Donât you hate it when you write out a nice long comment, only to have your comment deleted by a computer problem? Well, Iâll try to respond again.
The theory of special relativity has nothing to do with time. It only stipulates and proves that in the case of two non-accelerating coordinate systems either one can be considered stationery. On the other hand, accelerating, or rotating coordinate systems do not have an equivalence. However, general relativity gives us some beautiful equations for the invariance of space-time. Those equations are subject to verification and measurement, and they pan out just beautifully, notwithstanding what the B-theory of time might assert. No one asserts (to my best knowledge) that space is also just an illusion, and the four coordinates of any particle in the Minkowski space-time x[sup]2[/sup] + y[sup]2[/sup] + z[sup]2[/sup] + (ict)[sup]2[/sup] is invariant (i = sqrt(-1) and c is the speed of light in a vacuum). Since space is objective, so it time. Besides, if one accepts the B-theory, then the question arises: âwhere is that illusionary past and future resideâ? In our head only? Then how is it possible that our memories are almost the same?
This comment makes me sure you know something about the special and general theories of relativity (though you donât seem to be aware of the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of relativity), but your comment also makes me sure that you either donât know anything about the A- and B- theories of time, or you might just be mixing them up. On the A-theory the present is ontologically privileged. On the more popular versions of the A-theory (namely, growing block theory and presentism) the future is not actual. On the B-theory there is no ontological difference between the past, present and future; all are equally actual. Think of the Minkowskian notion of a âblockâ universe, a space-time manifold, and you have a model which is B-theoretic. The Einsteinian interpretation of special relativity involves the denial that there is a preferred reference frame, one from which absolute time is measured. The Neo-Lorentzian interpretation disagrees on precisely this point. If the Neo-Lorentzian is right, then there is an objective âpresentâ and the B-theory is false. If the Einsteinian is right, then the A-theory is false, and the B-theorist is correct.
Your last three sentences here are so riddled with grammatical errors that I, sincerely, canât make heads or tails of them. I donât mean to put you down for it, but seriously, in a conversation like this one, grammar matters. Iâll take a swing at those questions if you can rephrase them (and if they arenât based on a confusion I will have cleared up by then).
⌠in quantum mechanics there is no determinism. Furthermore, the free actions of humans cannot be predicted⌠That makes no sense. If our future actions are logically contingent upon the current state of affairs, then they are not free.
First, there are multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics (at least 11 of them), and a number of these are actually deterministic. Not everyone subscribes to the Copenhagen interpretation, and these interpretations are currently regarded as empirically equivalent. Second, not everybody agrees that being logically determined is quite the same as being causally determined. For instance, the Molinists who believe that God has, in addition to knowledge of all necessary truths and knowledge of all contingent states of affairs, a sort of âmiddle-knowledgeâ which consists in what people would freely do in non-actual circumstances. If God knew, logically prior to creating the world at all, what everyone in the world he was about to create would freely do, it doesnât follow that they donât act freely in the morally relevant sense. In fact, most philosophers think that Molinism is compatible with libertarianism. Unless what you mean by free is something even stronger than what the libertarian means, youâll want to rethink your statement.
The concept of omnipresence is invalidated by the fact that the future does not exist as an ontological entity, only as a set of possibilities.
⌠Thatâs true according to some versions of the A-theory⌠But again, first, it may be possible for God to derive facts about the future because they are causally and/or logically entailed. Even if it werenât, why on earth think the A-theory is true, much less the specific versions of the A-theory on which the future does not exist?
The problem is that the âauthoritativeâ source for Catholicism is entirely self-authenticated. If I have a problem about a technical term, all I have to do is to use the appropriate litmus test, and the ambiguity will disappear. Without the intent to hurt you, I have to point out that the claims of the church are exactly as âauthenticatedâ as the claims of the alchemists or astrologers.
I should start by saying that Iâm not exactly sure in what way you are using the word âauthenticated,â but for what itâs worth, as a convert to Catholicism myself (who took a surprise turn when I was on my way to Naturalism), I do think that there are some exceptional pieces of evidence for Catholicism. I think the claims of the alchemists and astrologers can be falsified; I do not think any of the Catholic faith has been falsified.