(Another) Cosmological Argument - Norman Geisler

[Magnanimity]

Hi all!

I did a quick search and although I found that Norman Geisler has been brought up here and there on CAF, I didn’t see any extensive treatment of his cosmological argument, which I find to be successful. So, I thought I’d post it here and see what criticisms result. (It’s from his book, Christian Apologetics, pp. 238-50.) He calls it a “vertical form” of the cosmological argument, and it runs thus:

1. 
   *]Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
   *]My nonexistence is possible.
   *]Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
   *]There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
   *]Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.
   *]This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect.
   *]This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called “God.”
   *]Therefore, God exists.
   *]This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.
   *]Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.
   
   Thoughts? Criticisms?
   
   It’s Thomistic, to be sure. So, it carries an Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics with it. I imagine, therefore, that if you’re not already somewhat familiar with this, premises like #3 above will need to be fleshed out a little more. But, let me know what you think.

 

[tonyrey]

1. 
   *]Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
   *]My nonexistence is possible.
   *]Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
   *]There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
   *]Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.
   *]This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect.
   *]This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called “God.”
   *]Therefore, God exists.
   *]This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.
   *]Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.

1. 
   How is 6 obtained from 5?

 

[AlbertBall]

Hi all!

I did a quick search and although I found that Norman Geisler has been brought up here and there on CAF, I didn’t see any extensive treatment of his cosmological argument, which I find to be successful. So, I thought I’d post it here and see what criticisms result. (It’s from his book, Christian Apologetics, pp. 238-50.) He calls it a “vertical form” of the cosmological argument, and it runs thus:

1. 
   *]Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
   *]My nonexistence is possible.
   *]Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
   *]There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
   *]Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.
   *]This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect.
   *]This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called “God.”
   *]Therefore, God exists.
   *]This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.
   *]Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.
   
   Thoughts? Criticisms?
   
   It’s Thomistic, to be sure. So, it carries an Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics with it. I imagine, therefore, that if you’re not already somewhat familiar with this, premises like #3 above will need to be fleshed out a little more. But, let me know what you think.

1. 
   How do 5,6,7,8,9,10 follow on from each other?

 

[Quid_estVeritas]

Hi all!

I did a quick search and although I found that Norman Geisler has been brought up here and there on CAF, I didn’t see any extensive treatment of his cosmological argument, which I find to be successful. So, I thought I’d post it here and see what criticisms result. (It’s from his book, Christian Apologetics, pp. 238-50.) He calls it a “vertical form” of the cosmological argument, and it runs thus:

1. 
   *]Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
   *]My nonexistence is possible.
   *]Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
   *]There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
   *]Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.
   *]This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect.
   *]This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called “God.”
   *]Therefore, God exists.
   *]This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.
   *]Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.
   
   Thoughts? Criticisms?
   
   It’s Thomistic, to be sure. So, it carries an Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysics with it. I imagine, therefore, that if you’re not already somewhat familiar with this, premises like #3 above will need to be fleshed out a little more. But, let me know what you think.

1. 
   premise 9 comes out of left field, it doesn’t follow in any way shape or form from the other premises. Most of the other premises are nearly as bad as far as not following from the preceding ones. This is the worst deductive argument I’ve ever seen, it’s not even qualified to be an inductive argument. YIKES!

 

[hatsoff]

Hi all!

I did a quick search and although I found that Norman Geisler has been brought up here and there on CAF, I didn’t see any extensive treatment of his cosmological argument, which I find to be successful. So, I thought I’d post it here and see what criticisms result. (It’s from his book, Christian Apologetics, pp. 238-50.) He calls it a “vertical form” of the cosmological argument, and it runs thus:

(1) Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
(2) My nonexistence is possible.

Okay, so we need to establish what is meant here by “possible.” Your suggestion of Thomistic possibility is unlikely to work for those not already subscribing to Thomism, who as far as I can tell are pretty much limited to professing Catholics—clearly not your audience for a persuasive argument.

One alternative might be the ordinary English sense of possibility, where a situation is possible iff we can coherently conceive of it having arisen.

(3) Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.

The phrasing of this premise is strange to me. Perhaps we could instead say

(3’) Whatever has the possibility not to exist has an external cause of its existence.

or

(3’’) Whatever has the possibility not to exist was previously caused to exist.

Either of those would do as general rules of thumb in the context of our own universe. However, they are not applicable outside space and time, and in any case our confidence in them is far too weak to have the existence of God hang on their acceptance.

(4) There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.

I see no good reason to suppose this is true.

(5) Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.

Roughly speaking, this follows from (1) through (4)—although the argument needs to be slightly revised if you want it to be deductively valid.

(6) This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect.

Okay, now we’re really off the rails. I can’t imagine any skeptic agreeing to this premise. I certainly don’t.

(9) This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.

This is another enormously problematic premise, for obvious reasons.

 

[Magnanimity]

How is 6 obtained from 5?

I believe the thinking is that if one can admit thru premise 5 then you’ve arrived at a necessary, uncaused Being who is pure Act. This sort of Being would entail other attributes like immutability, etc. You’re right though. Unless you’re reading the fleshing out of these steps, it does look like a leap.

 

[Magnanimity]

How do 5,6,7,8,9,10 follow on from each other?

AlbertBall, if it seems to you a bit much, as if he’s trying really hard to squeeze the God of the Bible from premise 5, then I actually sympathize with your reaction.

How about thru premise 5, then. If you think that’s as far as the argument can go, did it get there?

 

[Magnanimity]

premise 9 comes out of left field, it doesn’t follow in any way shape or form from the other premises. Most of the other premises are nearly as bad as far as not following from the preceding ones. This is the worst deductive argument I’ve ever seen, it’s not even qualified to be an inductive argument. YIKES!

Whoa, really?! That actually strikes me as pretty funny because I found ths argument to be so persuasive back when I was a junior in college (quite a while ago). But now, I think I see what you mean. Those later premises especially seem to be a little sneaky.

Let’s say then that we stop at premise 5. What are your questions from there only, if any?

 

[rossum]

1. Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
2. My nonexistence is possible.

I would say certain. What you are now is not what you were an instant ago and is not what you will be an instant from now.

1. Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.

Agreed, with reservations. See Nagarjuna’s analysis of “self” and “other” with respect to causation.

1. There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.

In an infinitely old universe an infinite regress is possible. This is possible if we are just a bubble in a larger multiverse. Acceptance of this point is provisional, depending on scientific discoveries.

1. Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.

No. The initial uncaused cause may have existed back when it operated but there is no requirement that it still exists now. My mother was caused by two of my grandparents, both of whom are now dead. Indeed it is certain that the cause of the universe is no longer operating, otherwise we would see new universes constantly popping up all over the place.

1. This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect.

“Unchanging” is impossible: On the first day God said “Let there be light” and on the second day God said “Let there be light” and on the third day God said “Let there be light” and on the fourth day …

Why “all-powerful”? Logically you can only go as far as “powerful enough to create one universe”. You have no evidence for any more power than that.

Why “all-knowing”? All you can show is “knowing enough to create one universe”.

Given that the universe we live in is imperfect, how can you deduce “all-perfect” from the state of the universe?

This is a very weak step in the argument.

1. This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called “God.”

Or “Allah”, or “Krishna” or “The Invisible Pink Unicorn” depending on your cultural background.

1. Therefore, God exists.

Therefore Allah, Krishna and the IPU also exist.

1. This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.

This God is identical to the God described in the Moslem scriptures and the God described in the Hindu scriptures.

I would also challenge the claim that the Old Testament God is “all-perfect”, He has far too much blood on his hands.

1. Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.

Therefore the God described in the Qur’an exists. Therefore the God described in the Bhagavad Gita exists.

rossum

 

[tonyrey]

(4) There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.

It is impossible to disprove that an infinite regress of causes can exist, of course, but the overwhelming weight of evidence is against it since in the vast amount of human knowledge there is not one instance of something creating itself.

 

[Quid_estVeritas]

Whoa, really?! That actually strikes me as pretty funny because I found ths argument to be so persuasive back when I was a junior in college (quite a while ago). But now, I think I see what you mean. Those later premises especially seem to be a little sneaky.

Let’s say then that we stop at premise 5. What are your questions from there only, if any?

yes, we should stop at 5, which is pretty much Saint Thomas’ argument. Then after that it goes off the tracks. I find that most of those Evangelical apologists like Geilser tend to overstate their case, just like guys like Richard Dawkins overstate the case against God, they’re kind of a yin to Dawkins and his gang’s yang.

 

[Magnanimity]

Okay, so we need to establish what is meant here by “possible.” Your suggestion of Thomistic possibility is unlikely to work for those not already subscribing to Thomism…

One alternative might be the ordinary English sense of possibility, where a situation is possible iff we can coherently conceive of it having arisen.

By “possible” is meant here that which, while actually existing (premise 1), does not exist necessarily. That which could not be.

The argument would be closer to your 3’. 3" is more akin to the Kalam, which is very distinct from this argument. At this point in the argument, Geisler is trying to consider whether causality applies in one of three forms: self-caused, uncaused, or caused by another. He rules out the first as metaphysically impossible. He then rules out uncaused as applying to possible beings because since they do actually exist but do not have to, a cause for their current existence is necessary. Iow, a cause of each individual’s current be-ing is necessary. Its actuality needs a cause outside of itself. Only a necessary being could be uncaused. Therefore, a cause (that which affects a transition from potentiality to actuality) which is outside of the possible being is required.

Either of those would do as general rules of thumb in the context of our own universe. However, they are not applicable outside space and time, and in any case our confidence in them is far too weak to have the existence of God hang on their acceptance.

OK, so this argument is generally trying to move from the world of experience-the world of everyday knowing that though many things do really exist, they do not have to exist-to the necessary metaphysical ground for their be-ing.

I see no good reason to suppose this is true.

Remember, this is not at all a variation of the Kalam. It has no temporal sense to it at all. If all the being of our experience is not necessary, but only possible, then it needs a cause for its continual be-ing.

Roughly speaking, this follows from (1) through (4)—although the argument needs to be slightly revised if you want it to be deductively valid.

Granted. I see your points made above as necessitating some more precise wording and more robust too, probably.

Okay, now we’re really off the rails. I can’t imagine any skeptic agreeing to this premise. I certainly don’t.

I sympathize. 6-10 need to be trying to achieve much less and likely altered to prove something more general (eg, whatever attributes can be entailed by a necessary, uncaused Being who is the metaphysical grounding of all possible being(s).

 

[Magnanimity]

yes, we should stop at 5, which is pretty much Saint Thomas’ argument. Then after that it goes off the tracks. I find that most of those Evangelical apologists like Geilser tend to overstate their case, just like guys like Richard Dawkins overstate the case against God, they’re kind of a yin to Dawkins and his gang’s yang.

Quid,

In another place, Geisler has a slightly altered version of the argument that ends in a revised premise 6. It reads as follows:

Premise 6: The uncaused cause must be infinite, necessary, eternal, simple, unchangeable, and one.

He then draws a weak concluding premise after this, “This uncaused cause is identical with the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition.”

How’s that?

And yes, this is an updated version of the Thomistic cosmological argument. It’s not a replicated version though, so I wanted to see if it works.

 

[AlbertBall]

AlbertBall, if it seems to you a bit much, as if he’s trying really hard to squeeze the God of the Bible from premise 5, then I actually sympathize with your reaction.

How about thru premise 5, then. If you think that’s as far as the argument can go, did it get there?

I would say 1-5 could be argued for.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

1. 
   *]Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).

1. 
   cogito ergo sum
   

   *]My nonexistence is possible.

   a contingent being
   

   *]Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.

   another contingent being, this need not be stated it is implied in the definition of ‘contingent’
   

   *]There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
   *]Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.

   this is where a lot of argumentation starts, i think Copleston handles this part better with hierarchical causality
   

   *]This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-perfect.

   this is a result of the conclusion of the contingency argument. its out of place.
   

   *]This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called “God.”
   *]Therefore, God exists.
   *]This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.
   *]Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.

   Thoughts? Criticisms?
   the rest is a huge pile of assertions based on the end result of the contingency argument. its a loop, im not a big fan of this one

 

[Oreoracle]

My nonexistence is possible.

Prove it. How does one know that an event that didn’t occur was or is possible? For example, let’s say I flip a coin and it lands on tails. How do I prove that it was possible for the coin to have landed on heads?

Because of my suspicions about modality, I only concur with the first premise. When the argument makes the classic leap that assumes everything except God is contingent, I have serious doubts.

 

[Magnanimity]

Prove it. How does one know that an event that didn’t occur was or is possible? For example, let’s say I flip a coin and it lands on tails. How do I prove that it was possible for the coin to have landed on heads?

Because of my suspicions about modality, I only concur with the first premise. When the argument makes the classic leap that assumes everything except God is contingent, I have serious doubts.

In this scenario, he is talking about your present existing. Geisler argues that regarding this premise you have three basic options: necessary, possible and impossible. Obviously, if you exist your existence is not impossible. So, that leaves necessary and possible (contingent). Are you suggesting that it is better to think of something like your own existence as necessary?

Perhaps I’m missing your objection here.

 

[Oreoracle]

In this scenario, he is talking about your present existing. Geisler argues that regarding this premise you have three basic options: necessary, possible and impossible. Obviously, if you exist your existence is not impossible. So, that leaves necessary and possible (contingent). Are you suggesting that it is better to think of something like your own existence as necessary?

Perhaps I’m missing your objection here.

Firstly, possibility does not equal contingency. A contingent entity is an entity that may or may not have existed (“possibly could be and possibly could not be”). As such, no contingent entities are necessary, but all necessary entities are possible.

My objection was simply that you can’t demonstrate my contingency, i.e., you can’t prove that I might not have existed. Indeed, a determinist would contend that my existence is necessary, as are all events/entities. On what grounds do you discount determinism?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Firstly, possibility does not equal contingency. A contingent entity is an entity that may or may not have existed (“possibly could be and possibly could not be”). As such, no contingent entities are necessary, but all necessary entities are possible.

My objection was simply that you can’t demonstrate my contingency, i.e., you can’t prove that I might not have existed. Indeed, a determinist would contend that my existence is necessary, as are all events/entities. On what grounds do you discount determinism?

since “you” required a cause, your parents, you are contingent.

follow this argument back far enough and you come to bare existence at its maximal state. beyond that is “nothing” which doesnt exist

 

[Oreoracle]

since “you” required a cause, your parents, you are contingent.

So I finally took your advice and started reading about modal logic. According to numerous sources, “contingent” merely means “possibly and possibly not.” It has nothing to do with causes; indeed, nothing about modal logic speaks of causes directly. The book I’m reading (“An Introduction to Modal Logic” by Kenneth Konyndyk) explicitly states that we shouldn’t confuse implication, or anything found in logic, with causation.

In case you’re not seeing the point, I would be a necessary entity in a deterministic schema because the events couldn’t have played out any other way, and so, if I was born, there was never a possibility that I might not have been born. Therefore, I would have been necessary. (“Necessary” means “not possible that it is not the case.”)