(Another) Cosmological Argument - Norman Geisler

[Magnanimity]

Firstly, possibility does not equal contingency. A contingent entity is an entity that may or may not have existed (“possibly could be and possibly could not be”).

It certainly seems like you use the terms interchangeably above, so I’m not sure of the distinction you’re drawing. Most would readily grant that they might or might not have been. Or, if you prefer, that tomorrow you might or might not be. This is not exactly the meaning of possible carried by the argument, but perhaps it might move us forward.

As such, no contingent entities are necessary, but all necessary entities are possible.

Clearly.

My objection was simply that you can’t demonstrate my contingency, i.e., you can’t prove that I might not have existed. Indeed, a determinist would contend that my existence is necessary, as are all events/entities. On what grounds do you discount determinism?

First, since you do presently exist, you are either (1) necessary being or (2) you “possibly could be or possibly could not be.” However, the only way for ‘you’ to fall within the former category is through some type of modal or extensional pantheism, I would think.

Second, there is an important distiction to be made here and that is between this argument and the Kalam. The infinite regression premise here only seeks to establish that any and all possible beings must have a metaphysical ground for every moment of their be-ing, their actuality. You’re objection hinted more at a Kalam type argument-of your becoming, or coming into existence once upon a time. But, that is a separate argument from this one.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

So I finally took your advice and started reading about modal logic.

glad to hear it. practice up, and soon you eill have me on the run.

According to numerous sources, “contingent” merely means “possibly and possibly not.” It has nothing to do with causes; indeed, nothing about modal logic speaks of causes directly. The book I’m reading (“An Introduction to Modal Logic” by Kenneth Konyndyk) explicitly states that we shouldn’t confuse implication, or anything found in logic, with causation.

first, let me say. this argument doesnt take a modal form. but that said, in the very idea of ‘possible’, is the implication of the need for a cause, other wise it wouldnt be possible but necessary.

i havent read that book, so i cant contradict it without the contest the author is using. but thats my thought on the matter.

In case you’re not seeing the point, I would be a necessary entity in a deterministic schema because the events couldn’t have played out any other way, and so, if I was born, there was never a possibility that I might not have been born. Therefore, I would have been necessary. (“Necessary” means “not possible that it is not the case.”)

usually when we talk about determinism, we mean it as applied to a system with rules, such as the universe. indeed, if the universe is strictly deterministic, and closed. then all events in it would be necessary from my thinking, unfortunatley the entire system itself is contingent.

but im glad to see you reading up on the issues. but how will you stay an athiest when it occurs to you that it isnt rational?

a little knowledge might be a dangerous thing. it was for me. goodnight

 

[Oreoracle]

First, since you do presently exist, you are either (1) necessary being or (2) you “possibly could be or possibly could not be.” However, the only way for ‘you’ to fall within the former category is through some type of modal or extensional pantheism, I would think.

Nowhere in modal logic is it held that an entity must be god-like to be necessary. This is an idiosyncratic belief among Catholic theologians. Truly, it is only speculation, which is a polite way of saying, “you are guessing.”

Second, there is an important distiction to be made here and that is between this argument and the Kalam. The infinite regression premise here only seeks to establish that any and all possible beings must have a metaphysical ground for every moment of their be-ing, their actuality. You’re objection hinted more at a Kalam type argument-of your becoming, or coming into existence once upon a time. But, that is a separate argument from this one.

All I’m saying is that the argument hinges on a bare assertion: the premise that we are contingent. Nobody has substantiated that premise.

 

[Oreoracle]

first, let me say. this argument doesnt take a modal form.

True. More specifically, it doesn’t take any form. Most of the time you’ll see term logic, somewhat sophisticated propositional modal logic, or even predicate logic in these forums. But this was more like an outline of a demonstration than an argument.

But modality was nonetheless invoked, of which, as I said, I am suspicious.

but that said, in the very idea of ‘possible’, is the implication of the need for a cause, other wise it wouldnt be possible but necessary.

Not necessarily (pardon the pun ). There are many instances of possibilities in mathematics that are not “caused.” For example, it’s possible for an interior angle in a triangle to measure 90 degrees. Now, I suppose you could say that the triangle’s “right triangle-ness” caused it to have a ninety-degree angle, but I could just as easily say that the right angle caused the triangle to be a right triangle. Instead, this can be reduced to a biconditional without causality playing a part: “Iff a triangle is a right triangle, it has a right angle.”

Anyway, different modal logics may define possibility somewhat differently. In my text, “possible” is interpreted to mean “broadly logically possible.” In other words, a possible thing is a thing without contradictory qualities. The reader is left to work out the philosophical implications and decide for himself how causation comes into play. Apparently, this is how most texts go about teaching it.

usually when we talk about determinism, we mean it as applied to a system with rules, such as the universe. indeed, if the universe is strictly deterministic, and closed. then all events in it would be necessary from my thinking, unfortunatley the entire system itself is contingent.

How do you know it is contingent?

but im glad to see you reading up on the issues. but how will you stay an athiest when it occurs to you that it isnt rational?

Atheism isn’t precious to me, if that’s what you’re saying. It’s the position I was born with, abandoned when my parents told me that God existed, and returned to again when I asked why I believed in him.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

How do you know it is contingent?

because there is no universe apart from the contingent beings of which it is composed any more than there is a human race apart from the people of which it is composed.

 

[cranster]

“There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence”
I see no good reason to suppose this is true.

If we are talking about things that exist in space time then some time has to elapse from one cause to the next. So moving backward in time from a thing to its cause… to that causes cause and so on you run into an obvious problem 13.7 billion years ago at the big bang when there was a singularity. Until there was the first instant of inflation of space there was no space time, and no prior to move before. The prior link in the chain stops there. We are talking about tangible physical things that exist in space time and not an infinite regress of abstract concepts such as numbers.

let’s for arguments sake say that Hoyle’s static state theory were true, (an always existing universe) which I don’t think many accept now with the discovery of cosmic microwave background radiation i.e. the echo of the big bang.

If we begin the journey of an infinite amount of descendant’s from us now in the present to infinity ago in the past, the problem is “the present”. We exist in the present. We got here… are here. So from some point of prior descendent’s we have to be able to move in to the future to reach us here and now. You can never pick a descendant to get to us because there is no beginning of descendant’s. The problem with an infinity of descendants ago is the inability to get to now. Any time you pick a descendant as a point to move forward to the present there is always a prior descendant meaning you can’t pick that one as a starting point. there is no beginning of descendant’s and the inability to have a starting point to move into the future to the present, yet here we are. People underestimate how big infinity is.

There logically has to be a first descendant or first cause… a point from the prior amount of descendant’s to reach us in the present with each descendant causing the one that follows. There logically has to be a first mover or uncaused cause for the possibility to reach the present. One that was not caused by a prior descendant for the present to exist. One that exists on it’s own whose existence is not contingent on another.

 

[Magnanimity]

Nowhere in modal logic is it held that an entity must be god-like to be necessary. This is an idiosyncratic belief among Catholic theologians. Truly, it is only speculation, which is a polite way of saying, “you are guessing.”

I’m not sure of the utility of your bringing up modal logic repeatedly. From what I recall from philosophy, modality in logic stretches back at least to Abelard, and there are hints of it in Aristotle, even. It’s simply that division of logic which deals with that which is necessary, possible and impossible, right? So, it is separate from truth-functional logic, I guess, but what’s the point you’re making here?

All I’m saying is that the argument hinges on a bare assertion: the premise that we are contingent. Nobody has substantiated that premise.

Alright, let’s attempt two things here in reply. First, since not many Catholics are going to be indeterminists, and yet will hold that their own existence is merely posssible, it is on you to show how a deterministic universe entails that you are a metaphysically necessary being. That is, even if a Catholic grants determinism (which to some extent he must), why would it follow from that that our own existence is necessary. I see no connection between the two. So, what is the argument?

The second thing to be done here is to give you your much sought-after argument for premise 2 “my nonexistence is possible.”

Let’s agree on some basic definitions. A necessary being is one which cannot not exist. A possible being may or may not exist. Uncontroversial so far in these definitions?

1. 
   *]Any being B that has any potentiality regarding its own existence has the possibility not to exist.
   *]Coming to be or ceasing to be are types of potentiality in existence.
   *]Any necessary being NB cannot not exist.
   *]Hence, any NB has no potential regarding its own existence.
   *]I once came to be (exist).
   *]So, I have potential within myself regarding existence.
   *]Therefore, I am not NB.

 

[Oreoracle]

I’m not sure of the utility of your bringing up modal logic repeatedly. From what I recall from philosophy, modality in logic stretches back at least to Abelard, and there are hints of it in Aristotle, even. It’s simply that division of logic which deals with that which is necessary, possible and impossible, right? So, it is separate from truth-functional logic, I guess, but what’s the point you’re making here?

My point is that modal logic is being invoked in the argument, but it seems that the argument’s author felt he could swap out the modal “necessary” for the Catholic’s metaphysical “necessary.” They aren’t interchangeable terms, and if terms foreign to a logical system are introduced, they should at least be properly defined before the argument is made.

Necessity is not defined as a god-like quality in T,D,B,K,S1,S2,S3,S4,S5, or any other modal logic I’ve heard of.

Alright, let’s attempt two things here in reply. First, since not many Catholics are going to be indeterminists, and yet will hold that their own existence is merely posssible, it is on you to show how a deterministic universe entails that you are a metaphysically necessary being.

This doesn’t necessarily cross into metaphysics, and that’s part of your problem here: you’re making a modal issue into a metaphysical issue for no apparent reason. But if you want me to explain, then so be it:

Determinism more or less holds that all sets of circumstances are caused by previous sets of circumstances and that the current set of circumstances will do the same for future circumstances. These circumstances are wholly caused by their predecessors, and so they are determined by them. No uncaused elements play a part, so there is no randomness.

Now, I’ll be generous with my explanation. You’re a Catholic, and so you presumably believe that God was all that existed at one time, correct? (Though you might argue that God exists outside of time, but that’s not important here.) So let the original set of circumstances in the universe (the sum total of all that exists) be A, which Catholicism would claim contains God alone. In essence, God=A, and all consequent sets of circumstances will be the letters that follow.

According to the determinist, the nature of “A” determines that it will act in a particular way, producing a set of circumstances “B.” The same goes for B, as it is determined to create C, and so forth. We can symbolize the implications as such:

1. A
2. A → B
3. B → C
4. C → D
   …

We could continue indefinitely, no? But to save time, we’ll call the present set of circumstances–the conditions we’re living in now–“Z.” Would we not eventually reach the point where Y implies Z? Truly, this whole scheme works like a syllogism wherein “A implies B; B implies C; therefore, A implies C.” The idea is the very same; eventually, we could see that A implied Z on this chain of implications all along, and so we were destined to be from the very beginning.

That is, even if a Catholic grants determinism (which to some extent he must), why would it follow from that that our own existence is necessary. I see no connection between the two. So, what is the argument?

What is the difference between saying, “A determines B” and “A necessitates B?”

Let’s agree on some basic definitions. A necessary being is one which cannot not exist.

I’m with you so far…

A possible being may or may not exist.

No. Even the most basic texts on modal logic will inform you that necessary entities are also possible entities. If “possible” means “may or may not exist” then we would be saying, “Necessary beings may or may not exist,” which is clearly absurd. This is why the term “contingency” is needed. A contingent being may or may not exist. All we know about possible beings is that they may exist; we don’t know whether it is possible that they not exist.

Regarding your list, please define “potential” in a way that is consistent with your usage.

 

[Magnanimity]

Oreoracle,

I do want to engage your reply a little more, but I also don’t want to be sucked into a direction that’s too tangential to the OP.

Let’s give you the argument you were looking for, since you’ve agreed with me what a necessary being is (one which cannot not exist).

Now this is a boring old truth-functional argument, so you might not think it has all the bells and whistles of modal logic, but…

At any rate, recall the form of modus tollens:
If P, then Q
~Q
Therefore, ~P

If Oreoracle is a necessary being, then he must always have existed.
Oreoracle has not always existed.
Therefore, Oreoracle is not a necessary being.

 

[Oreoracle]

Let’s give you the argument you were looking for, since you’ve agreed with me what a necessary being is (one which cannot not exist).

Maybe there is some confusion here. A necessary being is simply one that is “not possibly not the case.” Now, you’ve taken this to mean that necessary beings must exist at all times, and in a sense, you might be right. However, what if we include a specific time as part of the definition of an entity? Let’s say, for example, that I define Oreoracle as “a human male existing in 2010.” Thus, “Oreoracle is necessary” translates to “it must be the case that a particular human male will exist in 2010.” It is my understanding that this is the sort of necessity implied by determinism. I can be necessary without being eternal in that I was destined to exist; the events couldn’t have played out any other way.

Now this is a boring old truth-functional argument, so you might not think it has all the bells and whistles of modal logic, but…

You’re mistaken about my attitude. I’m not seeking to glorify modal logic, but rather to keep it in its place. In my opinion, modal logic is only useful for organizing thoughts. For example, if I said, “It is contingent that it will snow tomorrow” I really mean, “For all I know, it may or may not snow tomorrow.” I don’t believe that “contingency” exists outside of my head. Like probabilities, talk of “possibility” is simply a measure of our ignorance, e.g., I say that the prospect of snowing is contingent because I don’t have adequate knowledge of the weather conditions.

If Oreoracle is a necessary being, then he must always have existed.
Oreoracle has not always existed.
Therefore, Oreoracle is not a necessary being.

The argument is indeed valid, but I don’t believe it is sound. Again, necessity is not necessarily limited to eternal beings, but it depends on the definition you’re using.

 

[tonyrey]

Maybe there is some confusion here. A necessary being is simply one that is “not possibly not the case.” Now, you’ve taken this to mean that necessary beings must exist at all times, and in a sense, you might be right. However, what if we include a specific time as part of the definition of an entity? Let’s say, for example, that I define Oreoracle as “a human male existing in 2010.” Thus, “Oreoracle is necessary” translates to “it must be the case that a particular human male will exist in 2010.” It is my understanding that this is the sort of necessity implied by determinism. I can be necessary without being eternal in that I was destined to exist; the events couldn’t have played out any other way.

You are attributing necessity to the course of events. How would you justify that assumption?

You’re mistaken about my attitude. I’m not seeking to glorify modal logic, but rather to keep it in its place. In my opinion, modal logic is only useful for organizing thoughts. For example, if I said, “It is contingent that it will snow tomorrow” I really mean, “For all I know, it may or may not snow tomorrow.” I don’t believe that “contingency” exists outside of my head. Like probabilities, talk of “possibility” is simply a measure of our ignorance, e.g., I say that the prospect of snowing is contingent because I don’t have adequate knowledge of the weather conditions.

Your argument is indeed based on our ignorance but it cuts both ways. How can we tell whether contingency is an illusion or not? All the available evidence points to the fact that nothing we know exists necessarily…

 

[Oreoracle]

You are attributing necessity to the course of events. How would you justify that assumption?

I’m not claiming that determinism is the case, only that it might be the case (“for all we know”), and the position is rather convincing. Because Magnanimity was making the positive assertion that we all might not have existed, I wanted the rationale for their dismissal of determinism, which that claim would necessarily contradict.

This discussion isn’t helped by the fact that Catholics have a very obscure notion of “necessity” that they only apply to God. Any text on modality will show you ample cases of necessity, and they don’t always apply to God.

For example, one might see something like “If I am born, then I will die” symbolized as “A → B”. Given that, we can make an equivalent claim: “necessarily (A → B)” which translates to “necessarily A → necessarily B”. So if some argumentation demonstrates my birth to be necessary, my death is necessary. This doesn’t mean that my death “has always existed,” it merely means that, given certain conditions, it must have occurred. Necessity does not equal some eternal quality.

Your argument is indeed based on our ignorance but it cuts both ways. How can we tell whether contingency is an illusion or not? All the available evidence points to the fact that nothing we know exists necessarily…

Yes, we can be done with this much more quickly if evidence of my contingency is provided. How do you prove that I might not have existed? Do you have any evidence at all?

 

[tonyrey]

I’m not claiming that determinism is the case, only that it might be the case (“for all we know”), and the position is rather convincing. Because Magnanimity was making the positive assertion that we all might not have existed, I wanted the rationale for their dismissal of determinism, which that claim would necessarily contradict.

How about subatomic indeterminacy?

This discussion isn’t helped by the fact that Catholics have a very obscure notion of “necessity” that they only apply to God. Any text on modality will show you ample cases of necessity, and they don’t always apply to God.

Can you give examples of necessity which are not logical or mathematical?

For example, one might see something like “If I am born, then I will die” symbolized as “A → B”. Given that, we can make an equivalent claim: “necessarily (A → B)” which translates to “necessarily A → necessarily B”. So if some argumentation demonstrates my birth to be necessary, my death is necessary. This doesn’t mean that my death “has always existed,” it merely means that, given certain conditions, it must have occurred. Necessity does not equal some eternal quality.

There is only an incalculably high probability that you will die! It is conceivable that the future will be different from the past and you will be immortal. And of course it depends on how you define “you” or “I”. Most people believe it is only your body which dies, not you!

Yes, we can be done with this much more quickly if evidence of my contingency is provided. How do you prove that I might not have existed? Do you have any evidence at all?

Proof is not applicable to existential facts, only a high degree of probability because our finite intelligence entails fallibility. It seems highly probable that you might not have existed because there are countless conditions which could have prevented you from existing but only one sequence of events which led to your existence. existed. Of course this reasoning is based on the assumption that determinism is false - for which there is the evidence of indeterminacy…

 

[Oreoracle]

How about subatomic indeterminacy?

Could you provide examples?

Can you give examples of necessity which are not logical or mathematical?

I’m guessing that tautologies are out of the question?

I believe my biological implication (“If I am born, then I will die.”) ought to have been sufficient, but here’s another: “If matter exists, there exists some thing that is convertible to energy.”

There is only an incalculably high probability that you will die! It is conceivable that the future will be different from the past and you will be immortal.

But to admit that possibility is to dismiss what we already know about biology.

And of course it depends on how you define “you” or “I”. Most people believe it is only your body which dies, not you!

Fine, I’ll fix it for you: “If an organism is born, it will die.” Here, the emphasis rests on the body.

…for which there is the evidence of indeterminacy…

What evidence?

 

[tonyrey]

How about subatomic indeterminacy?

Quantum mechanics - in which there are indeterminacies, such as the relative indeterminacy of the positions of quantum particles to the precision with which their momenta can be measured (and vice versa). (See Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle.)

Can you give examples of necessity which are not logical or mathematical?

I’m guessing that tautologies are out of the question?
I believe my biological implication (“If I am born, then I will die.”) ought to have been sufficient, but here’s another: “If matter exists, there exists something that is convertible to energy.”

In our experience that is the case but who knows what scientific discovery may overturn that law? Induction never yields certainty. There is only an incalculably high probability that you will die! It is conceivable that the future will be different from the past and you will be immortal.

But to admit that possibility is to dismiss what we already know about biology.

It does not dismiss it outright but regards all conclusions as provisional - which is the scientific method.

And of course it depends on how you define “you” or “I”. Most people believe it is only your body which dies, not you!

Fine, I’ll fix it for you: “If an organism is born, it will die.” Here, the emphasis rests on the body.

Even so it is not an absolute certainty - as I have explained.

.

…for which there is the evidence of indeterminacy…

What evidence?

Chaos theory argues that precise prediction of the behavior of complex systems becomes impossible because of the observer’s inability to gather all necessary data.

 

[Magnanimity]

Oreoracle,

I think the discussion between you and tonyrey has gotten a bit too adrift from the OP for there to be any benefit for me to jump in. But, I have read the back and forth. A couple remarks should be made here.

In addition to reading modal logic texts and (hopefully) actual systems built off modality (eg, CI Lewis & A Plantinga), I recommend you start reading some Aristotelian metaphysics too. Michael Loux and W Norris Clarke would be good contemporary places to start.

I find myself making these recommendations now because when I began to write a reply to you earlier it seemed like my reply was requiring too much background info to be supplied before I could even get my points off the ground. And why should I do what other authors have already amply done? Better for you to get the background knowledge necessary to seriously engage these arguments.

The distinction between necessity and contingency has a very rich history in Aristotelian metaphysics, whether or not that metaphysics is Thomistic. But, if you don’t already know how these terms are used, it’s probably of little help to use your limited knowledge of a contemporary logical system and impose its terms and meanings retroactively on ancient or medieval systems without having at least as much knowledge of these metaphysical systems as you do of recent possible worlds metaphysics.

And that’s what’s going on here in this cosmological argument-metaphysics. Logic alone cannot answer philosophical questions, any more than mathematics alone can answer questions of physics. Logic and math are tools of the trade, but they are still only tools.

 

[Oreoracle]

In addition to reading modal logic texts and (hopefully) actual systems built off modality (eg, CI Lewis & A Plantinga), I recommend you start reading some Aristotelian metaphysics too.

Sorry, but I have no interest in Aristotle. Aristotle never demonstrated any of his assumptions to be true*. As far as I’m concerned, there is only one type of existence, and not 10 or however many types he posited (unless you count “conceptual” as a sort of existence).

• For a humorous example of this, I cite Aristotle’s claim that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. Apparently he didn’t have the sense to drop two objects of varying masses from a high building to find out. In my opinion, he was a pseudo-intellectual who thought that his conception of things alone made them true. You’ll find this often in the “reason above evidence!” crowd.

And as for your name, are you trying to fulfill his ideal of the “magnanimous man?”

Michael Loux and W Norris Clarke would be good contemporary places to start.

Suppose that a person is presented with classic literature and contemporary literature. Which is he more likely to read? Contemporary literature, as its name suggests, has only a temporary effect on the public’s understanding of things. I would rather learn about ideas that will last rather than Aristotelian nonsense that will be struck down as the public moves away from superstition.

Better for you to get the background knowledge necessary to seriously engage these arguments.

My apologies for not having Aristotle in my arsenal for the purposes of this thread. Maybe you should have put “(Aristotelians Only)” beside the thread title. Indeed, if folks aren’t Aristotelians, they probably won’t agree with much of what he says at all, save for his formulation of syllogisms.

The distinction between necessity and contingency has a very rich history in Aristotelian metaphysics, whether or not that metaphysics is Thomistic.

I don’t care much for Thomism either.

But, if you don’t already know how these terms are used, it’s probably of little help to use your limited knowledge of a contemporary logical system and impose its terms and meanings retroactively on ancient or medieval systems without having at least as much knowledge of these metaphysical systems as you do of recent possible worlds metaphysics.

If you were trying to invoke medieval metaphysics rather than modern modality, you should have said so. I’m not a mind-reader.

And that’s what’s going on here in this cosmological argument-metaphysics. Logic alone cannot answer philosophical questions, any more than mathematics alone can answer questions of physics. Logic and math are tools of the trade, but they are still only tools.

I agree.

 

[Oreoracle]

Quantum mechanics - in which there are indeterminacies, such as the relative indeterminacy of the positions of quantum particles to the precision with which their momenta can be measured (and vice versa). (See Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle.)

I think you’re moving the goalposts here, but perhaps unintentionally. Heisenberg’s principle was also called “the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.” The Principle argues that we are unable to know the motion and location of particles at a given time, not that the movements and location are “indetermined.” The indetermination comes from us, which is simply our inability to know the state of things. But just because we don’t know what’s going on doesn’t mean that nothing’s occurring–to assert otherwise is surely fallacious.

There is a huge difference between saying, “I see no cause for this,” and “This must be uncaused!” There’s an old adage: Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

In our experience that is the case but who knows what scientific discovery may overturn that law? Induction never yields certainty. There is only an incalculably high probability that you will die! It is conceivable that the future will be different from the past and you will be immortal.

Sure! And why stop there, hmm? It’s also possible that an elephant will spontaneously materialize in my room due to quantum randomness!

It does not dismiss it outright but regards all conclusions as provisional - which is the scientific method.

It’s not very practical to think of every detail of every scientific theory as being expendable. Some details might change, but I can say that given my biological conditions alone, I am 100% certain that I will die.

Even so it is not an absolute certainty - as I have explained.

Chaos theory argues that precise prediction of the behavior of complex systems becomes impossible because of the observer’s inability to gather all necessary data.

I only claimed that events may be determined, not that we can predict them. Again, you’re alternating between the causal usage of determination and our ability to “determine” what is occurring. They mean two different things.

 

[Magnanimity]

Sorry, but I have no interest in Aristotle. Aristotle never demonstrated any of his assumptions to be true. As far as I’m concerned, there is only one type of existence, and not 10 or however many types he posited (unless you count “conceptual” as a sort of existence).

• For a humorous example of this, I cite Aristotle’s claim that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects. *Apparently he didn’t have the sense to drop two objects of varying masses from a high building to find out. In my opinion, he was a pseudo-intellectual who thought that his conception of things alone made them true…

If you’re looking for the philosopher who is correct in every belief he holds, you’re very likely to never get beyond the ‘man in the mirror.’ You’re doing little more than throwing out the baby with the bathwater here. But why? Unless you know that a certain quirky (or ‘false’) view that a philosopher holds in one area X entails falsity in another area Y, you are not justified in believing that the philosopher’s statements about Y are false. I would challenge you to name one prominent philosopher (contemporary or past) who doesn’t hold rather quirky views that some would find humorous.

Let’s take a ready example to illustrate my point. David Lewis is probably the most well-known philosopher today who has created an ontological system based on the modal logic you’re fond of. Now, Lewis’ possible worlds nominalism would entail the rather quirky idea that we should regard all events and states of affair to be concrete entities on a level of ontological status with events of the ‘actual’ world. Quirky? Yep. False? Probably. Most philosophers today agree with that position? Nope. Therefore, Lewis’ ontology has nothing of value to offer the world of metaphysics? non sequitur. Likely, Lewis has much to offer the broader world of ontology.

I submit to you that the wise man does just the opposite of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Rather, he looks all around him, even to very contrary positions to his own, in order to find as much truth as he can.

But, you claim to know little of Aristotle (or Aquinas). That’s niether surprising, given your comments so far, nor a problem, per se. The problem arises from your lack of desire to learn of those monumental figures in the history of philosophy, since you are critiquing them. I can’t even imagine a possible world in which that could be intellectually responsible. No one ever said that you had to study philosophy. But, probably everyone agrees that you are not justified in critiquing a philosopher until you’ve taken the effort to understand his views.

And as for your name, are you trying to fulfill his ideal of the “magnanimous man?” *

You got it!

Suppose that a person is presented with classic literature and contemporary literature. *Which is he more likely to read? *

Both. There simply is no either/or dilemma here. The only responsible philosophically-oriented individual will be the one that studies Plato and Whitehead, Aristotle and Loux, Aquinas and W Norris Clarke. To ignore the past or the present is woefully to your own detriment.

**I would rather learn about ideas that will last rather than Aristotelian nonsense that will be struck down as the public moves away from superstition.

I imagine your’re aware of the fact that being an Aristotelian in, say, metaphysics, politics, or ethics has nothing to do with Thomism, nor even religious belief, right?

My apologies for not having Aristotle in my arsenal for the purposes of this thread. *Maybe you should have put “(Aristotelians Only)” beside the thread title. *Indeed, if folks aren’t Aristotelians, they probably won’t agree with much of what he says at all, save for his formulation of syllogisms.

I’m pretty sure I specified early on the Aristotelian/Thomistic underpinnings of this variation on Aquinas’ cosmological argument.

Additionally, to believe (contra Plato) that you can directly perceive objects external to you is to be an Aristotelian. To believe in a correspondence theory of thruth is to be Aristotelian. To believe that deductive syllogism is a valid way to extend one’s knowledge is to be an Aristotelian. To believe that being courageous is the superior middle action between being either a coward or rash/foolhearty, is to also be an Aristotelian. If you believe that man is a rational animal, you’re Aristotelian. And on and on it goes… I could probably point out numerous ways in which, unbeknownst to you, you’re an Aristotelian.

 

[tonyrey]

I think you’re moving the goalposts here, but perhaps unintentionally. Heisenberg’s principle was also called “the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.” The Principle argues that we are unable to know the motion and location of particles at a given time, not that the movements and location are “indetermined.” The indetermination comes from us, which is simply our inability to know the state of things. But just because we don’t know what’s going on doesn’t mean that nothing’s occurring–to assert otherwise is surely fallacious.

There is a huge difference between saying, “I see no cause for this,” and “This must be uncaused!” There’s an old adage: Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

I agree but the point is that we cannot know whether determinism is true or false.

Sure! And why stop there, hmm? It’s also possible that an elephant will spontaneously materialize in my room due to quantum randomness!

Theoretically yes! But in practice we can discount the possibility.

It’s not very practical to think of every detail of every scientific theory as being expendable. Some details might change, but I can say that given my biological conditions alone, I am 100% certain that I will die.

I share your certainty but our certainty does not entail absolute certainty. It is not impossible that the end of the world may come before you die! You may be one of the fortunate ones. It is not impossible that you will live forever in another dimension - as most people in the world believe…

I only claimed that events may be determined, not that we can predict them. Again, you’re alternating between the causal usage of determination and our ability to “determine” what is occurring. They mean two different things.

You have misinterpreted me. The point is that we cannot know for certain whether determinism is true or false but for all practical purposes we are justified in assuming that it does at the physical level - which takes us back to OP and the question of whether an infinite regress of causes is possible. The same answer applies. We can rule it out in favour of an inexplicable Source quite distinct from all known causes.