Another reason why philosophers are useless

[inocente]

If you keep coming up with weird analogies, this thread is going to die pretty fast.

Is that your plan?

It’s Innoruk’s thread, I was just commenting on your faulty arguments while he was away.

 

[inocente]

Indeed, we cannot volitionally influence (“will”) a whole lot of our functions - our desires are but one example. Let’s remember that most of our mind functions in the “white cells”, in the subconscious. We cannot “will” what to believe either, no matter how many times some people assert that our beliefs are under volitional control. Of course many times we can override our instinctual desires, and want to take a different option - if there is one.

Maybe ten year’s back I read a book by a sleep researcher. His model was that the brain contains modules, all of which are available when awake, and which by chatting to each other form the conscious mind.

In deep sleep these are all inactive, but every so often modules activate spontaneously (i.e. he didn’t yet know why ). When more than a few are simultaneously active they chat to each other and we call it dreaming or REM sleep. The reason why weird things happen in dreams is, for instance, we can fly like Superman if and only if all the modules which know we can’t are inactive.

It would be dangerous to remember such dreams (we might think the memory was real and we could fly), and indeed changes to long-term memory are switched off during sleep (we dream around six times a night but can only remember waking dreams).

It could be that psychosis, loss of contact with reality, is caused by long-term memory not being switched off during sleep, or else by modules spontaneously going off-line and taking away their knowledge while awake.

Of course his hypothesis may since have been falsified, but it does indicate how philosophical notions of free-will or lack of free-will might be too simplistic at the end of the day.

 

[inocente]

Maybe ten year’s back I read a book by a sleep researcher. His model was that the brain contains modules, all of which are available when awake, and which by chatting to each other form the conscious mind.

In deep sleep these are all inactive, but every so often modules activate spontaneously (i.e. he didn’t yet know why ). When more than a few are simultaneously active they chat to each other and we call it dreaming or REM sleep. The reason why weird things happen in dreams is, for instance, we can fly like Superman if and only if all the modules which know we can’t are inactive.

It would be dangerous to remember such dreams (we might think the memory was real and we could fly), and indeed changes to long-term memory are switched off during sleep (we dream around six times a night but can only remember waking dreams).

It could be that psychosis, loss of contact with reality, is caused by long-term memory not being switched off during sleep, or else by modules spontaneously going off-line and taking away their knowledge while awake.

Of course his hypothesis may since have been falsified, but it does indicate how the whole business of philosophical notions of free-will or lack of free-will might be too simplistic at the end of the day.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Innoruk

**Presumably she always has the option to lay back and “enjoy” the experience… I have never seen such a heartless and cruel point of view. And when I pointed out that if the ability to carry out one’s will is not important, then God could interfere and prevent the action itself, without infringing upon the perpetrator’s “free will”. Needless to say, I am still waiting for an answer. **

One cannot have free will without the freedom to exercise that free will. God does not give us free will and then take it away from us every time we choose to abuse it. Free will in the moral context means choosing between good and evil. Only the rank determinist would say, “I raped the girl because I had to.” That is nonsense. Nor does the law in most civilized nations allow determinism as an excuse.

 

[1AugustSon7]

Don’t understand. Seriously you lost me. :confused

My apologies. Let me try this again: I would like you to actually produce credible reasons why philosophy is useless.

You said we should harbour doubt; I said we shouldn’t. You said we should just in case a demon came along and whispered in your ear that if you threw yourself from the Temple pinnacle down then angels will come and rescue you lest you dash your foot against a stone… oh wait no you said that Superman would do the rescuing. For this reason, then, you said we should generally harbour doubt, and second guess ourselves as a rule. I argued rather that harbouring constant doubt is a kind of madness and will make you clinically ill. It will also make you watch the Matrix over and over again so you can find ways to detect whether or not your cable repair guy is really an agent of the machines that are controlling your world. It might also lead you into becoming a liberal agnostic who can’t see the difference between a marriage and sodomy. But then again there is no difference; after all, its all just atoms or, perhaps, just a computer generated imagine being produced in my brain by greedy, energy hungry machines.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Excellent post (as usual ). Indeed, we cannot volitionally influence (“will”) a whole lot of our functions - our desires are but one example. Let’s remember that most of our mind functions in the “white cells”, in the subconscious. We cannot “will” what to believe either, no matter how many times some people assert that our beliefs are under volitional control. Of course many times we can override our instinctual desires, and want to take a different option - if there is one.

I suggest to you that many, if not most, human individuals “accept” what they believe because the “beliefs” have been dispensated across the social network to which they are a part. That acceptance is not fixed or determined, but rather, acquiesced to for a number of reasons or motives - social acceptance, to make others happy, to not cause tumult, etc.
A case in point is how quickly entire societies can “flip flop” on matters such as “gay marriage” or abortion. This indicates that most members of these societies do not “self-determine” the issue, but rather acquiesce to the perception of which belief has the current dominance. Actual reasoning or truth has little to do with the volitional "buy-in” of the belief, but rather the power to compel behind the belief (intimidation, compulsion, social acceptance) is the dominating feature.

The fact that people act like sheep is not an argument for their actually being sheep or that they must do so. Rather, that each individual has the means (reasoning power) to assess their own beliefs is an indicator of a volition that can be free from compulsion - either internal or external.

The reason for holding a belief is a separate matter from the “motivation for” whether this be desire or the need for social acceptance. That the faculty of reason is poorly developed in the case of many and that limits their capacity for volition is not an, in principle, argument against free will. The fact that “a reason for” is not compulsive, but that motives for tend to be - and that we can recognize the difference - means that we have an intuitive sense of volitional freedom distinct from compulsion.

It is very possible, at any time, to look beyond accepted beliefs in order to gain a deeper sense of what is true, not merely what is accepted. The fact that the will to do so lies within each of is a strong indicator of free will. The fact that most of our beliefs lie somewhere between the “truth of the matter” and what we find “palatable,” and that we can recognize the difference, in our most candid moments, means that we all have a modicum, at least, of free will.

To make a claim that “we cannot volitionally influence a whole lot of our functions” is a strong and largely presumptive one. It might be true that many individuals, as a matter of fact, typically “do not” volitionally influence a whole lot of their functions, but to extend that to “cannot” is to make an unsubstantiated claim for which you have not made a case, except by appeal to the experience of “most” people.

 

[Portofino]

It was many years ago that I had a conversation with a believer about the “free will defense”. He said (like so many others) that God respects the free will, because it is so very important. So I asked him, why does God always “respect” the free will of a strong rapist, and never the free will of the weak victim. And his answer was: “the free will of the victim is not impaired, only the acting upon that will is limited”. And then he continued: “she always has other options…”. Presumably she always has the option to lay back and “enjoy” the experience… I have never seen such a heartless and cruel point of view. And when I pointed out that if the ability to carry out one’s will is not important, then God could interfere and prevent the action itself, without infringing upon the perpetrator’s “free will”. Needless to say, I am still waiting for an answer.

Your point here brings up the largely overlapping relationship between “freedom” and “power”

For example, a person could say, “how can you say I’m free, if I don’t have the freedom – if such is my will – to destroy God?” And I would expect that person to respond, “God did not create you with the power to destroy Him; just because you are not all-powerful, does not mean you do not have free will. Free will does not mean the freedom to do anything you want but the freedom to do what you want, within the boundaries of what you were created to be capable of doing.” Or, as I like to put it, “we are as free as we are, except in all of the ways that we aren’t”

I think this leads right back to your question about the problem of evil, essentially. Why should a human being have been created with the capability of overriding the freedom of another? Of violating another’s freedom? For one thing is for sure – we are not capable of violating God’s freedom So it’s clear that God has imposed limits to what human beings are capable of; not all things are possible to human beings, free will notwithstanding.

I think this also relates to the paradox of the devil. Yes, the devil has free will, and God respects it. But why would God have created the devil to be so capable of causing damage? No mere human being, presumably – and despite the most evil intentions – could ever hold a candle to the “sphere of activity” which the devil “enjoys.” Evil in intention, endowed with free will, and supernaturally capable – that indeed is a problem, because one is only as powerful as God has created one to be, and this includes the devil. Many a human being would have wanted to have some of the abilities that are ascribed to the devil – Charles Manson, for example – but, frankly, was not created by God (let’s say) to have those abilities. So, even if the devil exists and, yes, God respects the devil’s “freedom,” why would God have created the devil to be so darned powerful, and why would he have the ability to unleash his mayhem on mortal human beings?

Charles Manson could be the most evil-minded human being imaginable, but I don’t think I can remember anyone claiming that he is capable of “roughing up” an angel, for example : ) His sphere of activity is limited to this earth, and to his mortal life. With the devil, you are talking about supernatural malevolence and, indeed, quasi-omnipresence (every believing Christian on earth seems to believe, at times, that the devil knows their name and deliberately tries to tempt them and to sabotage them; that the devil is always “on the move” and that, presumably, he never permits himself a day of rest, which means one must be perpetually vigilant against his “wiles” and his machinations). If, with the devil, you are not talking about God, you nonetheless are talking of an entity with god-like capabilities (“humanity vs. God” is a joke, yet “the devil vs. God” is a serious proposition, even if we believe we know the pre-ordained ending of the eventual triumph of good. From an outsider’s perspective, I cannot say that the Gnostic notion of a “good God” and an “evil demiurge” is all that different from this worldview of “good versus evil”, “God versus Satan.” Again, “God versus Adam” is a joke, yet “God versus Satan” has some compelling drama to it

Yet, we should remember that the philosophers always came out of the well-fed segment of the population. who did not have to worry where their next meal will come from.

You’re right, it’s like Maslow’s hierarchy of needs – one need is satisfied, and another need emerges. The “metaphysical need” is largely an emotional one; in a way, it’s a longing for a kind of emotional authenticity. Existential angst, in a way, could be described as the “unrequited love of the universe” – do our lives have meaning?; did someone ‘out there’ create us for a purpose? Is there anyone listening?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Portofino

** Is there anyone listening? **

Yes. All you have to do is trust He is there and speak to Him in earnest.

 

[Innoruk]

Your point here brings up the largely overlapping relationship between “freedom” and “power”

Exactly. Assuming that God “gave” us the very limited freedom to act, and the petty much unlimited ability to “desire”, one must confront the question of balance. The point is that God is supposed to be a “smart” and purposeful being. Also supposing that God “desires” us to be with him, he sure “gave” us a huge amount of power to destroy, and only a very limited power to build.

It follows that either God’s desire is gauged incorrectly (for example he does not give a “dayum” what happens to us) or he is a very bad designer. A smart, and purposeful designer (who actually cares about the created ones) would only give a balanced amount of freedom to the creation. And definitely would not give out “freedom + power” which will go against his wishes. Taking an example: “if a designer would create a smart car, then he would give the necessary freedom to choose the proper speed, but would not give the freedom to veer off into a crevasse”. A good designer only gives freedom according to his “blueprint”.

I think this leads right back to your question about the problem of evil, essentially. Why should a human being have been created with the capability of overriding the freedom of another?

Exactly. If the “freedom” we have is supposed to be there that we could choose to “love” God or not, then all the extra freedom (to hurt other humans) is unnecessary.

Disclaimer: As always, when I use the word “God”, I do not speak of “God as an actual being”. I only point out the illogical and irrational propositions about God put forth by the believers. And I think the most convincing argument against God’s existence is the fact that he never comes down, and never kicks the living… ahem… what is the word?.. daylight out of his “followers”, who spread all that nonsensical stuff about him.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Innoruk

**Disclaimer: As always, when I use the word “God”, I do not speak of “God as an actual being”. I only point out the illogical and irrational propositions about God put forth by the believers. And I think the most convincing argument against God’s existence is the fact that he never comes down, and never kicks the living… ahem… what is the word?.. daylight out of his “followers”, who spread all that nonsensical stuff about him. **

The only irrational proposition about God is that put forth by the unbelievers: that he could not possibly exist.

All other irrationalities spring from that single one: such as, for example that we are free to make up our own moral compass and kickass believers until doomsday if we can get away with it.

 

[Portofino]

Exactly. Assuming that God “gave” us the very limited freedom to act, and the petty much unlimited ability to “desire”, one must confront the question of balance. The point is that God is supposed to be a “smart” and purposeful being. Also supposing that God “desires” us to be with him, he sure “gave” us a huge amount of power to destroy, and only a very limited power to build.

It follows that either God’s desire is gauged incorrectly (for example he does not give a “dayum” what happens to us) or he is a very bad designer. A smart, and purposeful designer (who actually cares about the created ones) would only give a balanced amount of freedom to the creation. And definitely would not give out “freedom + power” which will go against his wishes. Taking an example: “if a designer would create a smart car, then he would give the necessary freedom to choose the proper speed, but would not give the freedom to veer off into a crevasse”. A good designer only gives freedom according to his “blueprint”.

Exactly. If the “freedom” we have is supposed to be there that we could choose to “love” God or not, then all the extra freedom (to hurt other humans) is unnecessary.

Agreed. It’s also interesting how, in a traditional Catholic interpretation of hell, once you go there you are never heard from again. You can no longer harm anyone. Playtime is over, so to speak.

So why is not “playtime” over for Satan? There seems to be an “open door” policy in hell for Satan; unlike a human being who has been damned to hell eternally, Satan still interacts with the world of mortals, still able to wreak havoc. He abides in hell and he abides on earth. Why is this?

And is Satan suffering in hell? Upon reflection, as frequently as I hear of the suffering of the damned in hell, I rarely hear about the suffering of Satan. Unlike the suffering of a damned human being – whose suffering is purported to be unbearable – Satan seems to be holding up pretty well, under the circumstances, endowed with superhuman intelligence and an ability to think clearly enough to continue to have negative influence on the world of mortals (when an individual’s pain is unbearable, it is all but impossible to “think clearly” and to plot and scheme).

A few years ago, a high-ranking Vatican official declared that “Satan has infiltrated the Vatican.” A damned human being cannot infiltrate the Vatican, as a damned human being is confined to hell. Why should not Satan be confined to hell, no less than the damned? Is it merely because God respects Satan’s “free will”? Yet how many damned human beings would love the opportunity to continue to interact with the world of mortals – continuing to wreak havoc and influence destruction. But no – they are kept in hell, where they can no longer do harm. So why isn’t Satan? And, in earthly terms, why are human beings permitted to harm others during life, yet suddenly are not permitted to harm others, in death?

It would be completely logical for the damned to become Satan’s demons, his henchmen, able to roam the earth as freely as Satan himself.

So yes – in a gentler, more transparently just world, Satan would be confined to hell (free will notwithstanding, given that the damned have free will and they are confined to hell) and it would not be possible for one human being to violate the free will of another human being. Indeed, one’s freedom would be inviolable.

 

[polytropos]

You are asserting the axiom that there is a unique purpose to life, common to all humans, which can be objectively determined. You cannot prove an axiom.

Erm, no, I am not asserting it as an axiom. My broader point is that there is no necessary connection between disagreement about the purpose of life and the nonexistence of a purpose of life. Furthermore, I am saying that there the purpose of life disclosed by the classical philosophical tradition is both objective and common to all humans.

But as you’re a philosopher, and leaving aside whether it can or cannot be rationally determined, what is your rational argument that there must be a single unique purpose to life common to all humans? Noting that it is far from self-evident given the contrary evidence.

You are misconstruing my point. I am not asserting from the start that there must be a single purpose (although I am saying that you would be committing a logical error to rule it out from the start), but, as I said, the purpose which we conclude is necessarily the only purpose. This is obviously a subject for multiple volumes (cf. Thomas Aquinas), but to put it shortly, the proofs for God’s existence are binding on all, and the conclusions about human nature are, of course, about human nature, ie. what applies to all humans.

 

[polytropos]

Actually it was only a side-issue. I was hoping to see your (name removed by moderator)ut to post #241, about the question of “whether faith is needed to trust the (name removed by moderator)ut of one’s senses”, which is a much more interesting problem - and rarely, if ever discussed.

To be clear, I don’t distrust my senses (as I clarified in my previous post). My point is that the “stopping point” that distinguishes universal skepticism from regular skepticism is arbitrary and based more on the need to maintain a commitment to science than to skepticism.

The argument presented was that it is impossible to claim that the senses are unreliable because such a claim relies on the reliability of the senses. My point is that this is not necessarily true because we don’t have to compare sensory data to the true state of the universe in order to see if they are returning legitimate data; they would be unreliable if they contradicted. You and I both seem to think that they do not actually contradict.

Also a bit of a straw man to say that the reliability of the senses is “rarely, if ever discussed.” You have elsewhere refused to read Thomist defenders like Edward Feser, insisting instead that you are capable of arguing against Thomism without studying it. And perhaps you can, but what you don’t seem to be qualified in doing is asserting which topics have been adequately addressed by Catholic philosophy. Thomas himself wrote extensively about how we use the senses to learn about the world. You have never tried to take him seriously, so you falsely suppose that he simply proceeded without considering such fundamental issues.

It is not that simple. First, there is a need to have a common definition of what “evil” might be. I gave a rational argument against the simplistic definition of “evil is a privation of good”. You only answered that it is different from the “usual, christian definition”. Since that definition would include that a “hurricane is evil”, or a “cat playing with a mouse is evil”, I see no point in arguing against such an incorrect “definition”.

You gave this objection (direct me elsewhere if you have offered anything more substantial):

Again, the question is the definition of “evil”. The usual catholic definition “the privation of good” is woefully incorrect; the absence of rain is definitely a lack or privation of good, but it is not “evil”.

The problem here is that the absence of rain is simply not a lack or privation of good (or, at least, is not necessarily so). Privation of good largely refers to the lack of fulfillment of final causes. So a lack of rain on a given day is not necessarily evil, but a prolonged lack of rain leading to the premature death of crops (the final cause of plants is to grow) and the starvation of humans (which would prevent humans from fulfilling their natural ends) would be an instance of natural evil. On the other hand, an amount of rain sufficient to cause a flood which kills all of the crops would also be bad for similar reasons.

The basic premise of your objection is flawed. As you have demonstrated, you don’t understand what it means when Christians claim that evil is a privation of good.

In any case, there is an agreed upon definition of evil within Christianity. You are trying to show that Christianity is inconsistent, so you have to actually show that Christianity is inconsistent, or else your argument from evil is “parasitic” upon the rejection of Christianity’s definition of evil, so you are not really making any argument from evil at all, you are just marketing your disagreement with Christianity’s definition of evil as the “problem of evil.” But as you’ve demonstrated, you don’t really understand Christianity’s definition of evil in the first place.

I suggest you read this simple summary of all the defenses for the problem of evil: The tale of the 12 officers. These are the only “defenses” ever to be presented (there is nothing new under the sun)

Have read it. As the author says, “I have found that religious believers are often conditioned to accept trite solutions to the problem of suffering, and that it is all but impossible to shake that conditioning through dry analysis. The temptation to offer to an entity a moral blank check simply because it sports a nametag with “God” written on it, is overwhelming in our theistic culture. Hence, this attempt to make the point through a medium as far removed from dry analysis as possible.” He is not advancing a logical argument. I fully understand that evil is difficult to grapple with emotionally, but such an argument is just not based in reason and demonstrates no actual conflict that should discredit other logically demonstrated conclusions (like the existence of God).

There is also the claim that we are simply giving God a “moral blank check” (ie. that theists are committing the fallacy of special pleading). But this charge is flawed. The theist need not write any check if there is not actually a contradiction between evil and Christianity.

Furthermore, by the doctrine of divine simplicity, God’s will is His goodness. God’s will (as Aquinas’s Fifth Way demonstrates) corresponds to the hierarchy of final causation in the world. As intelligent agents, it is good for us to act in accordance with that hierarchy of final causation, but this means that God (having no potentialities and no final causes) actually doesn’t have moral obligations as we do. So it is really not special pleading, since one concludes that God is not bound to act as we are. (This point is necessarily incomplete. I’m not really sure where to start, since all of this is basic Thomism, which you insist on criticizing but with which you refuse to become familiar.)

 

[polytropos]

re: problem of evil, I would like to see (from anyone) a non-question-begging response to this argument:

Free will is freedom of will; it is the ability to will one thing or the other. Freedom to act is freedom to carry out an action. Free will is what is ultimately important; one can have free will without instantially being able to carry out a given evil act. If I have a loaded gun, for instance, and am separated from someone I hate by bulletproof glass, it is still sinful for me to fire the gun at him, even if I do not succeed in killing him. It is sinful even if I wish that someone would die, without attempting to kill.

So why doesn’t God just prevent evil and let us will it but not perform it, then? If God prevented evil, he would (of course) prevent all evil, ie. we would never be able to do evil. (One might object to that point and say that God could prevent most evil while allowing some, but one problem with that objection is that evil still exists, so the objection fails to show that a good God must prevent all evil. The other problem is that there is nothing to indicate that that is not what God is doing right now, and that there would be far more evil “without God,” assuming the sustenance of our world were possible “without God.”) But if we can never do evil, then we cannot will evil because evil action does not “exist.” That which is not principally possible (anything that God prevents would be principally impossible) does not exist as an option. There is no longer good and evil to choose between because there is no such thing as doing evil if it is literally impossible to do evil.

An example: God is right now preventing an evil action, which is called “snarfling.” Back in biblical times, He issued the Eleventh Commandment, “Thou shall not snarfle.” However, He has never actually let anyone snarfle, because that would be evil and He is a good God. To snarfle is impossible; God would not let us humans err in such a vile way. Note at this point that this example is thoroughly unfalsifiable (besides the Eleventh Commandment part); you have no way of knowing that there is not some evil action out there, called snarfling, which would be desecrating God’s creation if He had not thought to prevent it, because you don’t even know what it means to snarfle. So you obviously can’t will to snarfle in the same way that you cannot will to do any other evil act that you don’t know about and in principle cannot perform.

The case is different with murder, or rape, or stealing, or any real evil act. You know what murder is, so you actually can will it even if you cannot perform it in a particular instance.

Hence, God’s prevention of evil would entail the impossibility of willing evil.

Innoruk has shown that his argument from evil is parasitic upon rejections of other Catholic doctrines, in which case I’m not sure what the point is exactly, since he would already be assuming that Catholicism is false. I am curious if anyone can show a contradiction between evil and Catholicism without assuming a non-Catholic definition of evil.

Similarly, I would like to see a demonstration of said contradiction that takes into account the fact that the prevention of evil by an omnipotent being would make evil acts logically/metaphysically impossible, which does prevent the willing of such acts. I argue that the prevention of evil by a non-omnipotent being does not make evil acts metaphysically impossible (that much is obvious), so they can still be willed and free will is maintained. However, when the action is always prevented (as would be necessary if God prevented evil), then it is impossible to conceive of oneself performing the action (it cannot be apprehended by the intellect), so willing the action is impossible.

 

[anthony022071]

First: there is no such “THING” (ontological object) as “TRUTH”. (Truth is a concept.) Yes, sometimes the opinions of philosophers reflects REALITY. The question is: “how do we separate the opinions, which correctly reflect reality from those which do not”. I am aware of only one such method: “compare the opinion to reality”. No, of course I don’t believe that there is “supernatural” or “moral” truths, these are meaningless concepts.

I meant “thing” as in a reality. God is truth. Natural law is truth. The existence of anything is a truth. The best way to compare opinion to reality is to use sound definitions of words and essences,and consider the attributes and potentiality of causes,and fit effects with their proper causes. This is what Plato,Aristotle and the medieval theologians did.

Only in the somewhat nauseating language of lousy poets. Such language is inappropriate in a serious discussion.

Poets are right in locating the emotions in the heart. The heart is the source of blood for the rest of the body,and life and sensibility to the body. When we experience strong emotions,we fell them in and through our hearts.

We are not talking about what is “important”.

You said ironically that the the ability to act out free will is not important.

The usual “free will defense” is that God does not prevent the “evil actions”, since the free will of even the most evil person is so important, that it should not be tempered with. Now, if the “free will” is only the freedom to wish to do something, but it does not entail the ability to carry out that action, then God could prevent the actual action, while leaving the “free will” to stay “free”.

God sometimes does prevent evil actions. There are many examples in the Bible and in the history of the Church. One example is the battle of Lepanto in 1571. When it is said that God permits evil to happen,this does not mean he always permits it to happen. And though God allows for free human will,he does try to influence the human will to obey his commandments by the grace of his Spirit.

 

[Portofino]

Free will is what is ultimately important

But the very line “free will is what is ultimately important” is an assumption. That free will not only trumps, but ought to trump the prevention of unjust harm to one’s neighbor is what Catholics are assuming, in order to justify God’s ways.

Our own laws proceed on the contrary principle; there, it is morality that trumps freedom. Murder, stealing, and rape are not rendered legal, in the name of respect for free will.

why doesn’t God just prevent evil and let us will it but not perform it, then? If God prevented evil, he would (of course) prevent all evil, ie. we would never be able to do evil.

What is the problem with this? It is placing a very high premium on this notion of freedom; this is ironic to me, because Pope Benedict himself declared that western liberalism overvalues freedom, to begin with. I believe he said that “freedom must be tempered with truth.” There, he was speaking about legal restrictions to freedom.

The very question of temptation is part of this dilemma. Why does temptation exist? Why should be difficult – why not easy? If the consequences of evil behavior are so dire – an eternity in hell – why should such a thing be permitted to be possible? (you don’t let young children play with firearms, because you – as the adult – know that there is the chance that they can hurt themselves gravely).

But if we can never do evil, then we cannot will evil because evil action does not “exist.”

Again, the fundamental difference of opinion is in the assumption that it is terribly important to be capable of willing evil. Why?

case is different with murder, or rape, or stealing, or any real evil act. You know what murder is, so you actually can will it even if you cannot perform it in a particular instance.

Hence, God’s prevention of evil would entail the impossibility of willing evil.

A less cruel, less harsh world could still exist, in which the differences between “good” and “evil” would not be so extreme. The distinction between “good” and “evil” could be between “loving” and “less loving”, for example, or “good” and “less good.” This would take away from freedom but, then again, the good Lord already takes away from our power, as the evil-minded are not permitted to harm those in heaven, nor to harm God. We are not omnipotent. If there are legitimate restrictions on our power, then I don’t see why it would be disturbing to grant restrictions on our freedom to do “evil”, or to will evil, for the sake of living in a safer, less harsh, less cruel universe, where innocents – children, for example – are the not the legitimate targets of evil wills and evil actions.

The whole problem, obviously, is that God is not subject to the same morality as human beings. It would monstrous for a human being to say that he values freedom over morality and that, therefore, nothing is illegal, nothing is prohibited, and that one should never intervene. This would be a laissez faire attitude, which a Catholic would consider immoral. Yet when God permits “laissez faire”, in the name of freedom, then, suddenly, “freedom is of the utmost importance.”

Innoruk has shown that his argument from evil is parasitic upon rejections of other Catholic doctrines

It seems a lot of these arguments involve throwing the “burden of proof” back and forth, like a hot potato. I think Innoruk’s position is that all Catholic doctrines need to be proven; you cannot use an unproven doctrine, an article of faith (“free will is the most important thing”) to prove another doctrine or article of faith (“an omnipotent and omni-benevolent God made the universe just as it should be, and it ought not to be otherwise”).

which case I’m not sure what the point is exactly, since he would already be assuming that Catholicism is false. I am curious if anyone can show a contradiction between evil and Catholicism without assuming a non-Catholic definition of evil.

This itself begs the question; if you get to define your own terms, then of course you can create a logically consistent, self-contained system in which all dilemmas are solved. But the question is, has the Catholic himself proven it, or has he himself “begged the question” by authoritatively proclaiming it as axiomatic?

One of those Catholic axioms, as you seem to admit, is that “free will is of the utmost importance.” Yet I’ve encountered Catholics themselves who admit that this is a moral paradox, as this thinking has no place in a human conception of morality. Morality trumps freedom, every time – which, again, is why we have laws, and why we incarcerate violent criminals. Yet God is conceived of as not accountable to the human moral imperative to intervene to prevent evil – a truth, or a rationalization?

, I would like to see a demonstration of said contradiction that takes into account the fact that the prevention of evil by an omnipotent being would make evil acts logically/metaphysically impossible, which does prevent the willing of such acts.

Again, you assume that the willing of such acts is of the utmost importance. To whom? You essentially are saying, “if the ability to do evil did not exist, then free will as we know it would not exist.” Well, yes – if the ability to do evil did not exist, then the world as we know it would not be…the world as we know it.

I don’t see any way of affirming that the world as it is, ought to be the world as it is, without begging the question.

 

[Portofino]

He is not advancing a logical argument. I fully understand that evil is difficult to grapple with emotionally, but such an argument is just not based in reason and demonstrates no actual conflict that should discredit other logically demonstrated conclusions (like the existence of God).

From what I understand of his argument, I think he’s simply pointing out the paradox of having two moralities, two forms of goodness – one for God, and one for man. As you yourself grant, what would be immoral for man – non-intervention to prevent evil that one is capable of preventing – is presumably not immoral for God.

It only confuses matters, of course, when Jesus on earth was very hands on – healing the sick, raising the dead; and, of course, Christians still believe that God miraculously heals the sick. It is a sign of his love for us, they contend.

Yet the opposite – not healing the sick, not miraculously intervening is conceived of as not impugning the goodness of God one iota. It is a strange double-standard, seen from the outside. I appreciate that, in the end, it is the “Daddy knows best” argument, and that is a blank check, a way of saying, “God obviously knows better than us” and, in the words of Alexander Pope, “whatever is, is *right.”

The basic question is, “what does it mean to say that God loves us?” and “what does it mean to say that God is good?” In some respects, Christians seem to believe it means many of the same things it would mean here on earth – caring about one’s well-being; comforting; intervening, even, when one calls God for help. Jesus coming down to earth, per the Christian, was a great intervention and that can more easily be grasped in human terms, in a human conception of what it means to care about humanity’s well-being.

In other respects – as has a bearing on the problem of evil – what it means for God to love us, and for God to be good, is more a mystery. There is the appearance of indifference, that even Christians have felt; the appearance that “God’s away on business” (in the words of Tom Waits).

I think your argument would be a lot simpler if God never intervened, yet Catholics obviously believe that “sometimes he does, sometimes he doesn’t.” And even Christians wonder, or don’t understand, why he doesn’t intervene a little more than he does, or, perhaps, a lot more – for example, when there is a natural disaster, that has nothing to do with human beings being capable of willing evil. If anything, “natural evil” just confuses matters – non-human caused suffering and death is all around us, which blurs the sense that evil exists precisely so that the human will can be free.

 

[Innoruk]

To be clear, I don’t distrust my senses (as I clarified in my previous post).

I see. The problem, however, is different. There is the usual theist argument that one accepts the reliability of the senses based upon “faith”. If you disagree with that, then we are in agreement.

The argument presented was that it is impossible to claim that the senses are unreliable because such a claim relies on the reliability of the senses. My point is that this is not necessarily true because we don’t have to compare sensory data to the true state of the universe in order to see if they are returning legitimate data; they would be unreliable if they contradicted. You and I both seem to think that they do not actually contradict.

And how could you decide if there is a contradiction, or not, without actually comparing them? Do you have an “extra-sensory perception” of the true nature of “reality”?

Also a bit of a straw man to say that the reliability of the senses is “rarely, if ever discussed.”

I meant, that it is not discussed here, on these boards. I read some of Feser’s writings. Since I respect the forum rules, I am prevented from giving my true opinion, but it would not be complimentary. Besides, I am only interested in a dialog with an actual person. If Feser would show up, and would present his views, I would be happy to engage in a conversation with him. Of course you can take his place, but do not point to some outside text longer than a page or true.

The problem here is that the absence of rain is simply not a lack or privation of good (or, at least, is not necessarily so). Privation of good largely refers to the lack of fulfillment of final causes. So a lack of rain on a given day is not necessarily evil, but a prolonged lack of rain leading to the premature death of crops (the final cause of plants is to grow) and the starvation of humans (which would prevent humans from fulfilling their natural ends) would be an instance of natural evil. On the other hand, an amount of rain sufficient to cause a flood which kills all of the crops would also be bad for similar reasons.

The word of “natural evil” is a very confusing misnomer. Evil is a moral term, and it is only applicable to sentient beings. To call a tsunami “evil” because it prevents some humans from fulfilling some “natural ends” only serves confusion. In this catholic terminology the cat “playing” with the mouse is “evil”, a tree with a dense foliage is “evil”, because it “kills” the grass underneath. Of course it would be “evil” if someone could prevent a tsunami or earthquake and would fail to do so… but that would be a moral evil.

The basic premise of your objection is flawed. As you have demonstrated, you don’t understand what it means when Christians claim that evil is a privation of good.

I certainly understand it, I simply reject it as sheer nonsense.

There is also the claim that we are simply giving God a “moral blank check” (ie. that theists are committing the fallacy of special pleading). But this charge is flawed. The theist need not write any check if there is not actually a contradiction between evil and Christianity.

The theist simple denies the contradiction, by stipulating that there is no obligation for God to behave as a morally good person should. The trick is to employ the maxim of “might makes right”. Since God has the biggest “stick”, whatever he says - goes, and by the theist’s definition whatever God does is “good”… and then the theist is surprised when the atheists simply shrug off this kind of “reasoning”.

Furthermore, by the doctrine of divine simplicity, God’s will is His goodness.

Again, if God’s “goodness” is compatible with allowing / committing / perpetrating all the natural / moral horrors then God’s “goodness” is a meaningless term. The other contradiction is that the theist stipulates the existence of an “absolute morality” while he also advocates the “relative morality” - by asserting that action “X” is always, under any and all circumstances is immoral… unless it is God who does it. And then cheerfully denies this contradiction.

 

[Innoruk]

Our own laws proceed on the contrary principle; there, it is morality that trumps freedom. Murder, stealing, and rape are not rendered legal, in the name of respect for free will.

I am constantly amazed that the theists argue for the existence of genocides, tortures, wars, rapes and other atrocities. They decry the possible worlds without such atrocities as a “utopia”.

I remember a hypothetical poll from a long time ago when one of the options was to implement a system which could detect vicious thoughts and prevent them from being acting upon them. The theists were against such a solution… in the name of “freedom”.

 

[Bahman]

They are unable to come up with a coherent definition of “free will”.

Definition #1:
Some will assert that in order to have free will, one needs the following:

1. at least two different courses of action - where both of them would lead to a desired (willed) outcome for the agent
2. the locus of decision (which one to choose) must be with the agent
3. the agent can execute either action

Definition #2:
Others dispute this. They say that it is enough to be able to “will, wish, desire” to execute a certain action, but it is not necessary that one should be free to actually carry out that action. These people wish to separate “free will” and “freedom of action”. In their opinion the internal freedom of “wishing to do something” is a sufficient criterion of “free will”.

What is your opinion? I suggest to give an example why you prefer definition #1 or definition #2 (as the case may be).

Free will is the ability of an agent to make choices unconstrained by any factors. These factors in principle should include the laws of nature (nature in general, whatever which is need to explain the agent actions) as well otherwise the agent is constrained to laws of nature. This however leads to a paradox. To resolve the paradox one should either accept the laws of nature which means that free will does not exist or accept that an agent with free will (maybe any alive entity) is an unexplainable entity (simply infinity complex). This also means that the state mater is an unexplainable quality if we accept that human is made of sole mater.