I think indeed that complexity could co-exist with chaos.
To say that chaos is intelligible though, either (1) trades on an equivocation in the term chaos, or (2) really means that apparent chaos is intelligible.
(1) If you really means that chaos is intelligible, then it is not chaos, but cosmos.
(2) Apparent chaos, though, can be intelligible. In other words, things which at first appear to be chaos are not in fact chaos, and this can be known by its intelligibility.
The problem though, is how to take the “intelligibility” of things which are apparently chaotic. Philosophers like Kant have held that the mind imposes a form of intelligibility on the world, a form which we cannot know if it exists in the world itself, or if it is merely a conventional way in which the mind rearranges data. Data can fit multiple theories. Or rather, we can arrange the data as if they had intelligibility, which in fact they do not have.
I don’t think Kant or Sartre would be particularly fazed by your pointing out that you’ve found intelligibility in the world. The question is whether you put it there or not.
You’ve enunciated Kant’s position on the noumena/phenomena distinction quite well. I’m merely offering this argument from a realist’s perspective. However, if we want to delve deeper, we could point out that our own minds’ being capable of imposing order on the universe requires order within our minds. Even if there are things in the world which are chaotic, that doesn’t do away with the reality of order.
It is helpful.
I think I may have a good excuse to buy the book now.
Great! I’m sure you’ll enjoy it.
My question is this: what is Pruss’s stance on the cosmological argument as “proof” rather than rational justification for theism (a distinction which Rowe pursues), and what sort of status does the PSR have for him? Rowe allows the weak version of PSR through, but since it is an unprovable principle, says that the cosmological argument cannot, in principle, be a proof of God’s existence. I’m assuming Pruss works within this, but I’d appreciate your thoughts on this.
Pruss believes the cosmological argument is rationally compelling. He’s argued that a denial of the PSR results in the undermining of science and knowledge in general. In fact, he actually accepts a fairly strong version of the PSR, contra van Inwagen. Pruss and Gale have co-written a paper on the cosmological argument that makes use of the W-PSR, though, which you can read here:
www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/NewCosmo.html
My own summary of the argument goes like this:
- It is possible that a necessary being explains the contingent universe.
- If something is possibly necessary, then it exists in all possible worlds.
- Whatever exists in all possible worlds exists in the real world.
- Therefore, a necessary being exists in the real world.
This argument avoids van Inwagen’s objection, since we’re no longer talking about states of affairs, but simply concrete “things” (re: “beings”) in general. For example, then, there is a difference between what a thing is and what it does. It is possible that Jones is sitting under a tree, and it is also possible that Jones is not sitting under a tree. Regardless of which is true, Jones is still Jones. Applied specifically to the argument, therefore, a necessary being could exist without entailing some particular state of affairs. As Craig summarizes:
“[The PSR] merely requires any existing thing to have an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in some external cause. This premise is compatible with there being brute facts or states of affairs about the world. What it precludes is that there could exist things - substances exemplifying properties - which just exist inexplicably.” [1]
Hence, I don’t believe there is any contradiction in the notion of a necessary being. The other possible objection for the skeptic is to deny the S5 axiom on which (2) is dependent. The S5 axiom basically states that, “if p is possibly necessary, then p is necessary,” or, “◊□p → □p.”
However, this axiom is fairly easy to defend. Its contrapositive is this: “~□p → ~◊□p.” In other words, if something is not necessary, then it’s not possibly necessary. Davis puts it this way: “if p is not necessarily true, then it is not possible that p be necessarily true.” [2]
Given the equivalence of “~□p → ~◊□p” with “◊□p → □p,” and the obvious truth of the former, it follows logically and inescapably that the latter is also true. As a result, there is seemingly no tenable objection to the S5 axiom.
Now, since (3) follows from (2), and the real world is contained in the class of all possible worlds, it follows that (4) is correct and that a necessary being exists.
[1] William Lane Craig, “The Cosmological Argument,” in The Rationality of Theism, edited by Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser, Routledge Press, 2003, p. 115.
[2] Stephen T. Davis, “The Ontological Argument,” ibid., p. 107.
