Aquinas's First Way

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t think I denied any of the above.
My point is a simple one…

It appears equally consistent to say that electrolysis of water is merely an accidental change of the atoms involved whose identity, quantity and mass remains unchanged.

Your logic appears to be limited to an either/or solution: if a view is different from what you hold to be the case then it must be wrong.

Why cannot it be both/and as I have actually shown.
Depending on what “focal-distance” or perspective one chooses to view reality…the same change can be validly seen as either substantial or accidental. Reality is apparantly “layered.”

This appears obvious and an unavoidable logical conclusion from the analysis of the electrolysis of water.

Can you explain why you believe my perspective, at the atomic level, does not meet the criteria of accidental change?

I think the confusion here is that you are thinking of substantial and accidental changes in a scientific manner. But when I speak of these things I am speaking in a metaphysical way. Science and philosophy view the same reality in different ways. Remember that " metaphysical " means beyond or underlying the physical.

Pretend that I am a builder and I want to build a house. I buy lumber, nails, wiring, plumbing materials, roofing materials and a lot of other stuff and build a house. You will agree that the house is a different thing, has a different nature, than the individual " stuff " that I use to build the house. All this " stuff " still contains its own individual nature, but now it all combines for the good of the house. It all becomes subject to the nature of the house.

Now I discover that I have some left over " stuff, " so I decide to add a small back porch to the house. This could be called an " accidental " change. The basic house is still there but now it has the added feature of a small back porch, something that does not change the nature of the house.

After many years a tornado comes along and demolishes the house. Now the house is gone and all my " stuff " is scattered around who knows where. This would be an example of a substantial change.

Your point about " layering " sees only the physical reality of the " stuff " which makes the man or the cat or the horse or whatever. The philosopher would say, " Yes but there is a deeper reality than the " stuff…" There is the reality of the man, the cat, the horse, or whatever. These natures are certainly composed of a lot of " stuff, " and while this " stuff " retains its own nature, it does not behave entirely on its own. It serves under the guidance or governance of the nature of which it is the physical building blocks.

Dr. Bonnette speaks to this in his video, but in a slightly different way. I think Edward Feser addresses the same things in Aquinas, in many of his blogs, and in his videos.

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Your judgement of substantial or accidental arbitrarily depends on what level of intellectual “zoom” you apply to the “reality” under observation.

You see death as a substantial change only because you have decided to “bring into intellectual focus” that unity of organic material dimensioned by the borders of a body which cannot be divided without losing its “substantial” identity.

I can look at the same body as but one (marvellous) possible combination/collocation of a huge but fixed number of around 45 different atoms that still remain after “death” unchanged.

So I do not see “death” as a substantial change but an accidental change at this level … a re-arrangement of a marvellously integrated and complex organic structure into much cruder structures. Yet still the same collection of un-changing atoms. Accidental change.

(But lets keep to the electrolysis of water, its a simpler example to understand and the same analysis appears to apply.)

I am observing that substance/accident distinctions (and changes) only make sense relative to each other and are not absolutely fixed/defined at any specific “layer” of reality (ie the six basic sub-particles, atoms, molecules, compounds, cells, bodies etc etc.)

Much like we use genus/species classifications not absolutely but relatively at any arbitrary level of Porphory’s Tree we choose to focus on.

I am saying that “reality” is based on a hierachy of semi-autonomous layers of differing indivisible building blocks. So depending which layer of semi-fixed organisation we focus on … one man’s substantial change turns out to be another mans acidental change.

From a Physics point of view I don’t quite know why this is significant? In heavy water H2 and O2 atoms are still in a ratio of 2:1 - though the mass ratio of the respective atoms will of course be approx halved.

Dear Blue Horizon:

Two possible interpretations of your words come to my mind.

I. You think of atoms as a mental construct, and your thesis would be that besides “atoms” no other mental construct (like substance, form, etc…) is needed to explain change. Local movement of atoms would be enough to explain what aristotelians call substantial change.

II. You think of atoms as a mental construct that has its exact correlate in reality. Then you argue that no other realities, besides atoms, are needed for the emergence of new interactions.

You will need to decide which atomic mental construct you will choose, because there have been several of them, and I think that your argument would need to vary from one to the other. Let’s suppose for the moment that your conception of atoms corresponds to that of indivisible round particles.

Obviously, in any of the two interpretations above you are unable to see atoms with the eyes of your face. As you say, you “see” them intellectually; in other words, you conceive them. But you also have a sensory experience (directly or indirectly) of the new interactions’ results, such as temperature changes, color changes, density changes, viscosity changes, electrical conductivity changes, etcetera.

For a physical change, such as a temperature variation, if you make your “intellectual zoom” you will conceive a change on the speed and vibration level of the atomic or molecular particles. You will no longer “see” (conceive) the result of the macroscopic interaction; but you still will experience it (see it). If, on the other hand, there occurs a chemical reaction in front of you -let’s say, in a liquid phase- you will experience a certain number of new modes of interaction (those that I have mentioned already: electrical conductivity,…); but if you do the intellectual zoom, then you will conceive only new groupings between the particles, different distances between them, a change on their speeds, a new level of molecular vibration, etcetera.

Then, it appears that when you do the intellectual zoom you simply lose sight of something that really happens, and you will think that you don’t have to explain it, just because in those circumstances you don’t conceive it. However, as I said before, you still experience it. You will have to explain them.

Then, through a complex thought process you will combine conception and experience in order to say: “When I intellectually see certain changes in local movements of the atomic particles -so that simply a new arrangement occurs between them-, I experience a sudden emergence of a set of new interactions", and you will think: “You see? Nothing else besides the local movements of the atomic particles is needed to explain these new interactions”. But an aristotelian will say: “You see? When the particles acquire a new arrangement (form), a new substance comes about, which contributes to the explanation about why this new set of interactions emerge”. I think the good aristotelians had the will to make things as simple as possible, and they used simple examples. I imagine them saying this: “Through a sequence of accidental changes of his hand and his chisel (local movements), the sculptor makes a beautiful form out of a piece of marble”. And I think that the aristotelians have won the game.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[thinkandmull]

Hi Thinkandmull,

The proofs for God’s existence are complex and one could write a book on them. In fact, I did. So, frankly, I don’t have the time to go through all of them on this thread –nor to reply to every question.

Still, let me just make a few general observations. First, I have already distinguished the First Way from the Second in post 34. Second, when you talk about causal regressions, never forget that for St. Thomas, in his proofs for God’s existence, he is always talking about causal chains in which each member exists and causes simultaneously with all other members of the chain. In other words, causal regressions do not go back in time; they exist and act in the here and now. Any attempt to prove God’s existence through regression in time utterly misses the force of the Thomistic proofs. Third, St. Thomas uses the hypothesis of an eternal world to prove God’s existence in the Third Way, but, as a Christian, he believes that the world had a temporal beginning. Fourth, just because the finite things in the world need a cause, this does not mean that God needs a cause. Finite things, upon analysis, reveal their existential contingency. They do not explain themselves, and thus need extrinsic reasons or causes. God, as the Necessary Being – the sole Being in which essence and existence are identical, explains His own existence, and hence, is in no need of an extrinsic cause.

The key to proving God’s existence is to examine the finite things found in this finite world and to come to understand that neither singly nor collectively do they explain their own existence and/or becoming. The need for a transcendent First Cause becomes manifest precisely when we come to realize that the finite world needs an explanation and cannot explain itself. The materialist assumes that the finite material world is self-explanatory. Metaphysics reveals that no finite thing explains itself precisely because of its finitude, and hence, some transcendent cause is needed. Thus, in the First Way, the inability of any finite thing to bring itself from potency to act (to give to itself something it does not yet have) reveals that it needs an external cause of motion, leading, through the impossibility of an infinite regress of moved movers acting here and now, to a First Mover Unmoved. Only in a later part of the Summa Theologiae does St. Thomas make clear that this First Mover, not only fulfills the nominal definition of God, but actually entails the properties properly attributed to God Himself.

“First, I have already distinguished the First Way from the Second in post 34.”

And my post showed it didn’t answer the question yet. Are motions efficient causes?

“Second, when you talk about causal regressions, never forget that for St. Thomas, in his proofs for God’s existence, he is always talking about causal chains in which each member exists and causes simultaneously with all other members of the chain. In other words, causal regressions do not go back in time; they exist and act in the here and now.”

Over eternity is not simultaneous. If the world always existed, why cannot the motions have always been, each one being explained by the one before? The only argument is the Third Way. See below?

“Finite things, upon analysis, reveal their existential contingency. They do not explain themselves, and thus need extrinsic reasons or causes.”

It is not hard to imagine that a rock has always been, and had to be, apart from the kalam cosmological argument

“The key to proving God’s existence is to examine the finite things found in this finite world and to come to understand that neither singly nor collectively do they explain their own existence and/or becoming. The need for a transcendent First Cause becomes manifest precisely when we come to realize that the finite world needs an explanation and cannot explain itself. The materialist assumes that the finite material world is self-explanatory. Metaphysics reveals that no finite thing explains itself precisely because of its finitude, and hence, some transcendent cause is needed. Thus, in the First Way, the inability of any finite thing to bring itself from potency to act (to give to itself something it does not yet have) reveals that it needs an external cause of motion, leading, through the impossibility of an infinite regress of moved movers acting here and now, to a First Mover Unmoved. Only in a later part of the Summa Theologiae does St. Thomas make clear that this First Mover, not only fulfills the nominal definition of God, but actually entails the properties properly attributed to God Himself”

You would still have to prove that finite must be explained by infinite (Fourth Way), or that the good of the universe isn’t infinite…

 

[thinkandmull]

Cardinal Ratzinger on page 407 of God and the World said “Luther held out in favour of transubstantiation.”. I think he’s right. Lutherans may just be saying the accidents are not mental illusions. The physical breadness clearly still exists. Aquinas’s statements on the Eucharest definitely seem to put him in the idealist camp. Prime matter is nothing? So nothing is formed by something invisible into something? Uh…

He writes “because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text.26”. It has to asked: was Aquinas platonic? Didn’t he reject Forms apart from God? So are the forms God? Wouldn’t they have to be?

My argument: form would have to be no different than substance to save it as a concept., although reason cannot prove substance apart from matter exists. The substance is replaced by the Body of Jesus so the bread loses it non-physical form breadness, and thus we can look at the Host in adoration. That’s the only way reason can make sense of this

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think the confusion here is that you are thinking of substantial and accidental changes in a scientific manner. But when I speak of these things I am speaking in a metaphysical way. Science and philosophy view the same reality in different ways. Linus2nd

I don’t buy this Linus…and you still haven’t explained the flaw in my proposition…if there is one.

If metaphysic principles of substantial/accidental change are induced by observing sensible change in the natural world they should apply back to all future observations of the natural world too shouldn’t they?
Otherwise the “induction” of those principles from the natural world of the ancients by Aristotle was wrong or incomplete.

Now I am doing no more than what Aristotle did. I gaze out upon the natural world and am testing the validity of his inductions from the natural world.

The difference is we have the tools of modern science and I can “see” more of the natural world than he did. He didn’t have a telescope, a microscope or the wealth of experimental evidence that atomic theory (we cannot see atoms in a microscope as JF and others here rightly state) is consistant with.

It is very clear to those of us who accept the repeatable experimentrs of chemistry that electrolysis is a change where the underlying indivisible elements do NOT lose their identity. Therefore accidental change can be validly predicated of electrolysis of water.

Sure water diasappears/dies in electrolysis - so what. That happens when a puddle mysteriously disappears in the sun too. For the latter you will say that is accidental change.

But the distinctions are all so arbitrary depending on focus. Why is the latter an accidental change but the former not.

You might say we all know that water vapour is still water. Do we? Only because of atomic theory. To the senses it no longer behaves as water did.

And if we say, we know its still water because its reversible, just cool it down.
Therefore an accidental change.

Well the electrolysis of water is reversible too. Just make a spark.

My undeerstanding is that substantial change always involves the loss of original identity.
Do you agree.

If so the only real problem is how do we define the identity of a material thing? That appears somewhat arbitrary … depending on what “layer” of indivisible sensible reality we decide to focus on.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Dear Blue Horizon:

Two possible interpretations of your words come to my mind.

I. You think of atoms as a mental construct, and your thesis would be that besides “atoms” no other mental construct (like substance, form, etc…) is needed to explain change. Local movement of atoms would be enough to explain what aristotelians call substantial change.

II. You think of atoms as a mental construct that has its exact correlate in reality. Then you argue that no other realities, besides atoms, are needed for the emergence of new interactions.

You will need to decide which atomic mental construct you will choose, because there have been several of them, and I think that your argument would need to vary from one to the other. Let’s suppose for the moment that your conception of atoms corresponds to that of indivisible round particles.

Obviously, in any of the two interpretations above you are unable to see atoms with the eyes of your face. As you say, you “see” them intellectually; in other words, you conceive them. But you also have a sensory experience (directly or indirectly) of the new interactions’ results, such as temperature changes, color changes, density changes, viscosity changes, electrical conductivity changes, etcetera.

For a physical change, such as a temperature variation, if you make your “intellectual zoom” you will conceive a change on the speed and vibration level of the atomic or molecular particles. You will no longer “see” (conceive) the result of the macroscopic interaction; but you still will experience it (see it). If, on the other hand, there occurs a chemical reaction in front of you -let’s say, in a liquid phase- you will experience a certain number of new modes of interaction (those that I have mentioned already: electrical conductivity,…); but if you do the intellectual zoom, then you will conceive only new groupings between the particles, different distances between them, a change on their speeds, a new level of molecular vibration, etcetera.

Then, it appears that when you do the intellectual zoom you simply lose sight of something that really happens, and you will think that you don’t have to explain it, just because in those circumstances you don’t conceive it. However, as I said before, you still experience it. You will have to explain them.

Then, through a complex thought process you will combine conception and experience in order to say: “When I intellectually see certain changes in local movements of the atomic particles -so that simply a new arrangement occurs between them-, I experience a sudden emergence of a set of new interactions", and you will think: “You see? Nothing else besides the local movements of the atomic particles is needed to explain these new interactions”. But an aristotelian will say: “You see? When the particles acquire a new arrangement (form), a new substance comes about, which contributes to the explanation about why this new set of interactions emerge”. I think the good aristotelians had the will to make things as simple as possible, and they used simple examples. I imagine them saying this: “Through a sequence of accidental changes of his hand and his chisel (local movements), the sculptor makes a beautiful form out of a piece of marble”. And I think that the aristotelians have won the game.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

JF I don’t really disagree with anything you say above…I don’t quite see what it is in my contribution you feel the need to refute? I do not deny causality at any layer of reality. Both accidental forms and substantial forms need explaining when they change.

You seem to agree that a substance at a “higher” layer is but a temporarily abiding accidental form/change of much smaller stable substances of a lower level.

Yes I agree the ever changing hills and valleys of a wind-swept desert (whose sand never changes) need to have efficient causes to explain these accidental changes (the wind). Who can deny that.

You call those hills and valleys “substances”.
I call them accidental forms of the underlying substance called sand.

Are we not both right?

(BTW the atomic model is not a pure mental construct. It is a sensible model that best and consistently explains the results of thousands of unusual chemical experiements which prove that some sort of “identity” is preserved.)

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t buy this Linus…and you still haven’t explained the flaw in my proposition…if there is one.

If metaphysic principles of substantial/accidental change are induced by observing sensible change in the natural world they should apply back to all future observations of the natural world too shouldn’t they?
Otherwise the “induction” of those principles from the natural world of the ancients by Aristotle was wrong or incomplete.

Read below, I try to show that Aristotle was not wrong in his fundamental principles…

QNow I am doing no more than what Aristotle did. I gaze out upon the natural world and am testing the validity of his inductions from the natural world.

The difference is we have the tools of modern science and I can “see” more of the natural world than he did. He didn’t have a telescope, a microscope or the wealth of experimental evidence that atomic theory (we cannot see atoms in a microscope as JF and others here rightly state) is consistant with

True you have a better scientific understanding but you are not viewing the world metaphysically.

It is very clear to those of us who accept the repeatable experimentrs of chemistry that electrolysis is a change where the underlying indivisible elements do NOT lose their identity. Therefore substantial change cannot be predicated of electrolysis of water.

Sure water diasappears/dies in electrolysis - so what. That happens when a puddle mysteriously disappears in the sun too. For the latter you will say that is accidental change.

But the distinctions are all so arbitrary depending on focus. Why is the latter an accidental change but the former not.

I hope I have explained all adequately below. But wouldn’t you say that moderns generally have been prejudiced against philosophical analysis and more or less dismissed it out of hand? I think you should watdh Dr. Bonnette’s video if you haven’t already. Edward Feser also has some excellent ones on Youtube Just google. Now I and a few others here have our feet planted in both disciplines. We can see the value of each.

You might say we all know that water vapour is still water. Do we? Only because of atomic theory. To the senses it no longer behaves as water did.

And if we say, we know its still water because its reversible, just cool it down.
Therefore an accidental change.

The molecules are still water. The same with ice. It is an accidental change.

Well the electrolysis of water is reversible too. Just make a spark.

Yes

My undeerstanding is that substantial change always involves the loss of original identity.
Do you agree.

In a qualified way. Yes the same atoms are still there but they are now separate and act differently than when they were water molecules. They have been substantially changed. First the water has entirely disappeared. Secondly we have as a result two separate gasses.

If so the only real problem is how do we define the identity of a material thing? That appears somewhat arbitrary … depending on what “layer” of indivisible sensible reality we decide to focus on.

I disagree with your analysis for the reasons I have stated. Water has a different nature than the gasses given off by electrolysis. Yet the underlying atomic elements of water, in which they are united as molecules, change in a subatantial change, The molecules split into two separate gaseous substances with properties different from each other and from water also. And of course, with a spark applied in labatory conditions, we can have a reverse substantial change.

Now we can add a red dye to a puddle of water and induce an accidental change. The water molecules still exist but now they combine with the molecules of some colored substance. The water’s basic nature has not fundamentally changed, only accidentally.

Take the transubstantiation as another example. The substances of the bread and wine are changed into the blood of Christ ( and by concomitance, his whole body ). This is a substantial change. The substance of the bread and wine have disappeared, only substance of Christ remains. And only the accidents of the bread and wine remain, but they remain in no substance, no subject. The physical properties of the bread and wine are metaphysical accidents, they are not substances.

Science of course would say the the physical properties are real substances. And I have no problem with that.The metaphysical understanding is more fundamental and more accurate. The reason is that the actual physical composition of any substance could have been anything, it is determined by the union of the substantial form with matter. This underlying essence or substance is what determines the physical structure and it is what the physical structure adheres to. The physical elements do not determine the substance, but visa versa, it is the substance which determines the physical properties…

Have you read Aquinas by Edward Feser? That should help. Have you watched Dr. Bonnette’s video yet?

Linus2nd …

 

[JuanFlorencio]

BTW the atomic model is not a pure mental construct. It is a sensible model that best and consistently explains the results of thousands of unusual chemical experiements which prove that some sort of “identity” is preserved.

Dear Blue Horizon:

Before I respond to the rest of your message, could you please clarify what do you mean with “sensible model”?

JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

JF I don’t really disagree with anything you say above…I don’t quite see what it is in my contribution you feel the need to refute? I do not deny causality at any layer of reality. Both accidental forms and substantial forms need explaining when they change.

You seem to agree that a substance at a “higher” layer is but a temporarily abiding accidental form/change of much smaller stable substances of a lower level.

Yes I agree the ever changing hills and valleys of a wind-swept desert (whose sand never changes) need to have efficient causes to explain these accidental changes (the wind). Who can deny that.

You call those hills and valleys “substances”.
I call them accidental forms of the underlying substance called sand.

Are we not both right?

(BTW the atomic model is not a pure mental construct. It is a sensible model that best and consistently explains the results of thousands of unusual chemical experiements which prove that some sort of “identity” is preserved.)

Dear Blue Horizon:

I am interested on your description of a “sensible model”. Please, come back with it. Meanwhile I would like to respond to you, as follows:

I really think that your opinion differs quite a lot from the aristotelian position, which I wanted to distinguish in my previous post. To clarify furter, let me put first an example that almost everyone can follow, then another from organic chemistry:

First example:

If you analyze your car (not like a chemist!, but like the mechanic that fixes it when it breaks down), you will see a bunch of components in front of you. Apparently you see it as the same that you had before the analysis. An aristotelian would not see a bunch of components when the car is assembled and working; he would see a car. And if he compares this car with a bunch of components that will be used to build another identical car, he will say that there is an additional intelligence in the car, which is not yet in the bunch of components. He will call that intelligence “form”. We recognize it because the car has a functionality that you don’t get from the bunch of components. To make your point you seem to say: “but we can dissasemble the car!”. The aristotelian would not deny it. He could say that you can even build something else with those components, provided they have the potency and you an idea to do it. Then, when he compares the car with the other object he will say that they are two different substances. What makes them different? The form, idea or intelligence that is in them!

Second example:

Organic chemistry is based on the theory of functional groups. These are typical arrangements of atoms that can be found in bigger molecules. It is known that those functional groups exhibit typical interactions. It is possible to rearrange those atoms through a chemical reaction, which is usually reversible (this means that the reaction proceeds from “reagents” to “products” and from “products” to “reagents” all the time). So, in the medium of reaction there will always be transformations going on among the same atoms (you would say “there is an identity here!”). But the chemist promotes the reaction because he has a purpose. He does not see the same thing before and after the reaction. He recognizes the new functionality that arises after the reaction. Promoting different kind of reactions one after the other he is able to design a new product. There is an intelligence, idea, or form in it that was not present in the reagents. Looking at this facts, the aristotelian thinks that a technical term (like “form”) is definetly necessary to talk properly about all this. You seem to be willing to disregard the configuration of the atomic particles as the factor that explains the new functionalities. You seem to say that if in the medium of the reaction the atomic particles remain the same, there is an identity. An organic chemist (with his new product in his hands) would be surprised at such statement. An aristotelian would aknowledge the new functionality and would attribute it to new configurations (probably without knowing which ones, if you like; but his insight certainly makes a lot of sense).

Do you see the differences now? May be you have some doubts about the aristotelian terminology, or you have missinterpreted it,… I don’t know.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[ChainBreaker]

The relationship between this “substance” and the “matter” is the question Physical breadness remains, but something more profound has changed. Jesus has replaced a “something” with Himself. What that “something” is, is beyond the senses.

Cardinal Ratzinger *God and the World, Believing and Living in Our Time *(Ignatius Press, 2002). “‘But anyone can see that the wine remains wine’ But this is not a statement of physics. It has never been asserted that, so to say, nature in a physical sense is being changed. The transformation reaches down to a more profound level. Tradition has it that this is a metaphysical process. Christ lays hold upon what is, from a purely physical viewpoint, bread and wine, in its inmost being, so that it is changed from within and Christ truly gives himself in them”.

I don’t know how this could be explained in Aristotelian terms. I understand it terms of “function” because metaphysics does not seem equipped to describe the process in a meaningful way. Functionally speaking the bread is transformed into the body of Christ - that is to say the function and the effect of the bread is now Christ.

 

[thinkandmull]

Read below, I try to show that Aristotle was not wrong in his fundamental principles…

True you have a better scientific understanding but you are not viewing the world metaphysically.

I hope I have explained all adequately below. But wouldn’t you say that moderns generally have been prejudiced against philosophical analysis and more or less dismissed it out of hand? I think you should watdh Dr. Bonnette’s video if you haven’t already. Edward Feser also has some excellent ones on Youtube Just google. Now I and a few others here have our feet planted in both disciplines. We can see the value of each.

The molecules are still water. The same with ice. It is an accidental change.

Yes

In a qualified way. Yes the same atoms are still there but they are now separate and act differently than when they were water molecules. They have been substantially changed. First the water has entirely disappeared. Secondly we have as a result two separate gasses.

If so the only real problem is how do we define the identity of a material thing? That appears somewhat arbitrary … depending on what “layer” of indivisible sensible reality we decide to focus on.

I disagree with your analysis for the reasons I have stated. Water has a different nature than the gasses given off by electrolysis. Yet the underlying atomic elements of water, in which they are united as molecules, change in a subatantial change, The molecules split into two separate gaseous substances with properties different from each other and from water also. And of course, with a spark applied in labatory conditions, we can have a reverse substantial change.

Now we can add a red dye to a puddle of water and induce an accidental change. The water molecules still exist but now they combine with the molecules of some colored substance. The water’s basic nature has not fundamentally changed, only accidentally.

Take the transubstantiation as another example. The substances of the bread and wine are changed into the blood of Christ ( and by concomitance, his whole body ). This is a substantial change. The substance of the bread and wine have disappeared, only substance of Christ remains. And only the accidents of the bread and wine remain, but they remain in no substance, no subject. The physical properties of the bread and wine are metaphysical accidents, they are not substances.

Science of course would say the the physical properties are real substances. And I have no problem with that.The metaphysical understanding is more fundamental and more accurate. The reason is that the actual physical composition of any substance could have been anything, it is determined by the union of the substantial form with matter. This underlying essence or substance is what determines the physical structure and it is what the physical structure adheres to. The physical elements do not determine the substance, but visa versa, it is the substance which determines the physical properties…

Have you read Aquinas by Edward Feser? That should help. Have you watched Dr. Bonnette’s video yet?

Linus2nd …

“And only the accidents of the bread and wine remain, but they remain in no substance, no subject.” Doesn’t the Church teach that the substance of bread is changed into the Body Blood Soul and Divinity of Jesus? It never says the substance disappears and Jesus is attached to the physical matter as if it were a substance without being a substance (what would that even mean?)

 

[thinkandmull]

That was weird.

All I meant to say:

“And only the accidents of the bread and wine remain, but they remain in no substance, no subject.” **Doesn’t the Church teach that the substance of bread is changed into the Body Blood Soul and Divinity of Jesus? It never says the substance disappears and Jesus is attached to the physical matter as if it were a substance without being its substance (what would that even mean?) **

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The molecules are still water. The same with ice. It is an accidental change.

Come on Linus, you know that you cannot hide behind molecules if you will not allow me the use of atoms.

Give me a coherent justification (without the findings of modern science unavailable to Aristotle) that explain why water to invisible vapour isn’t a substantial change while electrolysis allegedly is?

I opine Aristotle simply used “common sense” criteria for this judgement (eg the new thing has different sensible properties, the change isn’t reverisable).

But it looks like Aristotle’s “common sense” criteria is not always as consistent or as obvious nowadays with the findings of men like Lavoisier.

True you have a better scientific understanding but you are not viewing the world metaphysically.

But you haven’t shown that your personal understanding of the relationship of Physics/Metaphysics is the same as Aristotle yet.

I am suggesting that if Aristotle were alive today he may well, by reason of the tools of modern science that give us a greater understanding of the sensible changes he observed, be driven to correct or refine his hylomorphic principles.

Your understanding of the relationship of Physics/Metaphysics seems more Platonic than what Aristotle was on about. His was a two-way street, yours seems to be more rationalist and apriori one way street relationship.

That is, you seem to hold that once a metaphysic principle is “twigged to” one need no longer worry about the observed sensible changes from which such principles were inducted - even if those limited sensible observations are later shown to be superficial or limited.

That is not the way of induction. No doubt you will say that hylomorphic principles are not abstracted from observing many cases of sensible change by induction or anything like it.
Well if that sort of abstraction is completely different from any form of inductive logic I would like to hear a coherent explanation.

Yes the same atoms are still there but they are now separate and act differently than when they were water molecules.

This sentence is not rational Linus.
If it is valid for Aristotle to say ice is still water, and clouds are still water then it is equally valid to say nascent hydrogen is still hydrogen, H2 molecules are still hydrogen and H+ ions are still hydrogen.

Chemists have proven the ongoing identity of the element hydrogen even though these instances may “act differently” as you put it. That is why we keep using the word hydrogen because the fundamental identity is still present in all cases - and can be proven by experiement.

You will have to mount a better argument than this.

I am not interested in Transubstantiation here sorry.
This is about Physics and Metaphysics not extrapolations based on faith.
I have no idea whether my observations are compatible with the extra “information” supplied by faith or not.

But being a Catholic I know nature cannot contradict faith.
If there is something in what I say (ie it is in accord with reason) then it won’t contradict Transubstantiation - though the supporting metaphysic propositions may need to be refined.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Dear Blue Horizon:

Before I respond to the rest of your message, could you please clarify what do you mean with “sensible model”?

JuanFlorencio

Only the obvious…

Well we simplistically try to think of atoms like something we could see at the macro scale don’t we (eg balls orbiting each other).
Obviously we posit a few “Griffen” like qualities that normal spherical masses don’t possess (eg forces other than gravity which cause attraction etc, no friction etc).

Its interesting that we have been able to “photograph” larger molecules (Iron oxide I think) in crystaline formation - apparantly they look pretty much like we’d expect them to if we rise to a more macro level from the models posited.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Dear Blue Horizon:

I am interested on your description of a “sensible model”. Please, come back with it. Meanwhile I would like to respond to you, as follows:

I really think that your opinion differs quite a lot from the aristotelian position, which I wanted to distinguish in my previous post. To clarify furter, let me put first an example that almost everyone can follow, then another from organic chemistry:

First example:

If you analyze your car (not like a chemist!, but like the mechanic that fixes it when it breaks down), you will see a bunch of components in front of you. Apparently you see it as the same that you had before the analysis. An aristotelian would not see a bunch of components when the car is assembled and working; he would see a car. And if he compares this car with a bunch of components that will be used to build another identical car, he will say that there is an additional intelligence in the car, which is not yet in the bunch of components. He will call that intelligence “form”. We recognize it because the car has a functionality that you don’t get from the bunch of components. To make your point you seem to say: “but we can dissasemble the car!”. The aristotelian would not deny it. He could say that you can even build something else with those components, provided they have the potency and you an idea to do it. Then, when he compares the car with the other object he will say that they are two different substances. What makes them different? The form, idea or intelligence that is in them!

Second example:

Organic chemistry is based on the theory of functional groups. These are typical arrangements of atoms that can be found in bigger molecules. It is known that those functional groups exhibit typical interactions. It is possible to rearrange those atoms through a chemical reaction, which is usually reversible (this means that the reaction proceeds from “reagents” to “products” and from “products” to “reagents” all the time). So, in the medium of reaction there will always be transformations going on among the same atoms (you would say “there is an identity here!”). But the chemist promotes the reaction because he has a purpose. He does not see the same thing before and after the reaction. He recognizes the new functionality that arises after the reaction. Promoting different kind of reactions one after the other he is able to design a new product. There is an intelligence, idea, or form in it that was not present in the reagents. Looking at this facts, the aristotelian thinks that a technical term (like “form”) is definetly necessary to talk properly about all this. You seem to be willing to disregard the configuration of the atomic particles as the factor that explains the new functionalities. You seem to say that if in the medium of the reaction the atomic particles remain the same, there is an identity. An organic chemist (with his new product in his hands) would be surprised at such statement. An aristotelian would aknowledge the new functionality and would attribute it to new configurations (probably without knowing which ones, if you like; but his insight certainly makes a lot of sense).

Do you see the differences now? May be you have some doubts about the aristotelian terminology, or you have missinterpreted it,… I don’t know.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

JF I don’t significantly disagree with any of this.
My point is otherwise.

Due to the layering of sensible reality forms live within forms as it were. The “matter” of one form is but a different and more abiding “hidden form” multiplied almost infinitely by comparision. In your organic chemistry example above the forms C,O,H appear to fit that bill.

How deep do those layers of forms within forms go I do not know.
But one layer does seem related to its adjacent layer as form to matter.

And when there is a substantial change in a higher layer this is usually only an accidental change in ther lower layer. Exceptions to this rule might be fusion/fission where perhaps two adjacent layers of sensible matter both appear to undergo a substantial change.

Another curious change might be isotopic decay (say D20 to H20). Here there is a substantial change in the lower form (deuterium oxide to hydrogen oxide) but prob only an accidental change in the higher form (both have the same sensible properties of water … though there are a few differences such as relative densities).

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t buy this Linus…and you still haven’t explained the flaw in my proposition…if there is one.

If metaphysic principles of substantial/accidental change are induced by observing sensible change in the natural world they should apply back to all future observations of the natural world too shouldn’t they?
Otherwise the “induction” of those principles from the natural world of the ancients by Aristotle was wrong or incomplete.

Now I am doing no more than what Aristotle did. I gaze out upon the natural world and am testing the validity of his inductions from the natural world.

The difference is we have the tools of modern science and I can “see” more of the natural world than he did. He didn’t have a telescope, a microscope or the wealth of experimental evidence that atomic theory (we cannot see atoms in a microscope as JF and others here rightly state) is consistant with.

It is very clear to those of us who accept the repeatable experimentrs of chemistry that electrolysis is a change where the underlying indivisible elements do NOT lose their identity. Therefore accidental change can be validly predicated of electrolysis of water.

Sure water diasappears/dies in electrolysis - so what. That happens when a puddle mysteriously disappears in the sun too. For the latter you will say that is accidental change.

But the distinctions are all so arbitrary depending on focus. Why is the latter an accidental change but the former not.

You might say we all know that water vapour is still water. Do we? Only because of atomic theory. To the senses it no longer behaves as water did.

And if we say, we know its still water because its reversible, just cool it down.
Therefore an accidental change.

Well the electrolysis of water is reversible too. Just make a spark.

My undeerstanding is that substantial change always involves the loss of original identity.
Do you agree.

If so the only real problem is how do we define the identity of a material thing? That appears somewhat arbitrary … depending on what “layer” of indivisible sensible reality we decide to focus on.

Hopefully I have given viewers enough to decide for themselves.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

Hopefully I have given viewers enough to decide for themselves.

Linus2nd

But did I catch you in heresy or not? You said Jesus is not the substance of the Eucharest…

 

[Linusthe2nd]

But did I catch you in heresy or not? You said Jesus is not the substance of the Eucharest…

Where did I say that?

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

You didn’t read post 72?

You said “And only the accidents of the bread and wine remain, but they remain in no substance, no subject.”

Doesn’t the Church teach that the substance of bread is changed into the Body Blood Soul and Divinity of Jesus? It never says the substance disappears and Jesus is attached to the physical matter as if it were a substance without being its substance (what would that even mean?)

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You didn’t read post 72?

You said “And only the accidents of the bread and wine remain, but they remain in no substance, no subject.”

Doesn’t the Church teach that the substance of bread is changed into the Body Blood Soul and Divinity of Jesus? It never says the substance disappears and Jesus is attached to the physical matter as if it were a substance without being its substance (what would that even mean?)

The church teaches that the accidents remain without a subject/substance in which to inhere. If you care to read S.T. on Christ’s presence in the Eucharist in Part 3 of the Summa, he explains that the substance of the bread and wine have been changed into the Whole Christ and that the accidents do not inhere in Christ. So they remain without a subject/substance in which to inhere. The Catechism says the same thing but in different terms.

Linus2nd