A simplified argument from motion

[Mirdath]

He can disregard us if he wants, and he necesarily trancends his creation; but if he wants to be known, then i see no reason why an all powerfull deity cannot choose ways of doing that through means which he deems appropiate.

But it is not God showing us he exists; instead, we have humans trying to show it. If God wants to be known, it is certainly within his power to reveal himself – but the God preached by the Catholic Church does not want to be known, he wants to be trusted.

I agree that nothing can be known about God except by means that God himself puts in place; but i reject the idea that it is “impossible” for us to know, since there is no logical reason or reference point which justifys your concept.

Logic is a thing of this universe. It operates only on the natural. Unless God is natural – which, being the creator of nature, he isn’t – he’s outside the scope of logic.

One can understand why and how Nature works, but one cannot know for from nature why Nature is Nature, and not something else. If you attemped to explain Nature; you are forced to look else-where.

Or to admit that we don’t have all the answers yet? Why give up asking and say ‘oh, that must be God’ as soon as you run up against a speedbump higher than the last few?

You have failed to explain why. If there is no natural cause; then God is necessarily the only other option.

If there is no natural cause, then some supernatural cause is indeed the only other option. In a way, that could be a god (or, for that matter, gods or the supernatural equivalent of natural processes); but how does that god exist? Is his frame of reference, too, created from the outside?

Theres no reason to think or hypothesize that there is anything else.

Says the person whose entire life is devoted to the worship of one potential Something Else.

Are you claiming that the personal will is controlled by blind forces? This is the only possibility i see if you think that the personal will is physical. There is no reason why we should have freewill if are thoughts are caused by chemical reactions in the brain.

I do not believe in free will. I believe we have the capacity for choice, but it is not from a free, unrestricted list – rather, we eliminate options from a much shorter, prioritized list. It’s called free won’t.

Do you think reasonable faith is offensive for some reason?

Offensive? No. I think it’s generally a contradiction in terms, and agree with Kierkegaard’s ideas on belief. Faith is trust in the unseen, hope in a promise given. Faith says ‘I will love and serve God because I trust in his goodness’. Reason says ‘let me know God, then we’ll see about loving and serving’.

The apostle Thomas provides a fine example of reasoned faith, in a way: he didn’t take any chances, made sure the risen Jesus was who everyone was saying he was, checked it out for himself. But is that really faith the way later Christians possess it? I don’t think so.

Let me be clear: I have nothing against personal revelation as a reason to believe – for the recipient. It strikes me as perfectly reasonable for a person who has put his fingers through the wrists of a man he knew to be dead to figure ‘hey, this guy is a special case’. However, that personal revelation doesn’t do anything for anyone else. We can’t be sure Thomas was telling the truth, or that he wasn’t hallucinating, or so on and so forth. Human observers have a bad track record.

The potential for evil necessarily exists in the ability to freely choose; but this does not take away the good of God; it is good that man is free to choose; however, he is also free to bare the concequence.

If freedom of choice can lead to evil, how is it good?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I’d like to hear everyone’s thoughts on this to see if this version of the argument has any merit. First off, I like the argument from motion because I think of it as a minimalist version of the cosmological argument (as opposed to the kalam version, which rests the premise that there cannot be an infinite series of past events). The formulation I’m working with goes like this:

1. If there is no Prime Mover, then all things exist in potentiality.
2. Not all things exist in potentiality.
3. Therefore, there must be a Prime Mover.

“Prime Mover” in this syllogism simply refers to “that being by which all potential beings arise”. It is also synonymous with “Pure Actuality”.

This is circular. It is arguing, if there is no Pure Actuality, there is no being which is pure act. There is a being which is pure act. Therefore, there must be a being which is Pure Actuality.

I think premise (1) is obvious, since if there is nothing purely actual, then all things that exist must be potential.

All things that exist would be in potency in some respect, but possibly in act in others, and would thus have capacity to move other things.

The support of premise (2) is transcendental. If all things exist in potentiality, then all things must be changing; for potential beings can both be and not-be, and are transferred from potentiality to degrees of actuality.

In the first place, you’re confusing potentiality with contingency here. A contingent being can be and not-be.

If all things exist in potentiality (e.g. in potency in some respect), then this implies they have the capacity for change, not that each and every one of them is in a process of change at every moment in time.

For example, a potentially hot piece of wood is made actually hot by a hot fire. But if all things are changing, then that too must be changing, which is self-contradictory.

It’s not that “all” things are changing. It’s that “some” things are changing at a given moment in time, and the subset of objects which is changing is itself changing. So there is no self-contradiction. Now you could argue that there is inherent self-contradiction in saying “some things are changing” because “some” never changes to zero or all. To which it could be counter-argued that in an eternal universe with a finite number of objects, there will be moment in time in which nothing is changing and which everything is. It could also be counter-argued that the problem with a temporal creation of the universe is that the proposition “nothing is changing” would have itself to change, so there’s something wrong with embodying a proposition as a “thing”.

Now you could argue about an inherent self-contradiction in the proposition “all things have the possibility of change”. But arguing against the very possibility of change in itself based on the definition leads to an absurdity. If there is possibility of change, then there must be possibility of change in the possibility of change (so the argument would go). But then there must be possibility of change in the possibility of change in the possibility of change. Etc. and on to infinity.

Let’s try changing the tense. All things have changed; that, too must have changed, which is self-contradictory. No, there’s possibly a finite time interval between when an object comes into being and when it changes.

Hence, at least one thing must be purely actual, and therefore, there must be a Prime Mover.

I think this argument is sound, but I’d like to hear some feedback in order to strengthen the proof, if at all possible.

As I’ve shown, there are some problems.

 

[punkforchrist]

Premise 1 is a tautology, yes, although disguised. You’re also leaving yourself open to the question ‘can there be two static things?’.

Yes, I think there can be. However, static things such as, “2 + 2 = 4” and “There are no married bachelors” are causally inefficacious. In the OP I provided an argument in favor of the Prime Mover’s uniqueness.

Interestingly enough, Christianity itself provides an example, as the Trinity is three distinct Persons. The fact that they share one divine nature is immaterial – they are three.

They are three persons, but they share one substance, or essence. Hence, there are three persons who are the one Prime Mover.

And the second premise doesn’t show that there must be at least one static thing; it simply asserts that that’s the way it is without offering any substantiation.

If propositions count as things, then it would appear that “all things are changing” is self-contradictory.

There’s a reason it’s called ‘supernatural’ Can anything which is defined as ‘beyond nature’ exist in a naturally meaningful sense of the term?

I’m only arguing in favor of a natural theology. Supernatural elements of theology are introduced later. One can be a deist and agree with the argument from motion.

Once again, you’re asserting that a Statement is a Thing, without showing that it is so.

Well, I’m actually saying that the referent of the statement is a thing. In either case, if statements are non-things, then they are non-existent. Do you believe this?

Yeah, they’re different, but you missed the similarity: not all people are necessarily Greek, and the way you phrased your argument not all static things are necessarily Prime Movers.

Okay, I see what you’re saying. However, abstract objects may be static, but they are causally inefficacious.

Isaiah 45:7 is an interesting verse: I form the light, and create the darkness, I make well-being and create woe; I, the LORD, do all these things.

Most translations use the word, “havoc”, as opposed to “evil”, since this verse is detailing things like natural disasters as opposed to moral evil.

Yes, if God created all things and has ultimate power over them, he is actively complicit in them. Evil and imperfection would not exist without God having created them.

But in Thomism, evil is not a thing; it is a privation. Have you read Alvin Plantinga’s God, Freedom, and Evil? It provides an excellent treatment of the Free Will Defense and “transworld depravity”.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hello SeekingCatholic!

This is circular. It is arguing, if there is no Pure Actuality, there is no being which is pure act. There is a being which is pure act. Therefore, there must be a being which is Pure Actuality.

It is only circular if no reason is given for the claim that there is no Pure Actuality. This is what is known as a reductio ad absurdum, or a reduction to the absurd. In the proof, we assume the negation of the statement that there is no Pure Actuality, and then demonstrate the absurdity of its consequent. Here’s a formal outline:

Prove A: There is a being that is Pure Actuality.
Assume ~A: There is no being that is Pure Actuality.
~A → B: If there is no being that is Pure Actuality, then all things exist in potentiality.
~B: Not all things exist in potentiality.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: There is a being that is Pure Actuality.
Q.E.D.

Notice that if ~A is true, then B necessarily follows. If there is no Prime Mover (or Pure Actuality), then all things that exist are merely potential. We then attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of B by postulating ~B. We can do this first by asking whether or not it is coherent for all things to be changing. What we find is that if all things are changing, then that too must be changing, in which case at least one thing is not changing, which is self-contradictory. Hence, ~~A logically follows, and since A is equivalent to ~~A, we have demonstrated the truth of A.

All things that exist would be in potency in some respect, but possibly in act in others, and would thus have capacity to move other things.

These things are capable of moving other things insofar as they are in act. But to remove the act is equivalent to taking away the transmission of potentiality to act. Hence, without fire (or another hot object) a piece of wood cannot become actually hot.

In the first place, you’re confusing potentiality with contingency here. A contingent being can be and not-be.

Good observation. What I meant to say was that potential beings can be both actual and merely potential.

If all things exist in potentiality (e.g. in potency in some respect), then this implies they have the capacity for change, not that each and every one of them is in a process of change at every moment in time.

I’m with you so far.

It’s not that “all” things are changing. It’s that “some” things are changing at a given moment in time, and the subset of objects which is changing is itself changing. So there is no self-contradiction.

Another way of formulating the contradiction, then, would be to say that “all things are capable of change”. If propositions are things (or rather, if the referents of propositions are things), then this proposition too must be capable of change.

It could also be counter-argued that the problem with a temporal creation of the universe is that the proposition “nothing is changing” would have itself to change, so there’s something wrong with embodying a proposition as a “thing”.

I’m not following this. I’m not saying that nothing is changing.

Now you could argue about an inherent self-contradiction in the proposition “all things have the possibility of change”. But arguing against the very possibility of change in itself based on the definition leads to an absurdity. If there is possibility of change, then there must be possibility of change in the possibility of change (so the argument would go).

Right, but this seems to support what I was saying. If all things have the possibility of change, then that too must be capable of change, which is impossible. And if that too could change, then we’re brought to the fallacy ad infinitum.

Let’s try changing the tense. All things have changed; that, too must have changed, which is self-contradictory. No, there’s possibly a finite time interval between when an object comes into being and when it changes.

I agree that there’s such a finite time interval, but I don’t see how that undermines the argument in the OP.

 

[Mirdath]

Yes, I think there can be. However, static things such as, “2 + 2 = 4” and “There are no married bachelors” are causally inefficacious. In the OP I provided an argument in favor of the Prime Mover’s uniqueness.

Then those static things exist, apparently independent of whether or not there is a Prime Mover, no? Is ‘2+2=4’ caused? If it came into being at some point, it changed – and is not static.

They are three persons, but they share one substance, or essence. Hence, there are three persons who are the one Prime Mover.

See, this is why you tend to get a lot of guff from unitarian denominations and religions They share a divine nature, just as you and I share a human nature – but they are still distinct persons. A person is a thing, I think we can agree; a nature, not so much.

If propositions count as things, then it would appear that “all things are changing” is self-contradictory.

If. Show that a proposition is a thing first.

I’m only arguing in favor of a natural theology. Supernatural elements of theology are introduced later. One can be a deist and agree with the argument from motion.

A natural theology? That’s a contradiction in terms: you say that God is a part of his own creation?

Well, I’m actually saying that the referent of the statement is a thing. In either case, if statements are non-things, then they are non-existent. Do you believe this?

I agree with it. ‘Believe’ is a bit of a thorny word to use; but no, I do not think statements and propositions exist in a meaningful sense.

But in Thomism, evil is not a thing; it is a privation. Have you read Alvin Plantinga’s God, Freedom, and Evil? It provides an excellent treatment of the Free Will Defense and “transworld depravity”.

Thomism is neither doctrine nor science; it’s simply one way of looking at things, and one I must admit I don’t particularly agree with much of the time.

Aside from that, even if evil is not a thing, can you deny God had a hand in its existence? Would evil exist, if not for God’s having acted?

 

[punkforchrist]

Hello Mirdath,

Given the thorniness of the argument I presented in the OP, with all of its nuances, I think I will stick to the more traditional formulation. Thanks for the help!

Mirdath:

Thomism is neither doctrine nor science; it’s simply one way of looking at things, and one I must admit I don’t particularly agree with much of the time.

That’s fine, but on the other hand, there are other ways of explaining evil in such a way that it does not conflict with God. Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity is one such example.

Mirdath:

Aside from that, even if evil is not a thing, can you deny God had a hand in its existence? Would evil exist, if not for God’s having acted?

I think a more important question is: does God have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil? I believe He does. No one can force someone to freely love him. That would be a contradiction in terms. God’s goodness is such that He will allow His creatures to choose a path away from Him if that is what they desire.

 

[punkforchrist]

Mirdath:

A natural theology? That’s a contradiction in terms: you say that God is a part of his own creation?

No, I simply mean that God can be known apart from appeals to revelation. Even David Hume, who denied the activity of the supernatural (i.e. miracles), was a deist who believed in God.

 

[Mirdath]

Given the thorniness of the argument I presented in the OP, with all of its nuances, I think I will stick to the more traditional formulation. Thanks for the help!

From my point of view, that’s like saying ‘okay, yeah, potatoes aren’t meant to be used to pound nails into the wall… I’ll try a watermelon’ It’s admirable that you spend so much thought and energy contemplating the divine, but this particular branch of inquiry does not seem to be all that fruitful.

That’s fine, but on the other hand, there are other ways of explaining evil in such a way that it does not conflict with God. Plantinga’s notion of transworld depravity is one such example.

I’m not a fan of Plantinga, but if what I’m reading about this is correct, the idea that God cannot create an absolutely good person would seem to fly in the face of everything the Catholic Church teaches.

The Problem of Evil is not an ironclad objection to the existence of the divine. It is an objection to the notion that the divine must needs be benevolent, even all-benevolent, and as that, it does quite well for itself.

I think a more important question is: does God have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil? I believe He does. No one can force someone to freely love him. That would be a contradiction in terms. God’s goodness is such that He will allow His creatures to choose a path away from Him if that is what they desire.

This talk about having reason to allow evil is… interesting, coming from a Catholic. The Catechism teaches that one may not do evil so that good may result (and if God is omnipotent, evil has come about as a direct result of his action); therefore, God has broken the laws of his Church.

No, I simply mean that God can be known apart from appeals to revelation. Even David Hume, who denied the activity of the supernatural (i.e. miracles), was a deist who believed in God.

Why is revelation not sufficient?

 

[punkforchrist]

It’s admirable that you spend so much thought and energy contemplating the divine, but this particular branch of inquiry does not seem to be all that fruitful.

Let’s take a look at the traditional formulation, then.

1. We observe things that are in motion.
2. Whatever is in motion is moved by another.
3. If all things exist in potentiality, then there can be no motion.
4. Therefore, there must be an unmoved Prime Mover.

I think you’ll agree with (1), and possibly (2). I would defend (3) by pointing out that if we remove what is actual, then we end up taking away any transition from potentiality to actuality. For example, without fire a piece of wood cannot become hot. Hence, there can be no motion. But because there is motion, then there must be something that is not merely potential, but rather purely actual. (4) logically follows from this.

I’m not a fan of Plantinga, but if what I’m reading about this is correct, the idea that God cannot create an absolutely good person would seem to fly in the face of everything the Catholic Church teaches.

God created man to be good, but man chose what was evil instead. God could not have forced man to be good, since no one can force someone to freely love him.

The Problem of Evil is not an ironclad objection to the existence of the divine. It is an objection to the notion that the divine must needs be benevolent, even all-benevolent, and as that, it does quite well for itself.

Can you provide a formal argument for this?

This talk about having reason to allow evil is… interesting, coming from a Catholic. The Catechism teaches that one may not do evil so that good may result (and if God is omnipotent, evil has come about as a direct result of his action); therefore, God has broken the laws of his Church.

No one may do evil so that good may result, I agree. However, it is not God that is actively doing the evil.

Why is revelation not sufficient?

Not everyone is encountered by special revelation, and yet, Romans 1 tells us that since the beginning of time, man has seen the glory of God by what has been made. This is called general revelation, which is what natural theology deals with.

 

[punkforchrist]

I should have formulated the argument this way (I really should go to bed )

1. We observe things that are in motion.
2. Whatever is in motion is moved by another.
3. This cannot proceed to infinity.
4. Therefore, there must be an unmoved Prime Mover.

(3) is supported by a number of arguments, one of which is the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. Imagine I ask you if I can borrow a book. You say I can, but before you can lend it to me, you have to borrow it from a friend, and that friend from another friend, and so on to infinity. The question is: who actually has the book? It would seem that I will never actually receive the book, anyway, since there will always be another person that has to receive it first. An infinite chain of movers is exactly like this. In order to arrive at the present state of motion, an infinite number of movers would have to be traversed. But since there can be no limit on what is infinite, then there will always be another mover that has to act before the present state could arrive. Hence, the present state could never arrive, which is absurd. Therefore, the chain of movers must be finite.

 

[IvanKaramozov]

It seemes to be based on Aristotilian metaphysics, I don’t think modern physics wouls accecpt that the natural state of all things is in a state of potentiality

 

[IvanKaramozov]

"Prove A: There is a being that is Pure Actuality.
Assume ~A: There is no being that is Pure Actuality.
~A → B: If there is no being that is Pure Actuality, then all things exist in potentiality.
~B: Not all things exist in potentiality.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: There is a being that is Pure Actuality.
Q.E.D."

That really dosen’t work as a proof.

to begain with you have no premesis or stated conclusion

secondly you have provided no for to an argument, it’s just really not a proof at all

above all, you’re using propositional logic, Predicate logic is better.

If I may suggust a better form, you’re argument translates as this into symbolic logic

Px–>(x) is a prime mover
Tx–>(x) is a thing
Ex–>(x) exists in potentiality

Ex’–>existential quantifier
(X)–>Universal quantifier
(-)negation
(^)Conjunction
(–>)Implication

Pr(1) -(Ex’)(Px)—>(X)(Tx–>Ex)
Pr(2) (Ex’)(Tx^-Ex)
…/.: (Ex’)(Tx^-Ex)

I have intermediate logic next semester, so I’m no expert, but I’m not sure if you can get a proof from that though

 

[SeekingCatholic]

It is only circular if no reason is given for the claim that there is no Pure Actuality… If there is no Prime Mover (or Pure Actuality), then all things that exist are merely potential. We then attempt to demonstrate the absurdity of B by postulating ~B. We can do this first by asking whether or not it is coherent for all things to be changing. What we find is that if all things are changing, then that too must be changing, in which case at least one thing is not changing, which is self-contradictory.

But I demonstrated that “all things exist in potentiality” is not the same thing as “all things are changing”. So there is no contradiction.

Another way of formulating the contradiction, then, would be to say that “all things are capable of change”. If propositions are things (or rather, if the referents of propositions are things), then this proposition too must be capable of change.

But here there is no longer any contradiction in this new formulation. The proposition “all things are capable of change” is capable of change in itself; the reason it doesn’t change is because there doesn’t exist an agent capable of changing it (in a universe without a Prime Mover). Simply because things exist in potentiality does not mean they are all capable of change on their own. There needs to be an object in act which can change them. There is no guarantee such an object will exist. A piece of marble is potentially a Michelangelo sculpture but it will remain a piece of marble without the existence of a Michelangelo.

Furthermore, if the referents of propositions are things, there clearly are propositions that aren’t capable of change; e.g., there is no such thing as a squared circle. Also, if you’ve defined a being in Pure Act as one not capable of change, you would then have to identify the proposition “all things are capable of change (except this proposition)” as the Prime Mover, so I again wonder about the validity of using the referents of propositions as “things”.

Basically, you’re attempting to argue from the fact that there are unchanging propositions to a Prime Mover. It seems rather a stretch to me.

I’m not following this. I’m not saying that nothing is changing.

The point is you end up with the same dilemma even if you postulate a Prime Mover. For then the new proposition is “all things except the Prime Mover are capable of change (or changing)”; but if that proposition is itself capable of change you have the same problem. Again this stems from using referents of propositions as “things”, which I question.

Right, but this seems to support what I was saying. If all things have the possibility of change, then that too must be capable of change, which is impossible. And if that too could change, then we’re brought to the fallacy ad infinitum.

“All things have the possibility of change”, including the proposition itself, is not a contradiction. It would be possible at some time in the future that not all things have the possibility of change.

I agree that there’s such a finite time interval, but I don’t see how that undermines the argument in the OP.

It just means that the fact that all things are in potentiality is not the same thing as that all things are changing.

 

[Mirdath]

Let’s take a look at the traditional formulation, then.

1. We observe things that are in motion.
2. Whatever is in motion is moved by another.
3. This cannot proceed to infinity.
4. Therefore, there must be an unmoved Prime Mover.

(3) is supported by a number of arguments, one of which is the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. Imagine I ask you if I can borrow a book. You say I can, but before you can lend it to me, you have to borrow it from a friend, and that friend from another friend, and so on to infinity. The question is: who actually has the book? It would seem that I will never actually receive the book, anyway, since there will always be another person that has to receive it first. An infinite chain of movers is exactly like this. In order to arrive at the present state of motion, an infinite number of movers would have to be traversed. But since there can be no limit on what is infinite, then there will always be another mover that has to act before the present state could arrive. Hence, the present state could never arrive, which is absurd. Therefore, the chain of movers must be finite.

And what if you’ve forgotten you actually have the book already and one of my friends steals it from you to give to me? Although that could result in the conclusion that you are God

Even accepting (3), that simply says ‘there must have been a primeval state’. Doesn’t point to an unmoved mover – and indeed, the idea of a mover which is itself permanently fixed is contradictory. That which exists in only one state cannot act, because to act is to change state.

God created man to be good, but man chose what was evil instead. God could not have forced man to be good, since no one can force someone to freely love him.

Sure God could have forced humans to be good, just as angels have no free will. But instead, apparently, he decided to create the potential for evil.

Can you provide a formal argument for this?

David Hume:

And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?

Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

Link to part 2.

No one may do evil so that good may result, I agree. However, it is not God that is actively doing the evil.

See above. If God is omnipotent and the creator of all things, evil comes about as a direct result of his actions.

 

[freesoulhope]

Even accepting (3), that simply says ‘there must have been a primeval state’. …

I don’t see how this follows from the arguement? A primeval state is something that exists in the past, and is apart of the chain of time; an unmoved mover, must be, by definition, outside of time, and the cause of it.

Doesn’t point to an unmoved mover – …

Thats what you think.

and indeed, the idea of a mover which is itself permanently fixed is contradictory. That which exists in only one state cannot act, because to act is to change state…

But you have just stated that the mover is permenantly fixed? So how does it follow that it is not moving something?

Your objection to the refutation of infinite regress, didn’t please me. I was quite upset by your weak arguement.

In order to sufficiently terminate the chain of effect, one necessarily needs an unmoved-mover outside the chain of time. It is the law of necessity. One need not comprehend it, to know that an ultimate reality, is absolutly necessary to complete the chain of cause and effect. A timeless foundation or unmoved-mover, must exist, inorder to explain the things which are in effect and continue to exist. One way around your objection is to think that the unmoved-mover is both mover and unmoved; as in being one and the same thing at the same time. So what we see is a simultaneoues affect, which of course must be the case, if we admit that the universe began to exist; as in, space time energy and matter.

Sure God could have forced humans to be good.

This goes agains’t Gods perfect nature; and i think it is quite obvious why such and act is not good

just as angels have no free will. But instead, apparently, he decided to create the potential for evil.

Who ever said that angels had no freewill. Was not the devil an angel? And God is always encouraging good in the world. He even came in to the world.

See above. If God is omnipotent and the creator of all things, evil comes about as a direct result of his actions.

It is perfectly good for creatures to have freewill. If God wills the perfect good, then it necessarily follows that God wills freewill. What you have to do, is show that freewill is not the perfect good. Before one can do that, one has to be in the position to know the perfect good; a position that God already fills. Being a finite limited being, such a feat, for you, is impossible.
You assume that your limited knowledge can know and comprehend Gods reasons for doing something, but a creation can only comprehend what the creator will allow; and if you ask, “why does God only allow me to comprehend a limited amount of things”, your still facing the problem of sufficient knowledge. I could argue that, since you lack knowledge, you therefore have the freedom to willfully learn; this could be a perfect good. Because we lack the cognotive skills; the arguement from evil serves as no more then a blind excuse. The arguement from evil; doesn’t work, since it assumes what it cannot know; such as, “if God was good, he would make people nicer”. How do you know that? The only obvious reason why human beings suffer, is because they choose to be evil towards eachother; it is because they will it. It seems quite obvious to me that evil can only exist if a being with freewill, freely stands opposed to the greator good; otherwise, if man chose only the greater good, then evil could not possibly effect man. Given that fact, the first question i have is; **“why does man seek to be blameless for his imperfections when he can attain it through being perfect?” **The second question is; "Is man humble enough to except that he is imperfect, rather then blame God for the evil which exists in the world?"

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I should have formulated the argument this way (I really should go to bed )

1. We observe things that are in motion.
2. Whatever is in motion is moved by another.
3. This cannot proceed to infinity.
4. Therefore, there must be an unmoved Prime Mover.

(3) is supported by a number of arguments, one of which is the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition.

Infinite sets aren’t formed by a finite number of successive additions. Doesn’t mean they can’t exist. Example: the set of integers. Moreover, the set of positive integers can be conceived of as an infinite number of succession additions: e.g. you start with 1 and add 1 more then the last element of the set; in the limit of an infinity of additions you achieve the set of positive integers.

Imagine I ask you if I can borrow a book. You say I can, but before you can lend it to me, you have to borrow it from a friend, and that friend from another friend, and so on to infinity. The question is: who actually has the book?

Yes, and as soon as you specify that your argument collapses, for it is no longer “so on to infinity”, but there is only a finite set of moves necessary from now to your possession of the book. If nobody has the book it doesn’t exist.

It would seem that I will never actually receive the book, anyway, since there will always be another person that has to receive it first.

That is like saying I can never count to 10, because before I can get to 10, I have to get to 9, and before I can get to 9, I have to get to 8, and before I can get to 8, I have to get to 7,… before I can get to -1000000, I have to get to -1000001, etc…

The fallacy of course is that you’re starting at a given, finite point in the series, both in borrowing the book and counting to 10 and thus only a finite number of moves are necessary here.

An infinite chain of movers is exactly like this. In order to arrive at the present state of motion, an infinite number of movers would have to be traversed.

I think to be more accurate you mean an infinite number of moves (not necessarily movers) would have to be traversed.

But the fallacy here is again failing to specify “in order to arrive at the present state of motion” FROM WHERE? As soon as you specify any definite finite point in time, then only a finite number of moves are necessary. If you want to specify “from the beginning” there is no beginning (in the scenario of infinite regress), just like there is no lowest integer.

But since there can be no limit on what is infinite, then there will always be another mover that has to act before the present state could arrive. Hence, the present state could never arrive, which is absurd. Therefore, the chain of movers must be finite.

The conclusion “the present state could never arrive” is incorrect (in fact meaningless) in an infinity of time.

 

[freesoulhope]

Infinite sets aren’t formed by a finite number of successive additions. .

Correct. So you should agree that the universe is finite, for it is a chain succesive additions or causation.

Doesn’t mean they can’t exist. .

In mathematics, that may well be true, but not all mathematical constructs represent actual reality.
If you start with 1, in the real world, then there is a beginning.

Yes, and as soon as you specify that your argument collapses, for it is no longer “so on to infinity”,.

If the universe has an infinite past, then how can one reach an infinite future? There is a reason why you are here naturally; that is because a natural cause has caused you. Now if you take causation back to infinity, then you will never arrive at a reason for why that causation took place in the first place, because there was never a first place; therefore, logically, it shouldn’t be taking place. An infinite universe is a fallacy.

but there is only a finite set of moves necessary from now to your possession of the book…

This can only make sense in a finite universe
If there is an infinite duration into the past, then nobody ever had a reason for having the book in there possesion in the first place. Therefore the whole idea of an infinite regress is absurd, and has no logical basis to be believed—because there has never been a basis!

If nobody has the book it doesn’t exist…

This is what the arguement proves; why can’t you see that?

That is like saying I can never count to 10.

You can count to ten, because there is a logical “basis” upon which one can get to the number two, by adding one to an “un-moved” maker; which is the number one. If the number one doesn’t exist, you can never rationally reach the number 2; let alone reach the number ten.

The fallacy of course is that you’re starting at a given, finite point in the series, both in borrowing the book and counting to 10 and thus only a finite number of moves are necessary here.

The arguement is only showing the absurdity of a system of causation in an infinite universe; it is not trying to prove infinitum. Such things might work in certain mathematical constructs; but they cannot work in the real world.

The conclusion “the present state could never arrive” is incorrect (in fact meaningless) in an infinity of time.

Not incorect; but correct in respect of what its trying to show. The mere fact that one has to speak of cause and effect, shows the fallacy of an infinite regress, because a trully infinite universe has no causitive duration. There is no actual point in time, there can be no past nor present(hence no cause and effect); we are not speaking about a system of time with an infinite universe.
Its completly ridiculous to conclude that the universe is infinite.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Correct. So you should agree that the universe is finite, for it is a chain succesive additions or causation.

As I showed, chains of additions or causations can go on to infinity; there is no logical reason why they must stop, and there are examples which don’t (e.g. the set of positive integers can be conceived of, starting with the set {1}, adding 1 + the last element, in the limit of an infinity of additions).

In mathematics, that may well be true, but not all mathematical constructs represent actual reality.
If you start with 1, in the real world, then there is a beginning.

Yes. If.

If the universe has an infinite past, then how can one reach an infinite future? There is a reason why you are here naturally; that is because a natural cause has caused you. Now if you take causation back to infinity, then you will never arrive at a reason for why that causation took place in the first place, because there was never a first place; therefore, logically, it shouldn’t be taking place. An infinite universe is a fallacy.

This argument against infinite regress goes like this: there can be no infinite regress because there must be a first cause, and if there is an infinite regress there is no first cause (or reason). That’s called a circular argument. You, probably being a well-read student of St. Thomas, would argue that nothing can happen without a first cause, a premise which I can simply deny. This is a weakness in his argumentation, attempting to sneak the conclusion into the premise.

In an infinite regress there is a natural cause for why I am here, there is a natural cause for that natural cause, and a natural cause for that one, and so on. Every cause has an explanation in terms of a preceding cause. Just like in the set of integers, there is a preceding member and a following member.

This can only make sense in a finite universe

Not so. Despite the fact that the set of integers is infinite, there is a finite number of steps between 1 and 10.

If there is an infinite duration into the past, then nobody ever had a reason for having the book in there possesion in the first place.

Yes they did - because the person before them gave it to them.

Therefore the whole idea of an infinite regress is absurd, and has no logical basis to be believed—because there has never been a basis!

Unfortunately you have not provided one scintilla of logically sound argumentation in support of that premise. Claiming “ridiculous” and “absurd” doesn’t count.

This is what the arguement proves; why can’t you see that?

OK, so someone has the book and it exists. I’m with you so far.

You can count to ten, because there is a logical “basis” upon which one can get to the number two, by adding one to an “un-moved” maker; which is the number one. If the number one doesn’t exist, you can never rationally reach the number 2; let alone reach the number ten.

But the number one does exist, despite the fact the set of integers is infinite.

The arguement is only showing the absurdity of a system of causation in an infinite universe; it is not trying to prove infinitum. Such things might work in certain mathematical constructs; but they cannot work in the real world.

There is no “first” or “ultimate” cause in an infinite regress. That is true. However arguing that an infinite regress is absurd because there is no “first” or “ultimate” cause is circular and begging the question. “They cannot work in the real world” is merely a gratuitous assertion.

The mere fact that one has to speak of cause and effect, shows the fallacy of an infinite regress, because a trully infinite universe has no causitive duration.

What exactly is “causative duration”?

There is no actual point in time, there can be no past nor present(hence no cause and effect); we are not speaking about a system of time with an infinite universe.

Its completly ridiculous to conclude that the universe is infinite.

Well, again, what is gratuitously asserted can be gratuitously denied. There is past and present, cause and effect, and a system for measuring time in an infinite (e.g. eternal) universe.

 

[punkforchrist]

Even accepting (3), that simply says ‘there must have been a primeval state’. Doesn’t point to an unmoved mover

If (3) is true, then the chain of movers cannot be infinite, which means that there must have been a first mover. Unless this mover is unmoved, then the regression continues, which is a contradiction.

Mirdath:

and indeed, the idea of a mover which is itself permanently fixed is contradictory. That which exists in only one state cannot act, because to act is to change state.

I can see how this applies to temporal agents, but what about timeless ones? The action of the Prime Mover does not need to be preceded by non-action. What if God willed from all eternity to create?

Mirdath:

Sure God could have forced humans to be good, just as angels have no free will. But instead, apparently, he decided to create the potential for evil.

The unproven assumption above is that angels have no free will.

Mirdath:

See above. If God is omnipotent and the creator of all things, evil comes about as a direct result of his actions.

There is no formal contradiction between the co-existence of God and evil. J.L. Mackie and others have attempted to demonstrate an implicit contradiction, though, saying that if God were omni-max, then He would not permit evil. However, even the atheistic philosopher Michael Martin points out that so long as God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, then the two are not logically incompatible.

Let’s put this in a formal syllogism. Let G = “If God exists, He is powerful enough and knowledgeable enough to eliminate evil.” W = “God wants to eliminate evil.” E = “Evil exists.” When we use substitution for these variables, this is what we get:

1. (G^W) → ~E
2. E
3. ~G

There are three conclusions we may draw from this.

1. ~G^W
2. ~G^~W

These two options conclude that God does not exist. The first because God wants to eliminate all evil, but does not, which casts doubt upon his omnipotence or omniscience; the second because God does not want to eliminate evil, and is therefore, morally imperfect.

The believer offers a third option:

1. G^~W

The third conclusion allows for the co-existence of God and evil, since God may not want to get rid of all evil in light of the greatest good.

 

[punkforchrist]

Infinite sets aren’t formed by a finite number of successive additions. Doesn’t mean they can’t exist.

I’m not actually arguing against any infinite sets. I’m simply saying that one cannot be formed by successive addition.

SeekingCatholic:

Example: the set of integers. Moreover, the set of positive integers can be conceived of as an infinite number of succession additions: e.g. you start with 1 and add 1 more then the last element of the set; in the limit of an infinity of additions you achieve the set of positive integers.

The future will indeed approach infinity as a limit, but it will never be traversed. Otherwise, infinity is limited, which is a contradiction.

SeekingCatholic:

Yes, and as soon as you specify that your argument collapses, for it is no longer “so on to infinity”, but there is only a finite set of moves necessary from now to your possession of the book. If nobody has the book it doesn’t exist.

If (3) demonstrates the impossibility of an infinite set formed by successive addition, then it follows logically that the chain of movers is finite. Hence, (4) follows necessarily.

SeekingCatholic:

That is like saying I can never count to 10, because before I can get to 10, I have to get to 9, and before I can get to 9, I have to get to 8, and before I can get to 8, I have to get to 7,… before I can get to -1000000, I have to get to -1000001, etc…

The two are not analogous, though. Between 0 and 10, we can say that there are is an infinite series of numbers, but the series itself is bounded between 0 and 10. If the chain of movers were infinite, then it would be specifically unbounded.

SeekingCatholic:

The fallacy of course is that you’re starting at a given, finite point in the series, both in borrowing the book and counting to 10 and thus only a finite number of moves are necessary here.

In the analogy of the book, the series does not begin with my receiving the book, but rather it terminates when I receive it.

SeekingCatholic:

I think to be more accurate you mean an infinite number of moves (not necessarily movers) would have to be traversed.

For the purposes of the argument, the two are identical. Unless one mover is making an infinite number of moves, “mover” in its ordinary sense is legitimate.

SeekingCatholic:

But the fallacy here is again failing to specify “in order to arrive at the present state of motion” FROM WHERE? As soon as you specify any definite finite point in time, then only a finite number of moves are necessary. If you want to specify “from the beginning” there is no beginning (in the scenario of infinite regress), just like there is no lowest integer.

If the chain of movers is infinite, then there ought to be a mover at an infinite distance away from the present. If not, then the chain is finite. However, if there is an infinitely distant mover, then we would have to add aleph-null to -aleph-null in order to arrive at the present state of motion. But since, an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition, then this is impossible. Therefore, the chain of movers is finite.

SeekingCatholic:

The conclusion “the present state could never arrive” is incorrect (in fact meaningless) in an infinity of time.

This is a tautology, but it does not solve the problem of whether or not an infinite can be formed by successive addition.