it provides the object to which her knowledge corresponds [yes!]… But [the content of] Jill’s [belief] is actually formed within her own mind by her own powers. She -]constructs/-] abstracts the content her belief] [that corresponds to] the actual object, like drawing a picture of something you see.

This is the case for all of those internal activities requiring objects that I listed. In her role as -]sufficient/-] [necessary but not sufficient]] cause, Jill -]constructs/-] [abstracts]] the [content of her belief **[from the object]

so that it logically corresponds to the object, so that her own capacities partly cause her belief to be KNOWLEDGE about the object] by -]selecting /-] [perceiving and selectively attending to (with her intellect)] -]an/-] [the] object [Jill doesn’t select anything **[at least, such an expression could be misleading] ]. The object’s existence did not [sufficiently cause] her knowledge concerning it. [Both she and the object were partial necessary causes, and jointly are the sufficient cause, of her knowledge.]

In the case of an omniscient subject, the subject’s “omniscience” [capacity for knowing] logically demands that it possess knowledge corresponding to all possible objects. [Yes] The existence of a knowable object thus [is a necessary causal condition for] the subject’s knowledge thereof, but the object did not [sufficiently cause] this [knowledge]—]the subject did!/-] [God is [-]the sufficient/-] a necessary causal condition for **his own having knowledge that X, and his omniscience (which is different than Jill’s logically contingent knowledge that X) makes His KNOWLEDGE logically necessary even though the existence of the object (not its properties) is ONE OF MANY necessary condtions for God’s knowing-that X.] So if [some] of this is the -]subject’s /-][object’s]**doing, would one really want to say that the -]object/-] subject] -]is [both a necessary and sufficient causal condition for the subject’s own knowledge of the] object?/-] **[does *not **know its object with necessity, just because its object is contingent] [The answer is, ‘No’] **[Both God and the object are partial necessary causes, and jointly are the sufficient cause of God’s knowledge, while God is also the necessary but not sufficient-in-all-orders-of-causality cause of the contingent object of his knowledge. ** (God’s concurrence with a free act is also a necessary but not sufficient cause of that free act qua free act, though he *is *its necessary and sufficient ontological ground.)]

Man, that was onerous! Remind me not to do that again!**

Yeah, cut it out! It was onerous for me the first time around!.

I just hope you haven’t made it worse for the guy by adding “jointly sufficient,” even though that’s technically implied by two different causes being necessary for one and the same effect…on second thought, that should make things more clear.

But did you really need to interject the difference between the spontaneous mental activities of “abstraction” and “construction” in there? sheesh…you geek

We are such Kantians, are we not?

It’s good that you brought back the passage to the topic of the OP with your last remark.

 

[Ingram]

The “little fact” you so generously leave us with is drivel.

Time is one of the parameters in all QM formulas. You are arrogating knowledge of physics which you do not own. Name dropping does not cut it. Feel free to apologize to CAF readers.

I name drop not to form a proof, but to inform. There are many who simply do not understand the limits of what “time” has been subjected to within QM. You appear to be one of these people. That time is a parameter in QM equations proves nothing, of course. You are in essence stating that because we put a factor within an equation it must be real. Putting it that way I hope makes you see the silliness of your logic. Julian Barbour has famously stated that time MUST NOT exist in a quantum theory of the universe. Carlo Rovelli also has found mathematical solutions that describe multiple events as one single event without a time parameter. Others find that the QM equations that are unsolvable since they expand to infinity are quite solvable IF time is left off the table.

Einstein: “For us believing physicists the distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, even if a stubborn one.”

There are theories within neurobiology that now support the idea that time has no essential quality of its own. There is the Damasios theory of consciousness - that time exists in consciousness and thus is in essence a feeling. Ernst Poppel in Munich, Germany and David Eagleton in Houston, Texas are neuroscientists whose work is exploring just such a theory.

You state that since Time is a parameter within QM equations it has to be real? Is that really what you want to say? I hope not. QM evolves. Everyone knows there are problems with it and its correlation with macro-scale. Do I arrogate knowledge? Of course. We all do. That is the essence of learning, no? Though you point it out in as rude a way as possible.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I name drop not to form a proof, but to inform. There are many who simply do not understand the limits of what “time” has been subjected to within QM. You appear to be one of these people. That time is a parameter in QM equations proves nothing, of course. You are in essence stating that because we put a factor within an equation it must be real. Putting it that way I hope makes you see the silliness of your logic. Julian Barbour has famously stated that time MUST NOT exist in a quantum theory of the universe. Carlo Rovelli also has found mathematical solutions that describe multiple events as one single event without a time parameter. Others find that the QM equations that are unsolvable since they expand to infinity are quite solvable IF time is left off the table.

Einstein: “For us believing physicists the distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, even if a stubborn one.”

There are theories within neurobiology that now support the idea that time has no essential quality of its own. There is the Damasios theory of consciousness - that time exists in consciousness and thus is in essence a feeling. Ernst Poppel in Munich, Germany and David Eagleton in Houston, Texas are neuroscientists whose work is exploring just such a theory.

You state that since Time is a parameter within QM equations it has to be real? Is that really what you want to say? I hope not. QM evolves. Everyone knows there are problems with it and its correlation with macro-scale. Do I arrogate knowledge? Of course. We all do. That is the essence of learning, no? Though you point it out in as rude a way as possible.

there is no such thing as time. its just an arbitrary measurement of change. no one takes an existent "time " seriously anymore.

here is Julians take on the issue.

youtube.com/watch_popup?v=WKsNraFxPwk#t=19

 

[Sarpedon]

Our actions are the causative factors in determining God’s knowledge. In other words, God knows what we shall do, because we do those acts. The problem here is that God’s knowledge is logically contingent upon our actions. If we would act differently it would “retroactively” (retroactively is not meant in the temporal sense, rather in the causative one!) change God’s knowledge. However, it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is “simple”, God has no “parts”, God is “indivisible”. God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions. Clearly, that would be contradictory to God’s essence - which is supposed to be uncaused. (It is true, that some Catholics advocate this solution. Of course they fail to think it over, and do not realize the ramification of their stance.)

Essence is best defined as “that whereby a thing is what it is.” (newadvent.org/cathen/05543b.htm). You are making the assumption that the content of God’s knowledge determines His essence, as opposed to the possession of that knowledge. In other words, you are assuming His essence is contingent on knowing something particular, instead of simply knowing in of itself. You are assuming that God’s essence as an omnisicent being depends on the content of his knowledge, as opposed to His simple possession of that knowledge, whatever it is.

In short, you are assuming that God’s essence (that whereby He is God) is contingent on knowing X instead of knowing X.

I am not an expert on philosophy (I’m an undergrad- working on that!), but your argument is simplistic. Furthermore, I do not think you can expect to get a good response on this question from a source as random as this message board.

I won’t be able to dialogue back and forth because I have too many obligations for school at this point.

 

[Syntax]

there is no such thing as time. its just an arbitrary measurement of change. no one takes an existent "time " seriously anymore.

I do. I think time is objectively real and substantive, so I am a robust realist about it. Even further, I think it is directional, linear, and consists of past, present, and future. I also think causality is fundamental to time, rather than time being fundamental to causality.

I have many logical reasons for thinking this, mainly because alternative views about it end up with crazy results. So time would be a really neat topic for another thread.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

I do. I think time is objectively real and substantive, so I am a robust realist about it. Even further, I think it is directional, linear, and consists of past, present, and future. I also think causality is fundamental to time, rather than time being fundamental to causality.

I have many logical reasons for thinking this, mainly because alternative views about it end up with crazy results. So time would be a really neat topic for another thread.

i am almost the exact opposite. for me, time is an arbitrarily subjective measure of cause and effect. only change exists, not time.

it would be interesting at some point to cover it.

 

[Syntax]

i am almost the exact opposite. for me, time is an arbitrarily subjective measure of cause and effect. only change exists, not time.

it would be interesting at some point to cover it.

I’m so tempted to jump in here…But I’ll be good for now.

 

[Thing]

Yes, it is getting boring by now, but the problem of omniscience and free will needs to be addressed again. The basic problem is this:

Suppose that God knows all our future decisions, and yet we still have freedom to act on our own volition, that is: “we have free will”. This is what Catholics assert in a unanimous fashion. If this is the case, there are 3 different ways of addressing the interrelationship between these two entities.

1. God’s knowledge is the causative factor in determining our actions. In other words, we do whatever we do, because God knows what we shall do. Obviously this negates our freedom totally and completely. Catholics - naturally - deny this.
2. Our actions are the causative factors in determining God’s knowledge. In other words, God knows what we shall do, because we do those acts. The problem here is that God’s knowledge is logically contingent upon our actions. If we would act differently it would “retroactively” (retroactively is not meant in the temporal sense, rather in the causative one!) change God’s knowledge. However, it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is “simple”, God has no “parts”, God is “indivisible”. God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions. Clearly, that would be contradictory to God’s essence - which is supposed to be uncaused. (It is true, that some Catholics advocate this solution. Of course they fail to think it over, and do not realize the ramification of their stance.)
3. There is a third possibility (for the sake of completeness), which is never discussed or even mentioned. This possibility is that God’s knowledge and our free actions are totally independent, there is no causative relationship either way. In other words, God’s knowledge just “happens” to coincide with our actions, it is mere chance that the two “happen” to be identical. No one advocates this solution. Natually so, since it reduces God’s knowledge (and therefore God’s essence) to something that depends on lucky chances.

Therefore, the conclusion is this:

1. God’s knowledge cannot cause our actions - because that would negate our free will.
2. Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.
3. God’s knowledge cannot be based upon lucky chances - because that would render God’s essence to be the result of random chance.

There are no other solutions. Therefore, omniscience and free will cannot be reconciled. Q.E.D.

1. True. Gods knowledge does not cause our actions, we are free.
2. Our actions do not cause Gods knowledge, He would not know what was going to happen next, though He is Omniscient.
3. It cannot technically be chance if He is correct every time, that is out.

How about 4.
You are talking about Christianity.

Look at it this way. You are a millipede, you are designed originally to run around and gather food and be happy. And you did that once. You were free then to act and travel wherever you wanted, and at the end of your physical life you were translated to heaven.

But now you are a Christian millipede. The devil has entered the picture. No longer is your final destination certain. So your actions which are still free now take on a serious aspect. as the devil is a foreigner in the design and he attemps to exploit this quality of freedom.

Now as a Christian millipede you attempt to run around as before gathering food and being happy, but, where once all your actions were good, now that the Creators Adversary is on the scene, trying to influence your freedom, your actions can now be anti-good also.

Freedom was never origionally designed for sin but it can accomodate it. Our freedom, our free will, was given when our destiny in heaven was the plan for us.

Now, with the devil on hand, God, being Omniscient, can know all possible choices and consequences, good or evil. And as before, we are still free to make any choice freely.

The only significant change now is that God knows who will go to hell as well as who will go to heaven. He knows all the free choices we will make and can make, He knows when and how He will intervene; because hell now exists life has changed. No longer is it a simple matter of everyone going to heaven in the end; now there are actual adversaries of God in the world of men. Freedom and freewill have taken on a different character. The devil is active and an intelligent enemy and our freedom now requires divine help to make the correct choices. So our freedom becomes entirely dependant on our prayer; while we act we can be confident of heaven, if we reject that we can fear hell.
So God, as Onniscient can know all the people who will go to heaven, and all the people who might have gone to heaven and all the people who may go to heaven.
The joker in this pack which you should not ignore is the devil, an active intelligence interfering with freedom; turning freedom ultimately into eternal slavery.

So in conclusion: we were always free, we are still free; the only difference now compared to the original plan for man is mans state in Eternity. Does man freely wish to choose an Eternal state of slavery or an Eternal state of freedom and peace. The outcome is contingent on the Christians continual relationship good with his Creator. But there are always now two forces at work shaping the future and a vacillating third force choosing between them. So it never becomes as simple as saying that God causes the future or ones free choices. He can know all the possible choices and even ultimately the final freechoice one will make but strangely enough its still our freechoice to make and the devils will to interfere with the final decision.

 

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Here’s some thoughts about “open theism” which resolves these debats about Divne Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

“Open theists” believe that God does not know what free agents will do. At most, God knows what they are *likely *to do. But there are two versions of this. One is the view that the future really is open, and that this is why God doesn’t always know how things will turn out. On this view, there is no fact of the matter about what future free agents will do. So God can know all there is to know about the future, which is just what you’d expect of an omniscient being. I myself think this is a perfectly plausible view.

The other kind of open theism is that the future is not open in the way described above, but that God still can’t know what anyone will freely do in the future. It’s impossible for God to know this because his *knowing that *someone will do something would render the action of that person unfree. This isn’t supposed to count against divine omniscience, however. Why? Well, it goes something like this: omniscience is really nothing but “maximal cognitive power,” and it’s metaphysically impossible for anyone to have infallible knowledge of what free agents will do with their freedom in the future. So the fact that God *can’t *know these things doesn’t count against his being omniscient.…(in a very similar way that God does not have the power to make 2+2=5, I suppose.)

I myself think the latter view is doesn’t get anywhere at all, since any account of omniscience that allows there to be facts that God does not know is an account of something **other than **omniscience. I simply do not buy the account of omniscience as “maximal cognitive excellence/power.”