An argument against God

[FredBloggs]

I would hardly call them contortions but rather a deeper understanding of the truth. Further, to say that we have “steered above the clouds and found nothing” is a rather laughable assertion to be frank and an honest spit in the face to many of the greatest thinkers in human history who have worked strenuously to discover great truths and build the intellectual foundation to which more than a few of the aspects of our modern world is rested upon. I would be conscious to give more respect to the ancients if I were you, even if you think they were wrong.

I did say I was being facetious I was just amused by the “sophisticated theology” language of the OP.

Although I would strongly challenge your assertion of “discover great truths.” Just what truths have these admittedly great thinkers discovered? Caveat: for me, truth means something that it is objectively and universally true.

 

[quaestio45]

I disagree. Please read the journal article that I posted a link to. We are at in impasse. Then end.

Its a pity to hear that an impasse has been reached so suddenly, but I suppose such a thing was an inevitable. In anycase, it was very interesting delving into the topic of God’s nature in necessity and voluntude.

I did say I was being facetious

I had to go back and check if you did, and I was surprised to see that I skipped over reading your first line thinking it was a part of the quote. My deepest apologies, I thought you were attempting to make some point based in history and philosophical development in an attempt to seemingly show the ridiculousness of intellectual disputations.

I was just amused by the “sophisticated theology” language of the OP.

I’m not sure if it would be categorized as theology rather than simply metaphysical philosophy, but I suppose those might be similar enough to be either or.

Although I would strongly challenge your assertion of “discover great truths.”

That may be fair; most contemporary thinkers have rejected many of tenents of ancient medieval thought, but I would still hold that some ideas have stuck, at least implicitly, in our thought.

Just what truths have these admittedly great thinkers discovered? Caveat: for me, truth means something that it is objectively and universally true.

It depends on perspective on this front, I’d say. But I doubt you want to know what I personally believe are great discoveries from these thinkers, and instead you wish to know what these thinkers thought which is widely accepted to this day (if even implicitly). Allow me to name a few; the idea that phenomena must have an explanation in either nature or externality, the idea of an intelligiable universe, the idea of higher truths as opposed to mere human perception, the idea of the objective against the subjective, the idea causal mechanics (Aristotle’s four causes), and the idea of potentiality and actuality.

 

[Richca]

Vico:

I would not use the word state then. God’s knowledge and will are the same. Creation has events that are conditionally necessary (not logically necessary).

Nonetheless the point still stands that God’s existence must be necessarily different were he not to create then if he were to create.

God’s existence or being is necessarily not different whether he creates or does not create. Creation does not bring about a change or difference in God’s own being or existence which cannot change. This follows from who God is and his attributes such as immutability, simplicity, eternity, infinity, perfection, and being Being or Existence itself. Creation does not make God lesser or greater than He is or he wouldn’t be God. The only distinction in God is that of the three persons and their relations to one another. All else is one and the same. Accordingly, God says of himself “I Am who Am” (Exodus 3:14), and in Mal. 3:6 “For I am the Lord and I change not”. And the psalmist says " Thou art always the selfsame" (Psalm 102:27).

God is perfect and complete in himself in an infinite degree with or without creation. In further evidence of this, we can consider that God existed by himself for an endless eternity before he even began creating the universe. Is he different now than he was for an endless eternity before creation? No, there is no before and after in God but only an eternal abiding and unchanging present.

 

[quaestio45]

P1) In order for something to be voluntary you must have the ability to be in a commited state of being (where you do the voluntary act) or uncommitted state of being (where you don’t do the voluntary act)
P2) These two states of being must be distinct from one another
P3) God cannot be concieved as being in distinct states of being
C1) Thus, God cannot act by voluntude
P4) What isn’t voluntary is necessary
C2) Thus, God always acts by necessity
P5) God created reality
C3) Thus, reality was created by necessity
P6) God is only necessitated in doing that which directly contributes to his goodness
P7) Nothing external to God can contribute to his goodness
C4) Therefore creation cannot have been made by necessity
C5) reductio ad absurdum

So I’m assuming you reject premise 2?

 

[Richca]

God’s will to create involves the communication of his goodness and being and perfections upon creatures, albeit in a finite degree. Whatever creatures possess and perfections they have, they have received from God. A thing cannot give what it doesn’t have. All of creation is a certain created likeness of the Creator. Whether God wills to create or not to create, He is what He is. He possesses in himself eternally and infinitely the plentitude of all being and all the perfections he may bestow upon creatures the first which is being or existence. Accordingly, I don’t see where God’s will to create or not to create can be construed as two distinct states of being or existence in him. So, I would reject P1 and P2 at least in reference to God as well as C1 but I would agree with P3.

 

[STT]

P1) In order for something to be voluntary you must have the ability to be in a commited state of being (where you do the voluntary act) or uncommitted state of being (where you don’t do the voluntary act)
P2) These two states of being must be distinct from one another
P3) God cannot be concieved as being in distinct states of being
C1) Thus, God cannot act by voluntude
P4) What isn’t voluntary is necessary
C2) Thus, God always acts by necessity
P5) God created reality
C3) Thus, reality was created by necessity
P6) God is only necessitated in doing that which directly contributes to his goodness
P7) Nothing external to God can contribute to his goodness
C4) Therefore creation cannot have been made by necessity
C5) reductio ad absurdum

So I’m assuming you reject premise 2?

I am afraid to say that I think you are mixing mode of being with mental state. There is one mode of being but different mental states. Like a mind being aware of different things.

 

[quaestio45]

Whether God wills to create or not to create, He is what He is.

I agree…

Accordingly, I don’t see where God’s will to create or not to create can be construed as two distinct states of being or existence in him.

There is intending creation and not intending creation. God must intend creation in order for creation to occur. God must no intend creation for creation to not occur. Clearly there is a difference, therefore, in Gods intention in order for creation to not occur. Thus, God must be different in order for creation to not occur (in that he does not intend creation). I would also that there definitely must be a difference between intention and not intending, for they are contradictory ideas. Thus, premise 2, at least in this instance, I believe holds up.

My solution to the problem goes by denying premise 3. No one likes the idea, but I think that you might actually find a small amount of agreement in it. Heres what I wrote:

Okay, so I’ve been doing some thinking and some reading and some consideration, and I think I have a solution to the problem that I think none of the Thomists will like.

P1) There are incompatible perfections to God (state of creation and state of passivity)
P2) These must be resolved by taking in one and rejecting the other
P3) With no final cause or essence to operate by in scenarios of incompatible perfection (as God’s essence is simply perfection), this requires the freest will to choose by voluntude
C1) Thus, God can and must act of voluntude

The reason I think the Thomist will disagree with me is because this necessarily means God is open to different state of beings, to which challenges to some extent total immutability. But allow me to make a defense for my proposal; God is by definition actuality and perfection itself. If that be so, whatever God is, actuality is, and whatever God isn’t, actuality isn’t. As such, what we conceive as actuality is simply a reflection of God’s current, eternal state of being. This is further supported when we consider how creation makes God no more perfect, yet nonetheless it is seen as a higher mode of existence when we do meaningfully create (relationships, families, lasting legacies) then when we don’t or do the opposite. As such, the actuality of a state of constant creation must be found in God too, who is actuality. Yet this creation, I say oncemore, does not add to God’s perfection, for it was equally perfect for him to never create, for oncemore I say that the state of God determines actuality and perfection.

Thus, it may not be a contradiction to call God pure actuality and simultaneously say he may have been in a different mode of existence then he currently is. It also isn’t a contradiction to say that God is immutable after his eternal choice yet ontoligically, oncemore, may have chosen differenlty then how he chose. Thus, God may be both voluntarily choosing and pure act all at once.

 

[quaestio45]

I am afraid to say that I think you are mixing mode of being with mental state. There is one mode of being but different mental states. Like a mind being aware of different things.

Well, the mental is a part of an entities being, no? So even if there is a change in the mental, it would constitute an over all change in the being, wouldn’t you say? I’ll give you an example: take the equation 5x-2=20. Each term within the equation we can say represents some element of a being, which adds up in total to make up the being. Now, lets say we changed the equation ever so slightly and made it 5x-1=y. All though there was a difference within a small portion of the being, it of course has an effect on being itself (as the resulting number from an equation changes when a term is changed). As such, it can be said that even a change in mental state is a change in being.

 

[STT]

Well, the mental is a part of an entities being, no?

The mental is a part of person and not mind.

 

[quaestio45]

The mental is a part of person and not mind.

The being of an individual is simply the whole of their existence. If one element is changed there, then the whole thing has change. Further, if the mind causes mental phenomena then we fall into the same place I’m describing.

 

[Richca]

Richca:

Accordingly, I don’t see where God’s will to create or not to create can be construed as two distinct states of being or existence in him.

There is intending creation and not intending creation. God must intend creation in order for creation to occur. God must no intend creation for creation to not occur. Clearly there is a difference, therefore, in Gods intention in order for creation to not occur. Thus, God must be different in order for creation to not occur (in that he does not intend creation). I would also that there definitely must be a difference between intention and not intending, for they are contradictory ideas. Thus, premise 2, at least in this instance, I believe holds up.

I would agree that there is a difference between God creating or not creating. The difference I believe, however, does not concern God’s own existence per se but whether things other than God or creation exists or doesn’t exist.

Creation is not the principle object of the divine willing. The principle object of the divine will is the divine being and goodness which are infinite and which is God himself. The divine goodness is the end object of the divine will. By God willing his own goodness, he wills all other things and on account of his own goodness. Aquinas says that God necessarily wills his own being and goodness. Creation is a secondary object of the divine willing which God does not necessarily will because creation is not necessary for God’s existence and perfection.

Since the divine being and goodness are altogether immutable and which are the principle object of the divine will, and since the divine will is identical to the divine existence and goodness, it must be that God’s will in regards to willing himself is altogether immutable. This is the case whether God wills to create or not to create. God’s will concerning creation or things other than himself is immutable on condition whether he wills it or not. For if God wills to create, he cannot will afterwards not to create. This does not mean that God’s will is mutable concerning creatures but that there are certain objects of the divine will in the divine intellect or knowledge such as creatures which God does not necessarily will to be or not be but he is free to do either. And whatever he wills, he wills from eternity by one eternal act of will.

So, God’s will concerning himself cannot be different since the principle object of the divine willing is the one divine being and goodness which is infinite and which cannot be increased or decreased. It appears that God’s will concerning secondary objects other than himself such as creatures can be different because he can freely choose to create them or not and because they are not necessary for God’s own existence, perfection, goodness, being, etc. I’m not sure the word ‘different’ is the right word to use here though. I was recently just reading in one of Aquinas’ works where he says that we shouldn’t use the word ‘different’ generally when speaking of God because of the false notions it can convey concerning God.

 

[quaestio45]

It appears that God’s will concerning secondary objects other than himself such as creatures can be different because he can freely choose to create them or not and because they are not necessary for God’s own existence, perfection, goodness, being, etc.

Yes, I strongly agree! The secondary objects of the will are unnecessary and thus may be different or not at all. This, I say, must be, in my estimate, the only way out of this problem. But such, of course, would be at least a partial rejection of premise 3. Most people are rather unenthusitic to do such a thing, I’ve learned.

I’m not sure the word ‘different’ is the right word to use here though. I was recently just reading in one of Aquinas’ works where he says that we shouldn’t use the word ‘different’ generally when speaking of God because of the false notions it can convey concerning God.

Why do you think we shouldn’t use the word different?

 

[STT]

The being of an individual is simply the whole of their existence. If one element is changed there, then the whole thing has change. Further, if the mind causes mental phenomena then we fall into the same place I’m describing.

Yes. The whole, person changes. That doesn’t mean that the mind itself is subject to change. The God of the Bible is not simple.

 

[quaestio45]

That doesn’t mean that the mind itself is subject to change.

As I’ve said over and over, a difference in effect stemming from the same cause needs explanation. That explanation must be a difference in the state of the mind.

The God of the Bible is not simple.

Any and every Christian would disagree heavily with that claim (well… I guess not protestants… but definitely everyone here).

 

[STT]

As I’ve said over and over, a difference in effect stemming from the same cause needs explanation. That explanation must be a difference in the state of the mind.

What do you mean with the state of mind? Mind does not have states. It experiences different things at different moments though.

Any and every Christian would disagree heavily with that claim (well… I guess not protestants… but definitely everyone here).

Could you please show me a verse in the Bible which tells that God is simple?

 

[Richca]

Richca:

It appears that God’s will concerning secondary objects other than himself such as creatures can be different because he can freely choose to create them or not and because they are not necessary for God’s own existence, perfection, goodness, being, etc.

Yes, I strongly agree! The secondary objects of the will are unnecessary and thus may be different or not at all. This, I say, must be, in my estimate, the only way out of this problem. But such, of course, would be at least a partial rejection of premise 3. Most people are rather unenthusitic to do such a thing, I’ve learned.

P3, in which you state “God cannot be conceived as being in distinct [or different] states of being”, I’d say cannot be rejected. God cannot possibly be in different states of being for many reasons. God’s ‘state’ of being or existence is to be not different. God’s being or existence is unbounded, limitless, infinite. God wouldn’t be infinite Being if he could go from one state of being to another. To go from one state of being to another is something that has limited being. It is also something that is a compound of act and potency for to go from one state of being to another is a change and change involves potentiality. God is pure act. God is also an absolutely simple being and not a compound being. Being cannot be added or substracted from God and to go from one state of being to another or different state is either an addition or somehow subtraction of being.

I would agree with Vico about using the word ‘state’ in reference to God. It sounds rather strange to me. It seems to me to carry the notion of limitation whereas God’s being is unlimited. Neither is God a kind of being or existence but he is Being and Existence itself. I’m not sure if it makes any sense that ‘to be’ itself can be called a ‘state of being.’ Without going any further into that presently and speaking in a loose or general sense about ‘state of being’, God’s ‘state of being’ so to speak is ‘to be’ itself and which involves all his attributes such as immutability, eternity, infinity, simplicity, etc.

I’m not sure the word ‘different’ is the right word to use here though. I was recently just reading in one of Aquinas’ works where he says that we shouldn’t use the word ‘different’ generally when speaking of God because of the false notions it can convey concerning God.

[/quote]

Why do you think we shouldn’t use the word different?

[/quote]

For one thing, if God’s will can be ‘different’ in reference to creation or creatures in that he can freely choose to either create or not create, you wrote above that this is at least a partial rejection of P3 which I just argued is not possible. So using the word ‘different’ in reference to God you take it appears as meaning God can be in various ‘states of existing’, changeable, etc., when I’m arguing that is not possible.

 

[quaestio45]

I addressed this here, tell me what you think:

The reason I think the Thomist will disagree with me is because this necessarily means God is open to different state of beings, to which challenges to some extent total immutability. But allow me to make a defense for my proposal; God is by definition actuality and perfection itself. If that be so, whatever God is, actuality is, and whatever God isn’t, actuality isn’t. As such, what we conceive as actuality is simply a reflection of God’s current, eternal state of being. This is further supported when we consider how creation makes God no more perfect, yet nonetheless it is seen as a higher mode of existence when we do meaningfully create (relationships, families, lasting legacies) then when we don’t or do the opposite. As such, the actuality of a state of constant creation must be found in God too, who is actuality. Yet this creation, I say oncemore, does not add to God’s perfection, for it was equally perfect for him to never create, for oncemore I say that the state of God determines actuality and perfection.

Thus, it may not be a contradiction to call God pure actuality and simultaneously say he may have been in a different mode of existence then he currently is. It also isn’t a contradiction to say that God is immutable after his eternal choice yet ontoligically, oncemore, may have chosen differenlty then how he chose. Thus, God may be both voluntarily choosing and pure act all at once.

For one thing, if God’s will can be ‘different’ in reference to creation or creatures in that he can freely choose to either create or not create, you wrote above that this is at least a partial rejection of P3 which I just argued is not possible. So using the word ‘different’ in reference to God you take it appears as meaning God can be in various ‘states of existing’, changeable, etc., when I’m arguing that is not possible.

Well certainly commiting to creating and not commiting to creating in intention can’t be the exact same, otherwise we commit contradiction.

 

[quaestio45]

What do you mean with the state of mind? Mind does not have states. It experiences different things at different moments though.

This is a conversation best carried on in your thread.

Could you please show me a verse in the Bible which tells that God is simple?

In the way that the trinity is not explicitly stated in the Bible, neither is the doctrine of divine simplicity. But the characteristics of a simple entity is consistent between the Bible and philosophy. As such, Thomas Aquinas made the connection that God is divinely simple (based off the cosmological argument as well, of course).

 

[STT]

In the way that the trinity is not explicitly stated in the Bible, neither is the doctrine of divine simplicity. But the characteristics of a simple entity is consistent between the Bible and philosophy. As such, Thomas Aquinas made the connection that God is divinely simple (based off the cosmological argument as well, of course).

How Jesus could be left alone if He is God? I am asking this question because He said “Oh God, why you forsaken me?” when He was on the cross. How God could be absent to Jesus if God is simple?

 

[quaestio45]

How Jesus could be left alone if He is God? I am asking this question because He said “Oh God, why you forsaken me?” when He was on the cross. How God could be absent to Jesus if God is simple?

You said the quote yourself, “Oh God, why hath thou forsaken me?”

That isn’t a question of abandonment, but a questioning of his own benevolence on the basis of suffering. Its supposed to mean that suffering is such an intense attribute of life that even God himself would question his own eternal goodness for even a moment if he were put in the same circumstances.