Anyone interested in a formal debate on God's existence?

[Eleve]

Creation ex nihilo seems incoherent to me, though. “Before” the universe, God was all that existed. What did God cause to become the universe? Nothing? You can’t cause “nothing” to become the universe, that’s no different than saying you didn’t cause the universe. Did God causally effect the universe? That would require a universe to exist. Therefore it would follow that if God caused the universe to begin existing, he used his own substance - his own thoughts.

David Hume:

It is exactly the same case with the third argument [Mr. Locke.], which has been employed to demonstrate the necessity of a cause. Whatever is produced without any cause, is produced by nothing; or in other words, has nothing for its cause. But nothing can never be a cause, no more than it can be something, or equal to two right angles. By the same intuition, that we perceive nothing not to be equal to two right angles, or not to be something, we perceive, that it can never be a cause; and consequently must perceive, that every object has a real cause of its existence.

I believe it will not be necessary to employ many words in shewing the weakness of this argument, after what I have said of the foregoing. They are all of them founded on the same fallacy, and are derived from the same turn of thought. It is sufficient only to observe, that when we exclude all causes we really do exclude them, and neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the causes of the existence; and consequently can draw no argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove the absurdity of that exclusion. If every thing must have a cause, it follows, that upon the exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself or of nothing as causes. But it is the very point in question, whether every thing must have a cause or not; and therefore, according to all just reasoning, it ought never to be taken for granted.

I think it’s just a mistake to say that (according to the theist) God caused “nothing” to become the universe, as if “nothing” were some object that we can manipulate. Instead, the doctrine says that there isn’t anything that God created the universe out of. That is, it doesn’t make sense to ask what he made it out of, because he didn’t make it out of anything. He just made it.

 

[Love4All]

I think it’s just a mistake to say that (according to the theist) God caused “nothing” to become the universe, as if “nothing” were some object that we can manipulate. Instead, the doctrine says that there isn’t anything that God created the universe out of. That is, it doesn’t make sense to ask what he made it out of, because he didn’t make it out of anything. He just made it.

Yes, that’s right. Another way of saying it would be that God’s omnipotence did not require any pre-existing material.

 

[Love4All]

I think it’s just a mistake to say that (according to the theist) God caused “nothing” to become the universe, as if “nothing” were some object that we can manipulate. Instead, the doctrine says that there isn’t anything that God created the universe out of. That is, it doesn’t make sense to ask what he made it out of, because he didn’t make it out of anything. He just made it.

Yes, that’s right. Another way of saying it would be that God’s omnipotence did not require any pre-existing material. Which is only sensible, if omnipotence means what it is supposed to mean.

 

[punkforchrist]

So just everyone’s in the loop, I’ve decided to drop the modal perfection argument from my opening statement. Part of the reason is word limits, but I also think ontological arguments can be very confusing for anyone, whether you’re a professional philosopher or a philosophical layperson.

In any case, my opening statement will now resemble a much more Thomistic defense of God’s existence: the argument from change, the modal third way (MTW), and the argument from desire (yes, Thomas does actually defend that last one).

 

[belorg]

I think it’s just a mistake to say that (according to the theist) God caused “nothing” to become the universe, as if “nothing” were some object that we can manipulate. Instead, the doctrine says that there isn’t anything that God created the universe out of. That is, it doesn’t make sense to ask what he made it out of, because he didn’t make it out of anything. He just made it.

Of course that’s a mistake, because if God really did cause some object that we call “nothing” to become the universe that would not be a violation of the ex nihilo nihil fit principle.
But if on the other hand there isn’t anything at all that became the universe, that is a clear violation of the ex nihilo nihil fit principle.

 

[belorg]

So just everyone’s in the loop, I’ve decided to drop the modal perfection argument from my opening statement. Part of the reason is word limits, but I also think ontological arguments can be very confusing for anyone, whether you’re a professional philosopher or a philosophical layperson.

In any case, my opening statement will now resemble a much more Thomistic defense of God’s existence: the argument from change, the modal third way (MTW), and the argument from desire (yes, Thomas does actually defend that last one).

I just noticed the quote below your post. That seems a bit odd for someone who is about to use lots of words to preach the Gospel.

 

[Love4All]

Of course that’s a mistake, because if God really did cause some object that we call “nothing” to become the universe that would not be a violation of the ex nihilo nihil fit principle.
But if on the other hand there isn’t anything at all that became the universe, that is a clear violation of the ex nihilo nihil fit principle.

No, it isn’t.

Ex nihilo nihil fit means that nonexistence produces nothing. If we begin with nothing at all, then nothing at all can ever come of that.

But God existing with His Wisdom is not “nothing at all,” it is God, with His Wisdom.

God can create without any pre-existing matter to form. That is the definition of Creation, in fact. Otherwise, we would call God, not the Creator, but the Architect.

Creation from nothing means exactly this. God created. He didn’t begin with pre-existing material. “Nothing” means “no thing.” He began with no thing. He made things.

But we’ve been over this before, and you have demonstrated your obstinate clinging to your void of understanding. Another example, I guess, of ex nihilo nihilo fit!

So if all you’ve got is your reiteration of your fallacy of argument from incredulity, please don’t bother to reply. Thanks!

 

[Love4All]

Sure. Bit of a useless definition, though. I’d call pretty much every human being on earth “beyond all description” because I think no description would fully encapsulate anyone.

But, to make my point clearer, if I were to try to find you, I might find one of your friends and ask him to describe you. With his description, I would have a better chance of locating you. If he described you fully enough to differentiate you from anyone else in your immediate neighborhood, it would be a piece of cake. Police track down crime suspects using this very method, all the time. So you really aren’t “beyond all description” after all. I might agree that we are beyond definition, but description is a more relative term.

And still, were I to attempt to describe God, that would not be helpful to you in locating Him. So I hope you can see the difference.

Just suggesting some interesting philosophy you might like.

Thanks.

Creation ex nihilo seems incoherent to me, though. “Before” the universe, God was all that existed.

And Wisdom.

What did God cause to become the universe? Nothing?

Not anything. God did not change any pre-universe into the universe, He created it.

You can’t cause “nothing” to become the universe, that’s no different than saying you didn’t cause the universe.

No, rather, it is saying that you didn’t cause anything to become the universe. Not the same thing as saying you didn’t cause the universe to be.

Did God causally effect the universe?

Yes. The universe is an effect; God is the Cause. We could say the universe is the effect of all effects, and God is the cause of all causes.

That would require a universe to exist.

No, that would cause a universe to exist. And we see it does.

Therefore it would follow that if God caused the universe to begin existing, he used his own substance - his own thoughts.

God can create something from nothing. You could say there are “God’s thoughts,” but, thoughts about what? If there is nothing besides God, what is there for God to think about?

But before He created His Creation, He created His Wisdom. You could say that He created His Wisdom out of His thoughts, or you could say that His Wisdom IS His thoughts. But if there is nothing at all existing apart from God, and God thinks up two creatures with immortal souls, then has He created two creatures with immortal souls?

If you say that there is a distinction between Him “thinking” two creatures with immortal souls, and Him actually creating them, then I would beg you to tell me what that distinction might possibly be. What is a spiritual soul? Not an object. But a subject.

Anyway, there are two of them, and they are God’s created Wisdom, and after that, He created other things as well.

I don’t see how hedonism follows from divine omnipresence. Isn’t that a Church doctrine, anyway?

Divine omnipresence is not Pantheism.

I am saying that if “everything is God” (Pantheism) then I am God, just as much as “God” is God, so why should I struggle to keep His Commandments? If I am just as much Him as He is, then I will do whatever I like. Who is there to stop me?

I would posit the following range (generally) of theological positions

Atheism - Pantheism - Deism - Theism

Also agnosticism and ignosticism, both of which I find attractive.

Would you admit to a position?

The “I,” “A,” and “O” positions are more or less attitudes one takes interiorly to the very idea of “God.” To wit: some hold that whatever God may be, they themselves are That. That is the “I” path. Some hold that whatever God may be, it can have no meaning to themselves whatsoever. That is the “A” path. And some hold that, if there is God, they had better worship Him, since He is God, after all. That is the “O” path.

Any other positions can be nothing more or less than subtle variations of these three.

 

[Love4All]

Philosophers and logicians count necessary truths as possible truths. If we want to say that something is possibly true but not necessarily true, then we’d say that it’s contingent.

At any rate, the very argument that ngill is criticizing - Plantinga’s modal ontological argument - also appeals to the idea that God both possibly and necessarily exists. So if there’s a problem with that, there’s a problem with Plantinga’s argument regardless of whether ngill’s criticism succeeds.

I am barely familiar with Plantinga’s argument, but from what you’ve said I think I could reconstruct it, possibly more simply since what passes above seems mighty complex. I didn’t read through it, so this will be from vague memory and my own understanding of modalities.

1. God by definition cannot be contingent.
2. Therefore if God exists, He exists Necessarily.
3. That which exists Necessarily in any possible world, exists Necessarily in all possible worlds, by definition of “necessary.”
4. If God is possible, then He exists in at least one possible world, by definition of “possible.”
5. Therefore if God is possible, then God is necessary, and thus God exists.

So it would seem, from this, that the burden of proof has been shifted on to the atheist to prove that God is impossible. If God is not impossible, then God exists. It would seem that the burden of proof of God’s existence, for the theist, has been met in the above, since we do not arbitrarily limit possibility without a good reason.

 

[polytropos]

What exactly is meant to constitute possibility? Conceivability?

Would a more general formulation of the conclusion be that there must exist something that is necessary?

 

[Eleve]

So it would seem, from this, that the burden of proof has been shifted on to the atheist to prove that God is impossible. If God is not impossible, then God exists. It would seem that the burden of proof of God’s existence, for the theist, has been met in the above, since we do not arbitrarily limit possibility without a good reason.

The theist, by the same token, says that God’s nonexistence is impossible. Possibility and necessity are duals; I don’t think you can shift the burden of proof just by rearranging operators.

 

[ngill09]

I am barely familiar with Plantinga’s argument, but from what you’ve said I think I could reconstruct it, possibly more simply since what passes above seems mighty complex. I didn’t read through it, so this will be from vague memory and my own understanding of modalities.

1. God by definition cannot be contingent.
2. Therefore if God exists, He exists Necessarily.
3. That which exists Necessarily in any possible world, exists Necessarily in all possible worlds, by definition of “necessary.”
4. If God is possible, then He exists in at least one possible world, by definition of “possible.”
5. Therefore if God is possible, then God is necessary, and thus God exists.

So it would seem, from this, that the burden of proof has been shifted on to the atheist to prove that God is impossible. If God is not impossible, then God exists. It would seem that the burden of proof of God’s existence, for the theist, has been met in the above, since we do not arbitrarily limit possibility without a good reason.

Look again at my refutation of this argument:

Of course, like all arguments, ontological arguments require a good bit of argumentative support and explanation. However, the precise definitions of terms like “excellence” aren’t particularly important to the argument - what’s important is the definition as provided by the argument. With Plantinga’s argument, “excellence” is defined as being “omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good”.

I was thinking more about these arguments today and I thought of a better parody. I’ll call it “The Rosencrantz Proof”

Let’s suppose that we have an unsolved mathematical conjecture, C. For example, let’s forget that it’s been solved recently and use Fermat’s conjecture (also known as “Fermat’s Last Theorem”). It states that no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two. A conjecture in mathematics is a mathematical statement that has not been proven or disproven mathematically. Fermat’s Last Theorem was unsolved for over 350 years, until it was proven to be true in 1995.

Now suppose Rosencrantz, an ambitious mathematician, wants to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem and become the most famous mathematician of his day. So he submits the following proof:

(1) Conjecture C is true only if no three positive integers a, b, and c can satisfy the equation a^n + b^n = c^n for any integer value of n greater than two.
(2) If Conjecture C is mathematically true, it is true in all possible worlds (mathematical proofs are generally accepted to be necessary in this way).
(3) It is possible that Conjecture C is true. (Premise)
(4) Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that Conjecture C is true.
(5) Therefore, (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that Conjecture C is true
(6) Therefore, Conjecture C is true.

What’s the problem with this proof? Well, it’s hidden in (3) and the limitations of axiom S5. The same problem is present in Plantinga’s argument. In general, people are unwilling to deny (3) and say “No, it is not possible that Conjecture C is true” (or in Plantinga’s case, to say “No, it is not possible that a maximally excellent being exists”). The appropriate response is to say that we don’t know Conjecture C is possibly true, or that a maximally excellent being possibly exists, because by axiom S5 and the necessary nature of these statements, there is no difference between saying it is possible that these statements are true and saying that they are true.

Very fun arguments to analyze though. Reminds me of some of Lewis Carroll’s stuff.

Because God’s existence is being defined as a necessary proposition, like a mathematical statement, the term “possible” under S5 is essentially redundant. God, as defined in Plantinga’s argument, either necessarily exists or necessarily doesn’t exist. Fermat’s Last Theorem is either necessarily true or necessarily false. If Fermat’s Last Theorem is not necessarily false, then it is necessarily true. This does not mean that we should suppose that Fermat’s Last Theorem is true until someone can prove it is false. The burden of proof still on the person making the assertion.

 

[Steinway]

I think it’s just a mistake to say that (according to the theist) God caused “nothing” to become the universe, as if “nothing” were some object that we can manipulate.

The “nothing” is actually from the Big Bang theory itself.

 

[punkforchrist]

I just noticed the quote below your post. That seems a bit odd for someone who is about to use lots of words to preach the Gospel.

Sometimes it is necessary; and technically I’m taking the affirmative in a debate over God’s existence, which is distinct from preaching the Gospel.

 

[Ion]

When are you guys going to start debating?

 

[punkforchrist]

June 1 is the tentative starting date.

 

[wyccanwolf]

if your still looking for someone, i can prove gods nonexistence, or at least i can try, it ought to be interesting though, i have these conversations with everyone from born-again christians to atheists, its interesting to learn anothers point of view, so if its still available, id like the chance

 

[Alec_Kais]

0 & 1.