I sure have no answers. Worse yet, if multiformity of grades of being is the motivation for predestination, it certainly seems to lend itself to double predestination.Even if certain philosophical explanations, such as this one, may technically cover the whole phenomenon, the way in which they do or the reason why they do remains painfully hidden. Why would this “multiformity of grades” or the manifestation of God’s justice through punishment be worth the eternal torment of so many of God’s beloved children?
Correct. Unless I am mistaken Calvin took things so far as to deny free will and to deny that God gives sufficient grace for salvation to everyone. Catholics have generally said this position means heretical double predestination, though I’m not sure Calvin actually taught that explicitly. Also he taught that falling from grace is impossible, which is a whole other can of worms and was not really necessary even if he wanted to take this extreme predestinarian view. All those Calvinist doctrines are not positions taught by Augustine or Aquinas, and are not acceptable ones for Catholics.But not in the sense that the predestined have no choice. This is where Calvin was wrong, and people who don’t look into it carefully are mistaken about what it’s about.
God gives every man a head start but we have to finish the race.
Concerning lending itself to double predestination, the principles of God’s universal salvific will, sufficient grace for salvation being given to all, that God is not the direct or indirect cause of evil, and that God only permits evil rather than ordaining it, are all buffers against that error.I sure have no answers. Worse yet, if multiformity of grades of being is the motivation for predestination, it certainly seems to lend itself to double predestination.
However, it seems to me that the preservation of multiformity may be an expedient which while philosophically satisfying does not really lie at the heart of the matter.
It is very odd that predestination should be founded upon multiformity of grades of being, since multiformity itself does not contain within itself a defense against, say, double predestination. Even if I stipulate that the buffers you mention against double predestination are valid, they are still not organic to multiformity of grades of being; they even seem ad hoc. I desire that a theory of predestination should contain its own natural buffers against double predestination.Concerning lending itself to double predestination, the principles of God’s universal salvific will, sufficient grace for salvation being given to all, that God is not the direct or indirect cause of evil, and that God only permits evil rather than ordaining it, are all buffers against that error.
I’m confused. It’s easy to make an erroneous conclusion if one focuses in on one aspect of the truth and ignores others. That’s why to avoid double predestination we need to take a look at the teachings, whether of Aquinas or of the Church itself, which are irreconcilable with this error rather than only those teachings which do not in themselves contradict it.It is very odd that predestination should be founded upon multiformity of grades of being, since multiformity itself does not contain within itself a defense against, say, double predestination. Even if I stipulate that the buffers you mention against double predestination are valid, they are still not organic to multiformity of grades of being; they even seem ad hoc. I desire that a theory of predestination should contain its own natural buffers against double predestination.
Now that was an oddly expressed desire, wasn’t it? If Aquinas’ predestination is not Calvin’s predestination–why call it predestination? Hmmm.
An excellent reading, in respect to this topic, is the book by Fr. William G. Most titled “Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God,” (1997). In this book, Fr. Most makes the case that there can be found two divergent views or conclusions in the writings of Aquinas on predestination which Aquinas did not see how they could be reconciled.On this point Aquinas comments “**The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. **Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above (Question 22, Article 2). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others” (Q. 23. Art. 5). This passage makes it sound as if the goodness of God is the cause of predestination and reprobation in the sense that the “multiformity of grades” of being requires reprobation: if all men were saved, multiformity of grades would not be preserved.
Heaven above! What is your opinion?…I am not seeking to form my own opinion of predestination (which I have already done)…
In the words of St. John of Damascus, “We ought to understand that while God knows all things beforehand, yet He does not predetermine all things.” Unlike Aquinas, I do not understand this stricture as being applied to natural things, but as meaning that God does not predestine men to Heaven or Hell. However, my opinion is unimportant and cannot imagine defending it or impugning others’. What matters to me is understanding Aquinas’ opinion.Heaven above! What is your opinion?
Hi Daniel,Summary of the arguments of Q. 23, Art. 1.
Aquinas affirms that men are predestined by God. Man by nature cannot attain to life eternal. However, man is able, as a rational creature, to be “led towards it, directed . . . by God.” God’s plan to do so is pre-existent in God’s mind. “Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.” No hint is given of double predestination; so far we might suppose that predestination is limited to God’s desire that all men be saved.
Evaluation of the arguments of Q. 23, Art. 1.
(1) Aquinas mentions Damascene’s opinion on predestination as an objection to his position. Damascene says that God “does not predetermine” all things. According to Aquinas, this objection supposes that “human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will.” Since he ranks the free will thesis as belonging to his opponent and never attempts to save it in the Respondeo, we may fairly conclude that Aquinas does not believe that “we are the masters of our own acts by free will.”
(2) Aquinas’ rebuttal of Damascene is that since God does not will malice or compel virtue, therefore “predestination is not excluded by Him.” This rebuttal is a non sequitur. (I personally was shaken to find this in Aquinas.) Here the question is, why does Aquinas misread Damascene so badly? My purely speculative answer is that when his intuition surged past the evidence, he followed in its wake.
(3) More sinister is Aquinas’ claim that Damascene calls “predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end.” Damascene in loco citato says no such thing. Not only is Aquinas putting words into Damascene’s mouth, but he slips us a disturbing definition of predestination: “an imposition of necessity” upon men such that they “after the manner of natural things
. . . are predetermined towards one end.”
All this I herewith offer to all and sundry for criticism.
Thanks, Dan
Small note on Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, he goes through great pains in his book Predestination to demonstrate the connection of his interpretation of Thomism to St. Thomas Aquinas himself, to Augustinian theologians before St. Thomas, and to various later Thomists, as well as to defend the theory on its own theological grounds. He points out honestly when and why ideas not found in St. Thomas’ own writings were introduced. Conversely, he hardly quotes from Banez at all. In my opinion the urge to blame Banez (and now Garrigou-Lagrange) for everything in Thomism that anti-Thomists reject is based in a very understandable but futile wish that the highly venerated St. Thomas had not taught Thomism.An excellent reading, in respect to this topic, is the book by Fr. William G. Most titled “Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God,” (1997). In this book, Fr. Most makes the case that there can be found two divergent views or conclusions in the writings of Aquinas on predestination which Aquinas did not see how they could be reconciled.
One such view Aquinas inherited from St Augustine and which biblical scholars of today say is based on an erroneous interpretation of Romans 9 and which also involves Augustine’s massa damnata theory. The authority of Augustine had great weight with the medival theologians. This view that those who are saved are saved solely by God showing them greater mercy than the reprobated seems to appear in some texts in Aquinas’ article on predestination in the Summa such as the one cited above by Daniel. Aquinas also cites Augustine as saying “Do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err” in regard as to why God chooses some to salvation and not others.
Fr. Most argues that the massa damnata theory of Augustine and the view that the saved are saved simply because God wishes to manifest his mercy and the reprobated are damned because God wishes to manifest his justice is entirely unscriptural and not in keeping with the teaching of the Church nor is it the teaching of the Church fathers.
Aquinas’ other view is based on 1 Timothy 2:4, that God wills all men to be saved and come to a knowledge of the truth. In the Summa Contra Gentiles Book 3, chapter 139, Aquinas raises the question why it is that if grace is necessary for salvation and grace is a free gift from God, how can God justly condemn some person to hell for not having grace. Aquinas answers that to impede or not to impede the reception of grace is within the scope of free choice. God is ready to give grace to all but only those are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace.
Fr. Most argues that this view of Aquinas is certainly scriptural and consistent with the doctrine of the Church as well as the teaching of the Church fathers. The first view which Aquinas inherited from St Augustine we should discard since it is based on an erroneous interpretation of scripture.
We should also keep in mind that there are different schools or interpretations of Thomistic thought that have come down to us. One such Thomism can be found in the popular writings of the Dominican Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange from the last century. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s book on predestination and reprobation is based on a system of infrustrable decrees from God which he claims is the teaching of St. Thomas but which really comes from the Thomistic theologian Domingo Banez from the 16th century. Banez taught that everything in the world is controlled by infrustrable decrees from God. He claimed that this was the teaching of St Thomas.
Fr. Most argues to the contrary that a system of infrustrable decrees from God is not the true teaching of Aquinas for it lends itself to a doctrine of double predestination.
Fr. Most argues from the teaching of the Church, Holy Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, and St. Thomas Aquinas that the doctrine of predestination is conditional, i.e., it is based on God’s foreknowledge of each person’s resistance or non-resistance to grace.
That God includes each person’s free will and choices in His eternal predestination is the teaching of the Catechism of the Catholic Church as well.
I don’t have the time and resources to really do a good job here, giving sources and so forth. But St. Thomas Aquinas certainly affirmed free will. In fact he somewhere suggested it was the basis of human equality (which also interestingly shows that he was familiar with and indeed took for granted the idea that all human beings are in some sense equal, an idea we often assume was absent in the Middle Ages).Summary of the arguments of Q. 23, Art. 1.
Aquinas affirms that men are predestined by God. Man by nature cannot attain to life eternal. However, man is able, as a rational creature, to be “led towards it, directed . . . by God.” God’s plan to do so is pre-existent in God’s mind. “Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.” No hint is given of double predestination; so far we might suppose that predestination is limited to God’s desire that all men be saved.
Evaluation of the arguments of Q. 23, Art. 1.
(1) Aquinas mentions Damascene’s opinion on predestination as an objection to his position. Damascene says that God “does not predetermine” all things. According to Aquinas, this objection supposes that “human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will.” Since he ranks the free will thesis as belonging to his opponent and never attempts to save it in the Respondeo, we may fairly conclude that Aquinas does not believe that “we are the masters of our own acts by free will.”
(2) Aquinas’ rebuttal of Damascene is that since God does not will malice or compel virtue, therefore “predestination is not excluded by Him.” This rebuttal is a non sequitur. (I personally was shaken to find this in Aquinas.) Here the question is, why does Aquinas misread Damascene so badly? My purely speculative answer is that when his intuition surged past the evidence, he followed in its wake.
(3) More sinister is Aquinas’ claim that Damascene calls “predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end.” Damascene in loco citato says no such thing. Not only is Aquinas putting words into Damascene’s mouth, but he slips us a disturbing definition of predestination: “an imposition of necessity” upon men such that they “after the manner of natural things
. . . are predetermined towards one end.”
All this I herewith offer to all and sundry for criticism.
Thanks, Dan
Hello Aelred Minor,Small note on Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, he goes through great pains in his book Predestination to demonstrate the connection of his interpretation of Thomism to St. Thomas Aquinas himself, to Augustinian theologians before St. Thomas, and to various later Thomists, as well as to defend the theory on its own theological grounds. He points out honestly when and why ideas not found in St. Thomas’ own writings were introduced. Conversely, he hardly quotes from Banez at all. In my opinion the urge to blame Banez (and now Garrigou-Lagrange) for everything in Thomism that anti-Thomists reject is based in a very understandable but futile wish that the highly venerated St. Thomas had not taught Thomism.
Regarding the Catechism, the exact quote you are thinking of is:
“To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of “predestination”, he includes in it each person’s free response to his grace.” (CCC 600)
Notice this is carefully phrased so that it can be interpreted according to either idea of predestination. Unfortunately, people on both sides of the debate sometimes read it and see only their own interpretation. A Molinist could indeed interpret this to say, “God takes his forknowledge of people’s free response to grace into account as the determining factor in his choice whether to predestine someone.” A Thomist could just as easily interpret it to say, “When God predestines a man what is predestined even includes that man’s free response to grace.”
Hi Daniel,Richca. It should be noted that this interpretation of Romans 9 comes from St Augustine who may be the only church father who interpreted Romans 9 this way.
Daniel. True! But why? I have never read a church father who even approached St. Augustine’s views before they became accepted in the West. Where did St. Augustine get his inspiration for predestination? My mind always flits back to his Manichaean days–shades of Julian! In fact, the reason I started this thread was because of a chance conversation. When an acquaintance asked me what a Manichee was, I told him in short that it was someone who believed that we are saved or damned by virtue of the class of men to which God had assigned us. He had a funny look on his face and admitted that that was just what he believed as a Calvinist. So I immediately applied to Aquinas, whom I had been told had cleared up the matter, but found there more muddle instead.