Aquinas and Modern Physics

[Gorgias]

(By the way, I bowed out of that thread once you asserted that I misunderstood the Wigner assertion, which I did not, because, as the article you quoted said:

However, before the photon is measured, the photon displays both polarizations at once, as dictated by the laws of quantum mechanics; it exists in a “superposition” of two possible states.

Once the person in the lab measures the photon, the particle assumes a fixed polarization. But for someone outside that closed laboratory who doesn’t know the result of the measurements, the unmeasured photon is still in a state of superposition.

Which is exactly what I said in my post.

Even the updated experiment upholds the assertion, but in a fascinating way: each independent observation acts as if the other observation did not take place – they act as if the other observer had not observed (and therefore, superposition was still possible).

So… if you want to continue to assert that I don’t understand, be my guest. But… you’ll lose credibility (if only in my eyes) by doing so!

 

[lelinator]

I think I’ve started giving a more complete example, above. Yet, I think, it’s important to note that, for each member in the series, one must ask what series gave rise to that particular member, no?

I agree.

So… many series – but all converge, at the point of asking “what gave rise to the material of the stuff itself, at the beginning” … to the answer “God”.

Again I agree, there must be a necessary cause which is the same for everything, and any hierarchical causal series must inevitably culminate with it. But that doesn’t tell me what such a hierarchical series looks like. It simply describes the beginning and the end without giving me any clue as to what’s in the middle.

So can you give me, at least in a general sense, what lies in between those two things. For example, the oven was the cause of the bread, and the baker was the cause of the dough, and the miller was the cause of the flour, and the farmer was the cause of the wheat. But that’s not a hierarchical series. So can you give me a general description of a hierarchical causal series?

 

[rom]

How can someone be convinced of the necessity of Thomistic metaphysics, especially act & potency? Many atheists don’t see any reason why we need Scholastic metaphysics for science to work. Some would say Galileo and Descartes displaced Aquinas’ metaphysics in favor of a third person view over a first person view. They might also say the existence of matter and energy with its properties is a brute fact similar to the Trinity (by saying it is inexplainable). I suppose the existence of matter would lie under contingency, but what do you think?

Metaphysics deals with things like potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, natures, substances, being and becoming, necessity and contingency, etc. All these things cannot be touched, measured or observed. No, they cannot be perceived by the senses, but they can be grasped by the mind. They can’t be observed, but they can be understood. This is why we call them the “intelligibles,” as opposed to the “tangible” realities that can be handled, measured and observed in the laboratory.

Honest thinkers should recognize that reality is not limited to the tangibles. There are realities which, although intangible and inaccessible to sense perception, are capable of being investigated and explored also by the human mind. They are no less real than moral values, such as honesty, justice, peace, truth, etc., which are also intelligibles, inasmuch as they are all equally imperceptible by the senses, but understood by the mind.

The problem in our day and age is that some thinkers have espoused the idea that the metaphysical intelligibles are not important, or that they are not worth talking about. They fail to see that the metaphysical intelligibles are just as important for understanding the real world, as moral values are for shaping our behavior. We shouldn’t deny or ignore their reality. For example, what is the ‘potency’ in matter anyway? It is nothing else but the latent capacity of material substances to change. Now, isn’t it true that material substances have a latent capacity to change? If so, then its ‘potency’ is real even if it is intangible.

Our primary notions of ‘potency’ and ‘act’ underlie our philosophical understanding of motion in the world. They are also the notions that lead us to discover an Unmoved Prime Mover, which is God. Sure, you do not need metaphysics for science to work, because science is only focused on describing the world, without actually explaining it. Science would rather assume, believe, or postulate that matter, energy, and the world at large always existed, rather than seek the true reason why all these exist. In metaphysics, at least, we have an explanation why the world exists, and that is because there is an Uncaused First Cause that brought it into being. Yes, the Uncaused First Cause is also an intelligible, and therefore unobserved by the senses. But, at least, its existence was not assumed, postulated, or taken for granted, but it was arrived at logically by reasoning (see my Post #120).

 

[AlNg]

The problem in our day and age is that some thinkers have espoused the idea that the metaphysical intelligibles are not important, or that they are not worth talking about.

I don’t think that is it. I think that it is thought that these “metaphysical intelligibles” are ambiguous and ill defined. Take for example the concept of moral value. What exactly is a moral value. Is it what the present society thinks it is, or is it something that never varies. Is capital punishment a moral value or not? Is it a moral value for slaves to obey in everything those who are their earthly masters? Is it a moral value for women to keep silent in church and if they desire to learn, they must ask their husbands at home?

 

[rom]

Just to be clear, they are in fact analogies.

No, they are examples.

An analogy refers to a comparison between two things that are similar but not exactly the same. Thus, we can say that the heart is analogous to a pump. Just as a pump works by cycles of pressure and release to deliver fluid, so the heart works by cycles of contraction and expansion to deliver blood to the various parts and organs of the body.

An example, on the other hand, is an instance that fits or illustrates a general description. Thus, a nickname may be described as a familiar name given to a person instead of the real name. For example (or for instance), Liz is a nickname for Elizabeth; Bill is a nickname for William, etc.

The cases given to illustrate a hierarchical causal series are examples that fit the description of a hierarchical causal series. There is no analogy involved. They are just examples.

They’re examples of the type of relationship that exists in a hierarchical causal series. But none of the examples actually culminates with the necessary cause.

I don’t think you will find one because it would be too long; nor is it necessary. St. Thomas did not give any example of a long hierarchical series leading to a necessary cause because he employed a shortcut. By using reasoning and philosophy, he was able to show that a hierarchical series could not be infinite. (See my Post #120 above)

The approach of St. Thomas is by reasoning, not by a member by member investigation of its efficient cause leading to an Uncaused First Cause. This is normal, and we use it also in mathematics. For example, how do you prove the validity of this formula for all integral values of n:

                        1 + 3 + 5 + . . . + (2n-1) = n^2

If you were to prove it by showing that it is true for n=1, and that it is also true for n=2, and that it is true for n =3, and so on, then you will never finish. In a case like this the mathematician will simply use a proof by mathematical induction. That means, after showing that it is true for n =1, 2, and 3, then he will use a shortcut and say, “Well, I can show that if it is true for any integral value of n, say n = k, then it is true also for the next value, n = k+1.” And that completes the proof.

I will not give you all the details of the proof, unless you want me to. But the point is that, by mathematical induction the formula can be shown to be valid for all integral values of n.

St. Thomas was smart. He only needed to start with a short hierarchical series, such as this loaf of bread was made by the baker. Then the rest is pure reasoning.

 

[rom]

AINg, it is time for me to rest now. However, you raised a good question, so I will respond as soon as I can, tomorrow if possible. Please be patient with me.

 

[lelinator]

No, they are examples.

I beg to differ, I think that if we wanted to dig down into the minutiae of say a hand moving a stick, moving a rock, it’s not really a hierarchical causal series at all, it’s a temporal one. It’s just that given the correct circumstances a temporal series can give the appearance of being a hierarchical one.

However, that’s not what I wish to accomplish here. I want someone to give me an example of a hierarchical causal series that culminates in a necessary cause. That doesn’t mean that you need to include every single step in the series. Just a general outline.

How do you get from that loaf of bread to the necessary cause? For example, do we simply say that the bread is made of molecules, and the molecules are made of atoms, and the atoms are made of fundamental particles, and the fundamental particles are somehow sustained in their existence by the necessary cause?

Is that an example of what a hierarchical causal series that culminates with a necessary cause, looks like? If not, then what does such a hierarchical causal series look like?

It seems to me, that if someone really knew what a hierarchical causal series looks like, then they would easily be able to describe the hierarchical causal series of something as mundane as a loaf of bread. The fact that people can’t, probably means that they have no idea what such a hierarchical causal series looks like.

 

[lelinator]

St. Thomas was smart. He only needed to start with a short hierarchical series, such as this loaf of bread was made by the baker.

Obviously that’s not a hierarchical causal series. Once you have a loaf of bread, you don’t need the baker anymore. You don’t need the miller anymore. And you don’t need the farmer anymore.

 

[rom]

I don’t think that is it. I think that it is thought that these “metaphysical intelligibles” are ambiguous and ill defined. Take for example the concept of moral value. What exactly is a moral value. Is it what the present society thinks it is, or is it something that never varies.

First, intelligibles are realities understood by the mind. Some of these realities are better understood than others; thus, they are better defined than others. Also, our understanding of these realities improve with time; so it is normal to see an improvement in our definitions as well. But you don’t reject these realities just because we did not understand them very well or did not define them very well in the beginning. In fact, the various sciences of phenomena (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) are in the same predicament. Their concepts and definitions are subject to revision as our knowledge and understanding of the subject improves. For example, their concepts of the electron, gravity, mass, etc. were ill-defined in the beginning, and they are still being refined as we speak. If you do not reject the concepts of modern science because these concepts are being fine tuned, why would you reject those of metaphysics?

Second, metaphysical intelligibles are not the same as moral intelligibles. Moral value is among the moral intelligibles. Metaphysical intelligibles refer to the principles of being, their parts, properties and operations. The moral intelligibles refer to the operations of free beings insofar as they are related to their ultimate end. Taken objectively, the actions and operations of a free being have a good moral value when they are properly ordered toward the attainment of its ultimate end (or goal). In the moral philosophy of St. Thomas the ultimate end of human life is taken to be God Himself. Therefore, any human act that contributes toward the attainment of God as ultimate end, has a good moral value; and any act that frustrates or hinders the attainment of that ultimate goal is regarded as evil. This principle itself is absolute and never varies, and is independent of what society thinks of the act itself.

Third, I would much like to answer some of your moral questions, but they will take us off topic. So, let me stay with the metaphysical intelligibles. I spoke earlier of potency as the latent capacity of material substances to change. Every material substance is actually what it is. But if it can change into a different kind of substance, it means that it has the capacity or potency to receive a different actuality. Paper is actually paper, but if it can change to ash, then it means it has the capacity or potency to receive the actuality of being ash. What is ambiguous about that? Notice that in philosophy, the approach is more fundamental. We do not show off our knowledge of chemistry by saying that paper turns into ash by a slow process of oxidation, bla, bla, bla. No, that is only a distraction. We stay with the basics, and go straight into the principles of change: if anything were to change, then it should have a potency to receive a new actuality. Where is the ambiguity?

 

[rom]

Obviously that’s not a hierarchical causal series. Once you have a loaf of bread, you don’t need the baker anymore. You don’t need the miller anymore. And you don’t need the farmer anymore.

Yes, you do need them, if you want to explain how the bread got there. You don’t need the baker, the miller and the farmer for the bread’s continued existence because existence depends on God, not the baker, the miller or the farmer. But the explanation of how the bread came to be there (or how the bread became bread) depends on the previous existence (not the continued existence) of the baker, the miller and the farmer. As I said before, secondary causes (baker, miller, farmer) are not the principal causes of being or existence, but they are the principal causes of becoming.

 

[lelinator]

Yes, you do need them, if you want to explain how the bread got there.

So given this definition, a series of falling dominoes is also an example of a hierarchical causal series. In fact absolutely every series is a hierarchical causal series, because everything must have a causal series that explains how it got there.

Can you understand how this explanation doesn’t seem to make any sense?

 

[lelinator]

Yes, you do need them, if you want to explain how the bread got there.

Okay, I’m going to attempt to discern how you’re differentiating a temporal series from a hierarchical series. Keep in mind however, that I can be way off when trying to figure out what someone else is thinking.

But here goes.

With the example of a loaf of bread, the baker, and the miller, and the farmer are all part of the series that lead to the existence of that loaf of bread. Take any one of them away, and you wouldn’t have a loaf of bread.

The example of the dominoes is different however, in that, the fact that the dominoes are falling has nothing at all to do with how they came to be dominoes. Therefore they’re part of a completely different type of causal series.

Is that how you’re differentiating a temporal series from a hierarchical series?

 

[rom]

However, that’s not what I wish to accomplish here. I want someone to give me an example of a hierarchical causal series that culminates in a necessary cause. That doesn’t mean that you need to include every single step in the series. Just a general outline.

What you want then is not a mere example of a hierarchical series, but an example of a complete hierarchical series that ends in a First Cause. I don’t think that even St. Thomas had or used a complete example like that because, as I said in previous posts, his approach was to employ reasoning to arrive at a first cause after giving a few instances of members that belong to a hierarchical series.

How do you get from that loaf of bread to the necessary cause? For example, do we simply say that the bread is made of molecules, and the molecules are made of atoms, and the atoms are made of fundamental particles, and the fundamental particles are somehow sustained in their existence by the necessary cause?

No, that will not be a good example. Because what you gave were the material causes of the bread. We are looking for efficient causes. Material causes become part of the bread. Efficient causes are extrinsic to the bread, and do not enter into the composition of the bread, but are responsible for the bread’s coming into being. The baker would be a better example of an efficient cause, rather than the atoms and grains of wheat. Don’t get me wrong. The wheat is also a cause, a material cause of the bread. But the approach to God employed in the Second Way of St. Thomas is through efficient causes, not through material causes.

It seems to me, that if someone really knew what a hierarchical causal series looks like, then they would easily be able to describe the hierarchical causal series of something as mundane as a loaf of bread. The fact that people can’t, probably means that they have no idea what such a hierarchical causal series looks like.

Be careful, Lelinator. It doesn’t mean that we have no idea of what a hierarchical causal series looks like. It just means that it is hard to trace the actual efficient causes that brought about the being of things. Sometimes, the efficient cause is not one but many. There can be multiple efficient causes that help to produce the bread. This is why St. Thomas simplified it and went to the basic principles of efficient causality rather than spend his time hunting for efficient causes. For him, it does not matter whether the efficient cause is one or many, or what or who the efficient causes are. The idea is any efficient cause cannot be a cause of itself, because then it would be prior to itself. So, if you have a series of causes being caused by other causes, then ultimately you have to arrive at a First Cause uncaused by any other. Otherwise, none of the secondary causes could cause anything, and we won’t have a loaf of bread. The fact that there is a loaf of bread dispels the idea that an infinite series of caused causes exist and, therefore, there must be an uncaused First Cause.

 

[lelinator]

What you want then is not a mere example of a hierarchical series, but an example of a complete hierarchical series that ends in a First Cause.

It doesn’t have to be complete. It can just be a general outline, so that I can understand what a real world example of a hierarchical causal series actually looks like. The example of the hand pushing the stick, pushing the rock, may make a nice analogy, but how does that same process apply in the case of the loaf of bread? The baker isn’t continually actualizing the bread, in the same manner that the stick is continually actualizing the movement of the rock.

No, that will not be a good example. Because what you gave were the material causes of the bread. We are looking for efficient causes .

I agree with that 100%, however Ed Feser might not. I’m not sure…thus confusion.

Be careful, Lelinator. It doesn’t mean that we have no idea of what a hierarchical causal series looks like. It just means that it is hard to trace the actual efficient causes that brought about the being of things.

This helps explain part of why I don’t think that the example of the hand pushing the stick, pushing the rock actually constitutes the type of hierarchical causal series that Aquinas was talking about. The hand and the stick explain why the rock is moving, but neither of them explain how the rock came to be a rock in the first place, or what’s sustaining its existence as a rock. So from that fact alone, I wouldn’t describe them as hierarchical causal series.

Does that make sense to you?

 

[rom]

So given this definition, a series of falling dominoes is also an example of a hierarchical causal series.

Yes.

In fact absolutely every series is a hierarchical causal series, because everything must have a causal series that explains how it got there.

Not every series of causes is a hierarchical causal series, but only those whose members have an essential dependence on prior members. Suppose a ball, A, is moved by another ball, B, that happens to be a blue ball. The ball B is blue because it was painted blue yesterday by a painter C. Here I cannot say that A is moved by C because the motion of A does not depend on B being blue. Suppose, instead, that B was struck by a stick D and caused B to move, and in moving it hits A that also starts to move. In this case I can say that the motion of A depends also on D. The series A-B-C is not a hierarchical causal series, but the series A-B-D is.

Having made the distinction above, I agree that everything must have a hierarchical causal series that explains how it got there, but I do not agree that every causal series is a hierarchical causal series.

 

[rom]

This helps explain part of why I don’t think that the example of the hand pushing the stick, pushing the rock actually constitutes the type of hierarchical causal series that Aquinas was talking about. The hand and the stick explain why the rock is moving, but neither of them explain how the rock came to be a rock in the first place, or what’s sustaining its existence as a rock. So from that fact alone, I wouldn’t describe them as hierarchical causal series.

Correct, the hand and the stick explain why the rock is moving, not why the rock is existing. Only God can be a cause of being or existence; creatures, such as the hand and the stick, could only be a cause of becoming or motion. Even in the case of the loaf of bread, the baker was a cause of the bread’s coming into being, but the actual existence of the bread presupposes the prior existence of the wheat and the other ingredients that make it up. Existence is the effect of God’s causality, but motion or becoming can be caused by His creatures.

Now, when we speak of a hierarchy of causes, you should trace the dependence of each member from prior members in the same respect. Thus, the motion of A depends on B, and the motion of B depends on D. However, the existence of A does not depend on the existence of B; neither does the existence of B depend on D. Thus, in the series A-B-D there is a hierarchical causal series with respect to motion, but not with respect to existence.

 

[lelinator]

Not every series of causes is a hierarchical causal series, but only those whose members have an essential dependence on prior members. Suppose a ball, A, is moved by another ball, B, that happens to be a blue ball. The ball B is blue because it was painted blue yesterday by a painter C. Here I cannot say that A is moved by C because the motion of A does not depend on B being blue. Suppose, instead, that B was struck by a stick D and caused B to move, and in moving it hits A that also starts to move. In this case I can say that the motion of A depends also on D. The series A-B-C is not a hierarchical causal series, but the series A-B-D is.

This explanation doesn’t seem complete to me. In the series A-B-C, the motion of A is in indeed dependent upon the fact that C painted B blue. At first blush it may not seem like it, but the motion of A is dependent upon the precise interaction between A and B, which is dependent upon the exact placement of B, which is itself dependent upon how B came to be in that exact location. And part of how B came to be in that exact location is the fact that C painted it blue.

So if one is going to be precise rather than vague in defining the hierarchical series that leads to the motion of A, then C is just as much a necessary component as D is. But if we follow that line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, then even seemingly disconnected events may have played a role in determining the motion of A. We need to consider how A got to where it was, and how the painter got to where he was. It would seem that we may have to consider everything as being a part of the hierarchical causal series that leads to the motion of A. And logically we have to do that for everything. So it would seem almost inevitable that the hierarchical causal series for any individual thing is somehow connected to everything else.

So the hierarchical causal series for our loaf of bread would seem to include everything which was involved, however indirectly, in the existence of that loaf of bread.

Would you say that that is an accurate description of a hierarchical causal series?

 

[AlNg]

Where is the ambiguity?

The ambiguity is that at one point in time burning a heretic at the stake is said to be a moral value whereas at another point in time burning a heretic at the stake is said to be morally wrong.

our understanding of these realities improve with time

This is not so much an improvement as it is a flip flop of what is meant by something being morally right or morally wrong.

 

[AlNg]

Only God can be a cause of being or existence

In quantum field theory particles are popping in and out of existence and in the case of an infant it is the mother and the father who are responsible for the child coming into the world.

 

[rom]

The ambiguity is that at one point in time burning a heretic at the stake is said to be a moral value whereas at another point in time burning a heretic at the stake is said to be morally wrong.

First of all, a paper being burned into ashes is not a heretic.

Secondly, I want to let you know that I will be away for a week and will not be able to continue this thread. So, you may have the last word, if you wish. I will not be able to respond to you anymore, or to anybody else for that matter, until I come back.

This explanation doesn’t seem complete to me. In the series A-B-C, the motion of A is in indeed dependent upon the fact that C painted B blue. At first blush it may not seem like it, but the motion of A is dependent upon the precise interaction between A and B, which is dependent upon the exact placement of B, which is itself dependent upon how B came to be in that exact location. And part of how B came to be in that exact location is the fact that C painted it blue.

Even the mere presence of C near the blue ball B will have a gravitational effect on B’s motion, right? O Lelinator! You are analyzing this to the death. Hahaha. Anyway, you may have the last word. I will be away for a week, so I’ll meet you again perhaps in another thread when I come back.