Against final causality

[DanAl]

A basic philosophical position in the Aristetolian-Thomist tradition is the notion of immanent teleology. Things “aim to” or “point to” the fulfilling of their potentialities. It is not mere efficient or formal causes at work here; telos is something “in-built” in the nature of things. Of course, just because Aquinas, Aristotle or other important thinkers defended final causes does not necessarily mean they were correct. And in fact this notion has been challenged by people like Duns Scotus (who spoke of final causes as “a flight towards fantasy”), Cardinal Cajetan, Francisco Suarez and William of Ockham.

There are at least three reasons to doubt immanent telos:

1-Parsimony. Final causes do not add anything over and above what efficient causes can do. Efficient causes are enough to do the work of immanent telos. The latter is an extra assumption we can do without.

2-Only rational self-movers can have a purpose. What is necessary for rational beings to act for the sake of an end? Rationality, we can act for the sake of an end and order the means to achieve it. That we’re self-movers runs counter to another Thomist/Aristetolian belief, but I will not address this particular issue here. I’ll merely point out that nature lacks rationality and cannot will an end. Does lack of rationality disprove immanent teleology? Maybe not, but it suggests something else, namely, It suggests that assigning ends to non-rational nature is a category mistake: projecting our ability to conciously seeks some ends to non-concnious nature.

3- Sometimes it is said that final causes are needed explain the apparent purpossiveness of nature, but this is no true: God can will some ends and order the means to achieve it without need to appeal to immanent teleology.

Is teleology useless, then? No, teleological talk can be useful as explanations of how efficient causes operate, but not as an extra category that is intrinsic to nature.

Thoughts?

 

[polytropos]

1-Parsimony. Final causes do not add anything over and above what efficient causes can do. Efficient causes are enough to do the work of immanent telos. The latter is an extra assumption we can do without.

Final causes, on the Thomistic view, are generally taken to explain why efficient causes can occur, ie. A can only be the efficient cause of B if B is the final cause of A. But the final cause is there whether or not the efficient cause is (whether or not the final cause is knowable). For instance, a strand of DNA has a final cause of unwinding, duplicating, and repackaging, but its form is certainly such that it is directed toward that end whether or not it actually does. (And certainly, any detailed account of DNA as an efficient cause would make an appeal to specific enzymes that interact with DNA in a certain way only because DNA has duplication as an end.) As such, it is not clear that we can dispense with final causes. We might stipulate that there are cases where we don’t need to use them, but the claim that they have no explanatory power simply seems to be false.

2-Only rational self-movers can have a purpose. What is necessary for rational beings to act for the sake of an end? Rationality, we can act for the sake of an end and order the means to achieve it. … I’ll merely point out that nature lacks rationality and cannot will an end. Does lack of rationality disprove immanent teleology? Maybe not, but it suggests something else, namely, It suggests that assigning ends to non-rational nature is a category mistake: projecting our ability to conciously seeks some ends to non-concnious nature.

Nature does not will an end. You are right that only an intellectual being can will things, since will follows from intellect. But final causes are not instances of will, nor are they instances of consciousness (the vast majority of final causality is unconscious). Final causes are more akin to intentionality or directedness, which can certainly be unconscious and unwilled (at least in the proximate sense), as the DNA example illustrates.

3- Sometimes it is said that final causes are needed explain the apparent purpossiveness of nature, but this is no true: God can will some ends and order the means to achieve it without need to appeal to immanent teleology.

I am a bit confused with this last sentence. If God “will some ends and order the means to achieve it,” how is He not putting final causality - intentionality, end-directedness - in nature? Ordering seems to presuppose the final causality that you are denying as necessary.

 

[1AugustSon7]

A basic philosophical position in the Aristetolian-Thomist tradition is the notion of immanent teleology. Things “aim to” or “point to” the fulfilling of their potentialities. It is not mere efficient or formal causes at work here; telos is something “in-built” in the nature of things. Of course, just because Aquinas, Aristotle or other important thinkers defended final causes does not necessarily mean they were correct. And in fact this notion has been challenged by people like Duns Scotus (who spoke of final causes as “a flight towards fantasy”), Cardinal Cajetan, Francisco Suarez and William of Ockham.

There are at least three reasons to doubt immanent telos:

1-Parsimony. Final causes do not add anything over and above what efficient causes can do. Efficient causes are enough to do the work of immanent telos. The latter is an extra assumption we can do without.

2-Only rational self-movers can have a purpose. What is necessary for rational beings to act for the sake of an end? Rationality, we can act for the sake of an end and order the means to achieve it. That we’re self-movers runs counter to another Thomist/Aristetolian belief, but I will not address this particular issue here. I’ll merely point out that nature lacks rationality and cannot will an end. Does lack of rationality disprove immanent teleology? Maybe not, but it suggests something else, namely, It suggests that assigning ends to non-rational nature is a category mistake: projecting our ability to conciously seeks some ends to non-concnious nature.

3- Sometimes it is said that final causes are needed explain the apparent purpossiveness of nature, but this is no true: God can will some ends and order the means to achieve it without need to appeal to immanent teleology.

Is teleology useless, then? No, teleological talk can be useful as explanations of how efficient causes operate, but not as an extra category that is intrinsic to nature.

Thoughts?

Without final causes efficient causes become irrational and finally unintelligible. Why did the builder build the house? There is no answer: i.e., for no reason. Why did the baby become a man? No reason. Why did this collection of dust and stuff in space become a planet or a moon? No reason. Why does fire burn? No reason. Why does ice freeze? No reason. Why do atoms sometimes form into more complex molecules? No reason: i.e., there is nothing about the things themselves (nothing “built-in”) that explains why they do what they do or produce the characteristic effects that they do.

Moreover, removing final causes and making them extrinsic rather than intrinsic to nature(s) seems even more problematic than granting that they are ‘built into’ the nature of things: my reason for building a house would thus not be my reason at all as it would have to be something extrinsic to me - and surely that would be absurd.

Science is in fact mostly inspired by the desire to know the final causes of things.

As for our being self-movers: rest assured, both Saint Thomas and Aristotle were well aware of that fact - better than we are, no doubt - and did not find that a sufficient reason to deny that that which is moved is moved by another. Moreover, it should be obvious that there are very real and absolute limits to our ability to be self-movers: I cannot, e.g., move myself to Jupiter, though I might desire to - or is it my desire that moves me?

 

[Bagheera]

It already starts with confusion. **Telos **is supposed to be the “end” point of causal chain, while “cause” is the antecedent or starting point. These are confused within the “teleological” argument. I suggest you restart with a clear terminology, and do not speak of “telos” as a “final cause”, because the whole setup is irrational. Just because the ancient philosophers used a confusing terminology, it is no excuse to continue their practice.

Then you can “ponder” about the “aim” of a natural phenomenon, for example an avalanche. It has no “telos” or aim. The final result is simply a new natural equilibrium of the snow. If it happens to destroy a village, it simply “happened”, but it was not the “aim”. One cannot rationally speak of a rock falling down (or an Earthquake) to “aim” itself toward some “potential”. The whole teleological argument is meaningless, it attempts to impose some anthropomorphic feature onto the unthinking reality.

 

[tonyrey]

The whole teleological argument is meaningless, it attempts to impose some anthropomorphic feature onto the unthinking reality.

Belief in “unthinking reality” is an absurd, unsubstantiated and self-refuting assumption made by materialists. It reduces thinkers to thoughtless things…

 

[Bagheera]

Belief in “unthinking reality” is an absurd, unsubstantiated and self-refuting assumption made by materialists. It reduces thinkers to thoughtless things…

I only wish that the forum rules would allow me to reply to this… but unfortunately certain words and phrases are disallowed, so I cannot express my opinion concerning you.

 

[DanAl]

Without final causes efficient causes become irrational and finally unintelligible. Why did the builder build the house? There is no answer: i.e., for no reason. Why did the baby become a man? No reason. Why did this collection of dust and stuff in space become a planet or a moon? No reason. Why does fire burn? No reason. Why does ice freeze? No reason. Why do atoms sometimes form into more complex molecules? No reason: i.e., there is nothing about the things themselves (nothing “built-in”) that explains why they do what they do or produce the characteristic effects that they do.

1AugustSon7, I see no problem in in explaining efficient causality through teleological talk. “The heart is for pumping blood.” Does that entail that there’s something in addition to efficient causes at work? I see no reason to assume so.

 

[DanAl]

I am a bit confused with this last sentence. If God “will some ends and order the means to achieve it,” how is He not putting final causality - intentionality, end-directedness - in nature? Ordering seems to presuppose the final causality that you are denying as necessary.

. God’s will is the extrinsic cause of the order in the universe and the potentiality of things. God achieves an end through efficient causes. It is fine to speak of final causes as an explanation of how efficient causes work, but it is dubious that immanent telos is something really existing in addition to the other three causes.

 

[Linux]

I feel tempted

 

[DanAl]

It already starts with confusion. **Telos **is supposed to be the “end” point of causal chain, while “cause” is the antecedent or starting point. These are confused within the “teleological” argument. I suggest you restart with a clear terminology, and do not speak of “telos” as a “final cause”, because the whole setup is irrational. Just because the ancient philosophers used a confusing terminology, it is no excuse to continue their practice.

Then you can “ponder” about the “aim” of a natural phenomenon, for example an avalanche. It has no “telos” or aim. The final result is simply a new natural equilibrium of the snow. If it happens to destroy a village, it simply “happened”, but it was not the “aim”. One cannot rationally speak of a rock falling down (or an Earthquake) to “aim” itself toward some “potential”. The whole teleological argument is meaningless, it attempts to impose some anthropomorphic feature onto the unthinking reality.

final causes can be understood as the final purpose of a thing or as an explanation of how efficient causes work.
Saddling a proponent of final causes as defending the thesis that an avalanche aims to destroy a village or that a rock falls because it “becomes jubilant,” to be in contact with the ground is to make a travesty of their position, gross distortions of what classical thinkers had in mind.

 

[polytropos]

It already starts with confusion. **Telos **is supposed to be the “end” point of causal chain, while “cause” is the antecedent or starting point. These are confused within the “teleological” argument. I suggest you restart with a clear terminology, and do not speak of “telos” as a “final cause”, because the whole setup is irrational. Just because the ancient philosophers used a confusing terminology, it is no excuse to continue their practice.

I don’t know why you have so much trouble using old philosophical terms. “Cause” has only strictly meant the antecedent point for the last 300-400 years (and only in a limited usage), and terms like material cause, final cause, and formal cause which do not refer to efficient cause are well-defined even if you don’t like the fact that they use the word “cause.” Perhaps they confuse you, but they aren’t confusing.

The whole teleological argument is meaningless, it attempts to impose some anthropomorphic feature onto the unthinking reality.

No one said that reality is fundamentally anthropomorphic or thinking. (I explicitly deny that reality is fundamentally anthropomorphic or thinking. Directedness does not imply consciousness.)

 

[Richca]

Without final causes efficient causes become irrational and finally unintelligible. Why did the builder build the house? There is no answer: i.e., for no reason. Why did the baby become a man? No reason. Why did this collection of dust and stuff in space become a planet or a moon? No reason. Why does fire burn? No reason. Why does ice freeze? No reason. Why do atoms sometimes form into more complex molecules? No reason: i.e., there is nothing about the things themselves (nothing “built-in”) that explains why they do what they do or produce the characteristic effects that they do.

Moreover, removing final causes and making them extrinsic rather than intrinsic to nature(s) seems even more problematic than granting that they are ‘built into’ the nature of things: my reason for building a house would thus not be my reason at all as it would have to be something extrinsic to me - and surely that would be absurd.

Science is in fact mostly inspired by the desire to know the final causes of things.

As for our being self-movers: rest assured, both Saint Thomas and Aristotle were well aware of that fact - better than we are, no doubt - and did not find that a sufficient reason to deny that that which is moved is moved by another. Moreover, it should be obvious that there are very real and absolute limits to our ability to be self-movers: I cannot, e.g., move myself to Jupiter, though I might desire to - or is it my desire that moves me?

Very good post 1AugustSon,

It appears to me that if we deny the final cause, the purpose of the thing, then we are left to say that things happen by chance. But what happens by chance or accident is outside the ordinary course of events. For we find that in the things of nature, efficient causes almost always produce a determinate effect unless they are impeded in some way or another. A man begets a man, and a lion begets a lion. An acorn becomes an oak tree. Now if it was by chance that an acorn became an oak tree, their would be no reason why an acorn might produce a man or lion at some other time which is plainly absurd. Consequently, that an acorn always produces an oak tree and a lion always begets a lion is not a consequence of chance.

 

[Bagheera]

final causes can be understood as the final purpose of a thing or as an explanation of how efficient causes work.
Saddling a proponent of final causes as defending the thesis that an avalanche aims to destroy a village or that a rock falls because it “becomes jubilant,” to be in contact with the ground is to make a travesty of their position, gross distortions of what classical thinkers had in mind.

Please read my reply below.

I don’t know why you have so much trouble using old philosophical terms. “Cause” has only strictly meant the antecedent point for the last 300-400 years (and only in a limited usage), and terms like material cause, final cause, and formal cause which do not refer to efficient cause are well-defined even if you don’t like the fact that they use the word “cause.” Perhaps they confuse you, but they aren’t confusing.

I am a stickler for clarity. We live toady, with meanings that are assigned in today’s world. “Meanings” are not absolute, they keep changing as time goes on. To be called a “liberal” was a praise a few decades ago, its meaning was crystal clear: “someone who likes, cherishes freedom or liberty”. This meaning has been modified, and today if one wishes to express the same attitude, then a new word “libertarian” or “classic liberal” must be used. The “old” term of “liberal” is almost a “cuss-word” today and this change happened in a few decades, not many hundreds of years.

Why should one accept ancient, outmoded definitions? Translate them into modern terminology. When these words have been coined, there was no understanding of the concept of “cause and effect” which exist in the physical world. Causation is a physical interaction between two objects, and it involves the exchange of elementary particles. All that gobbledygook of “final”, “material”, “formal” and “efficient” causes were developed, since the people did not understand what causation IS, and so they speculated and came up with a bunch of useless definitions.

No one said that reality is fundamentally anthropomorphic or thinking. (I explicitly deny that reality is fundamentally anthropomorphic or thinking. Directedness does not imply consciousness.)

To assign a “telos” indicates a conscious mind. “Telos” is definitely an “end” toward something could move toward. Of course “objects” (in general) do not “tend” to move to an end. Immaterial objects are simply affected by the environment. “Living” objects attempt to maintain their homeostasis in a changing environment, and when the “transmission errors” accumulate, they cease to be “living”. That could be understood as a “final” state.

The whole “teleological argument”, which is just a different version of the “design argument” is bogus. It confuses “order” with “design”. We can observe the order in nature, but order does not imply “design”. Order can be adequately explained by the laws of nature, some of which are deterministic and others are stochastic.

 

[polytropos]

I am a stickler for clarity. We live toady, with meanings that are assigned in today’s world. “Meanings” are not absolute, they keep changing as time goes on. To be called a “liberal” was a praise a few decades ago, its meaning was crystal clear: “someone who likes, cherishes freedom or liberty”. This meaning has been modified, and today if one wishes to express the same attitude, then a new word “libertarian” or “classic liberal” must be used. The “old” term of “liberal” is almost a “cuss-word” today and this change happened in a few decades, not many hundreds of years.

This is pretty irrelevant, though. Final cause is a compound term that has two words. If the two words are together, then we know we are referring to a term that has been well-defined since the time of Aristotle. There is literally nothing unclear about final cause. If I used the word cause casually and expected it to be taken as final cause, then I would be being unclear (but someone referring to final cause would not do that anyway, since they would explicitly distinguish it from the other 3 Aristotelian causes). Using the term final cause immediately indicates that I am referring to the term defined by Aristotle 2300 years ago.

Why should one accept ancient, outmoded definitions? Translate them into modern terminology.

They can be translated into modern terminology (end-directedness, intentionality). But suppose one is also used to doing exegesis of Aristotle’s (or some subsequent Aristotelian’s) works. Obviously, it makes sense to use a term that Aristotle uses, since it is not ambiguous anyway.

When these words have been coined, there was no understanding of the concept of “cause and effect” which exist in the physical world.

This is an absurd statement. Aristotle was not a fool who had no understanding of cause and effect. You might disagree with his doctrine of four causes, but he did base his works on observation rather than idle speculation.

For example:

Causation is a physical interaction between two objects, and it involves the exchange of elementary particles.

Aristotle definitely would not have denied that physical interaction between two objects was an instance of causation. This is essentially what was meant by efficient causality. Aristotle had other types of causes to explain that which efficient causality (and what your definition of causality) does not explain (but which they also do not rule out or exclude).

All that gobbledygook of “final”, “material”, “formal” and “efficient” causes were developed, since the people did not understand what causation IS, and so they speculated and came up with a bunch of useless definitions.

No, you are working with a narrower definition of causation which does not encompass all of Aristotle’s four causes. The following would be a non-sequitur: therefore, Aristotle’s four causes are false, speculative, or useless.

To assign a “telos” indicates a conscious mind. “Telos” is definitely an “end” toward something could move toward. Of course “objects” (in general) do not “tend” to move to an end. Immaterial objects are simply affected by the environment.

A recurring theme in what you’re saying here is that your claims do not preclude a full-bodied Aristotelian causality. Conscious action is definitely an instance of intentionality, and immaterial objects are affected by the environment, so we might say:

• Consciousness => intentionality

What this does not mean is that:

• Consciousness <=> intentionality

So to assert that to assign a telos necessarily indicates a conscious mind is simply unestablished by anything you’ve claimed. Conscious actions are intentional, but it does not follow that only conscious actions are intentional.

Similarly, immaterial objects are affected by their environment, but it does not follow that they are simply affected by their environment. To go back to the DNA example, no one is denying that it is not affected by its environment. Its being affected by its environment does not entail that it is not directed toward certain interactions and activities, however.

The whole “teleological argument”, which is just a different version of the “design argument” is bogus. It confuses “order” with “design”. We can observe the order in nature, but order does not imply “design”. Order can be adequately explained by the laws of nature, some of which are deterministic and others are stochastic.

The teleological argument is actually very distinct from the design argument. The design argument claims that organisms are “irreducibly complex” and so are most likely to have been designed by a creator. A teleological argument is not arguing from complexity (since it would hold that even simpler things have intentionality) and is not arguing for God as a “most likely” explanation of anything.

The laws of nature are also generally taken to be contingent. They are also not existents acting upon nature; they are cataloged and abstracted regularities between things that do exist. They describe the relationships between things rather than explain them.

 

[Bagheera]

A recurring theme in what you’re saying here is that your claims do not preclude a full-bodied Aristotelian causality. Conscious action is definitely an instance of intentionality, and immaterial objects are affected by the environment, so we might say:

• Consciousness => intentionality

What this does not mean is that:

• Consciousness <=> intentionality

So to assert that to assign a telos necessarily indicates a conscious mind is simply unestablished by anything you’ve claimed. Conscious actions are intentional, but it does not follow that only conscious actions are intentional.

Similarly, immaterial objects are affected by their environment, but it does not follow that they are simply affected by their environment.

1. What is an “immaterial OBJECT”? Concepts are definitely not composed of matter, attributes, relationships and actions are not “objects”, but all of them are contingent upon physical objects. Abstractions are not “objects”, but they are also dependent upon physical objects, and also a conscious mind, which can create “abstractions”. Again, the problem of precise definitions raise their “ugly” head.
2. Give me an example an “intention” which is not the result of a conscious mind. Sure looks like an oxymoron.

 

[Bagheera]

A recurring theme in what you’re saying here is that your claims do not preclude a full-bodied Aristotelian causality. Conscious action is definitely an instance of intentionality, and immaterial objects are affected by the environment, so we might say:

• Consciousness => intentionality

What this does not mean is that:

• Consciousness <=> intentionality

So to assert that to assign a telos necessarily indicates a conscious mind is simply unestablished by anything you’ve claimed. Conscious actions are intentional, but it does not follow that only conscious actions are intentional.

Similarly, immaterial objects are affected by their environment, but it does not follow that they are simply affected by their environment.

1. What is an “immaterial OBJECT”? Concepts are definitely not composed of matter, attributes, relationships and actions are not “objects”, but all of them are contingent upon physical objects. Abstractions are not “objects”, but they are also dependent upon physical objects, and also a conscious mind, which can create “abstractions”. Again, the problem of precise definitions raise their “ugly” head.
2. Give me an example an “intention” which is not the result of a conscious mind. Sure looks like an oxymoron.

The laws of nature are also generally taken to be contingent. They are also not existents acting upon nature; they are cataloged and abstracted regularities between things that do exist. They describe the relationships between things rather than explain them.

What do you mean by “explanation” here???

 

[Portofino]

Final causes, on the Thomistic view, are generally taken to explain why efficient causes can occur, ie. A can only be the efficient cause of B if B is the final cause of A. But the final cause is there whether or not the efficient cause is (whether or not the final cause is knowable). For instance, a strand of DNA has a final cause of unwinding, duplicating, and repackaging, but its form is certainly such that it is directed toward that end whether or not it actually does.

Can final causes change, evolve? Are they fixed eternally, or can they – in principle – change in the same way that a language changes, over time. In other words, are you positing that final causes can be malleable. Over the course of millions, if not billions of years, have certain causes gone extinct – or become greatly modified – with new final causes taking their place?

 

[polytropos]

1. What is an “immaterial OBJECT”? Concepts are definitely not composed of matter, attributes, relationships and actions are not “objects”, but all of them are contingent upon physical objects. Abstractions are not “objects”, but they are also dependent upon physical objects, and also a conscious mind, which can create “abstractions”. Again, the problem of precise definitions raise their “ugly” head.

My bad, I meant “material object,” as I’m assuming you did in post #12:

Immaterial objects are simply affected by the environment.

1. Give me an example an “intention” which is not the result of a conscious mind. Sure looks like an oxymoron.

From my post #2:

For instance, a strand of DNA has a final cause of unwinding, duplicating, and repackaging, but its form is certainly such that it is directed toward that end whether or not it actually does. (And certainly, any detailed account of DNA as an efficient cause would make an appeal to specific enzymes that interact with DNA in a certain way only because DNA has duplication as an end.) As such, it is not clear that we can dispense with final causes. We might stipulate that there are cases where we don’t need to use them, but the claim that they have no explanatory power simply seems to be false.

What do you mean by “explanation” here???

I don’t know, you were the first one to claim that the laws of nature were explanatory:

We can observe the order in nature, but order does not imply “design”. Order can be adequately explained by the laws of nature, some of which are deterministic and others are stochastic.

There is order, and from it we abstract descriptive laws of nature. Laws of nature do not cause order, nor do they account for it. They only describe order which is there. As such they do not explain order, since they presuppose its existence and are just a description of it.

 

[polytropos]

There is order, and from it we abstract descriptive laws of nature. Laws of nature do not cause order, nor do they account for it. They only describe order which is there. As such they do not explain order, since they presuppose its existence and are just a description of it.

To be clear, also, this is why an argument from order and teleology is different from an argument from complexity. Evolution does explain how complexity could arise.

 

[Bagheera]

My bad, I meant “material object,” as I’m assuming you did in post #12:

My most abject apologies. Yes, I meant “material objects”, and it was my fault to create this confusion. (My only explanation, which is not an excuse is that I made the post between two games of soccer in the Bundesliga, and did not pay as much attention as I should have. Please forgive me.) If we agree that speaking of “immaterial object” is nonsense, that is most agreeable.

From my post #2:

Where is the “intent” there? The DNA and its chemical actions/interactions perform the copy of information from the original to its “offspring”, but I cannot see any “intent” there. Could you amplify? I cannot see any “intent” without a conscious entity who “intends” it. The DNA simply does what it does, exactly as two atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen combine into a water molecule (under the proper circumstances). I cannot understand the proposition that hydrogen and oxygen “intend” to form a water molecule.

I don’t know, you were the first one to claim that the laws of nature were explanatory:

There is order, and from it we abstract descriptive laws of nature. Laws of nature do not cause order, nor do they account for it. They only describe order which is there. As such they do not explain order, since they presuppose its existence and are just a description of it.

I agree with this.

We could maybe discuss what an “explanation” is. As far as I am concerned it means that we gain information about the “ways and means” how something happens. If you mean that it should “explain” why (#1) there is order, then all I can say that the particles and the interaction of particles are brute facts, which do not need “external” explanation.

For the sake of clarity: In the English language there is one “why”, with two separate meanings. Why (#1) designates the antecedent cause of something, and why (#2) designates the “purpose” of something. It is most unfortunate that the two words happen to be the same. In this case I use why (#1). I see no reason to assume that why (#2) is a meaningful proposition.

To be clear, also, this is why an argument from order and teleology is different from an argument from complexity. Evolution does explain how complexity could arise.

I referred to this article:

philosophy.lander.edu/intro/aquinas.shtml

F.Part V. The Argument from Design. (Also named “The Teleological Argument”— The intricate design and order of existent things and natural processes imply that a Great Designer exists.)