Against Free-Will

[Perplexity]

This makes no sense. The idea that something as specific as an action a free-will believer claims one can be morally responsible for is “up to luck” under materialism is asinine. It has to be classical-mechanics certitude - there’s no way quantum randomness would have that kind of effect. Likewise, even if it were up to luck, there are many ways S could still be held morally responsible for that. Finally, this fails to disprove free will, since the claim of free will believers is “some human acts are free” not “all human acts”.

Could someone explain to me how or why Pieman inferred that I’ve said anything about materialism?

 

[Pieman333272]

Could someone explain to me how or why Pieman inferred that I’ve said anything about materialism?

Once you grant dualism, any and all physical barriers to free will dissolve with the possibility of a rational soul making the free choice where an all-mechanical brain couldn’t. Just as well, under your argument S’ rational soul could pick up where the other causal abilities left off in selecting whether or not to actualize A, thereby making it non-random.

 

[Bobber90]

Once you grant dualism, any and all physical barriers to free will dissolve with the possibility of a rational soul making the free choice where an all-mechanical brain couldn’t. Just as well, under your argument S’ rational soul could pick up where the other causal abilities left off in selecting whether or not to actualize A, thereby making it non-random.

If the non-physical has causal influence over the physical and acts according to reasons, wouldn’t we assume that the physical has reciprocal causal influence?

 

[MindOverMatter2]

If the non-physical has causal influence over the physical and acts according to reasons, wouldn’t we assume that the physical has reciprocal causal influence?

With out parts, its really a one way street unless God wills that physical components have a reciprocal effect on contingent minds. A cog-wheel can turn another cog-wheel because they both share the same nature. If physical reality is the produce of a mind and will, then what happens in physical reality is really up to the being that is the source of all physical and contingent things.

 

[Bobber90]

With out parts, its really a one way street unless God wills that physical components have a reciprocal effect on contingent minds. A cog-wheel can turn another cog-wheel because they both share the same nature. If physical reality is the produce of a mind and will, then what happens in physical reality is really up to the being that is the source of all physical and contingent things.

It is the reasons for action/inaction that are supreme though, surely? They relate to both sides of the dualism, and I do not see how there can be only one direction of causation when thinking is thinking of, about, on the physical world - even if done in a non-physical one.

 

[empther]

If the non-physical has causal influence over the physical and acts according to reasons, wouldn’t we assume that the physical has reciprocal causal influence?

No. There is no way for the physical body to fully control the spiritual soul in normal circumtances of everyday life. ( Naturally, a person can be broken down and controlled by torture, but that’s not normal circumstances. ) The physical can influence the free will only in the sense of supplying choices, such as what to eat for dinner, but the free will decides.

Compare the soul to a fog bank and compare the body to a bulldozer. The fog’s moisture will eventually rust the bulldozer, but the bulldozer can do nothing to the fog.

I couldn’t resist knocking another agnostic coming on this thread to support Perplexity,
but debating Perplexity himself is a waste of time. He will always throw out more garbage to deflect your attention away from the weaknesses in his previous garbage.

 

[Bobber90]

No. There is no way for the physical body to fully control the spiritual soul in normal circumtances of everyday life. ( Natually, a person can be broken down and controller by torture, but that’s not normal circumstances. )

Compare the soul to a fog bank and compare the body to a bulkdoser. The fog’s moisture will eventually rust the bulldozer, but the bulldozer can do nothing to the fog.

I couldn’t resist knocking another agnostic coming on this thread to support Perplexity,
but debating Perplexity himself is a waste of time. He will always throw out more garbage to deflect you from the weaknesses in his previous garbage.

Thanks for your attention, I don’t mind you disagreeing or forcefully disagreeing with me. If there is a mystery over how the physical could possibly control the non-physical, I think that is because they do not overlap; there is similarly the mystery of how on earth the non-physical would interact with the physical. The example of fog/machinery would help us here but for the fact that fog is just as physical as machinery in dualism.

 

[empther]

Thanks for your attention, I don’t mind you disagreeing or forcefully disagreeing with me. If there is a mystery over how the physical could possibly control the non-physical, I think that is because they do not overlap; there is similarly the mystery of how on earth the non-physical would interact with the physical.

Similar to the mystery of how a totally spiritual God could create and thereafter manipulate the physical universe, but if you don’t accept that it’s possible, you still have the embarrassing question of how to explain the universe.

The example of fog/machinery would help us here but for the fact that fog is just as physical as machinery in dualism.

I chose the fog/bulldozer analogy because the bulldozer has the rigidity needed to push other solid objects around, but the fog lackes the rigidity to be pushed around.
Likewise, the body has no way to “seize”, “push”, or otherwise control the soul.

 

[Perplexity]

I couldn’t resist knocking another agnostic coming on this thread to support Perplexity, but debating Perplexity himself is a waste of time. He will always throw out more garbage to deflect your attention away from the weaknesses in his previous garbage.

I love how empther thinks he’s knocking anyone at all. The guy is so far behind in philosophy I’d have to spend semesters trying teach him so he could catch up and have a worth-while conversation on these issues.

But, I am curious…does anyone else think I respond to objections by throwing garbage out there to deflect attention? I’d certainly like to know if I do that.

 

[Perplexity]

Once you grant dualism, any and all physical barriers to free will dissolve with the possibility of a rational soul making the free choice where an all-mechanical brain couldn’t. Just as well, under your argument S’ rational soul could pick up where the other causal abilities left off in selecting whether or not to actualize A, thereby making it non-random.

I chose the variable S to range over any and all cognizers, whether physical or immaterial. In this way, I could speak of the most general relation between an agent and indeterminacy. So, when you say a rational soul could pick up where the other causal abilities left off etc. you’re assuming an agent with a rational soul is different from S.

But, suppose S is a rational soul. The same problem ensues. In order for S’s action A to be genuinely indeterminate, we must be able to take all of S’s causal contributions to A and say they’re insufficient to bring about A. Otherwise, it’s determined. But, if S’s contributions to A are insufficient, then after taking them all into account there’s just no telling whether A will occur or not. You might say it’s more likely to occur. But, I’m not sure how that would change the fact that it could very well not occur also. It’s just a matter of luck.

 

[empther]

Perlplexity’s post #70

chose the variable S to range over any and all cognizers, whether physical or immaterial. In this way, I could speak of the most general relation between an agent and indeterminacy. So, when you say a rational soul could pick up where the other causal abilities left off etc. you’re assuming an agent with a rational soul is different from S.

But, suppose S is a rational soul. The same problem ensues. In order for S’s action A to be genuinely indeterminate, we must be able to take all of S’s causal contributions to A and say they’re insufficient to bring about A. Otherwise, it’s determined. But, if S’s contributions to A are insufficient, then after taking them all into account there’s just no telling whether A will occur or not. You might say it’s more likely to occur. But, I’m not sure how that would change the fact that it could very well not occur also. It’s just a matter of luck.

Dd you notice that Perplexity just writes more obscure garbage to cover his butt,
right after I wrote a couple of posts in clear plain English, even giving concrete analogies from everyday life, to make the concepts perfectly clear?

This is the difference between truth tellers like me, and the nonsense blabberors like Perplexity.

 

[prodigalson2011]

I don’t know where to begin with this one…there’s just so many things that need addressing.

I suppose for now I’ll content myself with pointing out that the denial of free-will (as I’ve specified) doesn’t entail or even remotely imply the reductionist worldview you describe above. I really have no idea where you’re getting a lot of these ideas. Have you read any books on free-will within contemporary philosophy?

You speak of contemporary philosophy as if its understandings are definitive truth, and you obviously derive your arguments from it. I’ve read alot of things, and to me, frankly, alot of it is pompous, elitist tripe that congratulates itself on its ambiguity. As illustrated by your argument, so much contemporary philosophy is stretched to ridiculous lengths to turn a rather basic discussion into something so impenetrable and inapplicable to real life as to render it comical. For instance:

The objection is simply that if an agent’s action is indeterminate, then the agent is not the kind of source of that action she needs to be if she is to be morally responsible for it.

Let’s hear a real world example of this. All I see is mental gymnastics; a maverick postulization of some notion of “indeterminate action.” Give me an example of a real time event that would support your statement, not just some fancy metaphysical equation.

 

[Bobber90]

Similar to the mystery of how a totally spiritual God could create and thereafter manipulate the physical universe, but if you don’t accept that it’s possible, you still have the embarrassing question of how to explain the universe.

If anyone could understand how it is possible, rather than just assert that it must be, then I would be very interested. Given that the choices are ‘embarrassment’ vs accepting confusion, I will have to be embarrassed.

I chose the fog/bulldozer analogy because the bulldozer has the rigidity needed to push other solid objects around, but the fog lackes the rigidity to be pushed around.
Likewise, the body has no way to “seize”, “push”, or otherwise control the soul.

The ‘soul’ takes information about the physical realm from the bodily senses, which are themselves affected by attention and basically a host of physical things. How can the two realms not have a reciprocal influence?

 

[Perplexity]

Perlplexity’s post #70

Dd you notice that Perplexity just writes more obscure garbage to cover his butt,
right after I wrote a couple of posts in clear plain English, even giving concrete analogies from everyday life, to make the concepts perfectly clear?

This is the difference between truth tellers like me, and the nonsense blabberors like Perplexity.

Again…the language and concepts I’m using aren’t anything new. I’m sorry you’re struggling to keep up. It only tells me though you haven’t spent any remarkable amount of time reading about this. I’m a truth-teller (i.e., honest), apparently…I just have a bigger vocab than you. New and big words don’t make a statement false.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Perlplexity’s post #70

Dd you notice that Perplexity just writes more obscure garbage to cover his butt,
right after I wrote a couple of posts in clear plain English, even giving concrete analogies from everyday life, to make the concepts perfectly clear?

This is the difference between truth tellers like me, and the nonsense blabberors like Perplexity.

Quite. Noam Chomsky, the linguist (and far left activist, but that’s a story for another thread) has a quote about intellectualism I really like. I don’t have the source on hand, but it’s something to the effect of “if your idea cannot be expressed clearly monosyllabically, it’s probably bull.” Obviously he doesn’t mean each word must be one syllable, but in the context of the interview, he was referring to philosophers and other intellectuals who have to resort to the implication of “insider jargon” and “hot words” of their particular philosophical system. Chomsky would eat a hole right through Perplexity. I’ll dig through my old books later and see if I can’t find the actual quote.

 

[Bobber90]

Quite. Noam Chomsky, the linguist (and far left activist, but that’s a story for another thread) has a quote about intellectualism I really like. I don’t have the source on hand, but it’s something to the effect of “if your idea cannot be expressed clearly monosyllabically, it’s probably bull.” Obviously he doesn’t mean each word must be one syllable, but in the context of the interview, he was referring to philosophers and other intellectuals who have to resort to the implication of “insider jargon” and “hot words” of their particular philosophical system. Chomsky would eat a hole right through Perplexity. I’ll dig through my old books later and see if I can’t find the actual quote.

I agree that an idea ought to be possible to express concisely, but hang on a second - there is nothing complex about what the OP said. I personally cannot cope with logical symbols and uses of letters, yet the description of actors at t1 and t2 was clear.

The argument was that indeterminacy doesn’t allow for free will, and surely the real difficulties are understanding the paradox that life doesn’t seem to contain indeterminacy, it does seem to have free will, hard determinism doesn’t permit free will, so what really is the compatibilism that is left? Is it the necessary outcome of these premises, or is it empirically definable (or both)?

 

[Perplexity]

I’ve read alot of things, and to me, frankly, alot of it is pompous, elitist tripe that congratulates itself on its ambiguity.

That’s nice. I’ve seen the same in non-contemporary philosophy. Even granting that this philosophy is pompous etc. it could still be true, so I don’t see what you’re hoping to achieve through this degradation.

As illustrated by your argument, so much contemporary philosophy is stretched to ridiculous lengths to turn a rather basic discussion into something so impenetrable and inapplicable to real life as to render it comical.

I can hardly make sense of this talk of real life etc. To me this is like complaining to a physicist that he’s using too big of words. So what? Physics et al need to sore. Let’s not clip the eagle’s wings to tip the ol’ hat to Nietzsche

Let’s hear a real world example of this. All I see is mental gymnastics; a maverick postulization of some notion of “indeterminate action.” Give me an example of a real time event that would support your statement, not just some fancy metaphysical equation.

Much of metaphysisc (the field free-will skirmishes take place on) is about making ‘mathematical’ or ‘symbolic’ models of reality. It’s just how science works. But, fair enough, try this out:

I’m thinking about standing up. At time t1 I’m sitting. At time t2, I’m standing. Prior to t2, I desire to stand in the more or less absent minded way I usually desire to physically move (like when I walk, I’m not really that conscious of all the physical stuff going on with each step). Nevertheless I choose to stand, or act on my desire.

If that action (of standing) is indeterminate, then prior to t2, no cause or causes are sufficient to entail my standing. That is, my desire to stand, my thought to stand etc. aren’t enough to make me stand. They might make it likely that I do, but aren’t the sufficient cause themselves. As we stipulated, I stood up. Was I responsible for that action? I don’t think so.** I **wasn’t the sufficient cause of it.

 

[Pieman333272]

I chose the variable S to range over any and all cognizers, whether physical or immaterial. In this way, I could speak of the most general relation between an agent and indeterminacy. So, when you say a rational soul could pick up where the other causal abilities left off etc. you’re assuming an agent with a rational soul is different from S.

If it’s not then the case you describe is impossible.

But, suppose S is a rational soul. The same problem ensues. In order for S’s action A to be genuinely indeterminate, we must be able to take all of S’s causal contributions to A and say they’re insufficient to bring about A. Otherwise, it’s determined.

You, sir, don’t know what you are talking about. Indeterminism is not the case you describe - indeterminism is compatible with S’ causal contributions to A adding to A, just not that S is guaranteed to bring about A.

You might say it’s more likely to occur. But, I’m not sure how that would change the fact that it could very well not occur also. It’s just a matter of luck.

You show even more ignorance here. What kind of mechanism for “luck” is there? Quantum fluxes and radioactive decay? Guess what - those are too far removed to have any effect on anything a free will believer would claim S could be morally responsible for.

 

[Pieman333272]

If the non-physical has causal influence over the physical and acts according to reasons, wouldn’t we assume that the physical has reciprocal causal influence?

The immaterial aspects of the mind can be affected by the physical, but the physical cannot force it into anything - there is no physical (name removed by moderator)ut that will guarantee you have a certain thought. There is mental output that in normal cases will guarantee you perform a certain action.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Again…the language and concepts I’m using aren’t anything new. I’m sorry you’re struggling to keep up. It only tells me though you haven’t spent any remarkable amount of time reading about this. I’m a truth-teller (i.e., honest), apparently…I just have a bigger vocab than you. New and big words don’t make a statement false.

I never implied your language was anything new. I’m not struggling to keep up. You and your ilk are struggling to get ahead by creating these theoretical systems that are based on, but bear no resemblance to, real life. You then congratulate yourselves on understanding everyone else better than themselves. It’s intellectual egotism. Just being HONEST.

Which brings us to, “I’M A TRUTH TELLER.” Are you sure? Of course, if there’s no free will there would be no reason to be proud of it either way. Not like it’s your own doing. And besides that, I don’t see how spouting out extremely vague postulates that have no concrete or permanent bearing on any thing we might actually deem “truth” makes you a “truth teller.”

“I HAVE A BIGGER VOCAB THAN YOU.” Really? We’re resorting to playground taunts? As though this means anything at all. In my view, someone who feels the need to flex their arcane vocabulary is just showing their even deeper need to feel superior.

“NEW AND BIG WORDS DON’T MAKE A STATEMENT FALSE.” Nor do they make it true, as you seem to think. My quarrel was not with your words, but the syntax and structure of your argument. Your language is intentionally vague, not meaning that the words don’t have clear meanings, but that your logic and its implications for our reality would be very hard if not impossible to verify, or falsify as the case may be.