Act and Potency: Real Concepts?

[Vera_Ljuba]

I think he is a better authority on his own position (and, by extension, position of Thomistic philosophers, since he is one of them) than you are, which is all I need here. Or do you think you are such an authority that one has to be “unquestionable” to outrank you?

Undeniable. But that is not what I am questioning. Why would he be unquestionable for those who do not subscribe to Thomism? I am questioning the whole “shebang” called Thomistic philosophy - on the ground that its main “pillars”, essence, etc… are nonsensical. And nothing that Feser said (or wrote) indicates otherwise.

No, its a pointer.

Like: “a rose is a rose is a rose”?

I already gave a couple of illustrations in this thread. They should be sufficient.

Again, I am not looking for illustrations. I am looking for the “essence” of a chair.

And, by analogy, separation of suspect (substance, analogous to essence here) and police description of a suspect (list of accidents, analogous to list of properties that describe the essence here) makes the concept of the suspect meaningless?

No need for analogies. All I am asking is: “what is the essence of a chair”? Should be pretty easy… or not? You don’t have to answer. You are free to admit that you have no idea. (Not that it matters to you, but I will even respect you for your honesty.)

 

[bcirka]

Well this thread really took a left turn from my original intention

I want to bring it back to the original topic. I had posed this question: Why must act and potency be features of reality?

Pulsence responded:

If act and potency aren’t real features then we have two situations. Everything is in potency or everything is in act.

Yet, this confused me, because my question is whether they are real, and the response was, if they are not real, then they must be real (“Everything is in potency or act”)

MPat then responded, regarding my challenge of Occam’s Razor:

But are we actually introducing any new entities? You might note that talking as if Thomism was false is all but impossible

Fair point. You’re saying that rather than claiming that act and potency are something in addition to the scientific explanation, that they are part and parcel of it, even if they are ignored. Makes total sense. But it takes me backwards to a reformulation of my original question: What evidence is there that act and potency are real features, even if they are purposefully or unpurposefully ignored by the scientific explanation.?

MPat, you said that talking as if Thomism is false is all but impossible. Let’s take an example: dropping a golf ball in a bucket of water. Can we not simply say that because of the density of the ball and the water; the law of gravity, the weight of the ball, etc that based on the physical laws in our universe, it would sink to the bottom? Why must we say that the ball had potential to sink to the bottom?

I’ve said it before, but a continued and gracious thank you for all the time many of you have been taking to help. I’m hoping by this slow and painful journey, that once it clicks for me, I’ll be able to help others get there too!

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Well this thread really took a left turn from my original intention

Happens all time.

I want to bring it back to the original topic. I had posed this question: Why must act and potency be features of reality?

I am not sure why you use “must”? And I am not sure if your usage of “act” is a shortened version of “actuality”? But assuming it is, the answer is rather simple.

“Actuality” is the real world. “Potency” is what is not current “actuality”, but what it could be. And that belongs to the realm of science. An “acorn” can grow into an “oak tree”, but not into a “frog”. A “tadpole” can grow into a frog, but not into an “elephant”. The laws of nature spell out the “possibilities”, there is no need for speculation. I have no idea why this simple thing needs further examination.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Well this thread really took a left turn from my original intention !

Yes, just read the whole thread and the last 80% is way off topic.

It seems potency and act is an attempt to extrapolate change/motion/causation principles from the material realm to the spiritual.

This sleight of hand it seems is needed to deal philosophically with creation ex nihilo and proof for the existence of God from motion.

 

[MPat]

Well this thread really took a left turn from my original intention

In that case, sorry about that…

Fair point. You’re saying that rather than claiming that act and potency are something in addition to the scientific explanation, that they are part and parcel of it, even if they are ignored. Makes total sense. But it takes me backwards to a reformulation of my original question: What evidence is there that act and potency are real features, even if they are purposefully or unpurposefully ignored by the scientific explanation.?

MPat, you said that talking as if Thomism is false is all but impossible. Let’s take an example: dropping a golf ball in a bucket of water. Can we not simply say that because of the density of the ball and the water; the law of gravity, the weight of the ball, etc that based on the physical laws in our universe, it would sink to the bottom? Why must we say that the ball had potential to sink to the bottom?

OK, let’s look at the alternatives. If we say that the ball did not have a potential to sink to the bottom, then it means that, well, the ball could not sink to the bottom. But if it could not, how comes that it did?

As you can see, denying the potentials starts looking silly very soon. Someone who wants to deny them has to deny that change exists (like Parmenides - goodbye to all science after that) or to be against any formalisation (goodbye to science again).

And in practice, as you can see in this very thread, it is not easy to find someone willing to argue against act and potency. It is easier to find someone who wants to deny existence of substances, existence of forms and matter, existence of essences…

Which, by the way, is why this thread had a potential to go off topic…

 

[bcirka]

Actually this little turn of the topic has been helpful, and again, I think it refines the original question even further. A couple of quick points:

Simple act and potency clearly exist. Simple, meaning that something either exists (act), does not exist but has the potential to (potency), or neither.

We’re not talking about “simple” act and potency however. Aristotle is positively asserting a feature of reality when he tries to solve the Parmenidian and Hericlitan paradoxes by positing potency tied to a being’s essence

So, this does move the question along a bit. It no longer is “are act and potency real features of the world,” but has transformed into “Do potencies exist as real features of a being’s essence?” And here I don’t mean simple potencies–as in descriptive language used to describe what a being “could” become. I mean real potencies, as features of a being’s essence that would solve the Parmenidean and Herclitian problems.

Of course, this question presupposes that essence’s exist in the first place. I’m going to go reread this thread where it began to speak of essences and continue this train of thought.

Thank you all, as always.

 

[Wesrock]

No need for analogies. All I am asking is: “what is the essence of a chair”? Should be pretty easy… or not? You don’t have to answer. You are free to admit that you have no idea. (Not that it matters to you, but I will even respect you for your honesty.)

The question is easy: There is no “chair” essence.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Of course, this question presupposes that essence’s exist in the first place. I’m going to go reread this thread where it began to speak of essences and continue this train of thought.

On of these days I might see a precise treatise on “what essence might be”, how can it be applied to the actual reality? My two favorite questions: “what is the essence of a chair”, and “what is the essence of a cow”? The expressions of “chairness” and “cowness” need to be defined precisely, not swept under the rug, that it is obvious.

The answers of “what makes a chair to be a chair” and “what makes a cow to be a cow” are meaningless, without the correct (and sensible) details.

 

[Wesrock]

On of these days I might see a precise treatise on “what essence might be”, how can it be applied to the actual reality? My two favorite questions: “what is the essence of a chair”, and “what is the essence of a cow”? The expressions of “chairness” and “cowness” need to be defined precisely, not swept under the rug, that it is obvious.

The answers of “what makes a chair to be a chair” and “what makes a cow to be a cow” are meaningless, without the correct (and sensible) details.

Chairs don’t have essences. Artifacts don’t have essences. By artifact, I do NOT mean non-living things, for atoms and molecules and such would seem to have essences. But an artifact like a chair or a bed has no intrinsic purpose in itself to be a chair or be a bed. It’s a series of parts arranged by an external user for the external user’s ends. The parts themselves have no end in themselves for being a chair or bed. The arrangement of parts is accidental (in an Aristotlean sense).

Cows do have an essence, though it should be clarified that the statement that essences exist doesn’t mean we have 100% knowledge of each essence. We argue that we can learn about the essence of a thing by observing and otherwise studying it. So our knowledge of an essence could change as our methods of study improve. We don’t see the essence itself, but only how it’s instantiated in something that exists. Now, it’s clear that a cow is not a human and is not a dog and is not a rose bush and is not a helium atom. I think you’d be better off asking a biologist about what properties are natural to cowness (we should probably narrow this down to species or genus instead of the generic term “cow”), from four legs to number of stomachs to teeth to behavior, that differentiates it from other essences, though this is an attempt to speak to what is essential to being a cow.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Chairs don’t have essences. Artifacts don’t have essences. By artifact, I do NOT mean non-living things, for atoms and molecules and such would seem to have essences. But an artifact like a chair or a bed has no intrinsic purpose in itself to be a chair or be a bed. It’s a series of parts arranged by an external user for the external user’s ends. The parts themselves have no end in themselves for being a chair or bed. The arrangement of parts is accidental (in an Aristotlean sense).

You mean that it is meaningless to ask “what makes a chair to be a chair”? And you have no way to decide is something is an artifact or “natural”? And there is no precise dividing line between living and an inanimate beings. “Purpose” does not exist unless there is someone who wishes to use that “something” for a reason. Someone might use a sharp object to scratch a drawing into a softer surface, or can use it to skin a carcass, or cut someone’s throat. None of them are “intrinsic”.

Cows do have an essence, though it should be clarified that the statement that essences exist doesn’t mean we have 100% knowledge of each essence. We argue that we can learn about the essence of a thing by observing and otherwise studying it. So our knowledge of an essence could change as our methods of study improve. We don’t see the essence itself, but only how it’s instantiated in something that exists. Now, it’s clear that a cow is not a human and is not a dog and is not a rose bush and is not a helium atom. I think you’d be better off asking a biologist about what properties are natural to cowness (we should probably narrow this down to species or genus instead of the generic term “cow”), from four legs to number of stomachs to teeth to behavior, that differentiates it from other essences, though this is an attempt to speak to what is essential to being a cow.

Biologists cannot help. Where does “cowness” end and a new mutant life-form begin?

So, I still deny that “essence” and “accidents” are meaningful terms.

 

[Wesrock]

You mean that it is meaningless to ask “what makes a chair to be a chair”? And you have no way to decide is something is an artifact or “natural”? And there is no precise dividing line between living and an inanimate beings. “Purpose” does not exist unless there is someone who wishes to use that “something” for a reason. Someone might use a sharp object to scratch a drawing into a softer surface, or can use it to skin a carcass, or cut someone’s throat. None of them are “intrinsic”.

Woah woah, I never said one cannot distinguish between artifact and substance. Artifacts are chairs, beds, boats, planes, houses, knives, etc… These are “whole” things that are accidental arrangements of parts which otherwise have no natural relationship to each other. By purpose, I don’t mean intelligence or conscious meaning, which is a common misconception of Aristotleanism, nor do I mean purpose as in the sense of a tool, which is again something only relevant to an external user. A piece of charcoal might be assigned extrinsically a purpose in writing, but that’s not the teleology of the carbon atoms itself. Even a hydrogen atom has teleology, in that it has properties in how it “behaves” and interacts with other things (teleogy on this level is generally very minimal and basic). An atom, while made up of parts, is as a whole something different than the sum of its parts due to its intrinsic properties. A bed isn’t. With regards to non-life versus life, life is seen as having at least ends based in nutrition.

But artifact, substance, essence, are all carefully defined terms.

Biologists cannot help. Where does “cowness” end and a new mutant life-form begin?

So, I still deny that “essence” and “accidents” are meaningful terms.

Biologists can’t help in determining when speciation or a change in genus occurs?

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Even a hydrogen atom has teleology, in that it has properties in how it “behaves” and interacts with other things (teleogy on this level is generally very minimal and basic). An atom, while made up of parts, is as a whole something different than the sum of its parts due to its intrinsic properties.

“Telos” or aim can only be meaningfully defined when there is a user, who uses that object for something.

A bed isn’t. With regards to non-life versus life, life is seen as having at least ends based in nutrition.

“At least” is not helpful.

But artifact, substance, essence, are all carefully defined terms.

No matter how carefully one defines an abstract object, if it cannot be “mapped” onto the reality, it is not useful.

Biologists can’t help in determining when speciation or a change in genus occurs?

No, they cannot. They cannot agree if something is “alive” or “inanimate”, because there is no clear dividing line between the two. Some biologists consider viruses to be alive, others do not. Are computer viruses, “info-bots” alive? They move, they collect information, they can even self-mutate, they change their environment, they exhibit a whole lot of features we usually associate with “life”.

 

[Wesrock]

“Telos” or aim can only be meaningfully defined when there is a user, who uses that object for something.

It’s simply an object being “aimed” at certain ends, an acorn to an oak tree, a human to goodness or truth, an atom to the specific properties it has as opposed to something else. It doesn’t require a user or consciousness in A-T metaphysics.

“At least” is not helpful.

Classically, living things can have nutritative appetities, sensitive appetites, and rational appetites (there’s an hierarchy here, generally plants were seen as nutritative only, most animals as nutritative an sensitive, and humans as rational animals all three), though these aren’t absolute definitions. Still, that something acting as some type of unified whole with some type of end in obtaining nutrients to continue and reproduce is seen as a basic part of a definition of life, even now. Please explain how the “at least” isn’t helpful?

And again, while there may be categories, it doesn’t mean we have sufficient information on each and every substance to know with absolute certainty if it’s life or not. But that’s not a flaw, because Thomism doesn’t claim we can know all essences absolutely.

No matter how carefully one defines an abstract object, if it cannot be “mapped” onto the reality, it is not useful.

Perhaps you can clarify, because it sounds almost like a non-sequitur.

No, they cannot. They cannot agree if something is “alive” or “inanimate”, because there is no clear dividing line between the two. Some biologists consider viruses to be alive, others do not. Are computer viruses, “info-bots” alive? They move, they collect information, they can even self-mutate, they change their environment, they exhibit a whole lot of features we usually associate with “life”.

Just because absolute knowledge is not had over a thing such that there are gray areas in how we apply categories doesn’t mean the system is false, it just means we need more information.

As for computer viruses, no, they are not living things. It’s an algorithm running in an artifact. Just because it is has similarities to a biological virus doesn’t make it a living thing. Within an Aristotlean philosophy, at least, there’s no ambiguity on that point.

 

[Wesrock]

This discussion on form/essence/substance/artifact/teleology should be continued in a separate topic.

 

[Richca]

Actually this little turn of the topic has been helpful, and again, I think it refines the original question even further. A couple of quick points:

Simple act and potency clearly exist. Simple, meaning that something either exists (act), does not exist but has the potential to (potency), or neither.

We’re not talking about “simple” act and potency however. Aristotle is positively asserting a feature of reality when he tries to solve the Parmenidian and Hericlitan paradoxes by positing potency tied to a being’s essence

So, this does move the question along a bit. It no longer is “are act and potency real features of the world,” but has transformed into “Do potencies exist as real features of a being’s essence?” And here I don’t mean simple potencies–as in descriptive language used to describe what a being “could” become. I mean real potencies, as features of a being’s essence that would solve the Parmenidean and Herclitian problems.

Of course, this question presupposes that essence’s exist in the first place. I’m going to go reread this thread where it began to speak of essences and continue this train of thought.

Thank you all, as always.

Well, according to Aristotle and his doctrine of hylemorphism which pertains to material substances, I think potentiality is a real feature which enters into the composition of the essence or substance of material substances. The essence, substance, or nature of material substances is a composition of the substantial form and prime matter. Matter is related to form as potency to act. Forms are acts and matter is potentiality. So, the essence or substance of material substances is a composition of act (form) and potency (prime matter). I’m not sure how substantial changes in nature would occur without the composition of potentiality which is in the matter in the substance of material beings. Although some portion of prime matter is always under one substantial form at a time, it is nevertheless in potentiality to receiving other substantial forms as eating bread is transformed into human flesh or human nature.

For Aquinas, all created being whether material or angelic is a composition of potency and act. The first thesis of the famous 24 Thomistic Theses states " Potency and Act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either pure act, or of necessity it is composed of potency and act as primary and intrinsic principles." Again, for Aquinas, the ultimate metaphysical structure of created beings is the essence and the act of being in which the essence stands in relation to the act of being as potency to act. Also, Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that the distinction between potency and act is a real distinction, that is, potency is a real objective and distinct feature of reality from act. A number of consequences follow from this principle such as form and matter are really distinct and essence and the act of being are really distinct.

The following is an informative article concerning potency and act from Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange O.P.:
thesumma.info/reality/reality6.php