An argument against God

[quaestio45]

In God knowledge and will are the same, so there is no doubt from which a choice can be made. However it is not unusual that man speak of God anthropomorphically. Since there is no doubt there is no other state.

I don’t understand how you can’t see how you are trying to “have your cake and eat it too”. If God is only necessitated in doing one thing and that is exist in perfection then he need not do anything beyond himself (like create). The fact he created leads us to a problem, that being “why did God create”. Now there are two options, either he did because he wanted to (for which we may never understand) or he did so because he had to. Now the latter is not possible because God can only be necessitated in being perfect in his sole being. Therefore it must have been voluntary and not needed. The problem with this however is that for something to be said to be unnecessary is to simultaneously say that it need not be in that state of being, and thus it could have been in another state of being. Now, you have two options: either admit God could’ve been different or say that he can’t. If he can’t be different, then you must be saying that his act was thus necessary and he could not have not created. But, this modal collapse leads to contridiction, as I’ve said that God needs only in his existence and not in any external act. As such, you can’t have it that God is necessary in every respect and also say he could have not created (or that his act of creation was unnecessary); you can’t have your cake and eat it too.

 

[Vico]

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If God is only necessitated in doing one thing and that is exist in perfection then he need not do anything beyond himself (like create).
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As such, you can’t have it that God is necessary in every respect and also say he could have not created (or that his act of creation was unnecessary);
…

“His own goodness suffices the divine will,” … “it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness.” And God acts not “by a necessity of His nature.”

S.T. I Q19 A2

Objection 3. Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.

Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.

S.T. I Q19 A4

I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature. This can be shown in three ways: …

 

[quaestio45]

“it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness.”

Yes… and God is goodness, so God wills by God’s nature.

God acts not “by a necessity of His nature.”

Correct, but what I’m saying is that what is necessary to God is necessary because his nature demands it (like goodness and perfection). As such, if it were that something was necessary to God, like creation, it can only be because it fulfills his natures need to some extent. But such is impossible in relation to creation. Thus, modal collapse is not an option for the theist.

 

[Vico]

…
Correct, but what I’m saying is that what is necessary to God is necessary because his nature demands it (like goodness and perfection). As such, if it were that something was necessary to God, like creation, it can only be because it fulfills his natures need to some extent. But such is impossible in relation to creation. Thus, modal collapse is not an option for the theist.

The term 'modal collapse’, means that all contingency is eliminated and every true proposition is rendered necessarily true. One definition of contingency is “something liable to happen as an adjunct to or result of something else” (Merriam-Webster, noun, 1b) Some things created are like that:

“God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, … that the perfect goodness of God can be without it” (S.T. I Q19 A3 RO4)

What do you think?

 

[quaestio45]

The term 'modal collapse’, means that all contingency is eliminated and every true proposition is rendered necessarily true.

Correct.

One definition of contingency is “something liable to happen as an adjunct to or result of something else” (Merriam-Webster, noun, 1b) Some things created are like that:

“God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, … that the perfect goodness of God can be without it” (S.T. I Q19 A3 RO4)

The way I’ve been using the term contingency was in reflection to a definition somewhere along the lines of “a condition dependent on an externality”. So when I said that modal collapse demands God be contingent upon creation I mean to say that God’s condition of perfection must be dependent upon creation were he to need to create. Does that make sense?

In anycase, I agree with the quote; God does not nor cannot without serious repricutions necessarily create reality (lest this contridict his sole perfect nature). The problem is that we are forced into saying that creation was necessary for God when we reject the idea that he had voluntude in his state of being insofar as he could’ve been different.

 

[Vico]

…
The way I’ve been using the term contingency was in reflection to a definition somewhere along the lines of “a condition dependent on an externality”. So when I said that modal collapse demands God be contingent upon creation I mean to say that God’s condition of perfection must be dependent upon creation were he to need to create. Does that make sense?

In anycase, I agree with the quote; God does not nor cannot without serious repricutions necessarily create reality (lest this contridict his sole perfect nature). The problem is that we are forced into saying that creation was necessary for God when we reject the idea that he had voluntude in his state of being insofar as he could’ve been different.
[/quote]

Really to get the answer given by Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles is needed.

• God knows all things at once, the events themselves are only conditionally necessary, they are not logically necessary (SCG I.67).
• God can know with omniscience in the eternal present, that a creature will have an event without making impossible the contingency of the event.
• Therefore just because God knows in the eternal present all that ever occurs, does not mean that those events are prevented from being contingent.

For any contingent event, the fact which explains it cannot be a necessary fact, otherwise that event would not be contingent.
God creates the world ex nihilo and is thus the cause of being for all creatures, but that creaturely existence is absolutely necessary does not follow.
The proposition ‘God does not create’ does not by itself entail a contradiction because creation is not logically necessary.

The necessity of supposition [conditional necessity] in a cause, moreover, does not require an absolute necessity in the effect. But God wills something in the creature, not with absolute necessity, but only by a necessity of supposition [that which comes from a condition] . . . From the divine will, therefore, an absolute necessity in created things cannot be inferred. But only this excludes contingency. (SCG I, Chapter 85)

God wills whatever is required for a thing that He wills, as has been said. But it befits certain things, according to the mode of their nature, that they be contingent and not necessary. Therefore, God wills that some things be contingent. Now, the efficacy of the divine will requires not only that something be that God wills to be, but also that it be as He wills it to be . . . Therefore, the efficacy of the divine will does not remove contingency. (SCG I, Chapter 85)

SCG I, Chapter 67 - That God Knows Future Contingent Singulars

SCG I, Chapter 85 - That the Divine Will Does Not Remove Contingency From Things, Nor Does It Impose Absolute Necessity On Them

https://genius.com/St-thomas-aquinas-summa-contra-gentiles-book-i-annotated

Must read:

Heythrop Journal (2009), pp. 648–657
Divine Necessity and Created Contingence in Aquinas
Peter Laughlin, Australian Catholic University, Canberra, Australia
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2009.00476.x

 

[Duke12VonFalkenburg]

“In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God.” John 1:1

“And the word became flesh and lived among us…” John 1:14

would the act of God taking on human flesh diminish his perfection? Even in human form Jesus was perfect as God is perfect.

God needs nothing from us. “I AM”. Out of love he creates and gives life. Nothing could diminish or contradict God’s perfection.

 

[quaestio45]

The proposition ‘God does not create’ does not by itself entail a contradiction because creation is not logically necessary.

…Vico, I must admit I’m running out of ways to say the same thing to you. I feel as if you are not understanding the absurdity of holding two contridictory ideas (that God could have not created but also he can’t be in a different state which allows for noncreation to occur). I think I know what you are attempting to lay out to me, which is that God needed not creation thus we can’t say it was necessary. I understand that and agree whole heartedly. But, and this is the crux of my argument, you can’t have it that God could’ve not created (which is something you’d have to say if you admit that creation was unnecessary) while simultaneously saying he cannot have ever been in a state which allows for noncreation to follow rather than creation. These two things are mutually exclusive; you cannot hold both but rather one or the other. Now, I ask you this friend, which do you hold and which do you sacrifice? Do you hold that God cannot have been different and thus must have created, or do you hold that he didn’t need to create and thus could’ve been of a different state?

 

[Vico]

Vico:

The proposition ‘God does not create’ does not by itself entail a contradiction because creation is not logically necessary.

…
These two things are mutually exclusive; you cannot hold both but rather one or the other. Now, I ask you this friend, which do you hold and which do you sacrifice? Do you hold that God cannot have been different and thus must have created, or do you hold that he didn’t need to create and thus could’ve been of a different state?

I believe that neither of the two positions you ask about are true. Rather, some acts of God’s will are only conditionally necessary, so they are not absolutely necessary for God.

See Divine Necessity and Created Contingence in Aquinas that I posted a link to, which shows the argument from Saint Thomas Aquinas that overcomes the objections of the Process and Open theists.

Excerpt from pages. 654-655

Indeed, creation is not required by some ineluctable logic or by the nature of deity so that God could not have willed not to create. The fact that something exists at all is wholly ascribed to the will of God as a gratuitous gift which arises freely from God’s own goodness.43 However, Aquinas does recognise that having created it is now conditionally necessary for God to create. The reason for this is that if God chooses between two alternatives, neither of which are absolutely necessary, then logically the choice that God does not choose remains forever unavailable to God. Thus having created, it is no longer open for God not to create. Whatever God wills, then, in the act of willing cannot be changed but God’s will remains free to choose what it is that God will in fact will. The acts of God’s will are thereby only conditionally necessary in this sense, they are not absolutely necessary for God.

 

[quaestio45]

some acts of God’s will are only conditionally necessary, so they are not absolutely necessary for God.

Look, I agree with this absolutely. Thats not what I’m contending.

The reason for this is that if God chooses between two alternatives, neither of which are absolutely necessary, then logically the choice that God does not choose remains forever unavailable to God.

Okay, lets start here, can we agree that if God chose not to create his being would be different then if he created?

 

[Vico]

Vico:

some acts of God’s will are only conditionally necessary, so they are not absolutely necessary for God.

Look, I agree with this absolutely. Thats not what I’m contending.

The reason for this is that if God chooses between two alternatives, neither of which are absolutely necessary, then logically the choice that God does not choose remains forever unavailable to God.

Okay, lets start here, can we agree that if God chose not to create his being would be different then if he created?

No it is impossible for God to be changeable in any way.

 

[quaestio45]

No it is impossible for God to be changeable in any way.

No, not changeable. Could he have been different? If the answer is no, to which I would think is your thought, then I have to ask you how it is possible that he could not have created if God absolutely needs to be in a different state of being (the state of passivity) in order to not create? Unless of course, he couldn’t not create.

 

[Vico]

…

You postulated that God absolutely needs to be in a different state of being (the state of passivity) in order to not create. But a state is defined as “the particular condition that someone or something is in at a specific time” and God is not conditioned by time.

 

[quaestio45]

You postulated that God absolutely needs to be in a different state of being (the state of passivity) in order to not create.

Correct.

But a state is defined as “the particular condition that someone or something is in at a specific time” and God is not conditioned by time.

So therefore he need not be different in order to not create? I’m sorry, but I’m very sure: one, that the law of sufficient reason applies to all regardless of temporal or not, and two, that time has nothing to do with this. God must be different then he is now to not create because God’s mind right now is willing for creation, and God also has a plan and intent for creation, none of which would be if God didn’t create.

 

[Vico]

…

So what is your definition of state then, if it does not involve time?

 

[quaestio45]

So what is your definition of state then, if it does not involve time?

Existence in one regard contrastable to another.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

So what is your definition of state then, if it does not involve time?

Existence in one regard contrastable to another.

I would not use the word state then. God’s knowledge and will are the same. Creation has events that are conditionally necessary (not logically necessary).

 

[FredBloggs]

It seems as if the God of actus purus cannot be real, for to be pure actuality is to necessarily mean you are in yourself, by yourself, and through yourself complete in being and perfection. If that be so, then only the sustaining of your own being would be necessary, whilst all else would be both voluntary and a noncontributor to your perfection in being.

Now, to commit to a voluntary act is to necessarily be in a different state of being (state of creation) then if you did not commit the act (state of noncreation). This would apply even to God, as the will or conscious or intent must necessarily be commited to creation in a world where he created as opposed to a theoretical world where he did not create.

If this be so, then we know by necessity that God must be different in his state of existence in order to not create what has been created. But God cannot be different, for his essence is existence, and his existence is pure actuality. As such, his existence can never be distinct from his essence, as they are one in the same. But were God, in order to have never created, to need to be in a different state of existence then he finds himself in now, we would be forced to recognize that God’s essence must also be different between these two possibilities. But if we recognize that the essence of an entity is the immutable nature which makes an entity a given entity, and were we to recognize that God must always be pure actuality, and that pure actuality must always mean the same thing across possibilities, then we are forced to say that God’s existence cannot possibly be different because his essence cannot be possibly different.

That which is impossible to be in a different state then the one it finds itself in is called a necessary state. As such, God’s current state is necessary. But if God’s current state is that of creating, then it follows that what is created is necessary because God cannot have it any other way. But a being of pure actuality and completion is only necessitated in commiting an act if it is in purposes of sustaining its own perfection. As such, creation becomes a contributing factor to God’s perfection, but such would be a contridiction to the nature of a pure act entity (as I’ve said above, it must be complete in being through themselves and not anything external to it, and it makes it contingent to the thing created, as it cannot be maximally perfect without it). As such, we reach a reductio ad absurdum of having contridictions arising from the nature of one supposed truth (pure act God), to which must lead to the disposing of its idea. As such, God cannot exist.

Just an observation, with apologies for being facetious:

A thousand years ago, God was a beardy man hiding behind a cloud. It’s fascinating the philosophical contortions that have resulted since our ability to fly above the clouds and find… nothing.

 

[quaestio45]

I would not use the word state then. God’s knowledge and will are the same. Creation has events that are conditionally necessary (not logically necessary).

Nonetheless the point still stands that God’s existence must be necessarily different were he not to create then if he were to create.

A thousand years ago, God was a beardy man hiding behind a cloud.

No, that is most certainly not correct. A thousand years ago and even further back there were many sophisticated interpretations of God that were far more nuanced then the measly “man with beard in the sky” trope. Who were such men with these interpretations? Try Aristotle, Plato any of the church fathers. So no, a thousand years ago men were not thinking of “a beardy man in the clouds”.

It’s fascinating the philosophical contortions that have resulted since our ability to fly above the clouds and find… nothing.

I would hardly call them contortions but rather a deeper understanding of the truth. Further, to say that we have “steered above the clouds and found nothing” is a rather laughable assertion to be frank and an honest spit in the face to many of the greatest thinkers in human history who have worked strenuously to discover great truths and build the intellectual foundation to which more than a few of the aspects of our modern world is rested upon. I would be conscious to give more respect to the ancients if I were you, even if you think they were wrong.

 

[Vico]

Vico:

I would not use the word state then. God’s knowledge and will are the same. Creation has events that are conditionally necessary (not logically necessary).

Nonetheless the point still stands that God’s existence must be necessarily different were he not to create then if he were to create.
…

I disagree. Please read the journal article that I posted a link to. We may be at in impasse.