THANK YOU,
Syntax for seeing to the root which I apparently
failed to point out in my last post!
You’re welcome

But my main concern is just clearing up everyone’s confusions and misuse of philosophical vocabulary–which almost everyone is guilty of in this thread.
In my previous posts, I have presented suggestions concerning WHY the -]logical contingency /-]between free choice X and knowledge of it does not entail direct and -]essential causation/-], from the points of how the logical contingency is established and questioning what constitutes an essential “property”.
Ok, “logically contingent”
actually means
logically could have been otherwise. “Logical contingency” does not mean
logical dependence. Only “logical entailment” expresses the relation of
logical dependence.
So if you say that the relation between cause and effect is
logically contingent, then you are saying that the effect might not have occured when the cause occurs. But cause-and-effect is not construed this way; rather, it is construed as expressing causal sufficiency, that is, given the cause, the effect *must *occur in terms of
ontological dependency, not
logical dependency.
I believe I read some of your posts, and I think I may agree with most of it, but I also think you are being a bit sloppy in your use of philosophical vocabulary. Don’t worry, though, you are doing a much better job than R Daneel in articulating a clear and well-formed thought.
R Daneel and I have been using the term “cause” to include “logical entailment” or contingency. “Cause” in terms of some event implies time and, as I already stated and so did R Daneel, time is not the issue here, discussing it only leads to greater confusion and misunderstanding.
There’s a really pressing need for a clarification of your use of terms here:
First, I know people will often say things in ordinary speech like
“My buying that new car is contingent upon my gettting my next pay check.”
However, this is an incorrect use of the term “contingent.”
“Contingent” does NOT mean
ontologically dependent on.
Strictly speaking, “contingent” only means
could have been otherwise (as I’ve already mentioned), as in,
“The existence of the universe is a contingent fact because God
could have *not *created it, that is, the universe might not have existed at all.”
It is true that the existence of the universe is
ontologically dependent upon God’s act of creating it because God caused it to come into existence. But it is also true that the universe *may not have existed *at all, that is, the universe exists contingently, not necessarily. See the difference?
Second, you cannot use “to cause” to mean “logically entails,” although I can see how you might think they are one and same. Logical entailment is a grounds/consequence relation between
premise and
conclusion as in,
(a) Necessarily P
(b) Therefore, P.
or
(a) ~(A or B)
(b) Therefore, (~A and ~B)
Causal sufficiency is a *material conditional *relation between
events, not between premise/conclusion as in,
If A, then B.
A
So, B.
Though causal sufficiency is often
expressed in logical form here above, it is
not a logical
relation between 2 premises and conclusion. It is a relation between an event A and another event B. So really it is saying,
A is sufficient for B
So given the occurrence of A, B must occur
Take the difference between
Grandpa didn’t wake up in the morning
why?
Because he’s sick
AND
Grandpa is sick
why?
Because he didn’t wake up in the morning.
The first expresses causal sufficiency. Grandpa’s being sick is the cause of his not getting up in the morning.
The second expresses my reason for believing Grandpa is sick and is expressed in the following inductive logical argument:
Grandpa didn’t wake up in the morning.
Therefore, he is probably sick.
The “real problem” (to use your phrase above) is actually the inverse of your presented argument. It is not that God’s knowledge logically entails a person choosing X (though that is certainly the case), it is that a person choosing X logically entails God’s knowledge of it! God’s knowledge is thus logically contingent upon the choice of a will not identical with His own. In effect, God’s knowledge is in some sense “caused” by this other entity’s choice (time not entering into it). If that is the case, and if God’s knowledge is indistinguishable from His essence (being divinely simple and unified), then God’s essence is in some way “caused” by, i.e. logically contingent upon, another being! God’s self-necessity goes out the window.
Ok, hold up. This is a
Divine Simplicity problem and doesn’t threaten Free Will at all. It has nothing to do with the **Foreknowledge/Human Freedom **debate. But if R Daneel, or anyone else thinks Divine Simplicity is a Foreknowledge/Human Freedom
issue, then he is clearly using the wrong argument to get across a different point. For there is nothing logically inconsistent about the following two statements:
(1) a person’s action X causes God’s knowledge of X
(2) a person Y feely does X.
So there’s nothing logically inconsistent about believing both (1) and (2) at once.
But, if I remember correctly, R Daneel was saying something along the lines that these two propositions (1) and (2), together with
(3) God’s knowledge causes a person Y to do X
is logically inconsistent because (3) will invariably contradict (2). But so what? No Christian believes (3) anyway!
So RDaneel’s argument is a *straw man *right from the get-go.