A Teleological Argument

[chessnerd321]

that assumption can only lead to the conclusion you wanted

Again I repeat, then OP should be very proud that his argument does exactly what he set out to do. The point of an argument, after all is to prove that a more basic set of facts or assumptions leads to a higher and more relevant conclusion.

 

[IWantGod]

@IWantGod Is this topic for discussion of various teleological arguments? Or would you like to focus on the one you presented?

I don’t mind. The reason i made this argument is because i find it easier to understand than the 5th way and thought that others might to.

Feel free to present your own argument.

 

[Gorgias]

3. Because their given nature is not ontologically necessary it cannot be said that any particular nature they have should necessarily have a particular effect, and the only case in which a thing must do a particular thing is because doing otherwise would conflict with the law of non-contradiction.

Hmm… having a hard time assenting to this one.

Sure, a contingent being does not necessarily exist. (By definition.)

Sure, a contingent being has a nature; the particular nature is contingent. (By definition.)

However, doesn’t a contingent being necessarily possess a nature?

And, once we establish a given nature, can’t we say that this being, with this particular nature, necessarily acts according to that nature?

6. Therefore when the uncaused cause creates unnecessary things it is also causing them to act to particular ends that are not necessary,.

@Wesrock, this is the point that smells like occasionalism to me, unless the intent here is only to posit the uncaused cause as the agent of primary causation (while allowing the contingent beings to be agents of secondary causation).

7. Causing things to act in a particular way that is not necessary requires intention and therefore knowledge since things do not act in any particular way for no reason.

Isn’t “because it’s their nature” the reason?

And therefore, if a contingent being acts according to its nature – which it must possess – then how can we posit that it was an intelligent being that was the cause of the contingent being?

 

[Sophia]

1. It is evident that unnecessary beings move to particular ends, and they do so because of their given nature.

1. No, this is not evident.
2. The expression “move to a particular end” is meaningless.
3. What is the “nature” of a being?

From here downward the whole proposition is nonsense.

 

[IWantGod]

Hmm… having a hard time assenting to this one.

Sure, a contingent being does not necessarily exist. (By definition.)

Sure, a contingent being has a nature; the particular nature is contingent. (By definition.)

However, doesn’t a contingent being necessarily possess a nature?

And, once we establish a given nature, can’t we say that this being, with this particular nature, necessarily acts according to that nature?

I was aware that this would eventually be brought up. Once a thing has a nature, then certainly it must be true that it will act according to the nature it was given. However what a nature is and what it does is entirely contingent upon the uncaused cause and thus the fact that an unnecessary being would do any particular thing could only be true because the first cause intended it to be that way. There is not a way that a thing must behave once it exists, we just find that they do behave in that way. A ball smashing glass is two natures acting according to their nature. However it could have been true that the ball goes through a hole in the glass that closes once the ball has gone through. The glass could have behaved differently. The laws of physics could have been different which is further supported by premise 5. Thus it cannot be said that the laws of physics as we find them is logically necessary.

If we are interested in defending true contingency, then we must say that the uncaused cause, in the act of creating a nature, is also determining or defining what that nature does once it exists.

Thus i am justified in making an inference to an intelligent cause since the uncaused cause is defining the ends to which things are in act…

 

[Gorgias]

the fact that an unnecessary being would do any particular thing could only be true because the first cause intended it to be that way.

IF that first cause is intelligent. But, that’s what you’re trying to prove. It seems you’ve presumed your conclusion in one of your premises, then…

There is not a way that a thing must behave once it exists, we just find that they do behave in that way.

Umm… “a thing must behave” – isn’t that the very definition of a nature?

A ball smashing glass is two natures acting according to their nature. However it could have been true that the ball goes through a hole in the glass that closes once the ball has gone through.

Yes, but only if the nature of glass is “to cease being solid.” It is not, and therefore, the two items must act according to their natures. You can’t posit “glass has a certain nature” and then attempt to get away with “but it doesn’t necessarily act according to that nature”… can you? Nah…

The glass could have behaved differently. The laws of physics could have been different which is further supported by premise 5 .

Right – but I’m trying to distinguish between the contingency of the particular law or nature and the necessity of it holding (once established). Beings necessarily have a nature. Physical creation necessarily has laws of physics.

Thus it cannot be said that the laws of physics as we find them is logically necessary.

I’m not claiming that the particular laws are necessary; merely that, they necessarily exist (and are, therefore, followed).

If that’s the case, then we aren’t forced – at least, along the lines of this argument – to conclude that the uncaused cause is intelligent… right?

 

[SalamKhan]

I would say that it is more fitting to argue for teleology & intelligent design from universals rather than particulars. For instance, the concept of pregnancy rather than individual or select pregnancies. This is more conclusive and will answer objections from atheists, such as:

“To what end is a miscarriage?”

Or the enthymeme:

“Some pregnancies fail, therefore pregnancy is bad design.”

 

[IWantGod]

Yes, but only if the nature of glass is “to cease being solid.” It is not,

We find that to be true, but it does not follow that this is logically necessary. It is the fact that glass could have behaved differently, and the fact that physical behavior is absolutely contingent upon the fist cause that justifies the clam that the uncaused cause determines things to behave in particular ways that they don’t have to. Which further supports my inference to an intelligent cause.

 

[Gorgias]

the fact physical behavior is absolutely contingent upon the fist cause that justifies the clam that the uncaused cause determines thing to behave in particular was that they don’t have to. Which further supports my inference to an intelligent cause.

Except that you still need to prove that the uncaused cause determined the particular nature. Since the particular nature is contingent, it could be arbitrary, and therefore, we could make the argument that it was not determined by an intelligent first cause.

 

[IWantGod]

Except that you still need to prove that the uncaused cause determined the particular nature. Since the particular nature is contingent, it could be arbitrary, and therefore, we could make the argument that it was not determined by an intelligent first cause.

If physical laws or natures are contingent then it follows necessarily that the uncaused cause has caused them to be that way and not some other way…

 

[IWantGod]

I would say that it is more fitting to argue for teleology & intelligent design from universals rather than particulars.

Can you give an example?

“To what end is a miscarriage?”

Or the enthymeme:

“Some pregnancies fail, therefore pregnancy is bad design.”

That being said is it a really a problem to say that God designed the laws of physics (which is all i am really saying)?

At the end of the day God knows all possible effects.

 

[SalamKhan]

Can you give an example?

I mentioned the concept of pregnancy as an example. Individual pregnancies vary, whereas the concept remains the same. It is more fitting to say that God invented the concept of pregnancy, He eternally understood it while it was in potentiality in its intelligible form, and ordered (as in putting things in order) it to be eventually actualised in its sensible form.

That being said is it a really a problem to say that God designed the laws of physics

No.

At the end of the day God knows all possible effects

Which are brought about by secondary causes (whether preparatory, efficient, etc.). The argument is whether God knows and understands as the first cause.

 

[STT]

1. Unnecessary things exist; this is to say that their existence is not necessary.

I buy that.

2. It is evident that unnecessary beings move to particular ends, and they do so because of their given nature.

I have problem with this. If God is sustainer of unnecessary being then He also is the mover. Therefore there is no nature that unnecessary being moves according to it.

3. Because their given nature is not ontologically necessary it cannot be said that any particular nature they have should necessarily have a particular effect, and the only case in which a thing must do a particular thing is because doing otherwise would conflict with the law of non-contradiction. A ball being thrown at glass doesn’t necessarily mean it has to smash. It could be that a hole will open up in the glass and the ball will move through it, after which the hole will close. It’s possible because the existence of any nature is not necessary other than the uncaused cause and neither is their effects other than what is logically necessary.

Please see previous comment.

4. Yet we find unnecessary things doing what they do not necessarily need to do in a consistent fashion…This is what we characterize as the laws of physical behavior.

Yes.

5. Since the uncause cause cannot be said to be governed by the laws of physics, it cannot be said that the laws of physics as we find them is a necessary feature of reality

I don’t think so. I think that the uncause cause, what you call God, is subjected to laws. His knowledge is laws of physics.

6. Therefore when the uncaused cause creates unnecessary things it is also causing them to act to particular ends that are not necessary,.

How? I cannot see how this follows.

7. Causing things to act in a particular way that is not necessary requires intention and therefore knowledge since things do not act in any particular way for no reason. We have some analogous understanding of this from our own intellectual activity like when we create bricks to build a house. But in the case of the uncaused cuase it is creating the very nature and the end to which the uncaused cause intends it to act.

No, it doesn’t need intention. It could be the nature of uncause cause to move/change/act accordingly.

Conclusion: Therefore the uncaused cause is an intelligent cause

This doesn’t follow.

 

[chessnerd321]

I don’t think so. I think that the uncause cause, what you call God, is subjected to laws. His knowledge is laws of physics.

While I admit I haven’t invested the time that would be required for me to either accept or reject OP’s argument, the problem definitely wouldn’t be with this premise.

It is clear that if all that is physical is contingent, then the uncaused cause must not be physical. That which is non-physical is necessarily not subject to physical laws. Now we have two possibilities:

1. The laws of physics, themselves non-physical, are nonetheless contingent.
2. The laws of physics are also uncaused, or are a part of the the uncaused cause.

But 2) doesn’t hold any water for me whatsoever. One can EASILY, and in fact modern physicists do, imagine physical realities with all sorts of different physics. So at least, any specific set of physical laws is contingent. You could argue that the idea of SOME SORT of physical laws is, however necessary for a physical world. But I’ll refer to the argument from intelligibility and the great Albert Einstein to back me up when I say that doesn’t hold water either:

The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it’s comprehensible.

 

[STT]

I don’t think that the truth is contingent. The truth is uncaused. Think of laws of logic or 1+1=2.

 

[chessnerd321]

I fail to see how that applies. Yes, truth is necessary. In fact, we would say that God is truth, namely the second person of the Trinity. Although I saw on a different thread you disagree.

The truth about contingent things however, like physical objects, is not necessary at all. The true nature of an object is contingent just as much as the object is. Its basically a tautology.

Does math and logic fit into this realm of uncaused truth? Phew. Don’t want to hazard a guess on that one I suppose. I don’t see any reason that logic and math couldn’t be a part of God’s inherent nature, but I also don’t see why it has to be. There’s no reason a theist couldn’t take the nominalist view on the existence of math and logic as abstract objects.

 

[Gorgias]

If physical laws or natures are contingent then it follows necessarily that the uncaused cause has caused them to be that way and not some other way…

So… be careful! That sounds dangerously close to coming to assenting to occasionalism! To wit:

If God is sustainer of unnecessary being then He also is the mover. Therefore there is no nature that unnecessary being moves according to it.

And, there we go! The occasionalism train has just left the station!

Anyway, back to the point:

After all, ‘to cause’ and ‘to intend’ are distinct concepts, aren’t they? In your proof, you’ve only been working with “he caused”, but haven’t demonstrated why that implies “he intended”. I mean, I could say “@IWantGod caused a thread that went wildly off-topic and contentious!”… but that wouldn’t mean that “IWantGod intended a tangential and contentious thread”, wouldn’t it?

By the same token, I could say that “zebra mussels are causing toxic algae blooms in Lake Erie”, but that would imply neither that they intended it nor that they are intelligent.

So… no. I don’t think you’ve proven your point.

That being said is it a really a problem to say that God designed the laws of physics ( which is all i am really saying )?

No. The problem comes with attempting to prove it, as you’ve attempted here.

At the end of the day God knows all possible effects.

Sure. As Christians, we believe that. However, if you’re working with a proof, you need to prove, not just assert.

 

[STT]

I fail to see how that applies.

How what applies?

Yes, truth is necessary. In fact, we would say that God is truth, namely the second person of the Trinity. Although I saw on a different thread you disagree.

Yes. Truth is necessary. I however have problem by accepting that the truth is second person of Trinity to be the truth.

The truth about contingent things however, like physical objects, is not necessary at all. The true nature of an object is contingent just as much as the object is. Its basically a tautology.

The truth about contingent thing is also not contingent. That is part of the truth, excluding the truth about God.

Does math and logic fit into this realm of uncaused truth? Phew. Don’t want to hazard a guess on that one I suppose. I don’t see any reason that logic and math couldn’t be a part of God’s inherent nature, but I also don’t see why it has to be. There’s no reason a theist couldn’t take the nominalist view on the existence of math and logic as abstract objects.

As I mentioned, math and logic are part of truth too.

 

[chessnerd321]

The truth about contingent thing is also not contingent

I would say the truth about a thing only exists so far as the thing exists. The truth about say, a particular apple, only exists if the apple does. If thing 1 only exists if thing 2 exists, then thing 1 is contingent. This is an obvious truth and I have no clue how else I could convince you if you don’t accept that.

As I mentioned, math and logic are part of truth too.

It’s by no means clear that math or logic are necessary truth in the sense that God couldn’t have created them as a means of undergurding the creation of the universe.

 

[Sophia]

I was aware that this would eventually be brought up. Once a thing has a nature, then certainly it must be true that it will act according to the nature it was given.

This “nature” is an undefined concept. To say that “nature” of an object is what it IS… is about as uninformative as you can get. (In logic it is called tautology.)

However what a nature is and what it does is entirely contingent upon the uncaused cause and thus the fact that an unnecessary being would do any particular thing could only be true because the first cause intended it to be that way.

This is hilarious. You mean that two and two makes four only because that “uncaused cause” designed it that way? If that “cause” would have wanted it to be otherwise, then two and two could be five, or six? And without a designer it could be any random number? Or that one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms would not always and necessarily make a water molecule if some “uncaused cause” wanted it to be otherwise?

There are some apologists who assert that the laws of the physical reality are really contingent upon the decision of this “designer”, and the fact that reality is not random points to some intelligent designer. They believe that nature without a designer would be haphazard, that an oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms could sometime combine into a water molecule and other times change into a uranium atom, just because there is no designer?

It is quite amusing to see your effort to “prove” God. So keep on trying. We need the entertainment. Though, personally, I would love to have a conversation with some intelligent apologist or philosopher.