A sound inductive cosmological argument?

[punkforchrist]

I’ve been reading Richard Swinburne’s excellent book,* The Existence of God*, and I was thinking over how one might go about presenting a concise version of an inductive cosmological argument. This attempt of mine is by no means comprehensive, so any feedback is welcome.

1. The uniformity of nature is either caused or uncaused.
2. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.
3. The uniformity of nature entails very complex things.
4. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is probably caused.

(1) shouldn’t be controversial. Something “uncaused” could logically be either self-sufficient or even a brute fact (although I don’t personally believe in brute facts).

(2) can be supported by an analysis of things we know that are complex. Always, or for the most part, whenever we observe a complex entity, we discover that it is caused by the formation and unification of its diverse parts.

(3) simply points out that nature contains many complex elements, and I don’t think anyone will disagree with that. As a result, I think (4) is more likely true than its negation, which would make this a cogent inductive argument.

 

[Touchstone]

I’ve been reading Richard Swinburne’s excellent book,* The Existence of God*, and I was thinking over how one might go about presenting a concise version of an inductive cosmological argument. This attempt of mine is by no means comprehensive, so any feedback is welcome.

1. The uniformity of nature is either caused or uncaused.
2. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.
3. The uniformity of nature entails very complex things.
4. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is probably caused.

(1) shouldn’t be controversial. Something “uncaused” could logically be either self-sufficient or even a brute fact (although I don’t personally believe in brute facts).

(2) can be supported by an analysis of things we know that are complex. Always, or for the most part, whenever we observe a complex entity, we discover that it is caused by the formation and unification of its diverse parts.

(3) simply points out that nature contains many complex elements, and I don’t think anyone will disagree with that. As a result, I think (4) is more likely true than its negation, which would make this a cogent inductive argument.

(2) operates on the assumption that physics is a model for metaphysics. I can’t see any warrant for that assumption. If I said:

(a) Humans are only created by humans

I could offer a similar “defense” of (a) as you have for (2):

(a) can be supported by an analysis of all the humans we know. Always, of for the most part, whenever we observe a human, we discover that it came from another human (or pair of humans).

And later, maybe I can use that to support (c):

(c):. There exists an infinite preceding chain of humans in our past.

QED.

It isn’t sufficient to merely observe that all of the evidence at hand is pointing towards one configuration. The weight granted to the induction rests on the qualifications made as to why that sample is inductively valid, why one should think that the specifics are representative of the general case. It was true, way back when, to say “all swans are white”, perhaps. But that’s such a poor induction as to be folly, for no basis for thinking that that uniformity is a general one was given. It’s fine to affirm that indeed no black swans are known (if that is indeed the case at the time), but this is always subject to an evaluation of our basis for induction, the confidence that that sample we have is representative or normative.

Also, (2) is, as stated, a pretty conspicuous beg to the question at hand. If this universe is indeed uncaused, a brute fact, then every complex thing is very certainly uncaused, ultimately. An uncaused universe means that complex things emerge without any root cause at all, and that possibility makes (2) a matter of affirming your conclusion in your premise. (2) is precisely the issue you are dealing with here.

Also also (!), why do you not believe in brute facts? You affirm they are logical possibilities above. Why the dismissal outright, then?

Also also also (!!), in (3), pointing out that nature contains many complex things is NOT the same as saying that nature entails that kind of complexity. Clearly it permits it, one way or the other, but “entails” is way too strong a word for what you’ve got in evidence. It maybe that the complexity we see is a “brute” fact of remote chance, the product of a one-in-a-gazillion random fluctuation that produced a “wings of the butterfly” set of cascading effects (many of which themselves are highly improbable, perhaps) that produces the complexity we see. Or, think of it this way. In another possible world, with the same starting conditions and natural laws, maybe little to none of the complexity we observe emerges in that world. We don’t know what is imposed in terms of complexity as a matter of *necessity *by natural law.

Interesting thread, though. Good on ya!

-Touchstone

 

[wasmit]

I’ve been reading Richard Swinburne’s excellent book,* The Existence of God*, and I was thinking over how one might go about presenting a concise version of an inductive cosmological argument. This attempt of mine is by no means comprehensive, so any feedback is welcome.

1. The uniformity of nature is either caused or uncaused.
2. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.
3. The uniformity of nature entails very complex things.
4. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is probably caused.

(1) shouldn’t be controversial. Something “uncaused” could logically be either self-sufficient or even a brute fact (although I don’t personally believe in brute facts).

(2) can be supported by an analysis of things we know that are complex. Always, or for the most part, whenever we observe a complex entity, we discover that it is caused by the formation and unification of its diverse parts.

(3) simply points out that nature contains many complex elements, and I don’t think anyone will disagree with that. As a result, I think (4) is more likely true than its negation, which would make this a cogent inductive argument.

(1) What do you mean by the word “uniformity”? What do you mean by nature?

You could truthfully say “nature is either caused or uncaused.”

(2) how complex does something need to be to qualify as “complex” ? An atom could be said to be complex, or it could be said to be basic/fundamental. A thing’s level of complexity is in the eye of the beholder.

what do you mean by “caused” (and uncaused)? If you mean “caused by a divine”, you are wrong. If you mean “caused by a previous event” you are correct for most things visible with the naked eye. Some atomic-level events are uncaused.

(3) again, what is “uniformity”? it seems superfluous. Complex things do exist.

(4) follows logically from the assumptions.

Here is a more basic form of your argument:

(1)Things are either uncaused or divinely caused.
(2)things are unlikely to be uncaused
(3)things exist
(4)things are likely to be divinely caused.

As you can see from removing the superfluous words in your argument, the entire argument rests on (2). So, you need to show that (2) is true.

Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.

The problem is, that (2) sounds very much like the ID/creationist movement, which has been thoroughly debunked.

 

[punkforchrist]

(2) operates on the assumption that physics is a model for metaphysics. I can’t see any warrant for that assumption. If I said:

(a) Humans are only created by humans

I could offer a similar “defense” of (a) as you have for (2):

(a) can be supported by an analysis of all the humans we know. Always, of for the most part, whenever we observe a human, we discover that it came from another human (or pair of humans).

And later, maybe I can use that to support (c):

(c):. There exists an infinite preceding chain of humans in our past.

QED.

Actually, I think this would be a correct use of induction. However, as with any conclusion based on induction, it would be subject to possible defeaters. Given our knowledge of humanity’s finitude in the past, we can safely say that there hasn’t been an infinite preceding chain of humans. The question, then, is whether we can find any such defeater for various inductive cosmological arguments.

It isn’t sufficient to merely observe that all of the evidence at hand is pointing towards one configuration. The weight granted to the induction rests on the qualifications made as to why that sample is inductively valid, why one should think that the specifics are representative of the general case. It was true, way back when, to say “all swans are white”, perhaps. But that’s such a poor induction as to be folly, for no basis for thinking that that uniformity is a general one was given. It’s fine to affirm that indeed no black swans are known (if that is indeed the case at the time), but this is always subject to an evaluation of our basis for induction, the confidence that that sample we have is representative or normative.

Well said. But, what would count as evidence against a “first cause” per se, as it pertains to the argument at hand?

Also, (2) is, as stated, a pretty conspicuous beg to the question at hand. If this universe is indeed uncaused, a brute fact, then every complex thing is very certainly uncaused, ultimately. An uncaused universe means that complex things emerge without any root cause at all, and that possibility makes (2) a matter of affirming your conclusion in your premise. (2) is precisely the issue you are dealing with here.

Wouldn’t you agree that we do observe that some (or, a great many) complex things are caused? I mean, we observe all the time the various configurations of atoms and molecules joining together to form more complex things. Atoms and molecules, then, would be considered causes of something like an organelle.

Also also (!), why do you not believe in brute facts? You affirm they are logical possibilities above. Why the dismissal outright, then?

The acceptance/rejection of brute facts isn’t part of the argument. However, since you asked, I believe in the principle of sufficient reason, which would preclude the reality of brute facts. I think Alexander Pruss’ defense of the PSR has been unparalleled.

Also also also (!!), in (3), pointing out that nature contains many complex things is NOT the same as saying that nature entails that kind of complexity. Clearly it permits it, one way or the other, but “entails” is way too strong a word for what you’ve got in evidence.

In that case, the word that corresponds to the “uniformity of nature” would still be something simple. This means that for all practical purposes it is identical to the first cause.

It maybe that the complexity we see is a “brute” fact of remote chance, the product of a one-in-a-gazillion random fluctuation that produced a “wings of the butterfly” set of cascading effects (many of which themselves are highly improbable, perhaps) that produces the complexity we see.

Given that we continue to find uniformity/regularity all throughout nature, I think nothing requires more faith than that.

Or, think of it this way. In another possible world, with the same starting conditions and natural laws, maybe little to none of the complexity we observe emerges in that world. We don’t know what is imposed in terms of complexity as a matter of *necessity *by natural law.

I didn’t say that nature is uniform by necessity. There may be possible worlds in which there is no gravity, or no strong atomic force. Incidentally, even those possible worlds of chaos are intelligible, which presupposes order.

Interesting thread, though. Good on ya!

Thanks for the response!

 

[punkforchrist]

(1) What do you mean by the word “uniformity”? What do you mean by nature?

I’ll just stick with dictionary definitions, in order to avoid any confusion:

“Uniformity”: a condition in which everything is regular and unvarying

“Nature”: the physical world including all natural phenomena and living things

(2) how complex does something need to be to qualify as “complex” ? An atom could be said to be complex, or it could be said to be basic/fundamental. A thing’s level of complexity is in the eye of the beholder.

As long as something is composed of parts it is complex.

what do you mean by “caused” (and uncaused)? If you mean “caused by a divine”, you are wrong. If you mean “caused by a previous event” you are correct for most things visible with the naked eye. Some atomic-level events are uncaused.

I’m just using the term, “cause,” in its normal usage. In other words, I’m not presupposing that if there is a first cause it must be God. I believe that it is God, but that issue comes up later.

Sub-atomic events may be uncaused in the sense that they’re random, but they still arise from the existing energy contained within the quantum vacuum. Quantum vacuums, in turn, are subject to various physical laws. For the sake of argument, however, we could just stick to macro-events.

 

[Touchstone]

Actually, I think this would be a correct use of induction. However, as with any conclusion based on induction, it would be subject to possible defeaters. Given our knowledge of humanity’s finitude in the past, we can safely say that there hasn’t been an infinite preceding chain of humans. The question, then, is whether we can find any such defeater for various inductive cosmological arguments.

I think the problem is much stronger than simply looking for a defeater, or making sure “the coast is clear” for a defeater. If you are seeking knowledge via this argument, you want to focus on the strength of the induction itself. That’s the point I was raising about white swans and black swans. At the time, it was perfectly good induction to conclude, based on all available evidence, that there were no black swans. But that’s a very shallow analsysis of the induction; if, for instance, you had some ulterior motive in making the case against black swans, the induction would be attractive. But as a matter of inquiry and not polemic, it behooves the thinker to ask: why do I suppose my induction obtains? What is my basis for thinking my projection of the available specifics (all known swans are non-black) to the general case (there are no black swans) will hold?

In the case of swans, that’s a hard case to make. Why can’t a swan be black? Well, no reason, really, we just don’t know if any! That’s still induction, but its the kind of induction that simply invites error.

In the case of your premise (2), it’s far worse. Not only are we without any basis for supposing that complex things can be uncaused, the “unlikely” in that premise EQUIVOCATES ACROSS TRANSCENDENTAL BORDERS. What I mean by that is that it takes an empirical survey in our physical world, and makes a transcendent leap toward asserting that the dynamics in our physical world also somehow also apply as metaphysics. That’s just totally spurious as an extrapolation, I think, totally without basis.

A more obvious, more ridiculous example may illustrate this better(2):

(1) God is either real or unreal.
(2) All real things are affected by gravity, based on our observations
(3) :. God is affected by gravity if he is real.

Now, the equivocation there on “real” should be quite apparent. “Real” in some transcendental (or metaphysical) sense is completely detached from any implications that come with the word “real” in a physical context ("extended in space-time). It’s a major, glaring error to suppose that a local dynamic (gravity) obtains as a metaphysical dynamic. It signals confusion between physic and metaphysics.

I suggest that your (2) does the same thing. Your use of “unlikely” is wholly bound to physical experience and physical dynamics. But you are applying that “unlikely” to a metaphysical conclusion, saying to the reader “metaphysics work just like physics!”. You might as well claim that gravity pulls on God, or whatever obtains in the metaverse/metaphysic. Gravity sure is consistently observed in our universe, but its absolutely no indicator of how things work in a transcendant context.

Well said. But, what would count as evidence against a “first cause” per se, as it pertains to the argument at hand?

Sorry, I forgot to answer this before I posted. Revisiting it again, I still don’t understand what you are asking here. Maybe you can restate this for me?

Wouldn’t you agree that we do observe that some (or, a great many) complex things are caused?

Yes, certainly!

I mean, we observe all the time the various configurations of atoms and molecules joining together to form more complex things. Atoms and molecules, then, would be considered causes of something like an organelle.

Yes, amazingly complex things that we can watch aggregate, build, and “complexify”.

I know (and lament) you are committed to thinking in essentialist terms, and I understand the gist of what you are saying about atoms and molecules, but I will note that as stated, its incorrect. An atom is not a “cause” for a molecule. It’s a component, but in terms of causality, its something else that provides the transition from “collection of atoms” to “assembled molecules”. The action of the weak nuclear force, electrical attraction/repulsion, etc. are needed for the process. They are also needed to make atoms… atoms, out of their constituent subatomic particles. In terms of causation, the forces of physical law are the “hands that make the cookies”, and the hadrons, leptons, and all the things made out of them and the other particles are “ingredients”.

I don’t think that’s particularly germane to your OP, and that may be just what you meant, above. But physics sees Thomist/Aristotelian causation as a completely different, and alien concept to its use of the word.

-TS

(continued in a bit)

 

[Touchstone]

The acceptance/rejection of brute facts isn’t part of the argument. However, since you asked, I believe in the principle of sufficient reason, which would preclude the reality of brute facts. I think Alexander Pruss’ defense of the PSR has been unparalleled.

OK, well, I’m a fan of Graham Oppy, and I think his critique of PSR (which includes Pruss, IIRC), is quite strong. Maybe Pruss has something more current than the last Oppy I went through on this? Maybe that’s another thread sometime.

In that case, the word that corresponds to the “uniformity of nature” would still be something simple. This means that for all practical purposes it is identical to the first cause.

OK, that makes sense. It’s not “complexity” your are focusing on, really, in (3), but nature as dependent on first cause, complex-or-otherwise. I’ll have to think some more on what that means to the argument.

Given that we continue to find uniformity/regularity all throughout nature, I think nothing requires more faith than that.

It requires no faith at all if there are a million billion trillion other universes out there in the “cosmic landscape”. It’s a statistical certainly, in that case. And that’s precisely why this kind of argument falls down, hard, I think. As always, these arguments are just so much “frosting” uncovering bedrock metaphysical assumptions that are gratuitous, nothing more than intuitive. If I claim that according to the Principle of the Cosmic Landscape (“PCL”, which was defended in unparalleled fashion by St. Syd the Vicious) our universe is one of a gazillion gazillion extant, then we shouldn’t be surprised at all that a one-in-a-gazillion fluctuation steered events to the development of a spectacular bit of complexity and biological diversity. It’s expected.

But wait, you say! Touchstone has no basis for beginning with such a metaphysical premise, that there are a gazillion gazillion universes! I would quickly agree, and confess to making up a stooge analog of the kind of metaphysical assumptions that underpin the premises you are working from here. For example, such an objection would indicate that you are operating from the assumption that this universe is NOT one of a gazillion gazillion tries. That’s certainly intutive, as we are parochial beings, inhabiting just this one universe and thus quite fond and presumptuous about it.

But it doesn’t hold up in terms of analytics. That intuition is just as gratuitous as a starting point as my claim that there are a gazillion gazillion competing universes out there, making just about any improbable event we might contemplate in this universe a statistical inevitability.

These are both – all – unwarranted, illicit starting points. In terms of rationalism, we have no choice but agnosticism on these kinds of metaphysical conjectures. They are perfectly inscrutable, totally opaque to us.

If I’m wrong in my thinking about your metaphysics, then I will immediately declare the working assumption here to be that there are a gazillion gazillion universes, and uncaused complexity of the kinds we see (and more) is inevitable somewhere so why not here? What would be the basis of your rejection of that?

If it comes down to “your intuition about metaphysics versus mine”, then we are just wasting our time, and we might as well be arguing Coke/Pepsi, Chevy/Ford, and LedZep/Rolling Stones.

I didn’t say that nature is uniform by necessity. There may be possible worlds in which there is no gravity, or no strong atomic force. Incidentally, even those possible worlds of chaos are intelligible, which presupposes order.

Yes, but only where your concept of “chaos” presupposes order. An “unordered chaos world”, or perhaps we’d say that’s just a “random world” would be similarly unintelligible by definition. In such a world, maximally random, minimally constrained, you would paradoxically (perhaps, depending on your familiarity with this) find maximal complexity. A “random world” would contain way more complexity than our universe, because randomness is the theoretical limit for complexity.

I suspect you may balk at that and say what you meant in terms of complexity is something like Dembski’s “specified complexity”, or maybe some kind of self-conflicting term like “ordered complexity”, but that would just trigger a worthwhile digression. When you stated to as:

1. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.

My first reaction was that this was quite contrary to our observations. For example, a random string generated in cryptographic machines that draws its copmlexity from the “uncaused” nature of isotope decay. The decay events are uncaused (so far as we can tell), even though they fit into a predictable curve (half-lifes) as a statistical ensemble.

The point here is that the most complex things you can find are random strings, strictly speaking (or random arrays of bits, if you prefer). Nothing is more complex than pure randomness, and if we can point at a source of uncaused randomness, there we have a font of maximal complexit, and uncaused complexity, at that.

So I’ll stop there, but I think if there are any follow ups to chase here, it would be som pressing on what you mean precisely by complexity. That’s one of those terms that seems quite “obvious” in superficial terms, but on inspection is extraoirdinarily deep and difficult, not to mention counter-intuitive.

Thanks for the response!

Good stuff, thanks.

-Touchstone

 

[punkforchrist]

Thanks again for your thoughts, Touchstone.

Touchstone:

In the case of your premise (2), it’s far worse. Not only are we without any basis for supposing that complex things can be uncaused, the “unlikely” in that premise EQUIVOCATES ACROSS TRANSCENDENTAL BORDERS. What I mean by that is that it takes an empirical survey in our physical world, and makes a transcendent leap toward asserting that the dynamics in our physical world also somehow also apply as metaphysics. That’s just totally spurious as an extrapolation, I think, totally without basis.

Each of the premises makes use of “causation” in the metaphysical sense, so I don’t see the equivocation. I also don’t see why one cannot observe something in the physical world and infer a metaphysical conclusion about it. For example, I could observe that “Touchstone is a human being,” and from that infer the metaphysical truth that “Touchstone is finite.”

A more obvious, more ridiculous example may illustrate this better(2):

(1) God is either real or unreal.
(2) All real things are affected by gravity, based on our observations
(3) :. God is affected by gravity if he is real.

Now, the equivocation there on “real” should be quite apparent. “Real” in some transcendental (or metaphysical) sense is completely detached from any implications that come with the word “real” in a physical context ("extended in space-time). It’s a major, glaring error to suppose that a local dynamic (gravity) obtains as a metaphysical dynamic. It signals confusion between physic and metaphysics.

I can definitely see the equivocation there. But, in the OP none of the premises use “causation” in a mere physical sense. It’s always in the broad metaphysical sense.

I suggest that your (2) does the same thing. Your use of “unlikely” is wholly bound to physical experience and physical dynamics. But you are applying that “unlikely” to a metaphysical conclusion, saying to the reader “metaphysics work just like physics!”. You might as well claim that gravity pulls on God, or whatever obtains in the metaverse/metaphysic. Gravity sure is consistently observed in our universe, but its absolutely no indicator of how things work in a transcendant context.

Once again, I don’t see any problem with making a physical observation and extending it toward metaphysics. We know that if God exists that gravity would have no effect on Him, simply because God is incorporeal. In other words, God’s incorporeality acts as a sufficient defeater of the inductive generalization that real things are affected by gravity. On the other hand, if we conceive of something complex, it is inexplicable as to how it could be metaphysically uncaused - at least, there’s no available defeater for this.

Sorry, I forgot to answer this before I posted. Revisiting it again, I still don’t understand what you are asking here. Maybe you can restate this for me?

Well, we both agree that conclusions based on induction can be “defeated.” What I’m saying is that while we do have some defeaters for inductive generalizations, like “all things are affected by gravity,” we don’t have any defeater for “complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.” We simply don’t have any example of anything to the contrary, nor can we conceptualize an instance of a complex entity on any metaphysical level that would not be caused in some sense. Keep in mind that a complex entity is one that is composed of parts, is divisible, and is therefore caused by the unification of its parts.

I know (and lament) you are committed to thinking in essentialist terms, and I understand the gist of what you are saying about atoms and molecules, but I will note that as stated, its incorrect. An atom is not a “cause” for a molecule. It’s a component, but in terms of causality, its something else that provides the transition from “collection of atoms” to “assembled molecules”.

That depends on how you’re using the term “cause.” If you restrict it to “efficient cause,” then you may have a case. However, I’m using the term broadly, where it applies to a thing’s necessary conditions.

 

[punkforchrist]

Touchstone:

OK, well, I’m a fan of Graham Oppy, and I think his critique of PSR (which includes Pruss, IIRC), is quite strong. Maybe Pruss has something more current than the last Oppy I went through on this? Maybe that’s another thread sometime.

It’s kind of like, “my dad can beat up your dad!”

It requires no faith at all if there are a million billion trillion other universes out there in the “cosmic landscape”. It’s a statistical certainly, in that case. And that’s precisely why this kind of argument falls down, hard, I think. As always, these arguments are just so much “frosting” uncovering bedrock metaphysical assumptions that are gratuitous, nothing more than intuitive. If I claim that according to the Principle of the Cosmic Landscape (“PCL”, which was defended in unparalleled fashion by St. Syd the Vicious) our universe is one of a gazillion gazillion extant, then we shouldn’t be surprised at all that a one-in-a-gazillion fluctuation steered events to the development of a spectacular bit of complexity and biological diversity. It’s expected.

But, don’t you think this is just as much a metaphysical claim as anything I’ve said so far?

In any case, I’ll make two other points about this. First, a single observed universe is a much simpler hypothesis than any multi-verse theory that would entail unobserved, purely speculative universes. Moreover, each of these alternate universes are still intelligible, giving them a sort of “order” common to the laws of logic and mathematics. So, I still think a first cause of a given universe’s regularity is still in order, and very appropriate.

But wait, you say! Touchstone has no basis for beginning with such a metaphysical premise, that there are a gazillion gazillion universes! I would quickly agree, and confess to making up a stooge analog of the kind of metaphysical assumptions that underpin the premises you are working from here. For example, such an objection would indicate that you are operating from the assumption that this universe is NOT one of a gazillion gazillion tries. That’s certainly intutive, as we are parochial beings, inhabiting just this one universe and thus quite fond and presumptuous about it.

I guess you read my mind!

But it doesn’t hold up in terms of analytics. That intuition is just as gratuitous as a starting point as my claim that there are a gazillion gazillion competing universes out there, making just about any improbable event we might contemplate in this universe a statistical inevitability.

In addition to the two points I’ve made about this, we might also consider the fact that we’re not just talking about probability; rather, we’re talking about specified probability. Even in a multi-verse, what are the odds of our universe displaying the uniformity is does? Not very likely…

These are both – all – unwarranted, illicit starting points. In terms of rationalism, we have no choice but agnosticism on these kinds of metaphysical conjectures. They are perfectly inscrutable, totally opaque to us.

Are you an agnostic with respect to basic math and logic, though?

If I’m wrong in my thinking about your metaphysics, then I will immediately declare the working assumption here to be that there are a gazillion gazillion universes, and uncaused complexity of the kinds we see (and more) is inevitable somewhere so why not here? What would be the basis of your rejection of that?

Hopefully, I’ve clarified a bit. Feel free to let me know if I haven’t.

If it comes down to “your intuition about metaphysics versus mine”, then we are just wasting our time, and we might as well be arguing Coke/Pepsi, Chevy/Ford, and LedZep/Rolling Stones.

Ah, but those questions have easy answers!

Yes, but only where your concept of “chaos” presupposes order. An “unordered chaos world”, or perhaps we’d say that’s just a “random world” would be similarly unintelligible by definition. In such a world, maximally random, minimally constrained, you would paradoxically (perhaps, depending on your familiarity with this) find maximal complexity. A “random world” would contain way more complexity than our universe, because randomness is the theoretical limit for complexity.

I’m just trying to minimize the number of assumptions here. However, even in such a chaotic world, it would still be the case that “A=A” and “2+2=4.”

I suspect you may balk at that and say what you meant in terms of complexity is something like Dembski’s “specified complexity”, or maybe some kind of self-conflicting term like “ordered complexity”, but that would just trigger a worthwhile digression. When you stated to as:

1. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.

My first reaction was that this was quite contrary to our observations. For example, a random string generated in cryptographic machines that draws its copmlexity from the “uncaused” nature of isotope decay. The decay events are uncaused (so far as we can tell), even though they fit into a predictable curve (half-lifes) as a statistical ensemble.

I’m not thinking in such specific terms. I agree that sub-atomic events may be uncaused in the sense that they’re random, but as I explained in an earlier post, the quantum vacuums are still subject to physical laws and so forth. The random fluctuations are still “caused” in the sense that they arise from already existing energy.

The point here is that the most complex things you can find are random strings, strictly speaking (or random arrays of bits, if you prefer). Nothing is more complex than pure randomness, and if we can point at a source of uncaused randomness, there we have a font of maximal complexit, and uncaused complexity, at that.

Hopefully, my points have clarified this matter, as well. Nevertheless, if you prefer, we can just stick with macro-level events.

 

[bullfrog654]

why does everyone at this site gain faith on my posts

 

[TheWhim]

1. The uniformity of nature is either caused or uncaused.
2. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.
3. The uniformity of nature entails very complex things.
4. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is probably caused.

Well, I see what you mean. Since complex things are always caused, and complex things are a part of the supposedly simple fact of a physical universe existing, this physical universe, partaking in the complexity by harboring complex things, also must have been caused – therefore there is a cause to this world.
Obviously the above is not written in terms of stringent logic to completely match your syllogistic frame but rather follows an atmospheric approach to catch the basic sentiment of your argument. Let me proceed in this wavering manner despite its proneness to unclarity and obscure leaps of thought.

Despite my being able to appreciate the tune or atmosphere of your argument there are some dissonant chords that perhaps stand in need of a more harmonious solution.

I wondered hard what you could possibly mean with “the uniformity of nature”. However, in a later post your write:

I didn’t say that nature is uniform by necessity. There may be possible worlds in which there is no gravity, or no strong atomic force.

Thereby I conclude that the “uniformity of nature” can be roughly taken to equate to physical laws. Well, there’s no problem here. That was just for the record.

The problem arises and entirely circulates about the third assertion.
In your agument you assume, undoubtedly just for the sake of argument(because you reject brute facts), that simple things are more likely to be uncaused than complex ones. That’s why you focus on complex things. The physical universe, just taken as a frame of physical laws making possible physical events, is simple. But it “entails” very complex things. Well, so what? Touchstone made a valid observation in concluding that “entail” is a very strong word. Indeed, the validity of your argument entirely depends on the word you apply to express the relationship between the uniformity of nature and the complex things. The stronger this relationship appears to be by strength of a word applied expressing a close relationship, the more conclusive does your argument become. This assessment, however, if true, would reduce your argument to a mere word-play.

Let’s get a stronger grasp on what I mean by playing through some examples:
3. The uniformity of nature contains very complex things.
Obviously that’s not very appealing. Nature may still be a brute fact. It contains complex things like a vessel contains water but as neither the properties of water mix with the properties of the vessel thereby, so neither does nature abandon its simplicity just for the sake of containing complexity. It does not share in the properties of the things it contains.
In consequence, the argument fails. Well, we’ve got to search for a better word here.
3. The uniformity of nature partakes in very complex things.
Ah, we’ve found it. That’s already very persuasive. It perhaps ressembles your “entail” in power of creating an atmosphere of association, though I would muse it’s even more effective than “entail” because it conjures images of the pleasant social life(partake in one another’s troubles, share in the life of the community etc.) and therefore emotionally predisposes the reader for the acceptance of your conclusion.
3. The uniformity of nature is melted with very complex things.
Oh, this has caught me. I’m convinced. Such a strong association, a fusion of properties and mergence of initially entirely different concepts must have its effect, after all. However, one might still take a step farther.
*3. The uniformity of nature transforms into very complex things. *
Nature leaves its plane of stubborn uniformity and takes posession of the ineffable heights of complexity. The butterfly is born. But, unbelievable enough, one may still be more audacious in the formulation of 3.
3. The uniformity of nature is the complexity of very complex things.
Well, this must knock off the worst skeptic. The strongest possible equation is made and the most ear-ringing word, laden with countless connotations of reality, is employed: being. Esse. The authority of Aquinas inevitably oppresses our mind. Who would dare still to refuse to comply with 3?

In summary, I mean this: posit matter and physical laws as a brute fact and leave them to their own working processes and they will cause the rise of complex things. However, this procedure does not change that matter and physical laws are simple. That they cause complex things to arise does not render them complex. In other words, I believe your argument fails.

And I will be glad to be refuted on this point, as always. Indeed, I believe your posts display the highest philosophical level on this board, punkforchrist, and every subject you touch turns into pure gold. No kidding here!

 

[Touchstone]

Each of the premises makes use of “causation” in the metaphysical sense, so I don’t see the equivocation. I also don’t see why one cannot observe something in the physical world and infer a metaphysical conclusion about it. For example, I could observe that “Touchstone is a human being,” and from that infer the metaphysical truth that “Touchstone is finite.”

I think this is precisely the kind of equivocation I was complaining about.

I can definitely see the equivocation there. But, in the OP none of the premises use “causation” in a mere physical sense. It’s always in the broad metaphysical sense.

Yes, but that is just to say that you hiding your equivocation in the word “broad”, tucking it in to the ambiguity and emptiness of that term – “metaphysical causation”. I’m intrigued your use of “mere”, here, because it seems that any and all concepts we may obtain in objective terms for “causation” are physical ones (at least in the successionist sense, cf. Hume et al). Metaphysical causation, as a basis for induction, isn’t even “mere” by comparison, but something far less, a subjective conjecture.

Maybe this is the point where this breaks off, dialectically, because the reasoning path here, as I see it is to press for formalism and substance in your use of “broad” metaphysical causality. Not being new to the idea, I do not expect you to supply such, for the very reason you are pointing at “broad” usage for the term in the first place – it’s intractable, inscrutable, conceptually.

Here’s a way to put a point on it: in (2), you assign some probabilistic features to [metaphysical] causality: it’s unlikely that complex things are [metaphysically] uncaused. Whence this probability analysis, though? It seems quite reasonable to say what you have in physical terms, as empirically we have a wealth of evidence attesting to the formation and assembly process of complex systems due to physical law (physical causality). Your (2) holds under that reading.

But as soon as I take you at your word and understand that you are NOT equivocating on “causality”, and intend “metaphysical causality” throughout, then (2) just collapses, and does not appear to be anything more than purely arbitrary. If you dispute this, then I ask, again: whence your probability calculus for the odds of complex systems being “metaphysically caused”?

I may be wrong, and stand to be corrected, but I predict that if you are going to address this, you’ve little to base this on besides “intuition” or “gut sense”. Having issued this kind of request many times before, I do not receive descriptions of the background probability and the selectable phase space, of numerators and denominators that support the claim of “likely” or “unlikely”. I receive “that’s just how it must be”. I’d be delighted to get more than that from you, and I think if I might expect such from anyone I’ve talked to on this, I might expect it from you. But nevertheless, I think you’d be world famous by Friday if you could deliver, and it seems hard to expect.

I’ll stop here for now, but here is the summary of my analysis, at this point: I believe you still are equivocating on “causality”, and say this is established by a) your dependency on empirical, physical notions of causality to support “unlikely” in (2), and b), your explicit claim that you intend to mean “metaphysical causality” throughout the syllogism. You do not have any grounds for “unlikely” in metaphysical terms for (2). Thus you must either equivocate to support (2), or be consistent in your semantics, in which case (2) is conspicuously without support.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Once again, I don’t see any problem with making a physical observation and extending it toward metaphysics.

Ok, but now you’ve announced a heuristic that is backwards epsitemologically. We don’t surmise something, and then, failing to “see why that doesn’t work”, embrace it. “I don’t see a problem” is not a form of warrant.

Moreover, there’s a clear problem in your extension. We put the “meta-” in “meta-physics” for a reason. It’s NOT physics.

If this isn’t clear, consider a handy example we use in software. If I write a software simulation, a “virtual world” in which there are just 2 spatial dimensions and the 2D object “citizens” of that world never, ever, ever move more than one inch an hour, punkforchrist, as a 2D citizen of “TSFlatWorld”, would make the following comment:
**
I don’t see any problem with making a physical observation and extending it toward metaphysics.**

That is, 2D-punkforchrist sees “no probelm” supposing that our real world is a 2D world in which objects never, ever move faster than one inch an hour. That would be 2D-punkforchrist musing from inside his world about the reality of the outercontext, the metaphysics transcendent to his world. 2D-punkforchrist can’t see a problem, any more than you can see a problem with the extension you’ve proposed here, but in neither case is any such conjecture justified, even a little bit. 2D-punkforchrist simply has not the foggiest clue that he is a construct of a C++ compiler and a x686 runtime, not the foggiest conception of space-time in our world, or its dynamics.

You have similarly zero knowledge of the domain you are extending into, and such extensions as you are contemplating are certainly useful and attractive, but they are intellectual spurious, unfounded. My example of TSFlatworld is a weak example, as at least both the outer context (our world) and the inner context (TSFlatworld) are governed by the physics of the outer context. Even (especially) that is something that cannot be taken for granted in our position. The metaphysics that obtain for us may be thoroughly “alien” and “non-extended”, for all we know, and that possibility is as inscrutable in terms of probability as any other conjecture we might conjure up.

We know that if God exists that gravity would have no effect on Him, simply because God is incorporeal.

We don’t know that in any other way than as a matter of analytical knowledge, as a tautology. We know that God is incorporeal in the same way we know bachelors are unmarried, via definitions we choose arbitrarily, totally unattached to any grounding in reality.

In other words, God’s incorporeality acts as a sufficient defeater of the inductive generalization that real things are affected by gravity.

But it doesn’t because it’s not an actual defeater. It’s just a tautology. If I took Anselm’s position and claimed we know God exists because it’s impossible for me to think of something greater/higher than the greatest/highest thing that exists, would you consider that a defeater for an atheist induction, where an atheist infers that no God or gods exists based on the consilience of evidence that fails to reveal any such being? That induction may stand or fall on other bases, but such a tautology (God is whatever we can imagine as the highest, and then some!) is no defeater at all. For all you know God is corporeal, if he exists. You are completely without foundation in positing such a defeater, save for using it as a definitional tool.

On the other hand, if we conceive of something complex, it is inexplicable as to how it could be metaphysically uncaused - at least, there’s no available defeater for this.

There’s no defeaters in view, all around. That’s just the problem. We haven’t even reached a point here were “defeater” is a coherent concept! If I ask you what would qualify as a defeater, epistemically, here, what would you say? You’ve just suggested that your arbitrary definition of God as “incorporeal” is some kind of defeater. If that’s what qualifies as a defeater, we are completely lost without a rudder, here. I might as well just say “But God is corporeal, it has been divinely revealed to me!”. Now what? Do I have a defeater or not?

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

punkforchrist:

Well, we both agree that conclusions based on induction can be “defeated.”

Yes, agreed. But I think now that we are quite at odds over what would stand as an actual defeater, even in principle.

What I’m saying is that while we do have some defeaters for inductive generalizations, like “all things are affected by gravity,” we don’t have any defeater for “complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.”

Agreed, but I suspect the reason for this isn’t what you think it is. The absence of a defeater is NOT because the evidence that would substantiate a defeater is lacking, where it might possibly exist. Rather, for “complex things are unlikely to be [metaphysically] uncaused” is so thoroughly confused as a conceptual proposition that “defeater” has lost all meaning. If you think I’m wrong, perhaps you might tell me what you suppose would represent a defeater for “complex things are unlikely to be [metaphysically] uncaused”? What would the world have to be like for you to say “premise (2) has a defeater for me”?

I say it’s unfalsifiable because it’s incoherent if we deploy “metaphysical causality” for (2). (2) only coheres conceptually in terms of physical causality.

We simply don’t have any example of anything to the contrary, nor can we conceptualize an instance of a complex entity on any metaphysical level that would not be caused in some sense.

Well, I say it’s a live option that the universe itself is a brute fact. Lots of causality proceeds from it, due to its constituent dimension and laws, but that’s just what makes it complex. I’m conceiving of the universe as a brute fact, utterly uncaused. Now what? Did I break some rule I missed?

Keep in mind that a complex entity is one that is composed of parts, is divisible, and is therefore caused by the unification of its parts.

Provisionally, lets say that the universe is at least considered complex by virtue of its constituent “parts” – dimensions, laws, matter, energy. I have a friend who makes an interesting case that this is in fact a simple unity, but that’s another discussion. But consider that these are individuated ontologically, and these parts are all reified together and due to perfectly no cause at all.

I remind you that I’m not saying this is what must be the case. Rather it just may be the case. But if that’s even possibly the case, it seems your argument falls. You are committed to demonstrating this is necessarily NOT the case, I think.

That depends on how you’re using the term “cause.” If you restrict it to “efficient cause,” then you may have a case. However, I’m using the term broadly, where it applies to a thing’s necessary conditions.

OK, but I don’t think that helps, really. As soon as we get to the foundation of physics, at the border of the metaphysic, then “necessary conditions” becomes an incoherent term. We have no idea what constitutes or does not consitute “necessary conditions” as a matter of metaphysics, any more than 2D-punkforchrist new what the necessary rules for TSFlatworld were. “Necessary conditions” is a stolen concept from the real world. Aristotle and his fellow travelers just overlooked the origin of the concept – same thing applies to “efficient cause”, etc.

-Touchstone

 

[Touchstone]

TS:

It requires no faith at all if there are a million billion trillion other universes out there in the “cosmic landscape”. It’s a statistical certainly, in that case. And that’s precisely why this kind of argument falls down, hard, I think. As always, these arguments are just so much “frosting” uncovering bedrock metaphysical assumptions that are gratuitous, nothing more than intuitive. If I claim that according to the Principle of the Cosmic Landscape (“PCL”, which was defended in unparalleled fashion by St. Syd the Vicious) our universe is one of a gazillion gazillion extant, then we shouldn’t be surprised at all that a one-in-a-gazillion fluctuation steered events to the development of a spectacular bit of complexity and biological diversity. It’s expected.

But, don’t you think this is just as much a metaphysical claim as anything I’ve said so far?

Yes, and that’s why I offered up PCL, as a kind of mirror to illustrate the problem. PCL is gratuitous as a starting point. It may be the case, but I’ve got no justification for embracing it on epistemic terms. I would embrace it for subjective, emotional, or maybe (a)theological terms.

All of those are problematic. And that’s why I discourage you from making such claims – they are clear invitations to error and mistakes. Rathere we face facts: we are in a position of metaphysical agnosticism on this issue. The merits of PSR or PCL or any of the other competing conjectures are simply inscrutable, and none of them are distinguishable from the other on the merits. One only gets selected from the others as a matter of caprice.

So my message with the PCL example was that we are bound, rationally, into a position of agnosticism on this matter. We don’t have any epistemic justification for embracing any of the competing conjectures.

In any case, I’ll make two other points about this. First, a single observed universe is a much simpler hypothesis than any multi-verse theory that would entail unobserved, purely speculative universes.

Sure, but you are again trading in stolen concepts, here. Parsimony is a physical principle, not a metaphysical one. Or, more precisely, we have ample grounding for realizing and applying the value of parsimony in physical inquiries (questions about this natural world), but we have no such grounding for thinking parsimony is useful at all as a matter of metaphysics. Parsimony may be useful as a matter of metaphysics, but we have no way to say if it is or is not.

Parsimony is a statement about the observed features of this universe, and only about this universe.

Moreover, each of these alternate universes are still intelligible, giving them a sort of “order” common to the laws of logic and mathematics. So, I still think a first cause of a given universe’s regularity is still in order, and very appropriate.

Well, like above, this begs the question: what does “in order” mean. If I respond that some set of these possible worlds are highly ordered but perfectly [metaphysically] uncaused, now what? Is it a “standoff of intuitions”?

In addition to the two points I’ve made about this, we might also consider the fact that we’re not just talking about probability; rather, we’re talking about specified probability. Even in a multi-verse, what are the odds of our universe displaying the uniformity is does? Not very likely…

See, that’s totally inscrutable, another stolen concept from physics. It maybe that the metaphysics that obtain, that we are perfectly unaware of make the configuration of our universe absolutely necessary, and thus the odds of our universe being this way, as a matter of metaphysics equal to 1. Here, you use “likely” again in a fashion that makes sense in terms of physics, but is quite meaningless as a metaphysical concept.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

punkforchrist:

TS:

These are both – all – unwarranted, illicit starting points. In terms of rationalism, we have no choice but agnosticism on these kinds of metaphysical conjectures. They are perfectly inscrutable, totally opaque to us.

Are you an agnostic with respect to basic math and logic, though?

No, but I only recognize these as being conceptual tools, rather than transcedent entities.

I’m just trying to minimize the number of assumptions here. However, even in such a chaotic world, it would still be the case that “A=A” and “2+2=4.”

Well, the Law of Identity obtains wherever you require that it obtains. Physics, reality isn’t beholden to our cognitive needs, though. I don’t know if you’ve ever dug around in dialethic epistemology, etc. but even in our world, there are features that defy our “universal logic”. Qubits, for example, are something like Booleans with the possibility of superimposition of both values. That breaks the Law of non-Contradiction, as there you have the strange case of a qubit in “true and false, superimposed” mode. But that just points up the limited scope of what we often suppose is a “metaversal logic”, parochial things that we are. In any given possible world, you are free to stipulate that “A=A”, as a necessary condition for thinking, but the physics may be such that A=A sometimes, but also sometimes A=B, or A=~A, possibly all at the same time, which just means that our notion of identity, which we draw from our physical universe, may not be useful in interpreting some other possible and strange world.

I’m not thinking in such specific terms. I agree that sub-atomic events may be uncaused in the sense that they’re random, but as I explained in an earlier post, the quantum vacuums are still subject to physical laws and so forth. The random fluctuations are still “caused” in the sense that they arise from already existing energy.

All right, but this begs for precision, then. I no longer know what you mean by “caused” when you say this. It looks very much like you are treating causality as a tautology, rather than a physical mechanism; even if works out physically to be maximally uncaused (as acausal as we can imagine via empirical analysis), you are declaring it “caused” by definition, just be virtue of being part of some container.

There’s no arguing with definitional truths. If virtual particles are ‘caused’ by definition, by virtue of occurring in a vacuum, then that’s that. But that’s argument by definition, then, and none of that takes heed of the physical reality, then. If it was actually uncaused in physical terms, you wouldn’t be able to recognize it because your tautology was standing in the way.

Hopefully, my points have clarified this matter, as well. Nevertheless, if you prefer, we can just stick with macro-level events.

I think we can just use “other possible worlds” where macro events have the dynamics of quantum fluctuations in this world, if you prefer, but that seems like six-of-one-half-dozen-of-another, doesn’t it?

Thanks for all the thought and time invested in your comments and clarifications, though. I sincerely appreciate it.

-Touchstone

 

[punkforchrist]

TheWhim:

In summary, I mean this: posit matter and physical laws as a brute fact and leave them to their own working processes and they will cause the rise of complex things. However, this procedure does not change that matter and physical laws are simple. That they cause complex things to arise does not render them complex. In other words, I believe your argument fails.

I mentioned very briefly, and probably not sufficiently, that this merely changes the referent from “first cause” to “law,” where both actually refer to some kind of simple principle. So basically, I think this is a distinction without a difference.

And I will be glad to be refuted on this point, as always. Indeed, I believe your posts display the highest philosophical level on this board, punkforchrist, and every subject you touch turns into pure gold. No kidding here!

Thank you for the kind words. I hope my professors think the same!

Touchstone:

I think this is precisely the kind of equivocation I was complaining about.

Is “Touchstone is finite” not a sound inference from “Touchstone is human”?

Yes, but that is just to say that you hiding your equivocation in the word “broad”, tucking it in to the ambiguity and emptiness of that term – “metaphysical causation”.

Making a term broad doesn’t empty it of its meaning. We may legitimately state:

1. Dogs are animals.
2. Butch is a dog.
3. Therefore, Butch is an animal.

Notice the broad use of “dog” in both premises. We don’t have to specify that the kind of dog we’re talking about is a brittany spaniel, or a golden retriever, or anything else.

Here’s a way to put a point on it: in (2), you assign some probabilistic features to [metaphysical] causality: it’s unlikely that complex things are [metaphysically] uncaused. Whence this probability analysis, though? It seems quite reasonable to say what you have in physical terms, as empirically we have a wealth of evidence attesting to the formation and assembly process of complex systems due to physical law (physical causality). Your (2) holds under that reading.

That’s not really what I meant. However, physical observations are a subset of metaphysical principles.

We can easily analyze the probability that something is metaphysical caused/uncaused by either making use of general physical observations, or by conceptualizing our analytical terms, attempting to think of them as concrete. For example, given that we have no instance in which something comes from nothing, we can infer inductively that something is necessary for something to come into being; or, we can conceptualize a state of affairs in which nothing exists. If nothing exists, then not even the potentiality for something to come into being would exist. This means that nothing could come into being.

But as soon as I take you at your word and understand that you are NOT equivocating on “causality”, and intend “metaphysical causality” throughout, then (2) just collapses, and does not appear to be anything more than purely arbitrary. If you dispute this, then I ask, again: whence your probability calculus for the odds of complex systems being “metaphysically caused”?

I don’t believe it’s possible to divorce physics from metaphysics. The logical positivists attempted that, and their system is almost universally agreed to be flawed. Nevertheless, if you wish to merely conceptualize a state in which something can be metaphysically uncaused, then I think you’ll run into the problem I mentioned above.

I may be wrong, and stand to be corrected, but I predict that if you are going to address this, you’ve little to base this on besides “intuition” or “gut sense”. Having issued this kind of request many times before, I do not receive descriptions of the background probability and the selectable phase space, of numerators and denominators that support the claim of “likely” or “unlikely”.

I’m not sure what something like that would look like under a metaphysical approach. The argument that something cannot come from nothing (re: the law of metaphysical causation), if sound, would have a probability of 1. That’s really what I’m arguing as far as non-physical elements of this argument are concerned. If we include our physical observations, on the other hand, then no probability for the conclusion’s negation can be assessed. The reason why is because we’ve never observed something coming from nothing. I don’t think we have to know what the probability is; otherwise, we would be forced to prove a universal negative.

Ok, but now you’ve announced a heuristic that is backwards epsitemologically. We don’t surmise something, and then, failing to “see why that doesn’t work”, embrace it. “I don’t see a problem” is not a form of warrant.

To put it more positively, then, I believe we can make metaphysical inferences based on physical observations.

Moreover, there’s a clear problem in your extension. We put the “meta-” in “meta-physics” for a reason. It’s NOT physics.

We need to be really careful here. “Metaphysics” is not the negation of “physics,” nor is it necessarily something that contradicts physics. Rather, it goes “beyond” physics in the sense that metaphysical principles are the necessary preconditions of physics. I’ll get to this more as we continue.

That is, 2D-punkforchrist sees “no probelm” supposing that our real world is a 2D world in which objects never, ever move faster than one inch an hour.

I think this analogy is problematic, given that 2D-punkforchrist is making a positive assertion, whereas my original claim simply allows for the possibility that metaphysics and physics can be fitted together within a coherent worldview. I don’t think this is a very extraordinary claim, whereas 2D-punkforchrist is making a different kind of claim.

You have similarly zero knowledge of the domain you are extending into, and such extensions as you are contemplating are certainly useful and attractive, but they are intellectual spurious, unfounded.

That would indeed be the case if all knowledge were restricted to what we can empirically observe. As I’ll argue, though, our a priori knowledge logically precedes what we know through empirical verification.

We don’t know that in any other way than as a matter of analytical knowledge, as a tautology. We know that God is incorporeal in the same way we know bachelors are unmarried, via definitions we choose arbitrarily, totally unattached to any grounding in reality.

 

[punkforchrist]

I’m sure you’ll agree with me that there’s a difference between defining God as X, and then demonstrating that X exists. We also define bachelors as unmarried, but that doesn’t mean there are any bachelors. What we can do, however, is give good reasons for thinking that bachelors are real; and likewise, we can offer good reasons to believe God is real. I realize you disagree with my conclusion that God exists, but we can’t reject that conclusion by ruling out all arguments based on a strong form of empiricism, without begging the question. If one wishes to defend empiricism, then good reasons need to be offered for that, too.

But it doesn’t because it’s not an actual defeater. It’s just a tautology.

See above.

If I took Anselm’s position and claimed we know God exists because it’s impossible for me to think of something greater/higher than the greatest/highest thing that exists, would you consider that a defeater for an atheist induction, where an atheist infers that no God or gods exists based on the consilience of evidence that fails to reveal any such being?

I don’t believe Anselm’s argument is sound, anyway. However, if it were a sound argument, then that would be a sufficient defeater for the atheist’s claim. After all, there is a difference between Y’s conceptualization and Y’s logical possibility.

What we would have to do if an argument is unsound is simply demonstrate that it’s unsound. Using empiricism to rule arguments out like Anselm’s strike me as circular.

There’s no defeaters in view, all around. That’s just the problem. We haven’t even reached a point here were “defeater” is a coherent concept! If I ask you what would qualify as a defeater, epistemically, here, what would you say?

If someone could demonstrate that “God” is like a square-circle, then that would sufficiently defeat my belief that “God exists” is rational.

As for what we observe, if we could find an example of something complex that’s not caused by something simpler, then that would give more weight against the claim that complex things are caused.

You’ve just suggested that your arbitrary definition of God as “incorporeal” is some kind of defeater. If that’s what qualifies as a defeater, we are completely lost without a rudder, here. I might as well just say “But God is corporeal, it has been divinely revealed to me!”. Now what? Do I have a defeater or not?

Hopefully my distinction between a definition X, and showing that X exists, are two different things. If someone were to define God as corporeal, then that’s fine linguistically. However, that person would be in the odd predicament of saying that God is caused by simpler parts.

If you think I’m wrong, perhaps you might tell me what you suppose would represent a defeater for “complex things are unlikely to be [metaphysically] uncaused”? What would the world have to be like for you to say “premise (2) has a defeater for me”?

If our cognitive faculties worked in such a way that we could coherently establish that “A=~A,” then that would qualify as a sufficient defeater for the order with which we perceive the world. This would be necessary, since something coming from nothing invariably results in contradictions.

I say it’s unfalsifiable because it’s incoherent if we deploy “metaphysical causality” for (2). (2) only coheres conceptually in terms of physical causality.

Is it your position that something must be falsifiable if it is to be known?

Well, I say it’s a live option that the universe itself is a brute fact. Lots of causality proceeds from it, due to its constituent dimension and laws, but that’s just what makes it complex. I’m conceiving of the universe as a brute fact, utterly uncaused. Now what? Did I break some rule I missed?

That depends on how narrowly you’re defining “universe.” If the “universe” also entails a simple first cause, then I think that’s perfectly consistent, even if linguistically non-traditional. I mentioned earlier a couple times that whenever someone uses the term “universe” in this way, all that’s happening is a substitution of the referent “first cause” to “universe,” or “nature,” or something else.

Provisionally, lets say that the universe is at least considered complex by virtue of its constituent “parts” – dimensions, laws, matter, energy. I have a friend who makes an interesting case that this is in fact a simple unity, but that’s another discussion. But consider that these are individuated ontologically, and these parts are all reified together and due to perfectly no cause at all.

I remind you that I’m not saying this is what must be the case. Rather it just may be the case. But if that’s even possibly the case, it seems your argument falls. You are committed to demonstrating this is necessarily NOT the case, I think.

We can attempt to conceptualize something like that, but once we try to think of each of these laws as intelligible, then they’re necessarily sharing in an ontological unity. One’s epistemic status is logically preceded by what is real (i.e. metaphysics), so this ontological unity whereby each natural law is known and made intelligible is logically prior to our knowledge of it. If this weren’t the case, then we’d be forced to say things like, “the moon is also not the moon, if we don’t exist,” which would be absurd.

OK, but I don’t think that helps, really. As soon as we get to the foundation of physics, at the border of the metaphysic, then “necessary conditions” becomes an incoherent term.

This will have to come down to how we understand basic logical and mathematical axioms.

So my message with the PCL example was that we are bound, rationally, into a position of agnosticism on this matter. We don’t have any epistemic justification for embracing any of the competing conjectures.

Notice, though, that metaphysical agnoticism is still a metaphysical claim. The conclusion that “we cannot know metaphysical-X” is just as much a metaphysical claim as “A=A.”

Sure, but you are again trading in stolen concepts, here. Parsimony is a physical principle, not a metaphysical one.

This rests on the presupposition that physics and metaphysics are somehow at odds with each other. Parsimony, as it was originally formulate by William of Ockham and the like, extended to all of reality, not just the physical world. I think restricting it to only physical things would be rather ad hoc.

Well, like above, this begs the question: what does “in order” mean. If I respond that some set of these possible worlds are highly ordered but perfectly [metaphysically] uncaused, now what? Is it a “standoff of intuitions”?

It’s my claim that those two statements are mutually exclusive.

 

[punkforchrist]

See, that’s totally inscrutable, another stolen concept from physics. It maybe that the metaphysics that obtain, that we are perfectly unaware of make the configuration of our universe absolutely necessary, and thus the odds of our universe being this way, as a matter of metaphysics equal to 1.

This would be interesting, since it seems that it would result in a kind of “stepping-on-the-carpet,” where one bump in the carpet is suppressed, which just results in another one popping up somewhere else. If we conclude that this universe is necessary, then that just results in another argument for God’s existence. If, on the other hand, we maintain the general consensus that the universe could have been different, then the universe’s states of affairs are explicable in terms of simpler entities.

No, but I only recognize these as being conceptual tools, rather than transcedent entities.

But, you agree that a thing’s being useful doesn’t suggest that it’s contingent, or non-necessary, correct?

Well, the Law of Identity obtains wherever you require that it obtains. Physics, reality isn’t beholden to our cognitive needs, though. I don’t know if you’ve ever dug around in dialethic epistemology, etc. but even in our world, there are features that defy our “universal logic”. Qubits, for example, are something like Booleans with the possibility of superimposition of both values. That breaks the Law of non-Contradiction, as there you have the strange case of a qubit in “true and false, superimposed” mode.

I’ve heard this claimed a number of times, but I’ve always found that it’s based on a misinterpretation of either the physics or the meaning of some logical axiom. Specifically, a qubit can be carried by a particle representing both 0 and 1, but not in the same sense.

But that just points up the limited scope of what we often suppose is a “metaversal logic”, parochial things that we are. In any given possible world, you are free to stipulate that “A=A”, as a necessary condition for thinking, but the physics may be such that A=A sometimes, but also sometimes A=B, or A=~A, possibly all at the same time, which just means that our notion of identity, which we draw from our physical universe, may not be useful in interpreting some other possible and strange world.

This is another important point we have to be careful with. “A=B” isn’t the equivalent of “A=~A.” The former is what we find in QM, but we also find it in everyday situations. We might say that “Butch is a dog,” but we couldn’t rationally say that “Butch is not-Butch.”

All right, but this begs for precision, then. I no longer know what you mean by “caused” when you say this. It looks very much like you are treating causality as a tautology, rather than a physical mechanism; even if works out physically to be maximally uncaused (as acausal as we can imagine via empirical analysis), you are declaring it “caused” by definition, just be virtue of being part of some container.

I wouldn’t go so far as to just define causality into existence, but as I’ve argued in my latest posts, some basic notion of causality is logically necessary for us to properly understand how things come into being.

There’s no arguing with definitional truths. If virtual particles are ‘caused’ by definition, by virtue of occurring in a vacuum, then that’s that. But that’s argument by definition, then, and none of that takes heed of the physical reality, then. If it was actually uncaused in physical terms, you wouldn’t be able to recognize it because your tautology was standing in the way.

This is actually something I’m very open about. QM may very well be indeterministic, and “uncaused” in that sense, and that’s fine. We’re allowed to have more than one working definition of a term; we just have to specify which one we’re using at the moment.

I think we can just use “other possible worlds” where macro events have the dynamics of quantum fluctuations in this world, if you prefer, but that seems like six-of-one-half-dozen-of-another, doesn’t it?

I don’t think that would be the same. Not only do quantum fluctuations arise from something, and are therefore caused in that sense, but all of our observations already support the view that macro-events are caused. What is crucial here is whether we can draw metaphysical conclusions from physical observations, and I believe we can and necessarily do.

Thanks for all the thought and time invested in your comments and clarifications, though. I sincerely appreciate it.

You too.

 

[TheWhim]

I mentioned very briefly, and probably not sufficiently, that this merely changes the referent from “first cause” to “law,” where both actually refer to some kind of simple principle. So basically, I think this is a distinction without a difference.

Indeed, I was never in any way concerned about any such distinction making any difference. Sorry to say, but still my objection remains wholly unaddressed.