A simplified argument from motion

[freesoulhope]

Unfortunately you have not provided one scintilla of logically sound argumentation in support of that premise. .

Nobody has ever provided any proofs of an infinite universe either; because in order to find that out, one would have to tranverse the infinite. Integers, do not give explanation to why an infinite univerese, as a whole, should or ought to exist. You your self have to first think of intergers, before they become real ideas, regardless of them being infinite.

The five ways, may not be air tight proofs, but it fits with logic in respect of an ultimate explanation for movement. The contradiction in an infinite universe, is not that it is infinite, but that an infinite chain of objects have been moving for an infinite duration; and therefore, the chain as an **infinite whole **rather then indivisual parts, has no reason for being in state of movement. In order for something to be in movement it needs an unmoved mover.

It is deceptive to focus on each indivisual cause, becuase any cause that makes up the universe as a **“whole”, **which isn’t an ultimate cause, isn’t really a cuase by its own power; its an effect, and is only a “co-cuase” in relation to the next object. One needs to find out, where the cause motion **ultimately **came from; and so any proir finite cause, cannot, by definition, provide that answer. If you saw a chain dangling from the sky, you would not think, infinite regress, by just looking at the indivisual links for an explaination. You would think that it came from somewhere. You would think about where the chain as a “whole”, has come from; not where the indivisual links have come from. A reasonable person will not be satisfied with an infinite regress as an anwser, especailly if a person is aware that an unmoved mover can serve as a better explanation for its existents.

An infinite universe, need only be considered if there is no other explanation; but i see no reason to “favor” an infinite universe.

The causes them selves, do not explain where causation came from. The person who subscribes to an infinite universe does away with the reason to look for an ultimate cause. But once you focus on causitive chain as a whole, an infinite universe exists for no reason; it goes outside the realm of logic. Indivisual causitive reasons become some what deceptive, because the **infinite movement **of things is not explained. I cannot prove that an ultimate cuase exists, but it does provide a more logical explanation, then infinite regress. Thomas aquiness provides answers for why anything ultimately exists in a state of movement; but an infinite regress simply ingnores the qeustion, and expresses that things have always moved. Which doesn’t seem reasonable to me.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I’m not actually arguing against any infinite sets. I’m simply saying that one cannot be formed by successive addition.

That’s what you need to provide some argumentation for in order to prove. As I pointed out an infinite set is obtained in the limit of number of additions going to infinity. Or, let’s put it this way, for any particular member of a (countably) infinite set, we can reach that member by a finite number of additions from a starting point.

If (3) demonstrates the impossibility of an infinite set formed by successive addition, then it follows logically that the chain of movers is finite. Hence, (4) follows necessarily.

(3) still needs to be proved. Further, for this argument to work it is assumed the chain of movers would have to be (ontologically) formed by successive addition, which is different from merely conceiving of it that way. The set of positive integers can be conceived of as starting from {1}, adding the last member of the set + 1, and taking the limit to infinity. That doesn’t mean the set is actually formed that way.

The two are not analogous, though. Between 0 and 10, we can say that there are is an infinite series of numbers, but the series itself is bounded between 0 and 10. If the chain of movers were infinite, then it would be specifically unbounded.

This analogy isn’t appropriate. My example of an infinite series was unbounded.

In the analogy of the book, the series does not begin with my receiving the book, but rather it terminates when I receive it.

My point is that there is a finite number of moves from any other person having the book to my receiving it.

If the chain of movers is infinite, then there ought to be a mover at an infinite distance away from the present. If not, then the chain is finite.

That is not the case. Take the infinite set of positive integers. Every member of the set has a finite distance from the number 1. There is no member of the set with an infinite distance away. Or, I suppose for the analogy to make better sense, I should take the set of negative integers plus zero. Every member of the set has a finite distance from the present (zero).

However, if there is an infinitely distant mover, then we would have to add aleph-null to -aleph-null in order to arrive at the present state of motion. But since, an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition, then this is impossible. Therefore, the chain of movers is finite.

There is no infinitely distant mover in an infinitely long chain of movers. Hence your premise is wrong and your proof fails.

This is a tautology, but it does not solve the problem of whether or not an infinite can be formed by successive addition.

Well this what you will need to prove for your argument to go any further. In a countably infinite set, every particular member can be achieved by a finite number of successive additions from a starting point.

 

[Mirdath]

If (3) is true, then the chain of movers cannot be infinite, which means that there must have been a first mover. Unless this mover is unmoved, then the regression continues, which is a contradiction.

Semantics, semantics. A primeval state would not be a ‘mover’ or ‘actor’ (it’s a state or mode, it can’t act itself), but a position from which movers and actors could arise.

I can see how this applies to temporal agents, but what about timeless ones? The action of the Prime Mover does not need to be preceded by non-action. What if God willed from all eternity to create?

Point conceded.

The unproven assumption above is that angels have no free will.

Looking back through Aquinas, I see that I was mistaken. However, they do not have free will in the same sense humans do; and there are other beings who do not possess it. Can a rock choose to love and glorify its creator? If being created for that purpose is an ultimate good, why have all things not been so created?

There is no formal contradiction between the co-existence of God and evil. J.L. Mackie and others have attempted to demonstrate an implicit contradiction, though, saying that if God were omni-max, then He would not permit evil. However, even the atheistic philosopher Michael Martin points out that so long as God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, then the two are not logically incompatible.

In other words, God is a utilitarian and a moral relativist: as long as it results in a greater net good than net harm, evil is permissible.

These two options conclude that God does not exist. The first because God wants to eliminate all evil, but does not, which casts doubt upon his omnipotence or omniscience; the second because God does not want to eliminate evil, and is therefore, morally imperfect.

I honestly do not see the latter as being necessarily problematic. Why should God be omnibenevolent? Is it not just as likely he might be omnimalevolent – or simply uncaring?

The third conclusion allows for the co-existence of God and evil, since God may not want to get rid of all evil in light of the greatest good.

‘Get rid of’? It only exists because of his actions in the first place.

 

[BlaineTog]

Looking back through Aquinas, I see that I was mistaken. However, they do not have free will in the same sense humans do; and there are other beings who do not possess it. Can a rock choose to love and glorify its creator? If being created for that purpose is an ultimate good, why have all things not been so created?

Because it fills a different roll.

In other words, God is a utilitarian and a moral relativist: as long as it results in a greater net good than net harm, evil is permissible.

Not at all. God respects our free will, which sometimes/often requires permitting evil. Evil is never good; by definition, evil “should not happen” and good “should.” However, God can turn the consequences of evil into good ones. The mistake lies in assuming that therefore the evil actions, because their consequences can be made good, are necessarily the best or only way for things to go. All things come to good, but they would come to good even if there were no evil.

I honestly do not see the latter as being necessarily problematic. Why should God be omnibenevolent? Is it not just as likely he might be omnimalevolent – or simply uncaring?

It’s not that he “should” be omnibenevolent, just that he is. That’s the point of the bible: not that God exists, but that he loves us.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Nobody has ever provided any proofs of an infinite universe either…

No argument there.

The five ways, may not be air tight proofs…

I’m not disagreeing that a First Mover is a better explanation. I wouldn’t be Catholic if I did. However I cannot, by strict logic, disprove the possibility of an infinite regress.

 

[Mirdath]

Because it fills a different roll.

Why does that role exist in the first place, if it is an imperfect or less than ultimate good?

Not at all. God respects our free will, which sometimes/often requires permitting evil. Evil is never good; by definition, evil “should not happen” and good “should.” However, God can turn the consequences of evil into good ones.

That way lies either universalism or again, God choosing to create imperfection. The problem of evil does not lie in what God does with the consequences, but in his having enabled evil in the first place.

The mistake lies in assuming that therefore the evil actions, because their consequences can be made good, are necessarily the best or only way for things to go. All things come to good, but they would come to good even if there were no evil.

Then murder is good, rape is good, war is good, famine is good, damnation is good, and there really is no such thing as true evil – because in the end it all ‘comes to good’. That’s a pretty tough one to defend, particularly the last given its finality.

I am an apostate – not through any choice of my own, but because I am unable to make a leap of faith. As such, I do not believe the Church a moral authority, and both do and have done many things knowing full well it considers them mortal sins. According to the Church, then, I am damned many times over, and probably a latae sententiae excommunicate to boot. Assuming I never do make that leap, I expect that if there exists a God such as the Church describes, I will remain eternally separated from him – that is, more than I am now. Is this what a loving, omnibenevolent God does? Does the good shepherd ignore the blind sheep?

It’s not that he “should” be omnibenevolent, just that he is. That’s the point of the bible: not that God exists, but that he loves us.

Is he really omnibenevolent? That’s asserted, but not demonstrated.

 

[BlaineTog]

Why does that role exist in the first place, if it is an imperfect or less than ultimate good?

In part, for the same reasons their are Extras in movies: to set things up such that the perfect role is possible. A movie without extras would be an inferior movie. And “imperfect” is the wrong word to use. “Less good,” perhaps. But man needs a place to rest his feet, so God made rocks.

That way lies either universalism or again, God choosing to create imperfection.

No, God chose to give us free will, which gives us the ability to make imperfect choices. Free Will itself is a good thing, as well as a thing necessary for, among other things, the meaning of our existence.

Then murder is good, rape is good, war is good, famine is good, damnation is good, and there really is no such thing as true evil – because in the end it all ‘comes to good’. That’s a pretty tough one to defend, particularly the last given its finality.

No, to all counts. Sorry, I was being a little lax with my language: God turns all temporal evil into good. Damnation is the only infinite evil, and it can never be good. And you’re oversimplifying it again. Just because something is eventually made good doesn’t mean it was a good thing. If I am poisoned and get sick, but I’m given an antidote and made better, it was still a bad thing that I was poisoned. God is omnipotent and can work all worldly actions into his plan, but that doesn’t mean the actions are all good in themselves, merely that God can
deal with them.

I am an apostate – not through any choice of my own, but because I am unable to make a leap of faith. As such, I do not believe the Church a moral authority, and both do and have done many things knowing full well it considers them mortal sins. According to the Church, then, I am damned many times over, and probably a latae sententiae excommunicate to boot. Assuming I never do make that leap, I expect that if there exists a God such as the Church describes, I will remain eternally separated from him – that is, more than I am now. Is this what a loving, omnibenevolent God does? Does the good shepherd ignore the blind sheep?

No. But he doesn’t rape his children either. If you choose to go firmly into the darkness and allow your soul to burn out, he will not forcibly move you into Heaven. Damnation is not something done to you but something you do to yourself. God loves you, and will try his darndest to convince you to come towards him, but at the same time he will respect your free will.

(Oh, and btw, while the Church sometimes names Saints, it never claims that any given person is in hell. I, for one, prefer to leave such things to God).

Is he really omnibenevolent? That’s asserted, but not demonstrated.

Sure it is. The Old Testament is basically about how Israel was an adulterous wife to God but he continually forgave her, and the New Testament is basically about how God let us crucify him in order that sins might be forgiven (because God is merciful, but also just). Crucification of God, the person who least deserves it, was the worst thing that ever happened, but God let us do it to him entirely for our sake. If that’s not a demonstration of omnibenevolence, what else could be?

(BTW, “The Problem of Pain” by C.S. Lewis confronts this issue better than I could, though read his “A Grief Observed” after to get a more personal look on things. Neither is particularly long, and AGO is very short).

 

[Mirdath]

But man needs a place to rest his feet, so God made rocks.

Nice turn of phrase

No, God chose to give us free will, which gives us the ability to make imperfect choices. Free Will itself is a good thing, as well as a thing necessary for, among other things, the meaning of our existence.

So God is responsible for giving us the ability to do evil – yes or no?

No, to all counts. Sorry, I was being a little lax with my language: God turns all temporal evil into good. Damnation is the only infinite evil, and it can never be good. And you’re oversimplifying it again. Just because something is eventually made good doesn’t mean it was a good thing. If I am poisoned and get sick, but I’m given an antidote and made better, it was still a bad thing that I was poisoned. God is omnipotent and can work all worldly actions into his plan, but that doesn’t mean the actions are all good in themselves, merely that God can deal with them.

Can, certainly. Maybe even does. But he could have worked without allowing for imperfection or evil from the beginning.

If you choose to go firmly into the darkness and allow your soul to burn out, he will not forcibly move you into Heaven. Damnation is not something done to you but something you do to yourself. God loves you, and will try his darndest to convince you to come towards him, but at the same time he will respect your free will.

As I said, I did not choose this.

(Oh, and btw, while the Church sometimes names Saints, it never claims that any given person is in hell. I, for one, prefer to leave such things to God).

I’m aware of that. The justification given is that it is impossible to know whether the person in question has squeaked in on his or her deathbed. I don’t have any reason to expect that my imminent demise will grant me the gift of faith.

Sure it is. The Old Testament is basically about how Israel was an adulterous wife to God but he continually forgave her, and the New Testament is basically about how God let us crucify him in order that sins might be forgiven (because God is merciful, but also just). Crucification of God, the person who least deserves it, was the worst thing that ever happened, but God let us do it to him entirely for our sake. If that’s not a demonstration of omnibenevolence, what else could be?

Creating the world so that it would not require such a sacrifice? The crucifixion is a demonstration of mercy, if one believes in the divinity of Jesus; but was it sublimely benevolent? I am not sure the crucifixion taken as-is is even really a sign of love, in spite of what John had to say on the matter. Such a sacrifice was overkill for a problem God, as the creator of all, was responsible for anyway.

 

[punkforchrist]

Or, let’s put it this way, for any particular member of a (countably) infinite set, we can reach that member by a finite number of additions from a starting point.

In other words, a finite quantity can be traversed by synthesizing finite elements. I agree with this, but that is not the same as saying an actual infinite can be formed by successive addition. No matter how many numbers are added, it will always and indefinately be possible to add another.

(3) still needs to be proved. Further, for this argument to work it is assumed the chain of movers would have to be (ontologically) formed by successive addition, which is different from merely conceiving of it that way. The set of positive integers can be conceived of as starting from {1}, adding the last member of the set + 1, and taking the limit to infinity. That doesn’t mean the set is actually formed that way.

Our conceptions of motion correspond to the real transmission between movers–that is, unless you deny the correspondence theory of truth. In any case, the positive integers represent the future, whereas the negative integers represent the past, but more on that below.

This analogy isn’t appropriate. My example of an infinite series was unbounded.

0 and 10 are the respective bounds of the analogy you gave.

My point is that there is a finite number of moves from any other person having the book to my receiving it.

This is true of any mover in the finite past, but what of the infinite past?

That is not the case. Take the infinite set of positive integers. Every member of the set has a finite distance from the number 1. There is no member of the set with an infinite distance away. Or, I suppose for the analogy to make better sense, I should take the set of negative integers plus zero. Every member of the set has a finite distance from the present (zero).

Emphasis mine. If there is no member of the set that is infinitely distant, what is the difference between that and saying the past chain of movers is finite? If the infinite past is non-existent, then the past is finite.

Further, all past events have been actualized (i.e. they have historically occurred). The infinite set, aleph-null, (in this case) contains all negative integers. This means logically that each member of that set would have to have been actualized. This means that there must be an actual point in the infinite past; otherwise, the past is finite.

There is no infinitely distant mover in an infinitely long chain of movers. Hence your premise is wrong and your proof fails.

Please see above. While the future is potentially infinite in that it will approach infinity as a limit and never reach it, all past events have been actualized. Hence, to say that there is no mover in the infinite past is synonymous with the claim that the past chain of movers is finite.

 

[punkforchrist]

Semantics, semantics. A primeval state would not be a ‘mover’ or ‘actor’ (it’s a state or mode, it can’t act itself), but a position from which movers and actors could arise.

Could you explain what you mean by “a position from which movers and actors could arise”? This sounds a lot like a Prime Mover to me.

Looking back through Aquinas, I see that I was mistaken. However, they do not have free will in the same sense humans do; and there are other beings who do not possess it.

There are heavenly angels and there are fallen angels. Their free will is analogous in many ways to our own.

Can a rock choose to love and glorify its creator? If being created for that purpose is an ultimate good, why have all things not been so created?

Rocks, as you agree, are not sentient creatures. They are strictly non-willing agents (more specifically, "things rather than “agents”), whereas if determinism were true, then humans would have a will, but not a free one. Rocks and other things demonstrate the glory of God to sentient creatures such as ourselves.

In other words, God is a utilitarian and a moral relativist: as long as it results in a greater net good than net harm, evil is permissible.

The greatest good need not be the most pleasure for the most people. Alternative worlds would have less cumulative good, and so God chose this world instead.

I honestly do not see the latter as being necessarily problematic. Why should God be omnibenevolent? Is it not just as likely he might be omnimalevolent – or simply uncaring?

If the argument from motion is sound, and I contend that it is, then God’s omnibenevolence follows, as I detailed earlier.

‘Get rid of’? It only exists because of his actions in the first place.

I would say instead that evil exists only because of man’s actions in the first place.

 

[Mirdath]

Could you explain what you mean by “a position from which movers and actors could arise”? This sounds a lot like a Prime Mover to me.

Your prime mover is a being; what I speak of is a state. It is not sentient, it has no will and no power of its own; it is mere potential.

Rocks, as you agree, are not sentient creatures. They are strictly non-willing agents (more specifically, "things rather than “agents”), whereas if determinism were true, then humans would have a will, but not a free one. Rocks and other things demonstrate the glory of God to sentient creatures such as ourselves.

Could they not demonstrate that glory and actively love God, had he willed it? Why did he create degrees of good?

The greatest good need not be the most pleasure for the most people. Alternative worlds would have less cumulative good, and so God chose this world instead.

What of alternate worlds possessing greater cumulative good? Or do you suppose that this is the best of all possible worlds, to steal a page from Voltaire?

If the argument from motion is sound, and I contend that it is, then God’s omnibenevolence follows, as I detailed earlier.

The former is not sound and the latter does not follow. If a creator made itself evident to me, I could, perhaps, believe in it; I might even be convinced that it is generally loving and well-intentioned. But I do not think I could ever be so naive as to believe it is all-benevolent and entirely exclusive from evil.

I would say instead that evil exists only because of man’s actions in the first place.

And man exists and acts because…?

 

[punkforchrist]

Your prime mover is a being; what I speak of is a state. It is not sentient, it has no will and no power of its own; it is mere potential.

How do potential beings arise from this, then? Unless they created themselves, which is highly problematic, then they must have been acted on.

Could they not demonstrate that glory and actively love God, had he willed it? Why did he create degrees of good?

They certainly could have had God willed it, but He chose not to create rocks with sentience. The degrees of good that exist point to God’s creative providence. When man looks upon the natural elements, like stars, oceans, and rocks, he sees their beauty. He then realizes that God created him even more beautifully. You seem to be conflating moral evil with natural evil, though. God can create something in potentiality without there being a moral deficiency in it.

What of alternate worlds possessing greater cumulative good? Or do you suppose that this is the best of all possible worlds, to steal a page from Voltaire?

Right, I believe this is the best of all possible (re: feasible) worlds.

The former is not sound and the latter does not follow.

Which of the premises of the argument do you disagree with specifically?

As for God’s omnibenevolence, if the Prime Mover is purely actual, then there can be no potentiality in it. If there were a mixture of good and evil in this being, then it would be potential. Since the Prime Mover is not potential, then it must be purely good.

If a creator made itself evident to me, I could, perhaps, believe in it; I might even be convinced that it is generally loving and well-intentioned. But I do not think I could ever be so naive as to believe it is all-benevolent and entirely exclusive from evil.

I used to underestimate the argument from religious experience, but reading William Alston’s book, Perceiving God, has changed my mind about that considerably. What, in your estimation, would qualify as a private revelation from God?

And man exists and acts because…?

God created man, but it doesn’t follow from that that God created the evil that exists in man. God creates man, and man is free to choose x or y. The fact that man chooses one over the other is not evidence that God is responsible for the decision itself.

 

[BlaineTog]

Nice turn of phrase

Thank you.

So God is responsible for giving us the ability to do evil – yes or no?

There’s not a yes or no answer because that’s a complex question (in the fallacious sense). It’s a “so what time last night did you kill your wife?” sort of question.

Essentially, the answer is yes, but the answer is misleading because you’ve oversimplified the question. God gave us free will; “free will” is defined as “the ability to choose to do good or evil.” But that done without choice is neither good nor evil from a moral standpoint. So in giving us free will, God gave us the ability to do evil, but he also gave us the ability to do good, and the two abilities are inseparable.

Can, certainly. Maybe even does. But he could have worked without allowing for imperfection or evil from the beginning.

Yes, but at the cost of obliterating all moral goodness. He would have created a giant, beautiful sculpture, and it certainly would have been worthwhile for him to created, but he chose to create something more and better than that as well. He created creatures which could equal him qualitatively, but such creatures can only exist if they can also potentially equal nothingness qualitatively.

As I said, I did not choose this.

Yes you did. This sounds harsh, but it’s merely consistent and accurate, and not the condemnation it appears to be. All sin (with the exception of original sin, which is different for reasons we don’t need to get into here) is a choice.

Let me make a distinction: your apostasy itself is not necessarily sinful per se if it’s due to “invincible ignorance.” Some might claim that only people who’ve never heard of Christ can have this, but I think it is at least not clear that it is relegated to cases such as that (though it’s immaterial whether we know this at all for all purposes beyond the merely intellectual).

As for your inability to make a leap of faith: leaps of faith are not an intellectual matter, but a matter of the will which is either aided of harmed by the intellect, and as such not strictly speaking subject to invincible ignorance. It is never impossible for someone to make a leap of faith unless they just don’t want to make it. It is, in fact, a matter of choice, though the choice may be buried deep down under layers of self-deception, personality, motivations, and possibly even just plain ol’ lack of interest. I’ve found that even when my sins appear to be beyond my control, they really aren’t. The fault just lies hidden, sometimes deeper than I’m completely comfortable going, but on some level, it’s me telling God that I prefer myself to him.

I’m aware of that. The justification given is that it is impossible to know whether the person in question has squeaked in on his or her deathbed. I don’t have any reason to expect that my imminent demise will grant me the gift of faith.

Eh, I’ve never been too interested in this sort of thing. In general, my hunch is that genuinely seeking coupled with attempts to humble yourself are probably good enough, but I have no hard reason to assume that, nor is it really the right question to ask. When Jesus was asked how many people would get into heaven, his answer was “strive to answer.” Had he said “10%,” people would have despaired. Had he said “50%,” they would have worked just a little bit harder than everyone else, but no harder. Had he said “90%,” everyone would kick back and ride the gravy train in. By telling people to focus on doing as much good as they can rather than on working hard enough to get into heaven, he answers they question they should have asked.

Creating the world so that it would not require such a sacrifice?

Impossible. Literally a logical absurdity, like a square triangle. Wait, let me backtrack a little: impossible to create a world worth creating that does not require such a sacrifice. God could have created just the Mona Lisa floating out in an infinite void. Instead, he decided to create a world populated with creatures who have the potential to become worthy qualitative equals. That world absolutely requires free will, which necessitates the existence of evil.

(con’t below)

 

[BlaineTog]

(con’t from above}

The crucifixion is a demonstration of mercy, if one believes in the divinity of Jesus; but was it sublimely benevolent? I am not sure the crucifixion taken as-is is even really a sign of love, in spite of what John had to say on the matter. Such a sacrifice was overkill for a problem God, as the creator of all, was responsible for anyway.

If it were overkill, it would only be all the greater a sign of love. Let’s say you buy your wife a diamond. Assuming she’s not greedy, even a 1/2 carat diamond would make her happy. But how much happier would a 3 carat diamond make her? Not because she has a bigger diamond than any of her friends or because the diamond particularly useful or for any other vain reason, but just because that her husband willingly made such a huge sacrifice just to show her how much he loves her.

In any case, God is responsible for evil in the same way a father is responsible for his son’s use of a pocket knife bought with allowance money given to him by the father to torture small animals. The father wanted his son to learn responsibility, so he slowly introduces him to the concept of money, even though he knows the son will probably make some frivolous and silly purchases. But what’s his recourse, really? He could just not give him money, but then the child grows up without really growing up, and the father certainly doesn’t want that. He’s given him the money and a speech about responsibility and that he should be kind to animals, but since the boy obviously isn’t going to listen to his father, he needs to learn through trial and error. And hey, maybe he’ll give his allowance to a homeless man, or maybe he’ll buy some bandages and carry them around in his lunchbox in case someone falls in the schoolyard in recess. That he knows that the child will do doesn’t change any of this.

 

[Mirdath]

How do potential beings arise from this, then? Unless they created themselves, which is highly problematic, then they must have been acted on.

Or the state is such that it allows for spontaneous generation.

Right, I believe this is the best of all possible (re: feasible) worlds.

And this, Dr. Pangloss, is where you and I will have to shake hands and go our separate ways on this point of discussion

Which of the premises of the argument do you disagree with specifically?

We’ve been over that. God is, in the end, only one potential answer to the question.

As for God’s omnibenevolence, if the Prime Mover is purely actual, then there can be no potentiality in it. If there were a mixture of good and evil in this being, then it would be potential. Since the Prime Mover is not potential, then it must be purely good.

You neglect the other side of that – the Prime Mover could be purely evil.

I do not see a problem with a deity who is neither pure good nor pure evil; both of those are concepts, and as such would they, as with everything else, not be superseded by the nature of the divine? How can we seriously hope to categorize and theorize and pontificate about that which our minds are incapable of grasping, to say ‘God must be thus-and-such’ and ‘logic shows us where God is hiding’? Nowadays we may laugh at the theologians who debated the greatest number of angels who could dance on a pin-head at once, but are we who would pigeonhole God any wiser than they?

 

[Mirdath]

(part 2)

I used to underestimate the argument from religious experience, but reading William Alston’s book, Perceiving God, has changed my mind about that considerably. What, in your estimation, would qualify as a private revelation from God?

In probably the first time it has been mentioned as a companion to obscenity or pornography, I think I’ll know it if and when I see it. I’m not at all sure what I would consider a convincing revelation to myself, although I used the example of an angel physically picking me up and dropping me into the confessional previously. That’d probably do it.

For others, I do not have the authority to say what they might be convinced by; and so I do not presume to speak for them. If they can find Jesus on a piece of toast, more power to them. But fortunately or unfortunately, those revelations are and have been private. They do me personally no good as far as giving me a reason to believe. If I were subjected to one, I would not expect anyone else to come to believe merely because of what I related.

I’ve been itching to throw in a quote here for a while, and forgive me while I succumb to temptation. This is from Jurgen, an early 20th century comic romance (and, for the record, the most delightfully ribald book I have yet read, putting Boccaccio’s Decameron and others to absolute shame) by James Branch Cabell, in which the title character meets God, who is ruler over Earth but who is himself a creation of Koshchei the Deathless, who made things as they are, and decided on a whim to indulge the expectations of human beings who showed him love and pride, two things foreign to him.

And Jurgen answered:

“God of my grandmother, I cannot quite believe in You, and Your doings as they are recorded I find incoherent and a little droll. But I am glad the affair has been so arranged that You may always now be real to brave and gentle persons who have believed in and have worshipped and have loved You. To have disappointed them would have been unfair: and it is right that before the faith they had in You not even Koshchei who made things as they are was able to be reasonable.”

“God of my grandmother, I cannot quite believe in You; but remembering the sum of love and faith that has been given You, I tremble. I think of the dear people whose living was confident and glad because of their faith in You: I think of them, and in my heart contends a blind contrition, and a yearning, and an enviousness, and yet a tender sort of amusement colours all. Oh, God, there was never any other deity who had such dear worshippers as You have had, and You should be very proud of them.”

“God of my grandmother, I cannot quite believe in You, yet I am not as those who would come peering at You reasonably. I, Jurgen, see You only through a mist of tears. For You were loved by those whom I loved greatly very long ago: and when I look at You it is Your worshippers and the dear believers of old that I remember. And it seems to me that dates and manuscripts and the opinions of learned persons are very trifling things besides what I remember, and what envy!”

“Who could have expected such a monstrous clever fellow ever to envy the illusions of old women?” the God of Jurgen’s grandmother asked again: and yet His countenance was not unfriendly.

“Why, but,” said Jurgen, on a sudden, “Why, but my grandmother – in a way – was right about Heaven and about You also. For certainly, You seem to exist, and to reign in just such estate as she described. And yet, according to Your latest revelation, I too was right in a way-about these things being an old woman’s delusions. I wonder now–”

“Yes, Jurgen?”

“Why, I wonder if everything is right, in a way? I wonder if that is the large secret of everything? It would not be a bad solution, sir,” said Jurgen, meditatively.

This passage sums up quite eloquently how I feel about the Abrahamic concept of God; as to what I think a God is more likely to be, Koshchei rather more fits the bill, although in Jurgen he plays something of a comic role, more fussy bureaucrat than universal force. But then Jurgen is a comedy.

God created man, but it doesn’t follow from that that God created the evil that exists in man. God creates man, and man is free to choose x or y. The fact that man chooses one over the other is not evidence that God is responsible for the decision itself.

Easily settled. Man chooses; but you say neither man nor choice would exist without a creator. Therefore, following the chain of events backwards, just as you do in the Prime Mover argument, we arrive at God’s creation. He is responsible.

 

[Mirdath]

There’s not a yes or no answer because that’s a complex question (in the fallacious sense). It’s a “so what time last night did you kill your wife?” sort of question.

I don’t see how. It presents two mutually exclusive options which cover the totality of the possible answers. Either God created us with the ability to choose evil, or he did not.

So in giving us free will, God gave us the ability to do evil, but he also gave us the ability to do good, and the two abilities are inseparable.

Interesting answer. One cannot do good without having the capacity to do evil. Does this apply to God as well, or to the souls in heaven who glorify him eternally?

Yes you did. This sounds harsh, but it’s merely consistent and accurate, and not the condemnation it appears to be. All sin (with the exception of original sin, which is different for reasons we don’t need to get into here) is a choice.

Being agnostic, I do not pray often – but I pray that God, if he’s around and listening, may keep you from experiencing what I have. It would crush your soul. Do you think I chose to live through a year of torment, of constantly questioning everything I had been brought up to think right and good and just, of wondering if I would be condemned not for a willful rejection but for an actual inability to trust the invisible, of going through the motions always hoping to see something, anything to confirm what I had been taught, and to finally come to the conclusion that there are no answers? I never chose agnosticism: I fell into it. I am not Maldoror, who hates God; I simply cannot see him.

It is never impossible for someone to make a leap of faith unless they just don’t want to make it.

I have tried, I have wanted. At this point, I’ve given up.

Impossible. Literally a logical absurdity, like a square triangle. Wait, let me backtrack a little: impossible to create a world worth creating that does not require such a sacrifice. God could have created just the Mona Lisa floating out in an infinite void. Instead, he decided to create a world populated with creatures who have the potential to become worthy qualitative equals. That world absolutely requires free will, which necessitates the existence of evil.

A nice idea, but it doesn’t wash. How easy would it have been for God to have removed the trees of knowledge and of life from Eden, so Adam and Eve would not have been tempted? Then we would be living in just such an ‘impossible’ world.

If it were overkill, it would only be all the greater a sign of love.

Frankly, it sounds more like a sign of masochism to me.

Let’s say you buy your wife a diamond. Assuming she’s not greedy, even a 1/2 carat diamond would make her happy. But how much happier would a 3 carat diamond make her? Not because she has a bigger diamond than any of her friends or because the diamond particularly useful or for any other vain reason, but just because that her husband willingly made such a huge sacrifice just to show her how much he loves her.

Every day I am ecstatic that my spouse merely exists. Icing on a cake is good, but honestly there comes a point when it’s just too much.

In any case, God is responsible for evil in the same way a father is responsible for his son’s use of a pocket knife bought with allowance money given to him by the father to torture small animals.

That father also created the pocket-knife and the small animals, told his son he had dominion over them, and has obviously been deficient in instilling a sense of morality in the kid.

 

[BlaineTog]

Interesting answer. One cannot do good without having the capacity to do evil. Does this apply to God as well, or to the souls in heaven who glorify him eternally?

To a certain extent, I think it’s the wrong question to ask. The souls in heaven are outside of time, and thus function differently from us. They’ve already made their choice, though they had it to begin with. In the case of God, God is all good, so I’m tempted to say no for that reason. It’s not that God has 100% goodons whereas humans have 50% goodons and 50% evilons, but that God’s actions are what defines what is good. It’d be like if upper management told all its employees that Steve were its pinnacle of burger-flipping prowess, that everyone should flip burgers like he flips burgers, and that anyone who flipped burgers differently would be fired. Is it possible for Steve to be fired because he flips burgers incorrectly? No, because the definition of “flipping burgers correctly” is “how Steve flips them.” Now, you could assume some sort of perfect burger flip from which Steve could deviate, but such assumptions cannot be made in the case of God. As I said, God is a singularity in which all his attributes form into one coherent, perfect whole. The objective standard of morality is God, right there alongside omnipotence and omniscience.

Being agnostic, I do not pray often – but I pray that God, if he’s around and listening, may keep you from experiencing what I have. It would crush your soul. Do you think I chose to live through a year of torment, of constantly questioning everything I had been brought up to think right and good and just, of wondering if I would be condemned not for a willful rejection but for an actual inability to trust the invisible, of going through the motions always hoping to see something, anything to confirm what I had been taught, and to finally come to the conclusion that there are no answers? I never chose agnosticism: I fell into it. I am not Maldoror, who hates God; I simply cannot see him.

I’m not saying you hate God, nor am I trying to belittle your experiences, which have no doubt been harrowing. But while you can’t always choose your experiences, you can choose how you react to them. Can you imagine no better ways you could have reacted? If we assume for a moment that saints exist, would you say that they would have handled your experiences no better than you did?

I have tried, I have wanted. At this point, I’ve given up.

Giving up is the worst thing you can do! By all means, take breaks, rest, but rally and always be open to moments of grace.

A nice idea, but it doesn’t wash. How easy would it have been for God to have removed the trees of knowledge and of life from Eden, so Adam and Eve would not have been tempted? Then we would be living in just such an ‘impossible’ world.

Again, an absurdity. The removal of the tree of knowledge of good and evil would have equated to the removal of free will. Free will is not just a pencil with which to mark a ballot, but the second box on the ballot as well! You can’t be said to have had a free choice if your choice was between A and A!

Frankly, it sounds more like a sign of masochism to me.

Wanting to express your love in the most full way possible is masochism? To a certain extent, I suppose it is. God is infinite gift-love and zero need-love. He wants to give of himself to others. If that’s masochism, then we need to learn to be masochists.

Every day I am ecstatic that my spouse merely exists. Icing on a cake is good, but honestly there comes a point when it’s just too much.

Your wife has finite giving powers. God does not.

That father also created the pocket-knife and the small animals, told his son he had dominion over them, and has obviously been deficient in instilling a sense of morality in the kid.

No, he tried his best. His best obviously wasn’t good enough. Even the absolute best sometimes isn’t good enough.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

In other words, a finite quantity can be traversed by synthesizing finite elements. I agree with this,

OK. That is the only point I was trying to make about counting from 1 to 10. So therefore your argument about the book stands refuted. There is only a finite number of moves necessary to get the book from whoever has it now to me.

but that is not the same as saying an actual infinite can be formed by successive addition. No matter how many numbers are added, it will always and indefinately be possible to add another.

Continuously repeating the same claims over and over again, without proof, and in the face of refutations I have provided, won’t make them true.

An infinite set cannot be formed by a finite number of successive additions. As the limit of the number of successive additions goes to infinity, however, the set approaches the (countably) infinite set.

And, you still haven’t provided any proof for the claim that an infinite set (in this case a hypothesized infinite regress of motion) must be formed by successive addition. Sets can be formed by successive addition but that doesn’t mean they must be.

Our conceptions of motion correspond to the real transmission between movers–that is, unless you deny the correspondence theory of truth.

I have no idea what you are getting at here.

In any case, the positive integers represent the future, whereas the negative integers represent the past, but more on that below.

OK.

This is true of any mover in the finite past, but what of the infinite past?

There is no mover in the “infinite past” because there is no “infinite past”.

Emphasis mine. If there is no member of the set that is infinitely distant, what is the difference between that and saying the past chain of movers is finite?

There is a difference between having a set with an infinity of members, but with each member a finite distance from zero, and a finite set with each member a finite distance from zero. You do agree that the “set of all finite negative integers” is an infinite set, yes? Your confusion appears to be in demanding that an infinite set have “negative infinity” as a member.

If the infinite past is non-existent, then the past is finite.

Refuted above. Every member of the “past” is a finite distance from today.

Further, all past events have been actualized (i.e. they have historically occurred). The infinite set, aleph-null, (in this case) contains all negative integers. This means logically that each member of that set would have to have been actualized.

Correct.

This means that there must be an actual point in the infinite past; otherwise, the past is finite.

No, it means that there is an infinity of points that have been actualized, not there must be an actual point in the infinite past. “Negative infinity” is not a member of the set. For each member of the set by definition has another member which is 1 less than it.

Please see above. While the future is potentially infinite in that it will approach infinity as a limit and never reach it, all past events have been actualized. Hence, to say that there is no mover in the infinite past is synonymous with the claim that the past chain of movers is finite.

It is not. Again, because there is an infinity of movers does not imply there is an infinite past. Every one of the movers exists at a finite time in the past from today.

 

[Mirdath]

God’s actions are what defines what is good. It’d be like if upper management told all its employees that Steve were its pinnacle of burger-flipping prowess, that everyone should flip burgers like he flips burgers, and that anyone who flipped burgers differently would be fired. Is it possible for Steve to be fired because he flips burgers incorrectly? No, because the definition of “flipping burgers correctly” is “how Steve flips them.” Now, you could assume some sort of perfect burger flip from which Steve could deviate, but such assumptions cannot be made in the case of God. As I said, God is a singularity in which all his attributes form into one coherent, perfect whole. The objective standard of morality is God, right there alongside omnipotence and omniscience.

So when God commands genocide or murder, as he commonly did in the Old Testament, it is good to commit such acts? How can that be reconciled with a morally absolutist stance that says those very acts are universally wrong?

Can you imagine no better ways you could have reacted? If we assume for a moment that saints exist, would you say that they would have handled your experiences no better than you did?

No and maybe, respectively.

Giving up is the worst thing you can do! By all means, take breaks, rest, but rally and always be open to moments of grace.

I am open, but it’s kinda like waiting for somebody’s imaginary friend to give me candy.

Again, an absurdity. The removal of the tree of knowledge of good and evil would have equated to the removal of free will. Free will is not just a pencil with which to mark a ballot, but the second box on the ballot as well! You can’t be said to have had a free choice if your choice was between A and A!

It would have removed the potential for sin, not free will – a concept I don’t have much truck with in the first place. Adam and Eve would still have been free agents, able to choose how they lived their lives; but they would not have had to deal with questions of morality.

Your wife has finite giving powers. God does not.

You don’t know my wife

No, he tried his best. His best obviously wasn’t good enough. Even the absolute best sometimes isn’t good enough.

God’s best wasn’t good enough?