Against Free-Will

[Bobber90]

As you rightly noted, materialism does not produce values. If it permits “subjective valuations”, it can only do so in a dismissive sense, in that those “subjective values” are accidental and inconsequential. That fact DOES impel you to reduce the “meaning of your life,” because within the materialistic worldview, any meaning that goes beyond physical function is illusory and, inherently, without value. “Subjective value” is the golden calf of materialism. While the materialist knows it is an empty god, he continues to exalt it nonetheless.

Bob Dylan said it best, “Sooner or later, ya gotta serve somebody.”

Our values appear the lesser when God as their source is taken away, whilst values whose grounding is an appeal to objectivity appear the lesser in materialism if God was never there. So I can understand part of your point from a theistic perspective. However, it does not follow that in materialism any meaning has to relate to evolutionary function or any function at all. The fact of evolution would confer no values… or as some evolutionary scientist said “Why should I care about my genes? My genes don’t care about me!” or something of the like.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Our values appear the lesser when God as their source is taken away, whilst values whose grounding is an appeal to objectivity appear the lesser in materialism if God was never there. So I can understand part of your point from a theistic perspective. However, it does not follow that in materialism any meaning has to relate to evolutionary function or any function at all. The fact of evolution would confer no values… or as some evolutionary scientist said “Why should I care about my genes? My genes don’t care about me!” or something of the like.

What, then, can meaning relate to, without becoming a fantastic delusion? Since in materialism, all things ultimately lead to nothing, then its ultimate meaning is… nothing. Seems like a closed case to me.

Again, I think it is mistaken to equate meaning to value. Value is a substratum of meaning. As for the evolutionary scientist, he shouldn’t care about anything at all because “he” doesn’t exist. Only his genes.

 

[Bobber90]

What, then, can meaning relate to, without becoming a fantastic delusion? Since in materialism, all things ultimately lead to nothing, then its ultimate meaning is… nothing. Seems like a closed case to me.

Again, I think it is mistaken to equate meaning to value. Value is a substratum of meaning. As for the evolutionary scientist, he shouldn’t care about anything at all because “he” doesn’t exist. Only his genes.

Subjective meaning can only be considered a delusion in materialism if it pretends to be objectively grounded. If I genuinely and, purely subjectively, care about something (eg, the health and happiness of my family), who is anyone to tell me that my attitude is insignificant because it is not objective? They would find out quite the opposite.

This relates to stuff I came across recently on objective moral values, which you might be interested to take a look at - it is the thread titled ‘Objective morality’ on this sub-forum.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Subjective meaning can only be considered a delusion in materialism if it pretends to be objectively grounded. If I genuinely and, purely subjectively, care about something (eg, the health and happiness of my family), who is anyone to tell me that my attitude is insignificant because it is not objective? They would find out quite the opposite.

This relates to stuff I came across recently on objective moral values, which you might be interested to take a look at - it is the thread titled ‘Objective morality’ on this sub-forum.

What you are discussing are subjective feelings, which I would argue are closely related to, but separate from, and perhaps even indicative of, objective meaning. Meaning is not an emotional state. But the overall pattern of human emotions suggests there is an intrinsic, objective value to the subjects of our feelings. I admit this assertion would need further explication to merit any serious consideration, but I haven’t the time at the moment. Perhaps I can come back to it later, if you like.

 

[Bobber90]

What you are discussing are subjective feelings, which I would argue are closely related to, but separate from, and perhaps even indicative of, objective meaning. Meaning is not an emotional state. But the overall pattern of human emotions suggests there is an intrinsic, objective value to the subjects of our feelings. I admit this assertion would need further explication to merit any serious consideration, but I haven’t the time at the moment. Perhaps I can come back to it later, if you like.

I would definitely like to hear more about the relationship between subjective feelings and objective meaning. The idea of patterns of emotion indicating intrinsic, objective value to the objects of our emotions is also very interesting, but I would advise looking at the thread first to anticipate objections. Ultimately, I would not expect that we convince each other, but it is interesting nonetheless.

 

[prodigalson2011]

To begin, I’ll draw out the most evident objection to a correlation between emotions and objective reality, which would be the obvious fact that trying to deduce an objective truth purely from emotional experience will yield about as much success as trying to start a fire with a bucket of water. However, I won’t be looking at objective realities through the lens of emotion. Rather, I’d like to first make some observations about the metaphysical tendencies of certain human emotions, and then pose some questions about the material nature of emotions in general.
So, firstly, I think we can, with relative certainty, say that human beings are capable of experiencing certain emotional states that our animal cousins cannot. Things such as spiritual ecstacy, pure joy, longing, profound sorrow, wonder and awe, moral guilt (especially without the influence of negative external (name removed by moderator)ut.) So, what separates these things from the more primitive emotions, i.e. fear, happiness, anxiety, depression? I would posit that the latter correspond exclusively to the temporal state of the subject in question, whereas the former correspond, positively or negatively, to such transcendent concepts as eternity, purity, good/evil etc. Does this, as I believe, point to the objective existence of these seemingly superstitious notions? One can quickly posit that these are merely the byproducts of our highly evolved brains, and as such are completely natural phenomena, and so the materialist might quickly sweep my argument back under the rug of failed philosophies where it belongs.
But, while important to the overall theme of my argument, these observations are not really the grounds of it. I would now like to turn to the material processes involved in our emotional experiences.
The question I am about to pose can be applied, I believe, with equal validity to any aspect of evolutionary theory, but for purposes of illustration, I’d like to start by applying it to the most common point of “controversy,” if you can call it that, between naturalistic evolutionists and ID’ers or creationists. The ID’er argues that the eye is too complex a structure to have evolved. The scientist then demonstrates that very simple light receptive organs exist in certain worms and then perhaps shows a few intermediary levels of sight ability, and then rests content in the knowledge that the pesky ID’er is back in his proper place: pwned, to use the modern parlance. However, I think the fatal mistake in this anti-naturalistic argument is using something purely physical, in this case the eye, which can clearly exist in a multitude of levels of complexity from the stupidly simple to the stupefyingly intricate, rather than asking a very fundamental question that I think has been entirely overlooked in evolutionary theory, probably because it cannot be answered scientifically. Before posing the question, it is necessary for us to examine and deeply consider one of the most generally accepted beliefs of the evolutionary school. And that is that evolution is an unconscious process. Let that soak in for a minute.
Now, taking that for granted, the question arises. And it is a question of something even more complex than the eye could ever hope to be. The very idea of sight. We can explain the eye. Can we explain “seeing?” Where did the idea of “sight” come from? If evolution is an unconscious process, by what means did a bundle of self-replicating animated cells decide they had better start organizing a means of translating light into a visual map that could separate varying frequencies into a spectrum of colors, depths, etc.? Once this is decided, how does an unconscious, unintelligent process go about building such a system? How does it know which kind of cells will be able to accomplish such a feat? Now let’s apply the question to the even more complicated question of emotions. By what means does an unconscious process determine that by combining and secreting certain chemical compounds into its constituent nervous system, it can produce even the most basic physiological and psychological effects to correspond to appropriate stimuli? Then moving beyond the basic category of emotions into the more advanced human set, by what means does this unconscious, unintelligent process produce creatures that exceed its own level of cognizance? By what means did this process, with no help from the illusory “persons” it creates develop electrochemical processes sophisticated enough to infer a sense of glory and beauty from a sunset? How did an unconscious, purely physical process produce such a transcendent concept to begin with?
It’s a bit like saying you can give a blind cave man a wrench and tell him to build you a car and he’ll eventually, without even giving him any idea what the word “car” means, build a Model T. What I’m saying is, the evidence suggests to me that consciousness is a necessary precedent for life. The idea precedes the product. Think of it as a far more universal application of the age old philosophical conundrum: “If a trees falls in the forest, and no one is around to hear it…”
And, ultimately, where there is consciousness, there is purpose of some sort. Where there is purpose, there is meaning. From here, you’re left to decide what those things are. As for me…

cont…

 

[prodigalson2011]

…cont. from previous post

If you’ll permit me to digress into a bit of soft scientific reflection, this is one of the things that really struck me as beautiful when I began digging back into my Christian heritage: of all creation accounts, Genesis fits modern science so beautifully. In the creation narrative, nowhere does it say, “God said let there be a bear, and there was a bear. … Let there be a tree, and there was a tree.” No. God says, “Let the Earth bring forth every kind of plant… Let the Earth bring forth every kind of animal…” God let the Earth develop life on its own. But the IDEA was His. Add to this the fact that the sequence of creation essentially matches what we now know to be true: In the beginning, the earth was formless and void. Check. Covered in darkness. Check. Clouds clear, there is light. Check. Water and land separate. Mountains rise out of the ground. Check. Life begins in water. Check. Earth covered in vegetation. Check. Fish and birds are the first animals (and before you object that birds came from dinosaurs, archaeologists have recently discovered fully evolved birds that were contemporary with dinosaurs). Check. Land animals next, followed by: Man. While necessarily more simplistic and poetic than a technical scientific account, it holds up extremely well in its developmental arch. Just food for thought. There’s a lot more on this I can refer you to if you’re interested.

 

[prodigalson2011]

That’s nice. I’ve seen the same in non-contemporary philosophy. Even granting that this philosophy is pompous etc. it could still be true, so I don’t see what you’re hoping to achieve through this degradation.

I can hardly make sense of this talk of real life etc. To me this is like complaining to a physicist that he’s using too big of words. So what? Physics et al need to sore. Let’s not clip the eagle’s wings to tip the ol’ hat to Nietzsche

After reading back over our brief conversations a few points came to my attention. The statement, “I can hardly make sense of this talk of real life…” is extremely telling!
And there’s nothing wrong with the words you’re using, but the argument you’re building with them. It’s a house of cards. Real physicists and crackpot physicists share the same vocabulary. And, as a side note, I assure you I have no interest in tipping any hat to Nietzsche.

Much of metaphysisc (the field free-will skirmishes take place on) is about making ‘mathematical’ or ‘symbolic’ models of reality. It’s just how science works. But, fair enough, try this out:

Yes, it certainly is how science works. You’ll notice I bolded the words “models of reality.” Scientific models of reality, in whatever field, should be able to be illustrated with real world examples. Any philosopher worth his salt can do this. Bertrand Russell spent an entire chapter using a table to make his argument. A physicist can demonstrate, using real objects, software, or various other means REAL WORLD examples of the principles he is addressing. You, however, seem to be unable to move beyond the abstract lexicon of this decidedly modern and decidedly absurd free will philosophy. I will grant you tried with the following example, but…

I’m thinking about standing up. At time t1 I’m sitting. At time t2, I’m standing. Prior to t2, I desire to stand in the more or less absent minded way I usually desire to physically move (like when I walk, I’m not really that conscious of all the physical stuff going on with each step). Nevertheless I choose to stand, or act on my desire.

If that action (of standing) is indeterminate, then prior to t2, no cause or causes are sufficient to entail my standing. That is, my desire to stand, my thought to stand etc. aren’t enough to make me stand. They might make it likely that I do, but aren’t the sufficient cause themselves. As we stipulated, I stood up. Was I responsible for that action? I don’t think so.** I **wasn’t the sufficient cause of it.

There is an incredible amount of smoke and mirrors going on here. “If the action is indeterminate.” Again, I cry “sophistry!” You’re creating dilemmas where there are none.
This looks like a job for Occam’s Razor!
You’ve really just dressed your example up in very specious philosophical trappings, from which you derive some consistent conclusions, but the very model you’re proposing lacks any foundation. “My desire to stand, my thought to stand aren’t enough to make me stand.” Are they not? What might be then? It’s what most reasonable people would call will. You seemingly choose to think it’s something completely divorced from you, perhaps because you have some vested interest in remaining morally unaccountable. Sorry if that sounds uncharitable, I just can’t imagine another reason why someone would put so much effort into denying their freedom. C’mon. Be free.

 

[Perplexity]

After reading back over our brief conversations a few points came to my attention. The statement, “I can hardly make sense of this talk of real life…” is extremely telling!

I said that because I really don’t understand why you’re drawing this dichotomy. I can’t make sense of it.

And there’s nothing wrong with the words you’re using, but the argument you’re building with them. It’s a house of cards. Real physicists and crackpot physicists share the same vocabulary. And, as a side note, I assure you I have no interest in tipping any hat to Nietzsche.

As the reader will note, prodigalson makes claims like ‘It’s a house of cards’ several times but you’ll be wont find any supporting reason for these claims in his post.

Yes, it certainly is how science works. You’ll notice I bolded the words “models of reality.” Scientific models of reality, in whatever field, should be able to be illustrated with real world examples. Any philosopher worth his salt can do this. Bertrand Russell spent an entire chapter using a table to make his argument. A physicist can demonstrate, using real objects, software, or various other means REAL WORLD examples of the principles he is addressing.

I don’t understand how you can make these claims and have any familiarity with scientific models. They’re almost purely mathematical.

You, however, seem to be unable to move beyond the abstract lexicon of this decidedly modern and decidedly absurd free will philosophy. I will grant you tried with the following example, but…

It’s uncustomary to do this in metaphysics. We need to understand the model first before we see if it lines up with reality.

There is an incredible amount of smoke and mirrors going on here. “If the action is indeterminate.” Again, I cry “sophistry!” You’re creating dilemmas where there are none.
This looks like a job for Occam’s Razor!

These are some of those claims I mentioned earlier. Maybe you’ll be able to find the supporting reasons, I certainly wasn’t able to.

You’ve really just dressed your example up in very specious philosophical trappings, from which you derive some consistent conclusions, but the very model you’re proposing lacks any foundation.

Just vague criticisms…supporting reasons have gotta be here somewhere.

“My desire to stand, my thought to stand aren’t enough to make me stand.” Are they not? What might be then? It’s what most reasonable people would call will

His first critique I can actually interact with is the claim that a person’s will is the sufficient cause for the action of standing up in my scenario. This means he must locate the indeterminacy in the will itself or something prior to it, otherwise we’re not even talking about the relation between free-will and indeterminacy. No matter where you locate the indeterminacy, the same conundrum arises: the causal influences prior to the obtaining of whatever will be insufficient to bring it about, so if it does occur, it’s not really because of those causal influences. That’s not to say they didn’t help.

You seemingly choose to think it’s something completely divorced from you, perhaps because you have some vested interest in remaining morally unaccountable. Sorry if that sounds uncharitable, I just can’t imagine another reason why someone would put so much effort into denying their freedom. C’mon. Be free.

I don’t think it’d matter whether I wanted to be morally unaccountable. I don’t see how that’d effect anything I’ve said. Although, for the record, I only hold this position (as far as I know) because I think the alternatives are vastly more improbable.

 

[prodigalson2011]

I said that because I really don’t understand why you’re drawing this dichotomy. I can’t make sense of it.

What dichotomy? If a theory cannot be related to the phenomena it is addressing without referring back to itself, it is nothing more than a circular argument and therefore useless.

As the reader will note, prodigalson makes claims like ‘It’s a house of cards’ several times but you’ll be wont find any supporting reason for these claims in his post.

house of cards - a structure or plan that is insubstantial and subject to imminent collapse, as a structure made by balancing playing cards against each other.

Your argument hinges upon the idea of indeterminacy. Indeterminacy is a philosophical dead end. You cannot find indeterminacy outside of the hypothesis of indeterminacy itself. By no logical means can its reality be asserted. It remains eternally hypothetical. Your argument attempts to bolster itself on thin air. It is “subject to imminent collapse.” Hence, it is a “house of cards.”

I don’t understand how you can make these claims and have any familiarity with scientific models. They’re almost purely mathematical.

The models themselves are mathematical, but the consequences of those models can be predicted and observed and, thus, either falsified or verified. The consequences of your theory remain unchanged whether or not it is true. It is unfalsifiable, and thus unscientific.

It’s uncustomary to do this in metaphysics. We need to understand the model first before we see if it lines up with reality.

Again, there is no way to see if your model lines up with reality. The variable (indeterminacy) is not observable, either directly or indirectly. As in your previous illustration of “the act of standing”, whether your assumption is applied to the scenario or not, the outcome remains unchanged. Your assertion may fit logically, but not reasonably. That is, you simply provide no reason to assume indeterminacy.

These are some of those claims I mentioned earlier. Maybe you’ll be able to find the supporting reasons, I certainly wasn’t able to.

smoke and mirrors - artful deception.

As I think I’ve fairly amply demonstrated, your theory is deceptive in that it is built on a very dubious ground from which no solid observations can be extrapolated. All you can do is take linear events and insert your premise into them. If your theory were to be expressed in a numerical equation, the only value “indeterminacy” could assume would be 0. Whether it is a part of the equation or not, the results remain the same. Your theory cannot be resolved.

Occam’s Razor - the maxim that assumptions introduced to explain a thing must not be multiplied beyond necessity.

This is a perfect recapitulation of the above paragraph. You introduce an entirely unnecessary (and untestable) concept to explain the relationship between cause and effect. The will is self-evident. The self is also self-evident. You can logically debate this, but you cannot reasonably debate it. You can use logic to argue almost any position, but just because it’s logical does not make it intelligent, or worthy of consideration. One must exercise some amount of reasonable discretion.

His first critique I can actually interact with is the claim that a person’s will is the sufficient cause for the action of standing up in my scenario. This means he must locate the indeterminacy in the will itself or something prior to it, otherwise we’re not even talking about the relation between free-will and indeterminacy. No matter where you locate the indeterminacy, the same conundrum arises: the causal influences prior to the obtaining of whatever will be insufficient to bring it about, so if it does occur, it’s not really because of those causal influences. That’s not to say they didn’t help.

No, my point has all along been that indeterminacy need not be posited at all, much less located. No matter where you “locate” it, you haven’t really “located it at all.” You’ve inserted it.

I don’t think it’d matter whether I wanted to be morally unaccountable. I don’t see how that’d effect anything I’ve said. Although, for the record, I only hold this position (as far as I know) because I think the alternatives are vastly more improbable.

By what means of deduction do you arrive at the conclusion that the alternatives are vastly more improbable? The probability of your position does not, to my mind, appear measurable at all. If you cannot actually calculate any approximation of probability, your position is held for strictly personal reasons.

 

[Perplexity]

Indeterminacy is a philosophical dead end. You cannot find indeterminacy outside of the hypothesis of indeterminacy itself. By no logical means can its reality be asserted. It remains eternally hypothetical.

I’d like to focus on this claim for now because I think it’s the most significant.

I take your above remarks about indeterminacy’s non-reality to be equivalent to the claim: indeterminism is false. That seems fair doesn’t it?

Determinism, as it’s understood in the currect subject, is simply that position which says the past (all events which have occurred before now) and the laws of nature together entail a single, unique future. There are no alternative possibilities. The present is determined, as is the future.

Indeterminism is simply the denial of determinism.

We’ve been discussing whether free-will is compatible with indeterminism. In my OP, I took it for granted that the participants in this discussion agreed that free-will is incompatible with determinism.

I’ll now lay out an argument which refutes your position:

1. Either determinism is true, or indeterminism is true.
2. Indeterminism is false.
3. Therefore, determinism is true.
4. If determinism is true, we are not morally responsible for any of our actions.
5. But, we are morally responsible for our actions.
6. Therefore, determinism is false.
7. Therefore, either determinism is true or indeterminism and neither determinism is true nor is indeterminism is true. [Contradiction]

(1) is just an instance of excluded middle
(2) is what you’ve asserted above
(3) is just a deduction from (1)-(2) via disjunction
(4) seems to be what you and the others agree on
(5) again seems to be what you assert
(6) is the logical deduction from (4)-(5) via modus tollens
(7) is the logical deduction of (1); (2) and (6) via conjunction.

How do we avoid (7)? I think your best bet is to reject (2). No matter what you do, you’ll have to contradict something you’ve previously said but this is the worst bullet you could bite of the options.

If you reject (2), then you’ll have to admit indeterminacy exists and consequently so do the problems it involves. Note, you said indeterminacy was problematic for free-will; but, avoided these by rejecting indeterminacy. So, in having to admit indeterminacy it seems you’ll have to embrace hard-indeterminism as I myself have.

 

[tonyrey]

I’d like to focus on this claim for now because I think it’s the most significant.

I take your above remarks about indeterminacy’s non-reality to be equivalent to the claim: indeterminism is false. That seems fair doesn’t it?

Determinism, as it’s understood in the currect subject, is simply that position which says the past (all events which have occurred before now) and the laws of nature together entail a single, unique future. There are no alternative possibilities. The present is determined, as is the future.

Indeterminism is simply the denial of determinism.

We’ve been discussing whether free-will is compatible with indeterminism. In my OP, I took it for granted that the participants in this discussion agreed that free-will is incompatible with determinism.

I’ll now lay out an argument which refutes your position:

1. Either determinism is true, or indeterminism is true.
2. Indeterminism is false.
3. Therefore, determinism is true.
4. If determinism is true, we are not morally responsible for any of our actions.
5. But, we are morally responsible for our actions.
6. Therefore, determinism is false.
7. Therefore, either determinism is true or indeterminism and neither determinism is true nor is indeterminism is true. [Contradiction]

(1) is just an instance of excluded middle
(2) is what you’ve asserted above
(3) is just a deduction from (1)-(2) via disjunction
(4) seems to be what you and the others agree on
(5) again seems to be what you assert
(6) is the logical deduction from (4)-(5) via modus tollens
(7) is the logical deduction of (1); (2) and (6) via conjunction.

How do we avoid (7)? I think your best bet is to reject (2). No matter what you do, you’ll have to contradict something you’ve previously said but this is the worst bullet you could bite of the options.

If you reject (2), then you’ll have to admit indeterminacy exists and consequently so do the problems it involves. Note, you said indeterminacy was problematic for free-will; but, avoided these by rejecting indeterminacy. So, in having to admit indeterminacy it seems you’ll have to embrace hard-indeterminism as I myself have.

You have overlooked self-determinism!

 

[Perplexity]

You have overlooked self-determinism!

I don’t think self-determinism is in the same kinda category determinism and indeterminism are in. Self-determinism seems more like an event to me, where prior to choosing, the agent is indetermined, and after choosing, the action is determined.

 

[prodigalson2011]

You have overlooked self-determinism!

Thank you, Tony. I was just about to say that.

 

[prodigalson2011]

I don’t think self-determinism is in the same kinda category determinism and indeterminism are in. Self-determinism seems more like an event to me, where prior to choosing, the agent is indetermined, and after choosing, the action is determined.

It is most certainly in the same category. It differs in that it is a conscious agent, yes, but its place in any discussion of determinism or indeterminism is absolutely essential. The only way one can even begin to discuss determinism or indeterminism in terms of human free will is by eliminating self-determinism, which seems the logical default of any intellectual entity, and which no philosophy has successfully eliminated.

 

[passer_by]

I’d like to outline a reason for doubting that free-will exists:

There are different kinds of freedoms of the will. The one we’re concerned with is that which is necessary for us to be morally responsible agents. An agent is morally responsible for an action if she’d deserve praise or credit if she understood that it was morally good, or she’d deserve blame if she understood it was morally bad. She’d deserve these moral predications solely in virtue of her performing the action.

Some say this free-will is compatible with us being determined, others don’t. But, what seems fairly uncontroversial (as much as can be in this field) is that an agent must be the appropriate source of the action in order to have been free with respect to performing it. She must exhibit a certain kind of control over the action in order to be morally responsible for it. If the action is produced randomly, we’d be wont to say the agent was responsible for it. etc.

What I want to suggest is that the free-will required for moral responsibility is incompatible with us being determined, or indetermined. This is good reason to doubt we have it.

I will not be providing my reason for thinking free-will is incompatible with determinism since I know of no determinists here. Rather, I’ll focus on indeterminism and its incompatibility with free-will.

So, let’s suppose that there is some agent, S, and some action A. Suppose that S causally influences the obtaining of A; but, that this causal influence is indetermined. That is, S was not causally determined to produce A.

So, we could even say there is some time, t1, at which S exerts her causal influence, and another time, t2, at which A obtains.

In order for S’s causal influence on A to be indeterministic the sum of all of S’s causal influences on A prior to t2 must be insufficient to bring A about. If that sum suffices to bring about A, then A is determined.

Therefore, taking all of S’s causal contributions collectively, prior to t2, it’s literally up in the air whether A will obtain or not. After taking all the causal conditions antecedent to A’s occurring, S plays no further causal role in whether A occurs. So, if A does happen to occur, it’s not because of S. It’s just a matter of luck whether A happens.

It seems, therefore, quite intuitive to me to say that S doesn’t exhibit the kind of control over A needed in order for S to be morally responsible for A. That is, if A happens to occur, it’d seem quite unnatural for us to ascribe praise or blame to S for A.

But, if an undetermined S isn’t morally responsible for A, then S doesn’t have free-will with respect to A.

I feel confident then in concluding that indeterminism is incompatible with free-will.

Thoughts?

What if we simply define being free as being able to be the ultimate source of our choices?

In this sense, regardless of our past events, our present situation, or what we know, we can choose anything we want to do next. So we are free and morally responsible, no?

 

[tonyrey]

I don’t think self-determinism is in the same kinda category determinism and indeterminism are in. Self-determinism seems more like an event to me, where prior to choosing, the agent is indetermined, and after choosing, the action is determined.

1. Prior to considering and making a particular choice we are neither determined nor indetermined nor self-determined with regard to that choice.
2. Our choice is either rational or irrational.
3. If our choice is irrational it is motivated by a mistake, a desire or fear or another personal factor.
4. If our choice is rational it is motivated by a decision to be rational and accept the rational conclusion.
5. We are not compelled to be rational or irrational because we transcend physical causality.
6. We don’t understand how we transcend physical causality but it is an essential condition of rationality.
7. Rationality presupposes free will and free will presupposes rationality:

“The truth shall make you free” - but you have to be free to accept the truth

 

[Jaaanosik]

…

1. Either determinism is true, or indeterminism is true.
2. Indeterminism is false.
3. Therefore, determinism is true.
4. If determinism is true, we are not morally responsible for any of our actions.
5. But, we are morally responsible for our actions.
6. Therefore, determinism is false.
7. Therefore, either determinism is true or indeterminism and neither determinism is true nor is indeterminism is true. [Contradiction]
   …

Please, would you assign points of views to numbers?
Which one is God’s point of view and which one is human point of view.
Thanks.

 

[Bobber90]

.
So, firstly, I think we can, with relative certainty, say that human beings are capable of experiencing certain emotional states that our animal cousins cannot. Things such as spiritual ecstacy, pure joy, longing, profound sorrow, wonder and awe, moral guilt (especially without the influence of negative external (name removed by moderator)ut.) So, what separates these things from the more primitive emotions, i.e. fear, happiness, anxiety, depression? I would posit that the latter correspond exclusively to the temporal state of the subject in question, whereas the former correspond, positively or negatively, to such transcendent concepts as eternity, purity, good/evil etc. Does this, as I believe, point to the objective existence of these seemingly superstitious notions? One can quickly posit that these are merely the byproducts of our highly evolved brains, and as such are completely natural phenomena, and so the materialist might quickly sweep my argument back under the rug of failed philosophies where it belongs.

Yes, I would say something like that – that we don’t know for sure what emotions animals might have. Perhaps some have a generalised sense of awe from time to time, but they lack our cognition and introspection so do not attribute that sort of feeling to anything philosophical.

.Before posing the question, it is necessary for us to examine and deeply consider one of the most generally accepted beliefs of the evolutionary school. And that is that evolution is an unconscious process. Let that soak in for a minute.

I agree that this might be overlooked when considering the macro evidence of it - species changing over time, adaptation and survival of the fittest - but that is exactly what these explanations say, that evolution is not an arranged process.

.Now, taking that for granted, the question arises. And it is a question of something even more complex than the eye could ever hope to be. The very idea of sight. We can explain the eye. Can we explain “seeing?” Where did the idea of “sight” come from? If evolution is an unconscious process, by what means did a bundle of self-replicating animated cells decide they had better start organizing a means of translating light into a visual map that could separate varying frequencies into a spectrum of colors, depths, etc.?

We can explain the origin of the idea of sight, especially the type of sight that you describe, because it is the variety we have and experience. If we were bats, we would be asking why we happened to have such usefully good hearing that responded so well to the audible clicks we produced, where that idea came from. These forms of perception can indeed be understood as the result of those stages of development you describe in the imaginary ID’er vs naturalist debate. If having organs that sense light provides greater opportunity to find food/evade predators, those creatures that possess them will survive. If one of them sees better or a more useful range of frequencies, they will develop the eye by their survival. I’m sure you get all that argument, and I struggle to see the conceptual gap in it.

.Once this is decided, how does an unconscious, unintelligent process go about building such a system? How does it know which kind of cells will be able to accomplish such a feat?

It is entirely fortuitous accident.

.Now let’s apply the question to the even more complicated question of emotions. By what means does an unconscious process determine that by combining and secreting certain chemical compounds into its constituent nervous system, it can produce even the most basic physiological and psychological effects to correspond to appropriate stimuli?

Well you are right, or you suggest the answer in your question - by secreting certain chemicals, basic physiological and psychological effects can be produced that correspond with appropriate stimuli. That is incredibly adaptive for an animal, especially in a complex environment, and would presumably have offered a survival bonus. We can think of many emotions which are relatable to evolution: sex/love/fear/empathy.

 

[Bobber90]

.Then moving beyond the basic category of emotions into the more advanced human set (if we could delineate them), by what means does this unconscious, unintelligent process produce creatures that exceed its own level of cognizance?

Is this a question of learning? How are we able to improve our cognitive ability, or think round corners? I guess the key thing is selective forgetting, and the corresponding selective reinforcement of thought processes which prove to be useful. The development of language, consciousness and all kinds of things are hugely interesting and fertile areas which seem to pose and threaten to answer all kinds of philosophical questions, but I’m no expert. We can see that being able to think from another’s perspective and predict actions is highly useful when catching/evading other creatures, or living cooperatively.

.By what means did this process, with no help from the illusory “persons” it creates develop electrochemical processes sophisticated enough to infer a sense of glory and beauty from a sunset?

The how question might be answerable by analogy. A mind from an evolutionary perspective might be like a piece of software-writing software; software that writes new codes according to the stimuli from the environment. The why question would have to be answered by saying that feelings such as glory are either adaptive or harmless accidents. Perhaps it is adaptive to feel a sense of satisfaction, accomplishment and pride when adaptive behaviour has been completed. Think about the species of birds that decorate their mating area with objects of the same colour in order to attract a mate. Maybe when they kick back and look at their ‘home’, they feel the same sense of glory?

.It’s a bit like saying you can give a blind cave man a wrench and tell him to build you a car and he’ll eventually, without even giving him any idea what the word “car” means, build a Model T. What I’m saying is, the evidence suggests to me that consciousness is a necessary precedent for life. The idea precedes the product. Think of it as a far more universal application of the age old philosophical conundrum: “If a trees falls in the forest, and no one is around to hear it…”

I think it’s more like having an imperative and having a variety of options. If there is a need to survive by overcoming problem x, there will be several solutions and creatures with a variety of physical characteristics. You might have the need for mobility answered by legs, fins, motors, snakelike twisting, or flapping of limbs. You might have the need for reaction provided by a nervous system, augmented by visual/auditory/tactile/chemical perception, etc etc. So it is not like asking for a car and getting a model T, but asking for survival and getting a form of transport that simply works.

Overall I think there’s a difference of perspective required to fully concede that evolution can be an unconscious process, but I do think the evidence supports it enough to make the jump. What is more difficult is understanding all the problem areas like consciousness and emotion. I can understand not wanting to make the jump based on the difficulty of these areas alone, but I don’t think that that reservation is insuperable, because we can extend from simple explanations to stupefying ones.