A serious logical problem

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Before I answer, I’d like you to answer a question: Does God have the power to roll a die with a random outcome, despite the fact that He knows the outcome in advance? Can God act randomly?
Shall I repeat the question, R Daneel?
 
Shall I repeat the question, R Daneel?
I was not aware that you addressed it to me. I have no idea about the relevance of your question. I am not talking about God’s ability to do something, only about his alleged knowledge of “everything” and the ramifications of this knowledge vis-a-vis our freedom of action.

There are two things under consideration here: God’s full knowledge of everything (past, present and future) and our alleged freedom of actions. According to the Catholic theology, there is a 100% correlation between the two. We are free to do whatever we want (not really, but sort of), and God’s infallible knowledge of what we do.

If there are two events (A - God’s knowledge and B - our free actions) in 100% correlation, then there are four possibilities:
  1. A is the causative factor for B.
  2. B is the causative factor for A.
  3. A and B are both caused by some external entity.
  4. A and B happen independently, and it is sheer luck/chance/coincidence that they are in harmony with each other.
In case 1) God’s knowledge causes (somehow) what we do - meaning that there is no free will - contradicted by Catholic theology.
In case 2) our free actions cause God’s knowledge - also contradicted by Catholic theology (about God’s simplicity).
In case 3) something external causes both God’s knowledge and our actions - also contradicted by Catholic theology.
Finally, in case 4) there is an incredible coincidence, and God’s knowledge is the result of this external concidence - also contradicted by Catholic theology.

That is all. All 4 possibilities are denied/contradicted by Catholic theology. Cases 1), 3) and 4) are obvious. Some Catholics assert that case 2) is the valid explanation, but they forget/neglect/unaware of the Catholic dogma about God’s simplicity. No matter how one tries to twist it, Catholic theology denies all 4 cases, therefore Catholic theology, God’s omnisicence and our freedom of action cannot be reconciled. One of them has to be incorrect - most probably Catholic theology. The funny thing is that I only use accepted Catholic dogma and theology to invalidate the dogma. Gotta love the beauty and simplicity of logic.
 
If there are two events (A - God’s knowledge and B - our free actions) in 100% correlation, then there are four possibilities:
  1. A is the causative factor for B.
  2. B is the causative factor for A.
  3. A and B are both caused by some external entity.
  4. A and B happen independently, and it is sheer luck/chance/coincidence that they are in harmony with each other.
In case 1) God’s knowledge causes (somehow) what we do - meaning that there is no free will - contradicted by Catholic theology.
If I might formalize the principle you are espousing: “No entity A can cause the existence of another entity B whose subsequent actions A does not determine.” This is a metaphysical claim, and I wonder what rational support it has. Working from the hypothesis of an omnipotent God – who, however, can do only noncontradictory things – I do not see why your principle should be accepted.

The problem is, in short, epistemological. We do not understand *how *such a thing could be. But neither do we understand how we are responsible for ANY of our actions, even without the God hypothesis. Free will is a mystery, as is the existence of consciousness. But we need not discard our belief in free will, any more than we discard our belief in consciousness.

My solution is not neat and tidy, perhaps, but it is one possible explanation that you might consider. If God is capable of random action, then God is capable of creating “random” beings within certain parameters: intelligent, free-willed, creative, etc. But if the particular person you are is random, it follows that your actions are not determined, although your fundamental nature is determined.

Suppose you say, though, that God is not capable of random action. Would you not be claiming, then, that *we *can do something God cannot?
 
Of course it can. Believers keep insisting that God “performs” miracles (for example), and any action presupposes a before-after relationship. Here we analyze God as a “passive” holder of “knowledge”. Time has no role here.
God does perform miracles but not in Time. Again, everything is present to God in the now, there is no past nor a present nor a future, everything is now. That is how God has Knowledge of what we will do because for Him we are doing it now, all of it.
I did and I will answer it again now. The highligted text indicates that God knowledge is contingent upon our actions. God’s knowledge is not a separate “part” of God, God is simple, his knowledge is his essence. Therefore God’s essence is contingent upon our actions, which is a contradiction.
Again, contingent is only used with Time, nothing is contingent for God as he is in Eternity and everything is Now for Him.
 
If I might formalize the principle you are espousing: “No entity A can cause the existence of another entity B whose subsequent actions A does not determine.” This is a metaphysical claim, and I wonder what rational support it has. Working from the hypothesis of an omnipotent God – who, however, can do only noncontradictory things – I do not see why your principle should be accepted.
I think we have a major misunderstanding. What I am saying is not like that at all. The point here is a synchronized and ongoing equivalence between God’s alleged knowledge and our actions. The question is the source of that equivalence. It is not the creation of something undetermined.
The problem is, in short, epistemological. We do not understand *how *such a thing could be. But neither do we understand how we are responsible for ANY of our actions, even without the God hypothesis. Free will is a mystery, as is the existence of consciousness. But we need not discard our belief in free will, any more than we discard our belief in consciousness.
Many people do not accept the free will hypothesis. If there is a free will, we do not know the mechanism for it.
My solution is not neat and tidy, perhaps, but it is one possible explanation that you might consider. If God is capable of random action, then God is capable of creating “random” beings within certain parameters: intelligent, free-willed, creative, etc. But if the particular person you are is random, it follows that your actions are not determined, although your fundamental nature is determined.
Your idea presents a different question, which should be explored somewhere else. What you say assumes a “time” for God. Any action (maybe with a random outcome) presupposes a future time for God. Yes, it is a very interesting problem, but it has nothing to do with the current question.
Suppose you say, though, that God is not capable of random action. Would you not be claiming, then, that *we *can do something God cannot?
That is a given, by Catholic teaching. It says that God is “unable” to lie or cheat, which is well within our powers to do. Calvinists believe otherwise. They say that God is able to lie, but chooses not to. Big difference.
 
God does perform miracles but not in Time. Again, everything is present to God in the now, there is no past nor a present nor a future, everything is now. That is how God has Knowledge of what we will do because for Him we are doing it now, all of it.

Again, contingent is only used with Time, nothing is contingent for God as he is in Eternity and everything is Now for Him.
Necessary and contingent existence have nothing to do with time.
 
Reposted from another forum:

Whenever I see debates like this erupt, I think they spring from a misunderstanding of Calcedonian Doctrine – which, if you fully understand it, describes this wonderful mystery our Church celebrates. Here is Fr. Barron explaining some of it:

"We find it terribly difficult to accept the ecstatic metaphysical poetry of Chalcedon, the language of divine/human unity.

But, from the standpoint of metanoia, from the perspective of the new mind, we see that God is not a competing supreme being, but the power whose very closeness to us enhances our humanity, whose very proximity makes us most fully ourselves.

And we see, at the same time, that God is a reality that can work its way into every corner of creation without ceasing to be itself In a word the “natures” of God and creation can come together without compromise and contradiction, precisely because God is not a being but the mysterious power of Being itself.

The Chalcedonian fathers proclaim, in their sober philosophical language, the undoing of Eden, they see as reality what the sinful mind can appreciate only as illusion or nonsense. And this new vision, these new eyes, come from Jesus Christ, from the God/human intimacy that is his very being.

In the startling and unique way of being that was Christ’s, the first believers glimpsed the theonomy that was offered but lost at Eden, that was held out alluringly throughout the Old Testament, that indirectly animated and gave purpose to all the finest expressions of the religious imagination of humanity."

If you would like to follow up and read more of this you can find it at:

payingattentiontothesky.com/2…nian-doctrine/

It might help you appreciate the paradox of an omniscient God and a creature with free will – on the face of it a sheer impossibility, a contradiction in terms, but at the heart of it part of the ecstatic metaphysical poetry of Chalcedon

dj
 
Necessary and contingent existence have nothing to do with time.
You seem to have a problem with removing God from Time though. You still have not addressed the issue of Eternity and God being in Eternity and therefore experiences everything at the same time so that His Knowledge is not foreknowledge but the experience of it happening in the Now.

You argument presupposes that God’s knowledge is a foreknowledge, that He knows what we will do before we do it so therefore He is the cause of us doing it therefore removing our free will.

This is not so, God knows what we will do because He experiences us doing it in the Now, everything is in the Now for God as he is in Eternity.

I think this is the last word for me as you do not seem to be open to discussing anything but your 4 possibilities all of which do not deal with the issue of God’s presence in Eternity.
 
You seem to have a problem with removing God from Time though. You still have not addressed the issue of Eternity and God being in Eternity and therefore experiences everything at the same time so that His Knowledge is not foreknowledge but the experience of it happening in the Now.

You argument presupposes that God’s knowledge is a foreknowledge, that He knows what we will do before we do it so therefore He is the cause of us doing it therefore removing our free will.

This is not so, God knows what we will do because He experiences us doing it in the Now, everything is in the Now for God as he is in Eternity.

I think this is the last word for me as you do not seem to be open to discussing anything but your 4 possibilities all of which do not deal with the issue of God’s presence in Eternity.
I have not used the word “foreknowledge” at all. God’s residing in time or in eternity is not exploited at all. The time-sequence is only mentioned by you, not in my argument. I did not say that case 1) is the solution. It is one of the logical possibilities, which is denied by the Catholic Church.

Right on, I am not discussing eternity, because it is not relevant to current discussion. Causation is not contingent upon time. The 4 possibilities are the only logical possibilities, all of which are denied by the Catholic theology. That is all.
 
Yes, it is getting boring by now, but the problem of omniscience and free will needs to be addressed again. The basic problem is this:

Suppose that God knows all our future decisions, and yet we still have freedom to act on our own volition, that is: “we have free will”. This is what Catholics assert in a unanimous fashion. If this is the case, there are 3 different ways of addressing the interrelationship between these two entities.
  1. God’s knowledge is the causative factor in determining our actions. In other words, we do whatever we do, because God knows what we shall do. Obviously this negates our freedom totally and completely. Catholics - naturally - deny this.
  2. Our actions are the causative factors in determining God’s knowledge. In other words, God knows what we shall do, because we do those acts. The problem here is that God’s knowledge is logically contingent upon our actions. If we would act differently it would “retroactively” (retroactively is not meant in the temporal sense, rather in the causative one!) change God’s knowledge. However, it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is “simple”, God has no “parts”, God is “indivisible”. God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions. Clearly, that would be contradictory to God’s essence - which is supposed to be uncaused. (It is true, that some Catholics advocate this solution. Of course they fail to think it over, and do not realize the ramification of their stance.)
  3. There is a third possibility (for the sake of completeness), which is never discussed or even mentioned. This possibility is that God’s knowledge and our free actions are totally independent, there is no causative relationship either way. In other words, God’s knowledge just “happens” to coincide with our actions, it is mere chance that the two “happen” to be identical. No one advocates this solution. Natually so, since it reduces God’s knowledge (and therefore God’s essence) to something that depends on lucky chances.
Therefore, the conclusion is this:
  1. God’s knowledge cannot cause our actions - because that would negate our free will.
  2. Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.
  3. God’s knowledge cannot be based upon lucky chances - because that would render God’s essence to be the result of random chance.
There are no other solutions. Therefore, omniscience and free will cannot be reconciled. Q.E.D.
Your logical error I believe is: “God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions.”

Correctly stated: God is knowledge therefore knowledge of our actions in time is necessary to Him.

This error follows from the obvious contradiction in terms: “it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is ‘simple’, God has no parts, God is ‘indivisible’. God’s **knowledge is an integral part **of his essence.” Either God has no parts (correct) or He does (incorrect). You seem to argue for both which is a contradiction.

Correctly stated God, having no parts, is knowledge. Humans share in God’s knowledge in a temporal fashion: from concepts, to judements, to reasoned conclusions. God, however, just simply knows because that is His essence.
 
Your logical error I believe is: “God’s knowledge is an integral part of his essence. That being the case, God’s essence would be contingent upon our actions.”

Correctly stated: God is knowledge therefore knowledge of our actions in time is necessary to Him.

This error follows from the obvious contradiction in terms: “it is an ironclad Catholic dogma (or doctrine) that God is ‘simple’, God has no parts, God is ‘indivisible’. God’s **knowledge is an integral part **of his essence.” Either God has no parts (correct) or He does (incorrect). You seem to argue for both which is a contradiction.

Correctly stated God, having no parts, is knowledge. Humans share in God’s knowledge in a temporal fashion: from concepts, to judements, to reasoned conclusions. God, however, just simply knows because that is His essence.
What do you try to say? There is no causative relationship between God’s knowledge and our actions? Neither causes the other? They just “happen” to coincide? Even in this case God’s knowledge is caused by this incredible set of coincidences, in other words: it is contingent.
 
Doesn’t the very word “contingent” need to be placed inside time though? Contingent, to me, implies a causal relationship which doesn’t really make sense outside time. If God is indeed “outside time” his knowledge of events being created precisely as they happen can’t be a causal relationship.

Of course, we are really incapable of fathoming how a being can interact with anything non-sequentially - so I’ll use that phrase for things that go beyond our intellectual capacity: mystery.
 
What do you try to say? There is no causative relationship between God’s knowledge and our actions? Neither causes the other? They just “happen” to coincide? Even in this case God’s knowledge is caused by this incredible set of coincidences, in other words: it is contingent.
I say be logical. An effect (God’s knowledge) cannot precede its cause (man’s action). Therefore, there is no causal relationship between God’s knowledge and our actions. God does not come to know as man does in time (see previous post). He is knowledge before man exists.

Your argument is a confusion of categories. If you argue about the attribute of the eternal Being then you must take all the terms which relate to the passage of time from your argument (they are irrelevant to the eternal) and restate it.
 
I have not used the word “foreknowledge” at all. God’s residing in time or in eternity is not exploited at all. The time-sequence is only mentioned by you, not in my argument. I did not say that case 1) is the solution. It is one of the logical possibilities, which is denied by the Catholic Church.

Right on, I am not discussing eternity, because it is not relevant to current discussion. Causation is not contingent upon time. The 4 possibilities are the only logical possibilities, all of which are denied by the Catholic theology. That is all.
It has everything to do with the current discussion. You cannot ask to explain why water boils and simply say “heat is not relevant”. I think I will follow ByzCatholic’s lead and bow out of the discussion. Several people have tried different paths to open up the discussion, it doesn’t seem like it is allowed. That is all.
 
Therefore, omniscience and free will cannot be reconciled.
Oh, you’re silly. Of course there are other solutions. It’s called compatibilism. Give this link a careful read.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

These are some of the main solutions of the contemporary compatibilist that you don’t think exist. It’s time for you to learn otherwise.

Denettian Free Will- he is a noted atheist and secular humanist, but don’t let that get in the way of the value of his contributions to philosophy.

Hierarchical Compatibilism- Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical mesh theory, circa. 1971. Central to this is the hierarchical theory of free will, which has been categorized as a Real Self Theory. Incidentally, his most successful publication has a title that, if printed here, would consist of “On Bull” followed by four of these *. It spent 27 weeks on the New York Times bestseller list and landed him an interview on The Daily Show…I think in 2005. thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-march-14-2005/harry-g–frankfurt There’s something very satisfying about seeing a Princeton professor get bleeped this much.

There’s also the Reason View, which Susan Wolf is responsible for. The Asymmetry Thesis plays a notable role in this theory. She’s currently at Chapel Hill teaching at NC, but before that…Harvard, Maryland, and Johns Hopkins. BA from Yale, Ph.D from Princeton. Her book having to do with compatibilism is Freedom Within Reason. But hey, I guess you can just ignore all that and say “There are no other solutions.”

Then there’s Reasons-Response Compatibilism, which can be Agent-based or Mechanism-based. And finally, there’s Strawsonian Compatibilism.

What was it you were saying just now? “There are no other solutions.” Yes, that was it. :rolleyes:

These are just the contemporary philosophical theories on compatibilism. Don’t let that fool you into thinking compatibilist theories only came into existence in the last 50 years. It’s been around for at least as long as incompatibilism, and probably longer than Christianity’s been around. This isn’t limited to Catholics, to Christians, or even to religion. The first contemporary philosopher that comes up in the source is a guy who’s been listed among the “Four Horsemen,” those being Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, and our main man Dennett. Compatibilism vs. Incompatibilism is an issue that transcends Christianity and religion in general. This debate is one that takes place among philosophers, and as I’m sure you well know, various philosophies have had a profound impact on Christianity throughout its history. Some of these philosophies- especially when applied by Aquinas- are treated as if they were handed down from the apostles themselves. In reality, though, this (as it is with the others) is a philosophical argument that has spilled into our backyards.

Anyway, the main point is this. Before you do anything else, I need to see you admit that there are “other solutions.” Compatibilism offers a solution to the “free will problem,” and it’s something that underlies the Catholic teaching on predestination as well as the analogous doctrines of most Protestant traditions.

We aren’t working with something that doesn’t exist.
 
Doesn’t the very word “contingent” need to be placed inside time though? Contingent, to me, implies a causal relationship which doesn’t really make sense outside time. If God is indeed “outside time” his knowledge of events being created precisely as they happen can’t be a causal relationship.
The existence of straightness is what **causes **another thing to be curved. But the straightness did not bend through time the thing that is curved. The truth of one **causes **the truth of the other instantaneously.
 
I think we have a major misunderstanding. What I am saying is not like that at all. The point here is a synchronized and ongoing equivalence between God’s alleged knowledge and our actions. The question is the source of that equivalence. It is not the creation of something undetermined.
You posted a trilemma:
  1. God’s knowledge cannot cause our actions - because that would negate our free will.
  2. Our actions cannot cause God’s knowledge - because that would negate God’s uncaused essence.
  3. God’s knowledge cannot be based upon lucky chances - because that would render God’s essence to be the result of random chance.
But these options are not comprehensive. Consider: God can, for all we know, cause the existence of beings with free will. The fact that He would know our choices in advance does not entail that the choices are not free. There is no “ongoing equivalence” between God’s knowledge and our action, because God’s knowledge is not contingent upon our action, just as my knowledge that I have spoken a word is not contingent upon my being able to hear. It is wrong to speak of God perceiving things, in our ordinary sense of the term.

Let’s just say that you had the power to think of something perfectly at random. Would you know what you were thinking of? Yes, of course. Just so, my actions are contained within God’s knowledge, not causally, but because they are “wrapped up in” the full person that God created in me. All my actions are contained within the “word” God spoke when He created me, and yet they are *my *actions, not His.
Many people do not accept the free will hypothesis. If there is a free will, we do not know the mechanism for it.
I agree. Similarly, if there are physical laws, we do not know the mechanism for them. Indeed, we are quite ignorant of many such things! But I, for one, choose the common sense view, and believe many things I do not see. 🤷
Your idea presents a different question, which should be explored somewhere else. What you say assumes a “time” for God. Any action (maybe with a random outcome) presupposes a future time for God.
I don’t see how randomness requires time. Can you explain this to me?
That is a given, by Catholic teaching. It says that God is “unable” to lie or cheat, which is well within our powers to do. Calvinists believe otherwise. They say that God is able to lie, but chooses not to. Big difference.
Gee, I take the Calvinist line. Uh-oh! Here comes the Inquisition… :eek:

It’s all semantics. God is “free” to lie, sure, just as Aristotle’s virtuous man is “free” to rape and pillage – but he won’t do it! To say that something is *against one’s nature *is not to impose a restriction on the person. *We *are the limited ones, for we do not even have access to our own nature (unless we get help). 😉
 
I don’t see how randomness requires time. Can you explain this to me?
As I understand it, randomness means complete uncertainty about the outcome, i.e., an unknown future event. From God’s omniscient perspective there is no uncertainty, therefore no randomness.
 
God is “free” to lie, sure, just as Aristotle’s virtuous man is “free” to rape and pillage – but he won’t do it! To say that something is *against one’s nature *is not to impose a restriction on the person. *We *are the limited ones, for we do not even have access to our own nature (unless we get help). 😉
If God violates his nature, he would not be perfect and also not even be God. God does not lie, therefore cannot lie. He who lies, cannot also be God.

{although such hardly precludes people from presumptuously *thinking *they have been lied to.)
 
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