A sound inductive cosmological argument?

[punkforchrist]

Indeed, I was never in any way concerned about any such distinction making any difference. Sorry to say, but still my objection remains wholly unaddressed.

I might not have understood you. I was interpreting the following (emphasis added):

TheWhim:

In summary, I mean this: posit matter and physical laws as a brute fact and leave them to their own working processes and they will cause the rise of complex things. However, this procedure does not change that matter and physical laws are simple. That they cause complex things to arise does not render them complex.

When I read this, I thought you meant that physical laws/nature is simple in essence. Could you re-summarize your central objection?

 

[TheWhim]

Could you re-summarize your central objection?

I know this is of no credit to me but I’m always feeling slightly disinclined to resummarize an objection when it already has been written down in a rather summarily way. Therefore, I shall feel content with copying here three small extracts taken from my post. Please read my entire post again(it’s number #11, by the way)…and again… I’m sure any present misunderstandings will soon be clarified then.

Well, I see what you mean. Since complex things are always caused, and complex things are a part of the supposedly simple fact of a physical universe existing, this physical universe, partaking in the complexity by harboring complex things, also must have been caused – therefore there is a cause to this world.

The problem arises and entirely circulates about the third assertion.

Nature may still be a brute fact. It contains complex things like a vessel contains water but as neither the properties of water mix with the properties of the vessel thereby, so neither does nature abandon its simplicity just for the sake of containing complexity.

etc… etc…

 

[punkforchrist]

I may still not understand your objection, so feel free to correct me if I’m mistaken, but I’ll give it a try. Nature, as you’ve alluded to is something simple, and its simplicity is not diminished by the fact that it brings about complex entities. Now, if this is the case, there is no need for a transcendent cause of nature, since nature itself is simple.

Is this correct? If so, my only point is that there is some kind of simple cause of complex things, whether it be nature or a transcendent cause. Here’s another way of putting the argument:

1. The universe is either caused or uncaused.
2. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.
3. The universe is very complex.
4. Therefore, the universe is probably caused.

This formulation avoids any confusion about the uniformity of nature “entailing” anything, which may have resulted in confusion.

If I might summarize Touchstone’s primary objection, I think I can put forward a concise response. He says that we cannot make physical observations, and then infer any metaphysical claims from them. However, I think this is simply mistaken. If we’re not allowed to make such metaphysical inferences, then we wouldn’t be able to say uncontroversial things like, “Jones is human; therefore Jones is finite.” Of course, this is absurd; we certainly can infer that Jones is finite based on his humanity.

In sum, I believe this is a cogent inductive cosmological argument. Of course, I’m also open to correction, so let me know if I’ve missed anything.

 

[TheWhim]

Well, it seems to me we’re approaching in mutual understanding.

Now, if this is the case, there is no need for a transcendent cause of nature, since nature itself is simple. Is this correct?

Yes, this is what I mean. I’m sorry if you already said so before and if I didn’t catch up with what you meant. - Assuming that nature(roughly: matter and physical laws) is simple, is a brute fact, it requires no transcendent cause. And the fact that nature contains complex entities does not render it less simple and more in need of a transcendent cause. So far my position(it may not even be my actual position; I’m just checking the argument for the sheer fun of it).

If so, my only point is that there is some kind of simple cause of complex things, whether it be nature or a transcendent cause.

If so, we do not arrive at God and your argument isn’t a cosmological argument for God’s existence anymore. Let’s say nature is the cause of complex things. That’s what I contended in my first post:

In summary, I mean this: posit matter and physical laws as a brute fact and leave them to their own working processes and they will cause the rise of complex things.

Well, there’s no need for a transcendent cause(i.e. God) here.

You reformulate the argument thus:

1. The universe is either caused or uncaused.
2. Complex things are unlikely to be uncaused.
3. The universe is very complex.
4. Therefore, the universe is probably caused.

Unhappily my confusion is not resolved. What is “the universe”? Is it both nature(matter, physical laws) and the complex entities it is inhabited with? But this would mean, again, to mingle simplicity(nature) with complexity(the things put forth by nature when left to it’s own working processes) and melt them into one term(the universe), forcing this term under the headline of “complexity”. This procedure I deem illegitimate and my whole argument in my first post was directed against it.

If I might summarize Touchstone’s primary objection, I think I can put forward a concise response.

I, for one, entirely agree with your response on this matter.

 

[punkforchrist]

Okay, I think we agree then. Cosmological arguments have two parts: 1) the demonstration of a first cause/necessary being; and 2) the demonstration that this first cause is God.

The argument I’ve constructed applies only to the former. I do think we can make a case that the first cause is God, but that would require more argumentation. If we left the argument without any further explication, then it would indeed be the case that the first cause could be either God or nature.

 

[TheWhim]

If we left the argument without any further explication, then it would indeed be the case that the first cause could be either God or nature.

Oh, well, then I entirely misconstrued your meaning and made a great fuzz about nothing. It’s sort of funny, though. - Okay, that’s just what I wanted to express. Though the argument arrives at the conclusion that there has to be a cause it does not prove a transcendent cause. - Viewed from this angle, of course, much of Touchstone’s effusion on the topic also appears a little out of place. I cannot possibly imagine why an Atheist should object to the proposition that matter and natural laws, when left to their own course, brought about complex entities. In fact, that’s the very conclusion anyone has to adopt who rejects a transcendent cause(God).

 

[punkforchrist]

I thought I had written an additional post, but it turns out that I confused this thread with an email exchange I’m having with an atheist. To sum up, cosmological arguments have two major parts: 1) to demonstrate the existence of a first cause; and 2) to show that this first cause possesses attributes most consonant with the God of classical theism.

I believe the inductive cosmological argument makes the existence of a first cause very plausible. Here’s why I believe the first cause is God:

The cause of the universe would have to be simple, since it is the cause of complexity; and, bodies are necessarily complex, given their divisibility. Because of this, the first cause must exist beyond the universe (all physical space, time, matter and energy), and is therefore timeless, changeless, and immaterial, in addition to being enormously powerful. Finally, the cause of the universe is either personal or scientific. Yet, it cannot be scientific, since all scientific causes are part of the universe itself. Hence, the first cause must be a personal agent.

 

[DavidHume]

Finally, the cause of the universe is either personal or scientific. Yet, it cannot be scientific, since all scientific causes are part of the universe itself. Hence, the first cause must be a personal agent.

If I am feeling charitable, I can grant you everything up to this, but I think you need to flesh this part out.

• What is the distinction between “personal” and “scientific?”
• Why are they the only two possible kinds of causes?
• What does it mean for a “scientific cause” to be “part of the universe itself” while a “personal cause” is not?

 

[punkforchrist]

DavidHume, thanks for the reply.

DavidHume:

What is the distinction between “personal” and “scientific?”

Personal causes are freely chosen; scientific causes are either deterministic, or random, as in some interpretations of quantum mechanics.

Why are they the only two possible kinds of causes?

Hypothetically, they’re not. However, this is an inductive argument and we’re considering the kinds of causes we know of. I could also throw in “abstract objects,” but they don’t stand in causal relations. As a result, I believe the best explanation of the complex universe is a personal cause.

What does it mean for a “scientific cause” to be “part of the universe itself” while a “personal cause” is not?

Assuming that personal causes are free (and this is an important premise; by no means should it be taken for granted), then there are no scientific explanations for them. So, unless one believes in self-causation, then scientific causes can only be caused by a personal agent.

 

[DavidHume]

DavidHume, thanks for the reply.
Assuming that personal causes are free (and this is an important premise; by no means should it be taken for granted), then there are no scientific explanations for them.

All right. Like my namesake, I don’t accept that assumption or the conclusion you tacked on to it. Personal causes are free in that they are not inevitable consequences of the universe, but they can still have scientific explanations.

That being said, what is the problem with an uncaused, non-personal entity?

 

[tonyrey]

Personal causes are free in that they are not inevitable consequences of the universe, but they can still have scientific explanations.

Your use of the term “personal” presupposes the existence of persons. I have not yet come across an explanation by an atheist of what a person is nor how a person can be autonomous.

 

[punkforchrist]

All right. Like my namesake, I don’t accept that assumption or the conclusion you tacked on to it. Personal causes are free in that they are not inevitable consequences of the universe, but they can still have scientific explanations.

That being said, what is the problem with an uncaused, non-personal entity?

The problem is squarely on the issue of whether a personal cause can be explained scientifically. I would simply respond, jovially: name that tune. How is personality explained by purely scientific mechanisms?

 

[DavidHume]

Your use of the term “personal” presupposes the existence of persons. I have not yet come across an explanation by an atheist of what a person is nor how a person can be autonomous.

I’m just using the terminology as it was given to me – I feel no need to defend it.

That being said, I can live with this sort of definition for “person” which I think covers punkforchrist’s meaning: an entity that exhibits behavior associated with intent, preference, and freedom of action.

 

[DavidHume]

The problem is squarely on the issue of whether a personal cause can be explained scientifically. I would simply respond, jovially: name that tune. How is personality explained by purely scientific mechanisms?

That’s talking about the opposite of what I am talking about. I claim that you have not covered the following case:

There is something that is uncaused and non-personal.

Why does this mean I have to explain personality in terms of scientific mechanisms? The possibility I am describing exhibits neither the properties of an ordinary physical object (it is uncaused) nor the properties of a personality (it is non-personal).

 

[tonyrey]

That being said, I can live with this sort of definition for “person” which I think covers punkforchrist’s meaning: an entity that exhibits behavior associated with intent, preference, and freedom of action.

Do you regard this entity as physical? If so, where is it located? How has it acquired intent and freedom of action?

 

[punkforchrist]

That’s talking about the opposite of what I am talking about. I claim that you have not covered the following case:

There is something that is uncaused and non-personal.

Why does this mean I have to explain personality in terms of scientific mechanisms? The possibility I am describing exhibits neither the properties of an ordinary physical object (it is uncaused) nor the properties of a personality (it is non-personal).

If the first cause isn’t personal, then it’s scientific. If you prefer a broader description, the cause would be purely “mechanical.” My point is that we can come to the conclusion that the first cause is personal by eliminating possible alternatives.

Do you agree that effects have a certain likeness to their causes?

 

[DavidHume]

If the first cause isn’t personal, then it’s scientific.

You’re just restating what I am asking you to justify. Why isn’t it possible that something can be non-mechanical and non-personal?

 

[punkforchrist]

DavidHume:

You’re just restating what I am asking you to justify. Why isn’t it possible that something can be non-mechanical and non-personal?

Right, and that wasn’t the attempted justification. I added the question: do effects have a likeness to their causes?

My point is that if personal beings (i.e. humans) exist, then their personality must have a likeness to their first cause. By analogy, boiling water has a likeness to the fire that heats it in that both are hot.

 

[DavidHume]

Right, and that wasn’t the attempted justification. I added the question: do effects have a likeness to their causes?

My point is that if personal beings (i.e. humans) exist, then their personality must have a likeness to their first cause. By analogy, boiling water has a likeness to the fire that heats it in that both are hot.

Oh.

“Likeness” is too imprecise a word to really take seriously from a philosophical standpoint, but consider table salt. Its chemical properties are nothing like those elemental sodium, nor of elemental chlorine. So no, it is not the case that “effects” must have any discernable “likeness” to their “causes.”

Moreover, by your own argument the universe is mechanistic and therefore must have a likeness to its cause, which must also be mechanistic. But you seem to be implying that the set of “scientific” objects is disjoint from the set of “personal” objects, which appears to lead to a contradiction.

 

[punkforchrist]

DavidHume:

“Likeness” is too imprecise a word to really take seriously from a philosophical standpoint . . .

I realize it’s a bit vague, but I think it’s appropriate given the informal nature of the discussion.

but consider table salt. Its chemical properties are nothing like those elemental sodium, nor of elemental chlorine. So no, it is not the case that “effects” must have any discernable “likeness” to their “causes.”

There are some discernible likenesses there. For example, salt resembles sodium’s white color and soft texture.

Moreover, by your own argument the universe is mechanistic and therefore must have a likeness to its cause, which must also be mechanistic. But you seem to be implying that the set of “scientific” objects is disjoint from the set of “personal” objects, which appears to lead to a contradiction.

I think this is probably the most serious objection to the argument. However, there’s not technically a contradiction in saying that both personal and mechanistic causes have a likeness to God. We’re essentially saying that “A has a likeness to God” and “B has a likeness to God,” as opposed to both A and ~A.

To illustrate the point more concretely, human beings possess attributes that are personal and mechanistic. We have knowledge (personal attribute) and possess mechanistic processes, such as a heartbeat.