Aquinas and Modern Physics

[Veritas6]

What do you make of this part of Aaron Boyden’s review of Edward Feser’s “Five Proofs” book?: "In an essentially ordered series, each member depends on a previous member for its continued existence. This requires that each member of the series be simultaneous . I’m not sure that making it simultaneous makes the infinite series any more impossible, but perhaps more importantly it is far from clear to me that there’s any reason to suppose there are such things . His examples of essential ordering involve chains of causes that extend through space, so if they truly are essential orders, they would appear to violate relativity .

[Feser would probably] say the examples are only for sake of illustration; the real simultaneous causes are also all in the same places, and so no violation of relativity. That seems to be his view in his book on Aquinas. But if so, he needs to work a lot harder to prove that there are such simultaneous causes; providing examples of non-simultaneous causes certainly doesn’t do anything to establish that simultaneous causes must also exist." @Wesrock @rom

 

[Wesrock]

Me thinks Aaron Boyden needs to pay more attention while reading.

Five Proofs of the Existence of God, p22

What makes these series hierarchical in the relevant sense, though, is not that they are simultaneous, but that there is a certain sort of dependence of the later members on the earlier ones. The cup has no capacity on its own to be three feet off the ground; it will be there only if something else, such as the desk, holds it up. But the desk in turn . . . [etc… etc…] So you might say that it is really the earth that is holding up both the cup and the lamp, and that it is doing so through intermediaries. The desk, chain, walls, and floor have no power to hold anything up except insofar as they derive that power from the earth. They are in that sense like instruments.
. . .
What makes a hierarchical series of causes hierarchical, then, is this instrumental or derivative character of the later members of the series.

p60-61

Are hierarchical causal series real?
…
But are there really any causes and effects that exist simultaenously in this way? . . . Wouldn’t measurement and precision instruments reveal a slight time lag between the movement of the stick and that of the stone? Or to take the example I used earlier, wouldn’t there also be a slight time lag between the motion of the particles that make up the desk and the motion of the cup the desk holds up, so that the cup’s behind held at a certain level isn’t simultaenous with what is going on in the desk? Moreover, doesn’t relativity theory cast doubt on the whole idea of simultaneous anyway?

The first of several points to make in response to all of this is that it is a simple mistake to think that being simultaneous entails being instantaneous. An event like someone’s using a stick to move a stone is of course spread out through time rather than occurring in a single instant. But to say that the motion of the stick and that of the stone are simultaneous is not in the first place to say that they occur in a single instant. It is rather to say that the stick’s moving the stone and the stone’s being moved by the stick are part of the same one event, however long this event lasts.

 

[Wesrock]

@Veritas6

p63-65

I also noted that what makes such a causal series hierarchical rather than linear is not simultaneity per se, but rather the fact that all the members in such a series other than the first have their causal power in a derivative or instrumental rather than inherent or “built-in” way. This, you will recall, is why linear series of causes can in principle extend backward to infinity, while hierarchical series of causes cannot. Since each member of a linear series has its causal power inherently rather than derivatively, there is no need to tracy any member’s action back to a first member, which imparts to it its power to act. Hence, such a series need not have a beginning. By contrast, a hierarchical series is hierarchical precisely insofar as each member other than the first can only insofar as its power to act is imparted to it from outside. If D is actualized by C only insofar as C is in turn being actualized by B and B in turn by A, then until we get to something which can actualize everything else in the series without having to be actualized itself–that is to say, to something which can impart causal power without having to derive it–then we will not really have explained anything . . . A hiearchical series without such a first member would be like an instrument that is not the instrument of anything, a series of causes which have derivative causal power without anything from which to derive it.

As this indicates (and as I also noted earlier), what is meant by a “first” cause in this context is not merely “the cause that comes before the second, third, fourth, and so on”, or “the one which happens to be at the head of the queue”. Rather, a “first cause” is one having underived or “primary” causal power, in contrast to those which have their causal power in only a derivative or “secondary” way. Thus, even if for the sake of argument we allowed that there could be an infinitely long hierarchical series [ . . . ] there would still have to be a source of power outside the series to impart causal power to the whole. Again, even an infinitely long paintbrush handle could not move itself, since the wood out of which it has made has no “built-in” power of movement. . . Or consider a mirror which reflects the image of a face present in another mirror, which in turn reflects the image of a face in another mirror, which in turn reflects the image of a face present in another, and so on ad infinitum. Even if we allowed that there could be such a series of mirrors, there would still have to be something outside this infinite series–the face itself–which could impart the content of the image without having to derive it. What there could not be is only mirror images and never any actual face. By the same token, even an infinitely long series of instrumental causes could not exhibit any causality at all unless there were something beyond the series whose instruments they were.

 

[STT]

What do you make of this short video that states the First Way works with Aristotle’s physics and cosmology, but is now invalidated by modern physics? One objection mentions physical changes resulting from gravity, nuclear forces, and electromagnetism do not come about from continual action of an external moving agent, but from intrinsic capacities identified as “fundamental forces”.

Another objection mentions no individual changes observed nor the motion of the universe is essentially subordinated chains. They are “temporally successive transfers of [kinetic] energy”. Physical change and motion result from intrinsic forces and not from continuous action of per se causes. I would appreciate any assistance. The written transcript is the second link, thank you.

I think that the first way of Aquinas proof is based on hierarchical cause rather than temporal cause. Motion in physical world however is the result of temporal cause but a sustainer might be needed to keep things in existence which this is hierarchical cause. So, I think one should argue against hierarchical cause if s/he wants to challenge Aquinas proof. To do that one needs to argue against Aquinas distinction between essence and existence. But what are essence and existence. Essence according to him is the definable nature of the thing that exists. Now he makes distinction between two category of things, finite and infinite. According to him, essence and existence are different in finite things and the same in infinite thing/uncaused cause. He argues that finite things cannot exist on its own whereas an infinite thing can therefore there is a need for a sustainer/uncaused cause to keep finite things in motion.

 

[rom]

Hello, everyone. I will also give my 2 cents on this, but not right now because I am at the middle of another business. But I will come back. Please be patient with me.

 

[lelinator]

@Veritas6,

In a previous thread, I asked for someone to describe the hierarchical causal series of a loaf of bread, and the only one who made any attempt to do so was @Gorgias. However, the series that Gorgias described was extremely short. It consisted of just two things. The loaf of bread, preceded by God. So it would seem, that a hierarchical causal series may make sense as an analogy, but in the real world it’s a bit more problematic.

Someone could try to define a hierarchical causal series by saying that the loaf of bread is made up of various types of molecules, which are made up of atoms, which are in turn made up of elemental particles, which are in turn made up of…? Until by necessity you get down to the first item in the series. Such a series would in fact be simultaneous. However, from a Catholic perspective such a series isn’t allowed, because the first item in the series would be part of the physical world. It’s a series that’s describing what the world is made of, and to a Catholic the world isn’t made of God. So it’s probably not an acceptable hierarchical series. (Technically it’s probably not a causal series at all)

But if we’re not talking about a series that’s defined by what the world is made of, then perhaps we’re talking about a series that’s defined by the forces that govern how the world is made, rather than what it’s made of. Those forces are things such as gravity, and electromagnetism, and the strong and weak forces. In which case we’re talking about a series that looks somewhat like the one that Gorgias described, but perhaps, at least one step longer. I.E what causes the loaf of bread is simply the forces that cause the particles and molecules to come together in the form of bread. But what causes those forces? Are the forces the fundamental cause of reality, or do they themselves need a cause? If so, what is it?

So at this point we have Gorgias’ causal series, only at least one step longer. The loaf of bread is formed by the forces that cause it to come together as a loaf of bread, and those forces are caused by…God? To a Catholic this explanation should be a bit more acceptable, because in such a series God could be described as being the cause of the world, while not actually being a part of the world. However, someone could object, because it’s not a simultaneous series. Forces require force carrier particles to mediate their effects, and that requires time. But technically speaking, a hierarchical series doesn’t need to be simultaneous. If at any point the underlying cause of the forces disappears, then the forces themselves disappear, and if the forces disappear, then the loaf of bread disappears. It wouldn’t be immediate, but it would be inevitable.

So our hierarchical series may end up looking something like this: the underlying cause gives rise to forces, (which may themselves have a causal order), and those forces give rise to “stuff”.

So now all that we need to do is figure out the nature of that underlying cause.

 

[Wesrock]

Someone could try to define a hierarchical causal series by saying that the loaf of bread is made up of various types of molecules, which are made up of atoms, which are in turn made up of elemental particles, which are in turn made up of…? Until by necessity you get down to the first item in the series. Such a series would in fact be simultaneous. However, from a Catholic perspective such a series isn’t allowed, because the first item in the series would be part of the physical world. It’s a series that’s describing what the world is made of, and to a Catholic the world isn’t made of God. So it’s probably not an acceptable hierarchical series. (Technically it’s probably not a causal series at all)

Actually, Feser uses this type of series in his Five Proofs of the Existence of God. There is nothing about bread that is self actualizing, it is actual because its molecules are. But there is nothing about those molecules that are self actualizing . . . (and so on, with some additional background material explained). Except the first member can’t end as a physical, material object because any physical, material object would not just be Pure Act, or whatever terminus is necessary depending upon what cosmological argument we’re using.

But if we’re not talking about a series that’s defined by what the world is made of, then perhaps we’re talking about a series that’s defined by the forces that govern how the world is made, rather than what it’s made of. Those forces are things such as gravity, and electromagnetism, and the strong and weak forces. In which case we’re talking about a series that looks somewhat like the one that Gorgias described, but perhaps, at least one step longer. I.E what causes the loaf of bread is simply the forces that cause the particles and molecules to come together in the form of bread. But what causes those forces? Are the forces the fundamental cause of reality, or do they themselves need a cause? If so, what is it?
…
So our hierarchical series may end up looking something like this: the underlying cause gives rise to forces, (which may themselves have a causal order), and those forces give rise to “stuff”.

Well, we have to ask ourselves what a law of nature is, and Thomists have given a great deal of thought to that as well. But more generally, is it a self-existing object itself? Is it just what we use to describe the nature of how things behave (Thomists would say this one)? And so on. But you’re right that we would reject the notion that a “law of nature” could be an ontological brute fact, because no matter how we define it “it” (or whatever physical object it’s just in the nature of) would have attributes that need be caused.

 

[Wesrock]

So now all that we need to do is figure out the nature of that underlying cause.

That’s what St. Thomas, and other theologians, have done. First and foremost by determining what cannot belong to that underlying cause (the things that are excluded are the things that themselves require some type of cause/external explanation). Like, just for one example, in the argument from motion, it’s based on the natural principle that any potency that is actualized is actualized by another, so therefore passive potency cannot belong to that underlying cause.

 

[rom]

What do you make of this part of Aaron Boyden’s review of Edward Feser’s “Five Proofs” book?: "In an essentially ordered series , each member depends on a previous member for its continued existence. This requires that each member of the series be simultaneous . I’m not sure that making it simultaneous makes the infinite series any more impossible, but perhaps more importantly it is far from clear to me that there’s any reason to suppose there are such things .

I don’t think it is correct to say that there are no examples of an essentially ordered series of causes, where each member depends on the continued existence of previous members. There are, of course, examples of that series. The example given by Wesrock of the books that rest on a shelf, that are carried by the walls, that are supported by the foundation, etc. is one example of that series. Also, the example of a child pulling a rope, that is tied to a train of carts, is another example. So, there are examples. It is just that they are harder to find in ordinary life or in nature. I think the reason for this difficulty is because the notion of continued presence or continued action was unnecessarily added to the concept of essential subordination. If we restrict the definition of essential subordination to the simple dependence of the motion of each member to the action of a prior member in the same respect, without requiring the continuous or simultaneous presence of prior members in explaining the motion of any subsequent member in the series, then we will find many more examples.

Five Proofs of the Existence of God, p22

What makes these series hierarchical in the relevant sense, though, is not that they are simultaneous, but that there is a certain sort of dependence of the later members on the earlier ones.

O Wow! I agree with that 100%. I have always insisted that the simultaneous and continuous presence of previous causes should not be added to the concept of essential subordination. However, this does NOT mean that I deny that as First Cause, God is continuously present in our lives. I think that His presence, His influence and action in our life is continuous, but we only know this after the fact that we have proved His existence and investigated His Nature as Unmoved Prime Mover and First Cause. In proving His existence, we shouldn’t require that “essential subordination” already include the notion of continuous presence, because it is a feature of God that will only become clear later.

 

[rom]

From Fesser:
The desk, chain, walls, and floor have no power to hold anything up except insofar as they derive that power from the earth. They are in that sense like instruments.
. . .
What makes a hierarchical series of causes hierarchical, then, is this instrumental or derivative character of the later members of the series.

I have some comments regarding these remarks. But first, let me make an important distinction between the First Way of St. Thomas and his Second Way. The First Way seeks to find the first cause of becoming (or motion). The Second Way seeks to find the first cause of being (or existence.)

In the Second Way St. Thomas proved that there must be an Uncaused First Cause of being, without which nothing else would exist. I submit that, after establishing God’s existence using the Five Ways, and after knowing God to be the one and only Necessary Being, we realize that the continuous action of the First Cause is required for our being. The reason for this is because secondary causes do not exist of necessity and only depend on another for their existence. In other words, since it is not of their essence to exist, they are not able to sustain their own existence, much less give existence to another. They cannot be a principal cause of being (esse, or existence), but they can be a principal cause of becoming. They can reproduce and make things, but not create them. Since secondary causes can never be a principal cause of being, all secondary causes act only as instrumental causes of being, and the continuous action of the First Cause, in whom alone existence belongs of necessity, is required.

In this thread we started by talking about the First Way of St. Thomas, not the Second Way. There is a big difference here. Unlike secondary causes of being, secondary causes of becoming (or motion) are NOT restricted to being instrumental causes of motion. In fact, animals and men often act as agents, that means, individuals that act and cause motion. This is not true of mere instruments, like a hammer or a saw in the hands of a carpenter. When a carpenter uses a saw to cut a piece of wood, we never say that the saw cuts the wood. We say that the carpenter cuts the wood. The action is attributed to the principal agent, not to the instrumental cause. But when a bird flies, we don’t say that God flies. It is the bird that flies. This is because, although the bird cannot fly without God’s concomitant action, the bird is not an instrumental cause, but a principal agent in the act of flying. God is the principal cause of every creature’s existence and concurrently acts with its motion. But as agent or secondary cause of motion, it (the creature) is a principal cause. In either case, God’s continuous action is required to conserve a creature’s being and to move it into operation. This is why St. Paul says, “For in Him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).

 

[lelinator]

Actually, Feser uses this type of series in his Five Proofs of the Existence of God. There is nothing about bread that is self actualizing, it is actual because its molecules are. But there is nothing about those molecules that are self actualizing . . . (and so on, with some additional background material explained). Except the first member can’t end as a physical, material object because any physical, material object would not just be Pure Act, or whatever terminus is necessary depending upon what cosmological argument we’re using.

Maybe it’s just me, but I don’t like that analogy at all. Everything that you see around you. Every object, from molecules to stars, and every attribute of those objects, from their motion to their color, can be traced back to those four fundamental forces. They are the underlying cause of everything. Take those away, and you have nothing.

It’s those four forces that cause particles to combine together to form atoms. And it’s those four forces that cause the atoms to combine together to form molecules. And it’s those four forces that cause those molecules to combine together to form bread. So if you want to trace the bread’s hierarchical causal series back to it’s original cause, then follow the forces. They’ll inevitably lead you back to the first cause, because whatever is the cause of them, must by necessity, be the cause of everything.

But you’re right that we would reject the notion that a “law of nature” could be an ontological brute fact, because no matter how we define it “it” (or whatever physical object it’s just in the nature of) would have attributes that need be caused.

You’re right, I don’t think that those four fundamental forces are just a brute fact, but I do think that they may have a very simple explanation. Physicist Richard Feynman used to explain why light travels in a straight line, by pointing out that light waves can, and do, take every possible path from the source to the observer. But the wave nature of light means that the vast majority of those paths will be destroyed by interference, and the only paths that’ll survive are the ones that take the shortest path through spacetime. Which is in most cases the straight path. So the mystery of why light travels in a straight line turns out to have a very simple and natural explanation. It’s because they’re waves, and that’s what waves do.

It may be, that what causes those four forces, and consequently everything else, may turn out to be no more complicated than what causes light to travel in a straight line. They may just be a natural consequence of the nature of their cause.

 

[lelinator]

just for one example, in the argument from motion, it’s based on the natural principle that any potency that is actualized is actualized by another, so therefore passive potency cannot belong to that underlying cause.

The bold part is where Aquinas and I disagree, at least on one small detail. I think that it’s entirely possible that something exists for which change is an intrinsic attribute of its existence. Therefore it doesn’t need an underlying cause for its change, because it can’t help but change. I think that if you begin with something that can’t change, you’ll never have change. But if you begin with something that does, then just as light emerges from a cacophony of waves, order will emerge from disorder.

 

[lelinator]

The example given by Wesrock of the books that rest on a shelf, that are carried by the walls, that are supported by the foundation, etc. is one example of that series. Also, the example of a child pulling a rope, that is tied to a train of carts, is another example.

Are these really examples of the types of hierarchical series that Aquinas was referring to in the First Way. Or like the example of the hand pushing the staff, are they just analogies?

 

[rom]

Are these really examples of the types of hierarchical series that Aquinas was referring to in the First Way. Or like the example of the hand pushing the staff, are they just analogies?

Yes, they are examples of the type of hierarchical series that Aquinas was referring to in the First Way. But if we define “hierarchical series” in a more general way that includes those in which an essential connection (of dependence) exists between the mover and the thing moved, without requiring the continued presence of previous movers, then those examples would not be the only examples of a hierarchical series that would fit in the First Way. As I said in my post above (Post # 115 ) the secondary causes of becoming (motion) do NOT always act as instrumental causes. They also act as principal causes in producing motion. Although they may receive an actuality from another external mover, they can, as principal agents, transfer that actuality to another creature without requiring the continued presence of the mover from which it received that actuality. (Of course, the concurrent action of God is always required because He is the First Cause of being and becoming, but the continued presence of all intermediate secondary causes is not required). Actually we observe this ability even in inanimate secondary causes of motion. When a stick hits a ball, and the ball starts to roll, it can transfer its energy to another ball without the continued presence of the stick. According to my definition, this IS a hierarchical series, and it cannot be traced to infinity. Or, as Fesser also admitted, if we assume that this series could go to infinity, then we still need to posit the existence of an uncaused prime mover outside the series to keep the transfer of motion going forever. I think it unlikely that there can be an actually infinite series of essentially subordinated movers, but we are entertaining that thought only because we know there is an eternal God that can sustain the motion forever.

 

[rom]

Someone could try to define a hierarchical causal series by saying that the loaf of bread is made up of various types of molecules, which are made up of atoms, which are in turn made up of elemental particles, which are in turn made up of…? Until by necessity you get down to the first item in the series. Such a series would in fact be simultaneous. However, from a Catholic perspective such a series isn’t allowed, because the first item in the series would be part of the physical world. It’s a series that’s describing what the world is made of, and to a Catholic the world isn’t made of God. So it’s probably not an acceptable hierarchical series. ( Technically it’s probably not a causal series at all)

You enumerated the possible material causes of a loaf of bread. But the so-called “hierarchical causal series” applies to efficient causes, not the material cause. Indeed, when St. Thomas wrote his Second Way, he started by saying, “The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause….” So, the relevant question is really, “What or who brought the bread into being?” not “What ingredients or what particles make up the bread?” One answer might be the baker. The next question then is this: What brought the baker into being? You might say, “His mom and dad.” Well, St. Thomas realizes that this series can be very long. So, instead of tracing the series of causes to the first human embryo, and so on, he used philosophy and made a shortcut by saying, “There is no case known in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.” Thus, the baker must have an efficient cause, and that cause must have an efficient cause, and so on. But, St. Thomas continues (I am paraphrasing now), this series cannot go to infinity because in any series the first is the cause of the second, the second is cause of the third, etc. But removing a cause will remove the effect. So, if we imagine that the series of causes can be infinite, then it means that there is no first cause. But without the first cause, there will be no second, third, etc… and ultimately there will be no bread. But the bread is right here. I am looking at it. Aha! So there must a First Cause, uncaused by no other. I call it God. Therefore, God exists.

 

[Veritas6]

How can someone be convinced of the necessity of Thomistic metaphysics, especially act & potency? Many atheists don’t see any reason why we need Scholastic metaphysics for science to work. Some would say Galileo and Descartes displaced Aquinas’ metaphysics in favor of a third person view over a first person view. They might also say the existence of matter and energy with its properties is a brute fact similar to the Trinity (by saying it is inexplainable). I suppose the existence of matter would lie under contingency, but what do you think?

 

[lelinator]

Yes, they are examples of the type of hierarchical series that Aquinas was referring to in the First Way.

Just to be clear, they are in fact analogies. They’re examples of the type of relationship that exists in a hierarchical causal series. But none of the examples actually culminates with the necessary cause. They’re just analogies of what such a causal series would look like.

So my question has always been, what does a hierarchical causal series that culminates in a necessary cause actually look like? And as an example I’ve arbitrarily chosen a loaf of bread. What’s the hierarchical causal series for that loaf of bread?

You enumerated the possible material causes of a loaf of bread. But the so-called “hierarchical causal series” applies to efficient causes, not the material cause.

So how would you describe a hierarchical causal series that culminates in a necessary cause, without having to resort to an analogy?

 

[Gorgias]

In a previous thread, I asked for someone to describe the hierarchical causal series of a loaf of bread, and the only one who made any attempt to do so was @Gorgias. However, the series that Gorgias described was extremely short. It consisted of just two things. The loaf of bread, preceded by God.

Hmm… not recalling the conversation.

Someone could try to define a hierarchical causal series by saying that the loaf of bread is made up of various types of molecules, which are made up of atoms, which are in turn made up of elemental particles, which are in turn made up of…? Until by necessity you get down to the first item in the series. Such a series would in fact be simultaneous.

Not entirely simultaneous. Bread ← flour ← wheat ← seed + fertilizer + water + radiant energy isn’t a simultaneous hierarchy, is it? Let alone everything that goes into those components, leading up to them.

But, at a certain level, you get to “individual atoms ← creation of those atoms”, and things get real fun. After all, you need a first cause for the creation of those atoms ex nihilo, right?

I’m not exactly sure what you mean by “from a Catholic perspective such a series isn’t allowed”, unless what you mean is merely “this series cannot terminate with a physical cause, since that physical cause itself is not uncaused.”

But if we’re not talking about a series that’s defined by what the world is made of, then perhaps we’re talking about a series that’s defined by the forces that govern how the world is made, rather than what it’s made of.

Nope. Governance isn’t origin. Unless you’re positing that gravity and electromagnetism themselves created the physical objects in the universe, you’re not describing a causal series.

So our hierarchical series may end up looking something like this: the underlying cause gives rise to forces, ( which may themselves have a causal order ), and those forces give rise to “ stuff ”.

I think you’d have to explain how gravity created the material that makes up my dog Fido… right? Otherwise, not so much.

Every object, from molecules to stars, and every attribute of those objects, from their motion to their color, can be traced back to those four fundamental forces. They are the underlying cause of everything. Take those away, and you have nothing.

No. I think you might be able to claim that they are a cause of things coming together in the ways that they have, but not that they created these things or the material that makes up these things.

 

[lelinator]

Hmm… not recalling the conversation.

No such thing as a hierarchical causal series in the real world Philosophy

The ‘hanger’ example is good as an illustration of a certain point, but isn’t intended to be the whole enchilada on its own. After all, the ‘motion’ here isn’t ‘motion’ in the way we normally think of; what’s really going on is that each of the hangers is reacting to gravity. The example merely illustrates that, without each of the hangers being in place, the whole chain falls apart. (That’s important; the distinction between per se and per accidens is about whether each part must continue t…

If you would like to change your answer I totally understand. What’s the hierarchical causal series for a loaf of bread?

 

[Gorgias]

If you would like to change your answer I totally understand.

Ha ha ha! OK – in that thread, I answered a different question, I guess: “what’s the terminus of a causal series?” The correct answer there is “God”!

What’s the hierarchical causal series for a loaf of bread?

I think I’ve started giving a more complete example, above. Yet, I think, it’s important to note that, for each member in the series, one must ask what series gave rise to that particular member, no? So… many series – but all converge, at the point of asking “what gave rise to the material of the stuff itself, at the beginning” … to the answer “God”.