Act and Potency: Real Concepts?

[pulsence]

I assume the materialist would claim Occam’s razor, and say that if the scientific explanation satisfies the question, you shouldn’t posit further explanations (like act & potency).

So what is that persuasive piece of evidence that answers the challenge of Occam’s razor here. Why must act and potency be features of reality?

If you are a scientist, applying Occam’s razor might lead one to stop at the efficient cause and not think about act and potency. However, a philosopher, being in a different field of study, can’t quite just stop at the efficient cause. Because in order to explain the efficient cause you need to understand act and potency. Really, act and potency is understood in science (not in those terms), otherwise you can’t provide for any real change, just supposed change.

Act is the current state of being of a thing. Potency is a potential state of a thing’s being, which it could be but currently isn’t. Scientific theories say that if something currently is and some event happens, then the result is some new state. So, if I throw a ball which leaves my hand at some velocity. Science says that it will then travel in an arc of some height and distance. In that statement act and potency is implied even if it isn’t stated explicitly. The ball at the start has the act of some velocity, and a potential (per the science) to travel some height and distance. Once the ball reaches that height and distance predicted, then that potential is realized and is now in act. But, the wind might blow and the potential height and distance isn’t met. This is alright because potential doesn’t mean a thing MUST actualize its potential, just that is could.

So, act and potency is used in science. But, they are philosophical terms and so one shouldn’t expect them to be used so explicitly in different fields of study.

To speak more directly to you second question:

Why must act and potency be features of reality?

If act and potency aren’t real features then we have two situations. Everything is in potency or everything is in act. Now if everything was in potency that is irrational, because there are things. If everything was in potency then there would not be any actual things, that is, there would be nothing. What if everything was in act? Well then there is no change, to start. In order for there to be change, then a thing needs to have the potential to become something that it currently isn’t. But if a thing is just in act then it has no potential to change. This flies right against our experience that things do change. If there is just act, then not only is there no change, but there is no difference. Potential also limits the way that a thing can be. It is why a dog is a dog and not a tree (form is a potential with respect to essence and being). If there is no potential then everything is one, and ultimately everything is God and God is everything. This is where the Greek pantheists arrived to. This also flies in the face of our experience that things are different.

 

[thinkandmull]

As GEddie was getting at, you’re confusing substance and accidents. A thing can have countless accidents which have a form to themselves and a “nature” or “essence”. Further as I said, when talking about non living things, we can only use these term analogically (aka the terms don’t quite fit right). What makes a blanket now a curtain is that it now has the “form” of a curtain. Form is both more simply and complex than you are providing for it.

Things can have seemingly countless accidental forms, but not countless substantial forms (in a way prime matter can though). The human soul (our form) generates only certain kinds of bodies. Our soul can’t generate a dogs body. The form makes the thing what it is. The human soul is what makes us human. Also the form is what makes a thing intelligible, because form is what gives matter its being in material things.

I don’t think anything changes in a blanket once you put it over a window

 

[thinkandmull]

A materialist (who, by the way, is unlikely to be a scientist) might well say so. That’s what materialists are for.

Now the question is this: what exactly are you trying to achieve?

If you want to make sure that you yourself know the answer, just look at the two accounts. There is no contradiction. The “scientific” account just explains how the potential was actualised, what the effective cause was.

If you want to give an answer that explains things to “neutral” observers, the answer is the same.

If you want to give an answer to the materialist, so that he would be given an answer - the answer is the same.

But if you want to persuade the materialist - don’t expect too much. You are not going to persuade someone who really really really doesn’t want to be persuaded.

Now, as we see, “thinkandmull” has agreed to play the part of “materialist”, and we can see how that looks.

So much ridicule and such strong declaration - “which is refutable”!

And yet, it is not so easy even to write as if Thomism was wrong. So, we still get “a bed” and “one gun”, even after the “changes”. I guess that should prove that pretending not to notice “bedness” and “gunness” more successfully requires pretty advanced skills. I doubt they are accessible to an average materialist…

And all that happened with artifacts, which have only accidental forms. Just imagine, how hard it is to pretend not to notice the substances - cats, dogs, horses!

There are also some misrepresentations. For example:

“Matter and form” here is replaced by “prime matter and form”. That ignores the point that matter itself consists of form and matter, until we reach prime matter.

Of course, after this correction it would be easy to see that children are quite capable of noticing that a rubber ball is made of rubber and has a form of a ball.

Sure, they might not know what is the matter and form for rubber (matter consists of atoms of carbon, hydrogen and sulphur; carbon and hydrogen are in long chains which are connected by atoms of sulphur - that is obviously a description of form), but that’s because it takes more studying to learn that.

Having a reference would be beneficial here.

The reference would be Aquinas saying in the First Part of the summa that the ax makes the form of the bed. I think other people here have make some good points in that something material doesn’t have one form. I am not a materialist though. I don’t believe things have to have form and prime matter. They are just objects. No need to posit two uniting principles. Just my opinion…

 

[thinkandmull]

I don’t see why it is necessary to posit two principles, instead of saying God thought “a tree” and bam! a tree is made. No need for him to create two merging principles. The rearranging of atoms speaks against this actually. When does a form change? When the atoms rearrange? Does a mountain have a form or do each of its peaks?

When the Church spoke of the soul being the form of the body, there is nothing wrong with interpreting this in accord with the Cartesians

 

[pulsence]

I don’t see why it is necessary to posit two principles, instead of saying God thought “a tree” and bam! a tree is made. No need for him to create two merging principles. The rearranging of atoms speaks against this actually. When does a form change? When the atoms rearrange? Does a mountain have a form or do each of its peaks?

Refer to my earlier post on this page to see why we need these two principles. Mainly in order for us to not be pantheist there needs to be act and potency, because potency is what makes that tree God willed not Him and just a tree.

Once more, mountains only have accidental forms. Accidental forms change every time there is a change of any sort. The rearranging of atoms requires act and potency or else they couldn’t change. Refer once more to my earlier post.

If you mean to think of substantial forms, which only living things have, then no, the substantial form doesn’t change every time there is a rearranging of its matter in corporeal beings (though its accidental forms do). The substantial form changes once there is something new. Once more the atoms do speak to this because, speaking simply, once the creation is greater than the sum of its parts, then there is probably a new substance, not just a new accidental arrangement (ignoring human constructive acts). For example: there is clearly something new once a sperm and egg combine. The resulting person can not be explain by the atomic configuration and so the sum is greater than the parts, and there is a new form present (a human soul).

Once more, we aren’t positing principles for the sake of principles. Act and potency come directly from the human experience that things change and are different. They are incredibly simple concepts (which science uses, else it couldn’t exist). The confusion comes when we try to run before we can walk, because the simplicity of the concept is what makes them so hard to understand. We overly complicate what act and potency is. Your questions all seem to miss understand the difference between substance and accidents. So I would encourage you to look into that more closely. Aristotle’s physics is where he discusses that. As a heads up, I’m not sure that Cartesian systems are able to deal with substance, because substance has a strong immaterial notion and Cartesian systems tend to get caught up in things with extension and bodies which are material. Further Descartes errors in that he seeks mathematical certainty in things which can’t have such certainty, so he and his philosophy is limited to where it can go.

 

[MPat]

Thanks for asking this. I should have clarified this a bit earlier. I want to be able to use Thomistic Metaphysics in my theological conversations with interlocuters–whether believers or unbelievers. I find it a useful tool in so many areas–discussions of the soul, transubstantiation, etc.

Thank you, it’s clearer now.

I assume the materialist would claim Occam’s razor, and say that if the scientific explanation satisfies the question, you shouldn’t posit further explanations (like act & potency).

So what is that persuasive piece of evidence that answers the challenge of Occam’s razor here. Why must act and potency be features of reality?

Using Occam’s razor in such way would require that we’d be 1) introducing new entities, and 2) have no good reason for that.

But are we actually introducing any new entities?

You might note that talking as if Thomism was false is all but impossible. Therefore, all those “entities” are introduced anyway. At most, we can fail to notice them, “hide” them by giving them no name.

A gracious thank you for all your time and patience!

You’re welcome!

The reference would be Aquinas saying in the First Part of the summa that the ax makes the form of the bed.

You mean, question 118 (dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP118.html)? “thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form”?

But you were saying:

Aquinas specifically said a bed has “bed-ness” as its form.

Yet the quote says nothing about “bed-ness”, it talks about “form of bed”. They are not the same.

“Bed-ness” would be not form, but essence. In effect, that is something like blueprint, plan, design, specification of bed. Something a bit like, let’s say, thedesignconfidential.com/2013/03/free-diy-furniture-plans-build-adjustable-twin-full-bed/.

You might note that this design also specifies materials, thus it is not just form. However, while it does talk about materials (lumber, screws, glue etc.), it does not include actual materials. Existence of the bed has to come from somewhere else.

On the other hand, “form of bed” is the configuration of the materials. After all, a pile of them is not a bed yet.

I don’t believe things have to have form and prime matter. They are just objects. No need to posit two uniting principles. Just my opinion…

And, once again, it is not “form and prime matter”, just “form and matter”.

I don’t see why it is necessary to posit two principles, instead of saying God thought “a tree” and bam! a tree is made. No need for him to create two merging principles.

You do understand that you have just forfeited a right to have a science of Botany (or, more specifically, Plant Morphology)?

For you end up saying that it is wrong to see how a tree is made of roots, trunk, branches, leaves put together in a specific configuration.

The rearranging of atoms speaks against this actually. When does a form change? When the atoms rearrange?

Yes, that’s what change of form tends to be.

So, one again, you have two major misconceptions about Thomism:

1. 
   *]You confuse form and essence.
   *]You talk as if material objects were made of form and prime matter and not of form and matter.
   
   And yes, this caricature of Thomism really is mysterious. You end up imagining that some strange “ghost” of “form” is being united with some strange “prime matter”…
   
   In the real Thomism things are much more simple. Something material is simply made of something (and we give this “something” the name “matter”) put together in some way (and we give this “way” the name “form”).
   
   It is not something mysterious - it is a very basic checklist for a scientist (or a craftsman). For example, if we take a water molecule, we check:
   
   1. 
      *]Do we know what it is made of? - Yes, of one atom of oxygen and two atoms of hydrogen.
      *]Do we know how it comes together? - Yes, the atoms of hydrogen are connected to atom of oxygen by covalent bonds (we can add the distances and the angle).
      
      It’s that easy.

 

[Wesrock]

I assume the materialist would claim Occam’s razor, and say that if the scientific explanation satisfies the question, you shouldn’t posit further explanations (like act & potency).

So what is that persuasive piece of evidence that answers the challenge of Occam’s razor here. Why must act and potency be features of reality?

A gracious thank you for all your time and patience!

Well, is the materialist who stops there actually using Occam’s Razor or just refusing to acknowledge that there’s a question as to what change is?

Do they acknowledge that things change? Or do they they say that there’s no such thing as change and we live in a block universe? Or do they say that things don’t change because they don’t persist, such that the you reading THIS has no real connection to the you reading THIS? Or, if they do acknowledge that things change, do they believe that things change without cause? Or that things act upon themselves? Do they believe that there’s no limited range of ways in which something can change?

I feel like any type of socratic inquiry, should they be open to actually addressing the question, leads to some model of change that is not “less” or “simpler” than the idea of act and potential, or easily represents reality as we know it (not that ease is sufficient by itself). And if they say no concept of change is needed, it seems they’re just begging the question.

 

[GEddie]

Methinks that unless all that jargon can be translated for non-speakers of Aquinas, your conversation in this venue is unlikely to bear any fruit.

ICXC NIKA

 

[thinkandmull]

Refer to my earlier post on this page to see why we need these two principles. Mainly in order for us to not be pantheist there needs to be act and potency, because potency is what makes that tree God willed not Him and just a tree.

Once more, mountains only have accidental forms. Accidental forms change every time there is a change of any sort. The rearranging of atoms requires act and potency or else they couldn’t change. Refer once more to my earlier post.

If you mean to think of substantial forms, which only living things have, then no, the substantial form doesn’t change every time there is a rearranging of its matter in corporeal beings (though its accidental forms do). The substantial form changes once there is something new. Once more the atoms do speak to this because, speaking simply, once the creation is greater than the sum of its parts, then there is probably a new substance, not just a new accidental arrangement (ignoring human constructive acts). For example: there is clearly something new once a sperm and egg combine. The resulting person can not be explain by the atomic configuration and so the sum is greater than the parts, and there is a new form present (a human soul).

Once more, we aren’t positing principles for the sake of principles. Act and potency come directly from the human experience that things change and are different. They are incredibly simple concepts (which science uses, else it couldn’t exist). The confusion comes when we try to run before we can walk, because the simplicity of the concept is what makes them so hard to understand. We overly complicate what act and potency is. Your questions all seem to miss understand the difference between substance and accidents. So I would encourage you to look into that more closely. Aristotle’s physics is where he discusses that. As a heads up, I’m not sure that Cartesian systems are able to deal with substance, because substance has a strong immaterial notion and Cartesian systems tend to get caught up in things with extension and bodies which are material. Further Descartes errors in that he seeks mathematical certainty in things which can’t have such certainty, so he and his philosophy is limited to where it can go.

I didn’t say act and potency were wrong concepts. There is practically no one who doesn’t know about them somehow. I said that there is no reason to, or that reason cannot, make a distinction between matter and form in a tree. Its an idea that is in the imagination, not in the tree. A tree’s tree-ness IS its matter

 

[thinkandmull]

Thank you, it’s clearer now.

Using Occam’s razor in such way would require that we’d be 1) introducing new entities, and 2) have no good reason for that.

But are we actually introducing any new entities?

You might note that talking as if Thomism was false is all but impossible. Therefore, all those “entities” are introduced anyway. At most, we can fail to notice them, “hide” them by giving them no name.

You’re welcome!

You mean, question 118 (dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP118.html)? “thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form”?

But you were saying:

Yet the quote says nothing about “bed-ness”, it talks about “form of bed”. They are not the same.

“Bed-ness” would be not form, but essence. In effect, that is something like blueprint, plan, design, specification of bed. Something a bit like, let’s say, thedesignconfidential.com/2013/03/free-diy-furniture-plans-build-adjustable-twin-full-bed/.

You might note that this design also specifies materials, thus it is not just form. However, while it does talk about materials (lumber, screws, glue etc.), it does not include actual materials. Existence of the bed has to come from somewhere else.

On the other hand, “form of bed” is the configuration of the materials. After all, a pile of them is not a bed yet.

And, once again, it is not “form and prime matter”, just “form and matter”.

You do understand that you have just forfeited a right to have a science of Botany (or, more specifically, Plant Morphology)?

For you end up saying that it is wrong to see how a tree is made of roots, trunk, branches, leaves put together in a specific configuration.

Yes, that’s what change of form tends to be.

So, one again, you have two major misconceptions about Thomism:

1. 
   *]You confuse form and essence.
   *]You talk as if material objects were made of form and prime matter and not of form and matter.
   
   And yes, this caricature of Thomism really is mysterious. You end up imagining that some strange “ghost” of “form” is being united with some strange “prime matter”…
   
   In the real Thomism things are much more simple. Something material is simply made of something (and we give this “something” the name “matter”) put together in some way (and we give this “way” the name “form”).
   
   It is not something mysterious - it is a very basic checklist for a scientist (or a craftsman). For example, if we take a water molecule, we check:
   
   1. 
      *]Do we know what it is made of? - Yes, of one atom of oxygen and two atoms of hydrogen.
      *]Do we know how it comes together? - Yes, the atoms of hydrogen are connected to atom of oxygen by covalent bonds (we can add the distances and the angle).
      
      It’s that easy.

1. 1. 
      You’ve done away with the concept of prime matter in your post, and stray far from Aquinas. The matter of a tree is not its leaves, ect., nor the matter of a statue the rocks and the form its shape. That is not what Aquinas is saying. Even mud has form and prime matter (pure potency) in Aquinas’s thought. You are confusing shape with form. A form cannot be directly seen.

 

[thinkandmull]

Thank you, it’s clearer now.

Using Occam’s razor in such way would require that we’d be 1) introducing new entities, and 2) have no good reason for that.

But are we actually introducing any new entities?

You might note that talking as if Thomism was false is all but impossible. Therefore, all those “entities” are introduced anyway. At most, we can fail to notice them, “hide” them by giving them no name.

You’re welcome!

You mean, question 118 (dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/FP/FP118.html)? “thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form”?

But you were saying:

Yet the quote says nothing about “bed-ness”, it talks about “form of bed”. They are not the same.

“Bed-ness” would be not form, but essence. In effect, that is something like blueprint, plan, design, specification of bed. Something a bit like, let’s say, thedesignconfidential.com/2013/03/free-diy-furniture-plans-build-adjustable-twin-full-bed/.

You might note that this design also specifies materials, thus it is not just form. However, while it does talk about materials (lumber, screws, glue etc.), it does not include actual materials. Existence of the bed has to come from somewhere else.

On the other hand, “form of bed” is the configuration of the materials. After all, a pile of them is not a bed yet.

And, once again, it is not “form and prime matter”, just “form and matter”.

You do understand that you have just forfeited a right to have a science of Botany (or, more specifically, Plant Morphology)?

For you end up saying that it is wrong to see how a tree is made of roots, trunk, branches, leaves put together in a specific configuration.

Yes, that’s what change of form tends to be.

So, one again, you have two major misconceptions about Thomism:

1. 
   *]You confuse form and essence.
   *]You talk as if material objects were made of form and prime matter and not of form and matter.
   
   And yes, this caricature of Thomism really is mysterious. You end up imagining that some strange “ghost” of “form” is being united with some strange “prime matter”…
   
   In the real Thomism things are much more simple. Something material is simply made of something (and we give this “something” the name “matter”) put together in some way (and we give this “way” the name “form”).
   
   It is not something mysterious - it is a very basic checklist for a scientist (or a craftsman). For example, if we take a water molecule, we check:
   
   1. 
      *]Do we know what it is made of? - Yes, of one atom of oxygen and two atoms of hydrogen.
      *]Do we know how it comes together? - Yes, the atoms of hydrogen are connected to atom of oxygen by covalent bonds (we can add the distances and the angle).
      
      It’s that easy.

1. 1. 
      Your *examples *of forms, finally, make them indistinguishable from essence

 

[thinkandmull]

Oh, one more thought. If matter and form are just the material, say, that a statue is made of, and its shape, why should I reread Aristotle in order to know what everybody knows about statues?

 

[Wesrock]

Oh, one more thought. If matter and form are just the material, say, that a statue is made of, and its shape, why should I reread Aristotle in order to know what everybody knows about statues?

Form is not shape, it’s what something is. A substantial form refers to a universal quality of the substance. An accidental form refers to a universal quality that is accidental to the substance.

Socrates (a substance) is a human (substantial form). I can’t change the substantial form without basically killing Socrates.

This wood (a substance) is made into a bed (accidental form). The arrangement of the wood is accidental to the substance of the wood, and I can change the bed into something else, or take the wood pieces apart, and not change the sibstance of the wood itself.

Rereading Aristotle should help you better understand such categories and distinctions and therefore be able to better understand what philosophers who use such terms are actually saying.

 

[MPat]

You’ve done away with the concept of prime matter in your post, and stray far from Aquinas. The matter of a tree is not its leaves, ect., nor the matter of a statue the rocks and the form its shape. That is not what Aquinas is saying. Even mud has form and prime matter (pure potency) in Aquinas’s thought. You are confusing shape with form. A form cannot be directly seen.

St. Thomas Aquinas, “De principiis naturae” (dhspriory.org/thomas/DePrincNaturae.htm) - “[8.] For example when a statue made from bronze the bronze which is in potency to the form of the statue is the matter; the shapeless or undisposed something is the privation; and the shape because of which is called a statue is the form.” - clearly contradicting yours “nor the matter of a statue the rocks and the form its shape”.

I’d say we shouldn’t rush to something more advanced like prime matter or virtual existence (yes, strictly speaking branches and roots exist in tree only virtually, but your account would get rid of them anyway), when there are still some misunderstandings about something basic like matter and form.

Your examples of forms, finally, make them indistinguishable from essence

Really? Why don’t you actually make that case? At first, try to explain what “form” and “essence” are.

Oh, one more thought. If matter and form are just the material, say, that a statue is made of, and its shape, why should I reread Aristotle in order to know what everybody knows about statues?

First, because you keep misrepresenting what he, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists taught. (Just look at the difference between “refutable” and “what everybody knows”.)

Second, because such formalisation makes science, proofs, programming possible. Just as formalisation of anything else (people do not learn arithmetic from Peano axioms).

Oh, and “form” is not always just the shape (unless, of course, by “shape” you mean more than geometrical shape).

 

[thinkandmull]

St. Thomas Aquinas, “De principiis naturae” (dhspriory.org/thomas/DePrincNaturae.htm) - “[8.] For example when a statue made from bronze the bronze which is in potency to the form of the statue is the matter; the shapeless or undisposed something is the privation; and the shape because of which is called a statue is the form.” - clearly contradicting yours “nor the matter of a statue the rocks and the form its shape”.

I’d say we shouldn’t rush to something more advanced like prime matter or virtual existence (yes, strictly speaking branches and roots exist in tree only virtually, but your account would get rid of them anyway), when there are still some misunderstandings about something basic like matter and form.

Really? Why don’t you actually make that case? At first, try to explain what “form” and “essence” are.

First, because you keep misrepresenting what he, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists taught. (Just look at the difference between “refutable” and “what everybody knows”.)

Second, because such formalisation makes science, proofs, programming possible. Just as formalisation of anything else (people do not learn arithmetic from Peano axioms).

Oh, and “form” is not always just the shape (unless, of course, by “shape” you mean more than geometrical shape).

Aquinas is being ambiguous. He uses matter and prime matter in two different senses. I don’t disagree that the bronze is the matter and the form the shape of the statue. Nobody does. I in no way do away with branches and leaves and call them virtual like you. The catholic encyclopedia says “Essence and nature express the same reality envisaged in the two points of view as being or acting. As the essence is that whereby any given thing is that which it is, the ground of its characteristics and the principle of its being, so its nature is that whereby it acts as it does, the essence considered as the foundation and principle of its operation. Hence again St. Thomas: “Nature is seen to signify the essence of a thing according as it has relation to its proper operation” (De ente et essentia, cap. i). Furthermore, essence is also in a manner synonymous with form, since it is chiefly by their formal principle that beings are segregated into one or other of the species. Thus, while created spiritual things, because they are not composed of matter and form, are specifically what they are by reason of their essences or “forms” alone, the compounded beings of the corporeal world receive their specification and determination of nature, or essence, principally from their substantial forms.” My case is that there is no distinction between form and prime matter except virtually (as Scotus says),* if even that*. Prove otherwise, or just say “go reread Aquinas” like they always say when they get into the mud

 

[thinkandmull]

So much time has been wasting talking about form prime matter, existence essence accident substance being universal ect., which has led to Stephen Hawkings and others saying philosophy is dead. Those concepts don’t add anything to human knowledge. We all know what a dog and a human is. As for the Eucharist, its better just to accept it as a mystery and let it be

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

So much time has been wasting talking about form prime matter, existence essence accident substance being universal ect., which has led to Stephen Hawkings and others saying philosophy is dead. Those concepts don’t add anything to human knowledge. We all know what a dog and a human is. As for the Eucharist, its better just to accept it as a mystery and let it be

I am so glad for this thread, and especially for your contribution. It is crystal clear that the whole Thomistic philosophy is a huge waste of time. About on par with the discussion about the number of angels dancing on the tip if a needle.

But, just for the fun of it. If some of you Thomists think that the concept of “essence” is a useful one, try to tell us what is the essence of a “cow”. It is easy to say: “what makes a cow to be a cow”, but that is an empty utterance. Enumerate all the “essential” (not accidental) properties which must all be there for this “whatchamacallit” to become a “cow”. Which make this “whatever” to be a “cow”. If any of these “essential” properties would be different, or would be missing, it would not be a cow any more. Or, if you prefer, perform the same kind of analysis and tell us what is the essence of a “chair”.

Have at it.

 

[Richca]

I didn’t say act and potency were wrong concepts. There is practically no one who doesn’t know about them somehow. I said that there is no reason to, or that reason cannot, make a distinction between matter and form in a tree. Its an idea that is in the imagination, not in the tree. A tree’s tree-ness IS its matter

If we had a marble statue of Plato and a marble statue of a lion before us, can both of these things be described simply according to their matter, the marble? If we say both these things are marble, is that going to give us a full description of these things? I don’t think so. Both of these things are made out of the same material, i.e., marble, yet the intelllect can clearly distinguish the one from the other and not just in the imagination. The one marble has the form or shape of Plato and the other has the form or shape of a lion. The marble itself does not give us a full description of what the thing is.

 

[thinkandmull]

I am so glad for this thread, and especially for your contribution. It is crystal clear that the whole Thomistic philosophy is a huge waste of time. About on par with the discussion about the number of angels dancing on the tip if a needle.

But, just for the fun of it. If some of you Thomists think that the concept of “essence” is a useful one, try to tell us what is the essence of a “cow”. It is easy to say: “what makes a cow to be a cow”, but that is an empty utterance. Enumerate all the “essential” (not accidental) properties which must all be there for this “whatchamacallit” to become a “cow”. Which make this “whatever” to be a “cow”. If any of these “essential” properties would be different, or would be missing, it would not be a cow any more. Or, if you prefer, perform the same kind of analysis and tell us what is the essence of a “chair”.

Have at it.

Ye I am of the opinion that a lot of Catholics have wasted too much ink on philosophy. Scholastics will sit for hours and talk about doctor Scotus and “thisness”.

 

[thinkandmull]

If we had a marble statue of Plato and a marble statue of a lion before us, can both of these things be described simply according to their matter, the marble? If we say both these things are marble, is that going to give us a full description of these things? I don’t think so. Both of these things are made out of the same material, i.e., marble, yet the intelllect can clearly distinguish the one from the other and not just in the imagination. The one marble has the form or shape of Plato and the other has the form or shape of a lion. The marble itself does not give us a full description of what the thing is.

Nobody would disagree with that. Why call that philosophy?

Let me ask this: how many forms are there in the water of a swimming pool?