P
punkforchrist
Guest
I’d like to hear everyone’s thoughts on this to see if this version of the argument has any merit. First off, I like the argument from motion because I think of it as a minimalist version of the cosmological argument (as opposed to the kalam version, which rests the premise that there cannot be an infinite series of past events). The formulation I’m working with goes like this:
I think premise (1) is obvious, since if there is nothing purely actual, then all things that exist must be potential.
The support of premise (2) is transcendental. If all things exist in potentiality, then all things must be changing; for potential beings can both be and not-be, and are transferred from potentiality to degrees of actuality. For example, a potentially hot piece of wood is made actually hot by a hot fire. But if all things are changing, then that too must be changing, which is self-contradictory. Hence, at least one thing must be purely actual, and therefore, there must be a Prime Mover.
Further, it would appear that a number of attributes follow from this. The Prime Mover must be eternal, since if there was ever a moment in which it came into being, then it would be potential. It must also be one, because if there were more than one Prime Mover, then there would be distinctions between them. But since distinctions entail limitations, and limitations potentiality, then the Prime Mover must be one.
I also believe a good case can be made that the Prime Mover must be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. For there are varying degrees of potentiality with respect to each. A human being, for instance, is more knowledgeable than a koala bear. This means that the knowledge of a human is more potent than that of a koala bear. Now, since something purely actual is nothing other than maximal potent, then the Prime Mover must be maximally powerful, intelligent, and good. This, of course, matches our definition of God, and monotheism at that.
I think this argument is sound, but I’d like to hear some feedback in order to strengthen the proof, if at all possible.
- If there is no Prime Mover, then all things exist in potentiality.
- Not all things exist in potentiality.
- Therefore, there must be a Prime Mover.
I think premise (1) is obvious, since if there is nothing purely actual, then all things that exist must be potential.
The support of premise (2) is transcendental. If all things exist in potentiality, then all things must be changing; for potential beings can both be and not-be, and are transferred from potentiality to degrees of actuality. For example, a potentially hot piece of wood is made actually hot by a hot fire. But if all things are changing, then that too must be changing, which is self-contradictory. Hence, at least one thing must be purely actual, and therefore, there must be a Prime Mover.
Further, it would appear that a number of attributes follow from this. The Prime Mover must be eternal, since if there was ever a moment in which it came into being, then it would be potential. It must also be one, because if there were more than one Prime Mover, then there would be distinctions between them. But since distinctions entail limitations, and limitations potentiality, then the Prime Mover must be one.
I also believe a good case can be made that the Prime Mover must be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. For there are varying degrees of potentiality with respect to each. A human being, for instance, is more knowledgeable than a koala bear. This means that the knowledge of a human is more potent than that of a koala bear. Now, since something purely actual is nothing other than maximal potent, then the Prime Mover must be maximally powerful, intelligent, and good. This, of course, matches our definition of God, and monotheism at that.
I think this argument is sound, but I’d like to hear some feedback in order to strengthen the proof, if at all possible.