Against Free-Will

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Yes, I would say something like that – that we don’t know for sure what emotions animals might have. Perhaps some have a generalised sense of awe from time to time, but they lack our cognition and introspection so do not attribute that sort of feeling to anything philosophical.
So far so good.
I agree that this might be overlooked when considering the macro evidence of it - species changing over time, adaptation and survival of the fittest - but that is exactly what these explanations say, that evolution is not an arranged process.
Yes. Now, I do want to stress that I’m not of the school that thinks God must intervene after the fact. I accept the scientific concensus on evolution, and do believe that it is, in fact, a natural process whose full physical explanation can be found within the physical universe. However, you have made a claim that I wish to disagree upon, and that these explanations say that evolution is not an arranged process. The best science we have can show how evolution can go to work upon organisms, but I don’t believe the purely statistical explanations say, in themselves, that the process is necessarily unarranged, if by unarranged we mean accidental. This may seem contradictory to my previous assertion, but I will make a distinction here. I believe that all physical phenomena within the universe can be explained within said universe. However, I think the totality of the universe is suggestive of a creative force outside of it. Anyway, as I was saying I don’t think the purely scientific explanations rule out arrangement, in a certain sense. Certain explainers (ahemDawkins) would certainly like to insist upon it, but I don’t think the data we have supports this in either direction.
We can explain the origin of the idea of sight, especially the type of sight that you describe, because it is the variety we have and experience. If we were bats, we would be asking why we happened to have such usefully good hearing that responded so well to the audible clicks we produced, where that idea came from. These forms of perception can indeed be understood as the result of those stages of development you describe in the imaginary ID’er vs naturalist debate. If having organs that sense light provides greater opportunity to find food/evade predators, those creatures that possess them will survive. If one of them sees better or a more useful range of frequencies, they will develop the eye by their survival. I’m sure you get all that argument, and I struggle to see the conceptual gap in it.
Perhaps I have been inefficient in stating this case, so I will try my best to reiterate. I don’t think this explains the origin of the idea of sight, and introducing a different scenario (bats and sonar, for instance) doesn’t effect the premise I was arguing from. Let’s see… It’s difficult to put this into words. I would agree that we can physically explain the origin of sight, sonar, or any other property of a living creature up to the point of physical evolution, but all of these physical properties have a metaphysical aspect that to me implies a conscious plan. Suspend your objections for just a moment, because I will return to this in my response to your next post.
It is entirely fortuitous accident.
Well, here’s our fundamental disagreement. I think it’s an astounding delegation of creative power from creator to creation.
Well you are right, or you suggest the answer in your question - by secreting certain chemicals, basic physiological and psychological effects can be produced that correspond with appropriate stimuli. That is incredibly adaptive for an animal, especially in a complex environment, and would presumably have offered a survival bonus. We can think of many emotions which are relatable to evolution: sex/love/fear/empathy.
Yes. For the sake of responding point by point, I’ll repeat: I agree with the evolutionary concensus, up to the point of atheistic accident vs. theistic super software, which should take us cleanly into your next post…
 
Is this a question of learning?..
The how question might be answerable by analogy. A mind from an evolutionary perspective might be like a piece of software-writing software; software that writes new codes according to the stimuli from the environment. The why question would have to be answered by saying that feelings such as glory are either adaptive or harmless accidents. Perhaps it is adaptive to feel a sense of satisfaction, accomplishment and pride when adaptive behaviour has been completed. Think about the species of birds that decorate their mating area with objects of the same colour in order to attract a mate. Maybe when they kick back and look at their ‘home’, they feel the same sense of glory?
I would like to focus on that second sentence. You say “A mind… might be like a piece of software-writing software.” This is a perfect metaphor for the point I’m trying to make, not only for life, but the universe in full. Your description continues, “software that writes new codes according to the stimuli from the environment.” I would fully agree that evolution can work independently from the smallest single cell organism on up, but exactly on that condition. This is what I meant when I said evolution implies prior consciousness, and while I said evolution, I should really have extended that statement to the entirety of existence, as all of the universe functions on some very solidly defined constants. So, I agree that any evolutionary effect can be explained by the “software” of evolution. But what cannot be explained is the software of evolution, or more appropriately, the software of existence. We can reasonably imagine a piece of software can perform such programs as you posit, but we cannot reasonably assert that that piece of software had no programmer.
I do not make an issue of whether such things as satisfaction are adaptively advantageous. In fact I would fully suggest they are. The fact that other animals experience similar things is self-evident and has no bearing to one side or the other, as they are the product of the same software. The question is rather, given the incredibly intricate and sensitive nature of the physical processes that govern these things, what are the chances that blind forces of nature could ever have achieved it if that potential were not deliberately placed within them? What are the odds that the earliest forms of organic matter, simple self-replicating cells would contain the potential to form such stupendously elaborate interdependent systems? That they would be capable of producing the right chemicals and chemical reactions to successfully carry out the evolutionary process?
Think of the forces of nature, perhaps, as a blind man being led by a seeing-eye-God.
I think it’s more like having an imperative and having a variety of options. If there is a need to survive by overcoming problem x, there will be several solutions and creatures with a variety of physical characteristics. You might have the need for mobility answered by legs, fins, motors, snakelike twisting, or flapping of limbs. You might have the need for reaction provided by a nervous system, augmented by visual/auditory/tactile/chemical perception, etc etc. So it is not like asking for a car and getting a model T, but asking for survival and getting a form of transport that simply works.
I think this ignores the need for a functional, prescribed system (in this case, the laws and constants of the universe) to both create and respond to such needs.
Since I failed to properly express this in my original post, I will stress it here: once the universe exists, no further interference should be expected to be necessary. The car should not be looked at as analogous to the eye, as my original post implied, but to the universe as a functional whole. Life, in this model, should be viewed as a subprogram of the “software” of existence.
Overall I think there’s a difference of perspective required to fully concede that evolution can be an unconscious process, but I do think the evidence supports it enough to make the jump. What is more difficult is understanding all the problem areas like consciousness and emotion. I can understand not wanting to make the jump based on the difficulty of these areas alone, but I don’t think that that reservation is insuperable, because we can extend from simple explanations to stupefying ones.
I have no problem conceding that evolution itself is an unconscious process. I do have a problem conceding that the “software” of evolution, and all of existence along with it, wrote itself. One popular theistic argument goes, “Only minds can produce information. DNA contains information. Therefore, DNA is the product of a mind.” This argument only works with DNA, of course, but I think the implications are universal. In fact, the only attempted refutation I’ve heard went something like, “Every day, meteorologists record information from wind, etc. So does wind have a mind?” This is a strikingly weak counterargument, and is, in fact, quite silly. Wind does not contain any information. An observing mind can translate it into certain forms of information, but prior to that it is merely physical phenomena with no intrinsic informative power, and after, the information is still the product of the observing mind.
 
I’d like to outline a reason for doubting that free-will exists:

There are different kinds of freedoms of the will. The one we’re concerned with is that which is necessary for us to be morally responsible agents. An agent is morally responsible for an action if she’d deserve praise or credit if she understood that it was morally good, or she’d deserve blame if she understood it was morally bad. She’d deserve these moral predications solely in virtue of her performing the action.

Some say this free-will is compatible with us being determined, others don’t. But, what seems fairly uncontroversial (as much as can be in this field) is that an agent must be the appropriate source of the action in order to have been free with respect to performing it. She must exhibit a certain kind of control over the action in order to be morally responsible for it. If the action is produced randomly, we’d be wont to say the agent was responsible for it. etc.

What I want to suggest is that the free-will required for moral responsibility is incompatible with us being determined, or indetermined. This is good reason to doubt we have it.

I will not be providing my reason for thinking free-will is incompatible with determinism since I know of no determinists here. Rather, I’ll focus on indeterminism and its incompatibility with free-will.

So, let’s suppose that there is some agent, S, and some action A. Suppose that S causally influences the obtaining of A; but, that this causal influence is indetermined. That is, S was not causally determined to produce A.

So, we could even say there is some time, t1, at which S exerts her causal influence, and another time, t2, at which A obtains.

In order for S’s causal influence on A to be indeterministic the sum of all of S’s causal influences on A prior to t2 must be insufficient to bring A about. If that sum suffices to bring about A, then A is determined.

Therefore, taking all of S’s causal contributions collectively, prior to t2, it’s literally up in the air whether A will obtain or not. After taking all the causal conditions antecedent to A’s occurring, S plays no further causal role in whether A occurs. So, if A does happen to occur, it’s not because of S. It’s just a matter of luck whether A happens.

It seems, therefore, quite intuitive to me to say that S doesn’t exhibit the kind of control over A needed in order for S to be morally responsible for A. That is, if A happens to occur, it’d seem quite unnatural for us to ascribe praise or blame to S for A.

But, if an undetermined S isn’t morally responsible for A, then S doesn’t have free-will with respect to A.

I feel confident then in concluding that indeterminism is incompatible with free-will.

Thoughts?
Suppose moral responsibility were a matter of evaluating intentions and not acts. Under this assumption, would your argument work as I think you might intend it to?
 
Therefore, taking all of S’s causal contributions collectively, prior to t2, it’s literally up in the air whether A will obtain or not. After taking all the causal conditions antecedent to A’s occurring, S plays no further causal role in whether A occurs. So, if A does happen to occur, it’s not because of S. It’s just a matter of luck whether A happens.
I think this is where things go awry. Something caused A (action) to occur at t2. It is the nature of the indeterminate cause that is at issue, not whether there was a cause. If an indeterminate cause necessarily equated to a random cause then I would agree with you, there would be no free will sufficient to allow for moral choices. Simply because a cause is not determined though does not entail it is random.

Take agent causation. It is asserted that the substance (soul) of S ultimately causes A. It is self-caused, not controlled by prior or concurrent causes extrinsic to S’s substance. S’s choice to cause A is indeterminate in the sense that there is no prior cause to examine to understand how S will act. It also may be indeterminate in the sense that other human beings publicly cannot know with any probabilistic accuracy how S will act. However, S knows exactly how she will act, and she will tell you quite plainly that it wasn’t random or “up in the air.” S may even tell you how she is going to act before she does so, giving you reasons for the same.

The point: indeterminacy does not = randomness or “up in the air.”
 
Uh hunh, 🤷

Or as Buck Crosswhite said in post #3
You go to McDonalds. You choose an order. Case closed. Free will exists.
:rotfl::extrahappy:

If anybody came to this “philosophy” section expecting to find philosophy, :eek:
I’m sorry you were disappointed! :hypno: :yawn: :sleep:
 
I think this is where things go awry. Something caused A (action) to occur at t2. It is the nature of the indeterminate cause that is at issue, not whether there was a cause. If an indeterminate cause necessarily equated to a random cause then I would agree with you, there would be no free will sufficient to allow for moral choices. Simply because a cause is not determined though does not entail it is random.

Take agent causation. It is asserted that the substance (soul) of S ultimately causes A. It is self-caused, not controlled by prior or concurrent causes extrinsic to S’s substance. S’s choice to cause A is indeterminate in the sense that there is no prior cause to examine to understand how S will act. It also may be indeterminate in the sense that other human beings publicly cannot know with any probabilistic accuracy how S will act. However, S knows exactly how she will act, and she will tell you quite plainly that it wasn’t random or “up in the air.” S may even tell you how she is going to act before she does so, giving you reasons for the same.

The point: indeterminacy does not = randomness or “up in the air.”
I agree that indeterminacy does not = randomness. I explained elsewhere it’s simply the negation of determinism, so it comprises randomness and probabilities. By ‘up in the air’ I mean after taking all the agent’s causal influences into account, if it’s indeterminate, then there will be a genuine chance that it still won’t occur, and the agent can’t play any further causal role in determining that. This occurs when the probability of the thing occurring is 0.2, all the way to 0.80, etc. My intuitions inform me that the agent, therefore, wouldn’t be the kind of source she’d need to be in order to be responsible for this thing (action, intention or what have you).
 
Originally Posted by Perplexity
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empther: If you insult me one more time, I’ll leave the forum.

mindovermatter acutely observed:
]What’s the indeterministic probability of that?:rolleyes:

:rotfl:

Can I have that in writing, Perplexity? 😃

:rotfl::extrahappy:

Forgive me for being a skeptical theist.

:rotfl::extrahappy:

I bought a Powerball lottery ticket yesterday. My chances of winning that are greater than Perplexity leaving. He lives to pontificate his atheistic ill-defined improperly used terminology like lights on a string of Christmas lights.

If anybody is here looking for real philosophy,
start with Plato’s Dialogues, Aristotle’s Niomechian Ethics, and anything by Acquinas.
 
:rotfl:

Can I have that in writing, Perplexity? 😃

:rotfl::extrahappy:

Forgive me for being a skeptical theist.

:rotfl::extrahappy:

I bought a Powerball lottery ticket yesterday. My chances of winning that are greater than Perplexity leaving. He lives to pontificate his atheistic ill-defined improperly used terminology like lights on a string of Christmas lights.

If anybody is here looking for real philosophy,
start with Plato’s Dialogues, Aristotle’s Niomechian Ethics, and anything by Acquinas.
K, I’m out of here. And it’s Aquinas* you ignorant ****.
 
I agree that indeterminacy does not = randomness. I explained elsewhere it’s simply the negation of determinism, so it comprises randomness and probabilities.
It may comprise randomness and probabilities (I assume you mean less than 1) to observers viewing the actor’s conduct, but it doesn’t mean that from the actor’s perspective.
By ‘up in the air’ I mean after taking all the agent’s causal influences into account, if it’s indeterminate, then there will be a genuine chance that it still won’t occur, and the agent can’t play any further causal role in determining that.
This is incorrect. Those proponents of agent causation who only require causal control by the actor do not define indeterminacy in this way. The actor’s choice is indeterminate in that it is not determined by any extrinsic cause. It is determined by the actor. It is self-determined.
This occurs when the probability of the thing occurring is 0.2, all the way to 0.80, etc.
While it may seem this way to the outside observer, it is not at all the case from the perspective of the actor. You may observe an actor take moral action X rather than immoral action Y a sufficient number of times to come to the probabilistic conclusion that the next time there is an 80% chance she will take moral action X. Now shift to the actor’s perspective. She has already made the decision to choose immoral action Y this time around. From the actor’s perspective the probability that she will take immoral action Y is 100%. You may ask: how can this be? How can it be that from an outside perspective the probability of taking immoral action Y is 0.2 while from the actor’s perspective it is 1?

Because new relevant information changes the probability. In this case, the relevant information is that the actor had already chosen to take action Y. Had the actor divulged this information to you (ie. she told you she had already decided to take action Y) you would radically revise your probabilistic analysis of what action she would take.
My intuitions inform me that the agent, therefore, wouldn’t be the kind of source she’d need to be in order to be responsible for this thing (action, intention or what have you).
I suspect your intuitions would change if the agent was the locus of causal control of her action and she told you she was going to take that action.
 
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