About omnipresence

[Tyrel]

It is question of now and whether God knows it or not. He is not omniscient if He doesn’t know it.

If and only if there is such a thing as ‘now’ objectively. Otherwise, the problem evaporates.

 

[STT]

If and only if there is such a thing as ‘now’ objectively. Otherwise, the problem evaporates.

God should know it even if now is subjective.

 

[Tyrel]

God should know it even if now is subjective.

That’s a little like saying that God should know where ‘here’ objectively is. God knows perfectly well where the referent ‘here’ is, in any sentence which actually refers to any place. God know perfectly well when the referent of ‘now’ is, in any sentence which actually refers to any particular time by ‘now.’

 

[STT]

That’s a little like saying that God should know where ‘here’ objectively is. God knows perfectly well where the referent ‘here’ is, in any sentence which actually refers to any place. God know perfectly well when the referent of ‘now’ is, in any sentence which actually refers to any particular time by ‘now.’

If that is true then God should know our subjective experience at ‘now’ which this is subject to change.

 

[Tyrel]

If that is true then God should know our subjective experience at ‘now’ which this is subject to change.

Yes. I see no reason to think he doesn’t. The point is that when we say that things now are subject to ‘change,’ that doesn’t imply that the future is indeterminate or undetermined.

In fact, speaking literally, we can no more change the future than we can change the past or the present. Change requires something to go from one state to a different state. We can change over time. You cannot change a state at any time.

 

[STT]

Yes. I see no reason to think he doesn’t. The point is that when we say that things now are subject to ‘change,’ that doesn’t imply that the future is indeterminate or undetermined.

In fact, speaking literally, we can no more change the future than we can change the past or the present. Change requires something to go from one state to a different state. We can change over time. You cannot change a state at any time.

How could God know ‘now’ in B-series of time knowing the fact that Past, Now and Future are real?

 

[Tyrel]

How could God know ‘now’ in B-series of time knowing the fact that Past, Now and Future are real?

On the B-theory, all the referents of true propositions with tensed indexicals are actual. The past, the future, and the present are all real. Why think there would be any difficulty, then, for God to know the whole B-series? Even on a relatively anthropomorphic perceptualist model of God’s knowledge, I can’t see what the difficulty is supposed to be.

 

[Tyrel]

If the B-theory is true, then ‘now’ is an indexical whose referent is fixed by context, not unlike the way the indexical ‘you’ is fixed by context. If God is omniscient, does he know who you are? Sure. Is there any objective fact about who ‘you’ is? No. Then how can he know who you are? Because the referent of the indexical is yourself, that is fixed by the context in which it is being used, and God is aware of that.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Allow me to make this point in its own post, just to put the appropriate emphasis on it. The A-theory is the one which states that there is a real objective difference between past, present and future times. Versions of the A-theory like presentism and growing block theory suggest that the future is literally unreal.

It is quite revealing that our whole vocabulary reflects the “tense”-driven approach. You cannot formulate a “tense-less” proposition without some artificially chosen “null-point”. Try to translate the proposition of “At noon three days from today there will be a thunderstorm in Washington D.C.” into a “tense-less” form. And also assign a “truth-value” to it.

By the way, if someone argues that “time” is just an illusion, do they also contend that “space” is also an illusion?

The B-theory, on the other hand, treats all these times as on an ontological par.

I cannot take this idea seriously. The world-view proposed by Newton - absolute space and absolute time - has been made obsolete by the concept of general relativity - which has been substantiated by zillions of actual experiments. This “B”-theory is on intellectual par with postulating that the reality is composed of 4 elements (earth, water, air and fire) or that certain mental problems are caused by demonic possession.

 

[Tyrel]

It is quite revealing that our whole vocabulary reflects the “tense”-driven approach. You cannot formulate a “tense-less” proposition without some artificially chosen “null-point”. Try to translate the proposition of “At noon three days from today there will be a thunderstorm in Washington D.C.” into a “tense-less” form. And also assign a “truth-value” to it.

“2+2=4” That’s a true tenseless proposition. “at time t0, three days from time t1, there is a thunderstorm in Washington D.C., and this proposition is enunciated at t1.” Something like that seems to suffice. As far as what its truth value is, my not knowing it is irrelevant; there is a truth of the matter.

By the way, if someone argues that “time” is just an illusion, do they also contend that “space” is also an illusion?

No, not necessarily.

I cannot take this idea seriously. The world-view proposed by Newton - absolute space and absolute time - has been made obsolete by the concept of general relativity - which has been substantiated by zillions of actual experiments. This “B”-theory is on intellectual par with postulating that the reality is composed of 4 elements (earth, water, air and fire) or that certain mental problems are caused by demonic possession.

Newton was an A-theorist (even if that is slightly anachronistic), not a B-theorist. You seem to remain confused about the distinction. The B-theory does not require anything like Newton’s absolute time. Newton’s idea, in fact, was that time could and would proceed even in the absence of any change of states - time ran independently of motion. I’m not sure that he was obviously wrong (after all, there is the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of relativity to contend with, not to mention more esoteric views which harmonize the A-theory with the general theory of relativity), but I’m happy to accept that he was in fact wrong. I’m a B-theorist.

Here’s the thing. You’re a B-theorist too. Everything you’ve said indicates that. The trouble is you still don’t seem to understand what the B-theory is, and it is due to this confusion that you don’t identify yourself as a B-theorist. What you are constantly disagreeing with, even in this latest comment (where you reject Newton’s absolute time), is the A-theory of time.

 

[STT]

On the B-theory, all the referents of true propositions with tensed indexicals are actual. The past, the future, and the present are all real. Why think there would be any difficulty, then, for God to know the whole B-series? Even on a relatively anthropomorphic perceptualist model of God’s knowledge, I can’t see what the difficulty is supposed to be.

There is no difficulty for God to know the full Time series but the position of now. That is true that motion of time is an illusion in B-series but we have subjective experience of it therefore God should have the same knowledge about the position of now from our perspective which is logically impossible since this requires a change in God.

 

[Tyrel]

There is no difficulty for God to know the full Time series but the position of now. That is true that motion of time is an illusion in B-series but we have subjective experience of it therefore God should have the same knowledge about the position of now from our perspective which is logically impossible since this requires a change in God.

At any time at which I can think to myself “this is now” the referent is fixed and God knows it. There is no time at which we think “it is not now now.” God knows that we consider it to be ‘now’ at any time when we exist and are conscious. For there to be any more to the subjective experience of now, the A-theory would have to be true.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

“at time t0, three days from time t1, there is a thunderstorm in Washington D.C., and this proposition is enunciated at t1.” Something like that seems to suffice.

No, it does not. The expression of “three days” is meaningless without time. The rest is just as meaningless without “time”.

As far as what its truth value is, my not knowing it is irrelevant; there is a truth of the matter.

It is not just you, who does not know what the truth-value is, it is impossible to assign a truth-value to something that does not exist.

No, not necessarily.

That is not much of an answer. When and where is “space” subjective?

Here’s the thing. You’re a B-theorist too.

No kidding? I explicitly deny that the past or the future have ontological existence. It is true that one may present a 4-dimensional model of reality, where time is just another dimension, but mathematical models cannot be confused with the physical reality.

One divides time into three parts: a half-line indicating the past, another half-line indicating the future and the point separating them indicating the present. Of these the “present” is knowable, since it interacts with our senses. If one can remember the past, then the memory can be construed as “knowledge” about the past. But one cannot know the future, since it does not exist YET.

 

[Tyrel]

No, it does not. The expression of “three days” is meaningless without time. The rest is just as meaningless without “time”.

Time exists on the B-theory, it just consists of an ordered series of events.

It is not just you, who does not know what the truth-value is, it is impossible to assign a truth-value to something that does not exist… I explicitly deny that the past or the future have ontological existence. It is true that one may present a 4-dimensional model of reality, where time is just another dimension, but mathematical models cannot be confused with the physical reality.

This latest rejoinder surprised me a little bit; it seems that you aren’t just an A-theorist, you’re actually a full blown presentist. How do you reconcile your presentism to the theory of relativity? Do you think that there really is a preferred reference frame after all, as the Neo-Lorentzians maintain?

One divides time into three parts: a half-line indicating the past, another half-line indicating the future and the point separating them indicating the present. Of these the “present” is knowable, since it interacts with our senses. If one can remember the past, then the memory can be construed as “knowledge” about the past. But one cannot know the future, since it does not exist YET.

Well, I could know the future if it were unactualized but followed deterministically from some prior set of events, and I had a sufficient comprehension of the deterministic process. I could, as I explained earlier, also know it if it were logically entailed without following from the present with causal determinism. However, this is all an aside. I think that to deny that future-tense propositions have truth values is just to deny the law of excluded middle, according to which all meaningful propositions have at least one of the classical truth values (i.e., true and false). Future tense propositions are obviously meaningful. Isn’t your intuition about the truth of the law of excluded middle stronger than your intuition about presentism?

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Time exists on the B-theory, it just consists of an ordered series of events.

Does it? Is “time” not just an imaginary construct, which has no place in the physical reality? And how do you get from one event to the next - without time in the real sense? What is the unit of measurement on the “time-axis”?

This latest rejoinder surprised me a little bit; it seems that you aren’t just an A-theorist, you’re actually a full blown presentist. How do you reconcile your presentism to the theory of relativity? Do you think that there really is a preferred reference frame after all, as the Neo-Lorentzians maintain?

Which theory of relativity? The special theory of relativity is just a mathematical abstraction. In the actual reality there are no linear, non-accelerating coordinate systems. According to the theory of general relativity, there is a way to differentiate between accelerating (or rotating) coordinate systems. So it is perfectly sensible - not just metaphysically, but physically - to consider “now” as a special case.

By the way, let me point out another possible disagreement between us. There is “physics” (science) and there is “metaphysics” (speculation). If the metaphysical speculation leads to the same result as the scientific approach then metaphysics is useless. If the speculation is contradicted by science then metaphysics is garbage. Speculation has its place under the Sun, but only as a starting point in an actual investigation of realty.

Well, I could know the future if it were unactualized but followed deterministically from some prior set of events, and I had a sufficient comprehension of the deterministic process. I could, as I explained earlier, also know it if it were logically entailed without following from the present with causal determinism. However, this is all an aside.

Only by sacrificing the libertarian concept of free will.

I think that to deny that future-tense propositions have truth values is just to deny the law of excluded middle, according to which all meaningful propositions have at least one of the classical truth values (i.e., true and false). Future tense propositions are obviously meaningful. Isn’t your intuition about the truth of the law of excluded middle stronger than your intuition about presentism?

The law of excluded middle does NOT say that a proposition is either “true” or “false”. It says that a proposition is either “true” or “not true” (or “false” versus “not false”). Not all propositions have (or can have) a truth value associated with them. One of the simplest one is: “I lie” or “this proposition is false”.