Aquinas's First Way

[Blue_Horizon]

Well, if you insist on misrepresenting what I said Cheers
Linus2nd

Linus why do you so easily take offence when someone disagrees with you?
Clearly I do not understand what you are trying to say about the hand/stick/stone…and I am inviting you to explain yourself more clearly. That is all.

But I note from below that you regularly shy away from doing that when it comes to real-world examples, you are only confident in explaining abstract ideas.

Its your choice whether you want to explain the sentence I quoted .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

…continued…
In this regard my standard example is Galileo who invited a bishop to look through his telescope one night to see the moons orbiting Jupiter. The bishop pretty much said, “Galileo I do not need to look through your misty lenses to know that what you say you see is but a figment of your craving imagination - everybody knows such a thing is impossible by Scripture.”

I see Linus appears to have contributed another good example of an apriori, non-falsifiable tautology made to look like “truth.”:

“the idea that newton or any other sceintist has disproven the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas has been roundly refuted by men and women with solid Catholic, philsophical, theological, and scientific backgrounds.”

Of course if someone has actually disproven the First Way…Linus would never recognise it if we took his above statement seriously.
He would just say, no, that person does not have a solid philosophical, theological or scientific background . That’s what I mean by an apriori, unfalsifable tautology.

Linus, to me these sort of tautological statements aren’t worthy of the name “truth” or “certainty” or even good philosophy. Its seems an insecure and semi-closed world-view.
Its a circular reasoning that never allows us to admit the reality of the rare philosophical “black swans” that come the way of even the smartest thinkers.
Such people just say - its not a swan, its a goose, that less than solid explorer in Australia was mistaken.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

JF the above is a little vague and generalised (which is not a criticism) but I really have no serious issues (yet) with what you say at that level.

Hi Blue Horizon!,

I understand what you say. My brief description of the notions “relation” and “interaction” is **vague **to you because the references I provided in my post were not enough. You may have your own references, and the use I make of those terms might be in conflict with yours. It is **general **to you, because you wouldn’t know how to use them as I do. I am aware of all this, but I would need a long, long post to make them more and more familiar to you. I am totally responsible of any confusion I may cause on you in this respect.

The only thing I would observe is that in any syllogism (in so far as you talk of premises) there are in fact two very different types of “relations” or interactions (as you put it) with the thinker.

“Relations” are not the same as “interactions”.

There is the relationship **seen **between the premises - which is mainly what you speak of above.

I would stress the word “seen” in order to find acceptable your statement above. Because a relation between the premises exists only if you establish it.

Then there is the relation made between the individual’s perception and the word or image he uses to represent/symbolise/refer to that perception.
This is a very different type of relationship from the former.

There is no relation between perception and words or images unless you think of them, unless you elaborate a theory (about language, for example). It is us who establish relations between elements (whatever they may be).

Now, it is true that there are different types of relations, but all of them have in common that they are the result of our intellectual activity.

One day, my chemistry teacher brought to the classroom an strange object, and he put it on his desktop. It looked nice, but I did not know what it was. He started the class, and after some explanations about the first atomic theories he approached his desktop, pointed his finger to the object and said: “There you are, the atom of Thomson looked like this”. Then, the strange object made some sense to me; but I had some questions, and my teacher answered them. As a result, the object was not strange to me any more; it became a model. What was my teacher doing? He was promoting the elaboration of the mental construct in my mind. The object was not a “model” in itself; it required a discourse.

Does this add some clarity, Blue?

Please let me know.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Dear Friends,

I wanted to call your attention to the following aristotelian text (Methaphysics, Book VII, Chapter 2):

“Substance is thought to be present most obviously in bodies. Hence we call animals and plants **and their parts **substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, etc., and all things which are parts of these or composed of these, **either of parts **or them or of their totality; e.g. the visible universe and its parts, the stars and moon and sun.”

Naturally, we can discuss if Aristotle was right or not; but now the discussion would have an interesting shift.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Firstly, I appreciate the gesture Linus but we have argued this one endlessly before without clarity so I’ll leave it to Dr. Bonnette to offer a fresh perspective when he’s free. I get email notifications on my chosen threads so time is not of the essence.

You need to reread posts 3, 46, 49, 50, 57, 58, 61, 89, 93, 95, 98, & 99

Secondly, in any case you haven’t got off the ground with the opening paragraph from what I can see.

If you understood my contribution below you would not write “Clearly the stick is in immediate contact with the rock and the motion of the stick is simultaneous with that of the rock” because I clearly disagree for the reasons given.

But just because you disagree does not mean that I am wrong.

I have no reason to believe that Aristotle of Aquinas, when using this example, meant anything else than that the connected assembly was initially at rest and then the hand moved.

I have explained what I think is the proper explanation. It was not meant as a scientific statement as that is understood today. It was meant to illustrate the principle that an ordered series of causes must have a First Mover which has no potential to be moved.

You seem to be saying that the whole hand/stick/stone assembly example is to be understood as moving at constant velocity. I do not think so…unless you can prove my understanding of their example is mistaken?

That is not what I meant and I didn’t to imply it.

And I do not think that is possible because your statement “I really think it is enough that the causal chain is established.” is flawed if your interpretation of Aquinas’s example is accurate.

I disagree.

According to Newtonian physics if three items in a free connected assembly are at constant velocity in space then there is no way one can infer any order of instrumental motion causality between them. In fact there is no chain of force between them at all because, without friction, none needs its partner to stay at constant velocity. In fact it may be that none caused the motion of the other. There is certainly no simultaneous causality in constant rectilinear motion.

I am not clear about what you mean by " a free connected assembly. " But you need to read the thread " The First Way Explained " ( Post 99 ) where it is pointed out: 1. that there is a cause of inertial motion and, 2. there is no such thing as a perfect vacuum even in a laboratory and, 3. if there is uniform motion that is due to the nature of the moving object, which nature is caused by the efficient causality of God.
bing.com/videos/search?q=…8738823D25A84E ( Link to " The First Way Explained )

Of course if we are talking rotational motion that is a different matter as acceleration is involved (rather than constant rectilinear motion) and therefore instrumental causality can be determined as originating from the centre of rotation. However I do not believe Aquinas or Aristotle meant a golfers swing at all.

They were not talking about rotational motion, they were illustrating a principle which applies with univocal force to all examples.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Linus why do you so easily take offence when someone disagrees with you?
Clearly I do not understand what you are trying to say about the hand/stick/stone…and I am inviting you to explain yourself more clearly. That is all.

But I note from below that you regularly shy away from doing that when it comes to real-world examples, you are only confident in explaining abstract ideas.

Its your choice whether you want to explain the sentence I quoted .

I think that I have explained my meaning, and have just tried to do it again here and on another thread.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

OK, just checked out the video.
At least so far as my contributions here are concerned I didn’t see anything apposite to my observations sorry. The closest it got was 38:00 to 39:00 or so.

I am not a Materialist Atheist (I hate putting people in boxes because nobody’s “system” is exactly the same as others even though some themes may have large overlaps) but I seem to find myself agreeing with them on many of the statements you put in their mouths re atoms in humans.

I find myself thinking that, on the issue with respect to atoms and humans, it really looks like a refutation of a straw man. I am not sure you understand what they are trying to say because, like Linus on this point, you keep concluding you both cannot be right.

You stated "Richard Dawkins doesn’t exist – what exists is only a tremendous pile of trillions of elements and subatomic particles. The atoms that form your body came out of a star and are still what they were originally. "

Is this really Dawkin’s view? I don’t think so.
Why don’t you believe that elemental ions in my body retain their characteristic functionality (which is how you defined Arist substance/essence/form) and also be a human unity with its characteristic functionality?

A behive and its colony of bees is a unity and has a characteristic organisational unity and functionality - much the same around the world. That doesn’t mean the different types of individual bees that make up the unity of the hive don’t have their own individual characteristic functionality. Just as grace builds on nature and doesn’t destroy it why cannot higher forms organise otherwise unrelated aggregates of smaller forms into a single unity without denying their natures?

Sure the characteristic functionality of salt is different from that of its two constituent elements. So what? Water and steam have the same problem in this regard but the ancients still see them as the same substance don’t they? On what basis…their characteristic functionalities are also very different.

I think trying to say that there is an analogy between the form of salt and the form of a human (in so far as the characteristic functionalities of the more complex form are very different from its constituents) is weak.

I agree that in the compound salt this is true to a certain extent (it isn’t true when we compare the action of sodium ions of molten salt with those of molten lye which exhibit the same characteristics even though lye and salt are very different).

But that aside, the atoms that constitute a human are organised in a completely different way from those that constitute a compund.

The human body is a marvellous unity made up of many different types of sub-unities. There are aggregations of inorganic compounds, organic compounds of greatly varying complexity, cells and, surprisingly, a very large percentage by weight of symbiotic bacteria and micro-organisms…all united by the soul into doing things that none of its constituents can do on their own.

So while I agree that in a compound the higher form largely overrides the functionality of the constituent elemental forms of which it is composed … it cannot be assumed that the body does the same. There is no aggregation in a compund, there is in a body.

And, as noted above, even compounds can be made to reveal the characteristic activity of their constituant building blocks by revealing their ionic forms in molten or soluable states.

Dr. Bonnette does not have time to engage in a running debate. Would you like someone else to try to answer?

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Would you further agree that Aristotelain “substance” is just as much (if not more) a mental construct as the atomic theory model ?

Or, looking from the other end, I would say that the atomic model is as much metaphysics as is Aristotelian “substance.” Linus would prob disagree with me.

I would say that both are sets of relations. But certainly there is a difference between them. Let me put an example again:

We nowadays have a terminology about movement, and we have procedures to quantify it. When we see an object moving in front of us, we can say, for instance, that the object had a displacement, and we can measure the distance. We say that the object has travelled for certain time; and we can measure the time. We can say that the object had a certain average speed, and probably a certain acceleration too, and we can determine them.

Now, observe that movement and displacement are direct experiences (I call them interactions). Using them we develop a relation that we have called “time” (it is basically a relation that we establish between two movements; one of them being the “reference”). Distance is a relation that we establish between two spatial objects (one of them being the reference). Using the relations “distance” and “time”, we develop a relation that we call “speed”. Then, using the relations “speed” and “time” we develop a new relation that we call “acceleration”. So, there are here some relations whose elements are interactions, and others whose elements are other relations. Then, I say that there are relations of different “orders”. Those that are established between interactions belong to the lower order class. Those that are established between relations belong to a higher order class.

When we read Titus Lucretius Carus´ arguments to demonstrate the existence of atomic particles, we can see that his foundations were basically a couple of complex experiences: the gradual drying of clothes exposed to the wind and sun light; and the decomposition of corpses (which does not proceed indefinitely, but reaches an end). Based on the first experience, Lucretius establishes relations after relations until he concludes that there must be particles so small that we cannot see them. Based on the second, he again establishes a series of relations by which he concludes that there must be particles that cannot be divided (atoms).

Aristotle asks himself, what are the uses we give to the word “substance”? He distinguishes several senses in which the word is commonly used and then tries to establish a hierarchy between them. Now, I would say that his hierarchy is based on direct complex experiences, but his attitude towards them is different from the attitude we can identify in Lucretius. So, for example, when Lucretius thinks of minuscule particles while he observes clothes drying, Aristotle thinks of entities which suffer an “accidental” change. When Lucretius thinks of atoms when he sees a corpse decomposing, Aristotle thinks of an entity that has lost its form. While Lucretius is focused on the structure of matter, Aristotle is focused on the structure of being.

Which approach is more metaphysical? The atomists thought that matter is the only existing being. So, their reflection about matter structure must have been the most fundamental to them (from that point of view, we could denominate it “metaphysical” nowadays). Aristotle thought that matter is not the only existing being, but that there are other beings which are not material. So, the first principles of being must have been to him something more fundamental than matter structure (from this perspective, atomism could not be called “metaphysical”).

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

For example, contrary to the “mental constructs” of the senses, concrete is not actually as concrete as we thought. It is 99.99% empty. While that mistake is not able to be detected by the human body (and is of no consequence for daily life)…there are experiments impossible in Aristotle’s day that prove this by means of the same senses - thanks to new tools such as the neutron gun and neutron detectors.

Hi Blue Horizon!,

I am skipping part of your post to follow certain order.

Surely you will agree with me if I say that no one of our daily interactions with concrete authorizes us to say that it is 99.99% empty. As you have said, we could come to that conclusion if we observe the interaction between a stream of neutrons and a relatively thin concrete wall. But this experience does not negate our daily experiences. You can lean on a concrete wall without fear of falling, even after seeing the experiment, because your interaction with the wall is different from the interaction between it and the stream of neutrons. For a stream of neutrons the wall is almost empty; for us, it is impenetrable (it is not our mistake if we think so; if becomes a mistake if we think the wall is absolutely impenetrable). The same concrete wall has at least these two different modes of interaction.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Would you agree that even “the phantasm” is to some extent a “model” a “mental construct” of sorts that allows us to make pre-conceptual sense of a battery of sounds and colours/shapes and tactile impressions…ultimately ending in a well delinated sensible “image” that might get the name “elephant” well before we ever have a “concept” of it. (Like the way an animal “sees” things).

Do we have to do with colors, shapes, and sounds in our daily life? No, absolutely not. We have to do with people, elephants, plants and many other entities. Colors, shapes, sounds and other things are the result of a late intellectual analysis. I never in my life have had to elaborate any image of anything based on the elements that we distinguish through intellectual analysis.

“Phantasm” is a notion that has always eluded my comprehension. In other words, my set of experiences and the terminology I use does not allow me to “assimilate” it. Further, I have never felt compelled to produce a notion like that.

This is a simplistic approach to what I have observed: If it is the first time -as an adult-, I am in front of an elephant, I naturally experience it as a new kind of entity; but I already display a set of behaviors that I deem sensible in the current situation. Also, I laboriously compare the animal with many other entities that I already know (this is a process that happens automatically, so to say). Why do I compare it? Because I feel the need to know how I should behave in front of it. I also ask questions to other persons (to those that appear to know the animal) to learn about other references that might be familiar to me. And I need to do this because the elephant does not display all its interaction modes at once (there is no entity that displays all its interaction modes at once, because they depend on the other entities with which it interacts) . By doing so, I am building a “mental construct” (a set of relations) which will mold my behavior the next time I come across another elephant.

Is there an intermediate (a “phantasm”) between the elephant and me while I am in front of it? Not at all! We are in direct contact, interacting with each other.

Then, I could reflect on the direct interactions I have had with the animal and on other relations that I have learnt from others, to refine the whole set of relations that I have established. This will lead me to what is usually called a “concept”.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

So metaphysics (mental constructs?) may well be operating even in sense cognition (admittedly at a very low level), though we learn to do this automatically at so young an age we are not even aware of the process. It becomes hardwired rather than conscious. Is it not intersting that the optic nerves are so complex that they are regarded as part of the brain all the way to the eyeballs.

All the relations we build by ourselves play a role in the way we know the world. To know something involves a) the relations we establish between the entity and our current set of relations (assimilation), and b) the relations we establish between the entity and other entities, which mimic the interactions of the entity.

Concerning the relations we get from language, it is not obvious to me that all of them influence our cognition (at least in a positive way; it might happen that they have a negative influence; they may operate as a kind of restriction for the establishment or assimilation of other relations). There are some relations that do not seem to have a cognitive or even a pragmatic function, but are a kind of ornaments. We human beings have the tendency to produce a lot of ornaments.

JuanFlorencio

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Blue may have gotten the term " phantasm " from me. I see it as the intellectual synthesis and coordiantion of the sensory data our seneses receive and on which the intellect makes a judgment - it is true or not true. I would not call the " phantasm " an image but rather an idea or a concept of a universal which we apply to individuals outside the mind? But it could also be universals currently composed or dredged up by memory. And some of these universals could be what has been abstracted from reality or be purely mental constructs, ideas like, " All men are created equal. " .

Linus2nd

 

[JuanFlorencio]

So even what we see is not to be wholly trusted - as science has shown in a way that Aristotle never realised.

Whatever you experience may be, Blue Horizon, you have to admit you are experiencing it. Science is not an entelechia above us. There is no science, but scientists; and scientists have senses just like you and me. The source of their information is their senses. The point is “what are the relations that you can establish based on your sensory experiences (that is, on your interactions)?”

When we establish relations to know an entity “A”, we usually proceed by analogy. We compare A and B, and we say “A is similar to B”. So, we get the feeling that we know A. But there is always the posibility that someone else says “No, A is similar to C, not to B”, according to his own experiences.

Surely you can understand that there is no identity between A and B or C. So, the only thing we can reasonably say is “**A **is more or less like B” or “A is more or less like C”. If we say “A is B” or “**A **is C”, it becomes false, because, as Parmenides said, “A is A” and “not A is not A”.

Best regards, Blue Horizon!
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Blue may have gotten the term " phantasm " from me. I see it as the intellectual synthesis and coordiantion of the sensory data our seneses receive and on which the intellect makes a judgment - it is true or not true. I would not call the " phantasm " an image but rather an idea or a concept of a universal which we apply to individuals outside the mind? But it could also be universals currently composed or dredged up by memory. And some of these universals could be what has been abstracted from reality or be purely mental constructs, ideas like, " All men are created equal. " .

Linus2nd

Dear Linus:

Well, I know that “phantasm” is a scholastic term. However, as I said, I could never assimilate it. On your side, you could make an extraordinary use of it. And I certainly would like to know how this term and others like *agent and passive intellect *became indispensable.

I had difficulties with the term “abstraction” as well: Along with the term “essence” it was used for centuries, and I would have expected that hundreds of essences would have been abstracted over all that long time. However, it simply did not happen. On the other hand, it was inexplicable to me how could we make so many theoretical mistakes if it is true that we have the capacity to abstract forms from reality. For decades, many good philosophers tried to design a method to find truth (but, do you need a method if you can abstract?). As for me, I have tried to explain how it can be that we err.

Concerning the synthesis of sensory data, my experience does not indicate the need of any particular effort. I live among objects already constituted, not among sensory data that wants some kind of integration.

However, as I have said before, no entity displays all its interaction modes at once; and the *knowledge *we have about entities has to do precisely with their interactions. We build this *knowledge *by mimicking the interactions through relations. Some of us have enough with building a set of relatively independent relations (as if the interaction modes of the entity were independent from each other as well), but other persons work on them to produce relations of higher order based on them. This is the synthetic effort that I have identified, and it does not have to do with sensory data but with relations. On the other hand, these higher order relations are not the result of an abstraction capability: we propose them by trial and error.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I would say that both are sets of relations. But certainly there is a difference between them. Let me put an example again:

We nowadays have a terminology about movement, and we have procedures to quantify it. When we see an object moving in front of us, we can say, for instance, that the object had a displacement, and we can measure the distance. We say that the object has travelled for certain time; and we can measure the time. We can say that the object had a certain average speed, and probably a certain acceleration too, and we can determine them.

Now, observe that movement and displacement are direct experiences (I call them interactions). Using them we develop a relation that we have called “time” (it is basically a relation that we establish between two movements; one of them being the “reference”). Distance is a relation that we establish between two spatial objects (one of them being the reference). Using the relations “distance” and “time”, we develop a relation that we call “speed”. Then, using the relations “speed” and “time” we develop a new relation that we call “acceleration”. So, there are here some relations whose elements are interactions, and others whose elements are other relations. Then, I say that there are relations of different “orders”. Those that are established between interactions belong to the lower order class. Those that are established between relations belong to a higher order class.

When we read Titus Lucretius Carus´ arguments to demonstrate the existence of atomic particles, we can see that his foundations were basically a couple of complex experiences: the gradual drying of clothes exposed to the wind and sun light; and the decomposition of corpses (which does not proceed indefinitely, but reaches an end). Based on the first experience, Lucretius establishes relations after relations until he concludes that there must be particles so small that we cannot see them. Based on the second, he again establishes a series of relations by which he concludes that there must be particles that cannot be divided (atoms).

Aristotle asks himself, what are the uses we give to the word “substance”? He distinguishes several senses in which the word is commonly used and then tries to establish a hierarchy between them. Now, I would say that his hierarchy is based on direct complex experiences, but his attitude towards them is different from the attitude we can identify in Lucretius. So, for example, when Lucretius thinks of minuscule particles while he observes clothes drying, Aristotle thinks of entities which suffer an “accidental” change. When Lucretius thinks of atoms when he sees a corpse decomposing, Aristotle thinks of an entity that has lost its form. While Lucretius is focused on the structure of matter, Aristotle is focused on the structure of being.

Which approach is more metaphysical? The atomists thought that matter is the only existing being. So, their reflection about matter structure must have been the most fundamental to them (from that point of view, we could denominate it “metaphysical” nowadays). Aristotle thought that matter is not the only existing being, but that there are other beings which are not material. So, the first principles of being must have been to him something more fundamental than matter structure (from this perspective, atomism could not be called “metaphysical”).

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

JF I was only looking for a yes or no answer to my question with perhaps a one sentence explanation so I could understand where you are coming from!

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Hi Blue Horizon!,

I am skipping part of your post to follow certain order.

Surely you will agree with me if I say that no one of our daily interactions with concrete authorizes us to say that it is 99.99% empty. As you have said, we could come to that conclusion if we observe the interaction between a stream of neutrons and a relatively thin concrete wall. But this experience does not negate our daily experiences. You can lean on a concrete wall without fear of falling, even after seeing the experiment, because your interaction with the wall is different from the interaction between it and the stream of neutrons. For a stream of neutrons the wall is almost empty; for us, it is impenetrable (it is not our mistake if we think so; if becomes a mistake if we think the wall is absolutely impenetrable). The same concrete wall has at least these two different modes of interaction.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

But we are not talking about our daily experience (and associated everyday practical certainties) as I indicated prev.

We are talking about our reflecting on such experiences and our classifying/relating of them in some way - something humans do all the time consciously or not.

Most of us assume solid bodies lean on solid walls.
In fact what is really happening is that the repulsive forces across largely “empty” space is reliably producing this effect.

Just like people using cell-phones having no idea of how it actually works - yet we know enough at the “blackbox” level to get repeated successful results from them.

Of course an electronics engineer who knows how one works can tinker and, as predicted, get a lot more out of them than a “blackbox” type user. (Like using a tin can aerial to amplify weak signals in rural areas where normal users would be dropped off the grid).

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Do we have to do with colors, shapes, and sounds in our daily life? No, absolutely not. We have to do with people, elephants, plants and many other entities. Colors, shapes, sounds and other things are the result of a late intellectual analysis. I never in my life have had to elaborate any image of anything based on the elements that we distinguish through intellectual analysis.

“Phantasm” is a notion that has always eluded my comprehension. In other words, my set of experiences and the terminology I use does not allow me to “assimilate” it. Further, I have never felt compelled to produce a notion like that.

This is a simplistic approach to what I have observed: If it is the first time -as an adult-, I am in front of an elephant, I naturally experience it as a new kind of entity; but I already display a set of behaviors that I deem sensible in the current situation. Also, I laboriously compare the animal with many other entities that I already know (this is a process that happens automatically, so to say). Why do I compare it? Because I feel the need to know how I should behave in front of it. I also ask questions to other persons (to those that appear to know the animal) to learn about other references that might be familiar to me. And I need to do this because the elephant does not display all its interaction modes at once (there is no entity that displays all its interaction modes at once, because they depend on the other entities with which it interacts) . By doing so, I am building a “mental construct” (a set of relations) which will mold my behavior the next time I come across another elephant.

Is there an intermediate (a “phantasm”) between the elephant and me while I am in front of it? Not at all! We are in direct contact, interacting with each other.

Then, I could reflect on the direct interactions I have had with the animal and on other relations that I have learnt from others, to refine the whole set of relations that I have established. This will lead me to what is usually called a “concept”.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

I assumed you understood Aristotelian/Thomistic Cognition Philosophy where “phantasm” is a technical word. (I learnt this in my first year of philosophy in 1978 Linus.)

Nevermind - the point is significant “intellectual” construction goes into converting the raw information of the senses into a “sensible species” and then a phantasm which is present in the imagination which makes much more sense of “reality” - but this is still pre-conceptual so far as human intellection goes.

It is the way animals “think”.

Nevermind.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Whatever you experience may be, Blue Horizon, you have to admit you are experiencing it. Science is not an entelechia above us. There is no science, but scientists; and scientists have senses just like you and me. The source of their information is their senses. The point is “what are the relations that you can establish based on your sensory experiences (that is, on your interactions)?”

When we establish relations to know an entity “A”, we usually proceed by analogy. We compare A and B, and we say “A is similar to B”. So, we get the feeling that we know A. But there is always the posibility that someone else says “No, A is similar to C, not to B”, according to his own experiences.

Surely you can understand that there is no identity between A and B or C. So, the only thing we can reasonably say is “**A **is more or less like B” or “A is more or less like C”. If we say “A is B” or “**A **is C”, it becomes false, because, as Parmenides said, “A is A” and “not A is not A”.

Best regards, Blue Horizon!
JuanFlorencio

Yes I think you understand the point I am making.

In computer programming there are two ways we can give data to another process - by way of the “value” itself (e.g. the number 16)…or by way of an address (a “reference” or “pointer”) as to where that data is held in PC memory (a symbol if you will).

I find that an interesting distinction when it comes to human communication/understanding.

Humans cannot pass literal “values” (ie our concepts) though we try to with “words” or definitions.

In fact Ricouer would say that we cannot even well comprehend the substances we identify in “reality” because our experiences of, for example, “elephants” are no better than if those experiences were “internal words”. Very 2D. There is always the possibility our senses will one day tell us something about elephants we never knew before or may even contradict a “gap” in our knowledge which we had unconsciously interpolated wrongly from the little we do know.

So for me the Hindu saying is always true, “the sensible substance once named (turned into a 2D concept or definition) is no longer the 3D reality” (which is always bigger).

Therefore how fragile is our “metaphysics” when we think that the relationships we discern (and manipulate by logic) between our 2D concepts well represents the empirical 3D relationships that actually hold in the world between actual 3D substances.

We only deal in “references” to reality, never the actual “values” themselves.
Therefore the relationships we discern between 2D representations are equally 2D.

Sure we do validly know 3D objects by these 2D representations (eg ananolgy).
But it is always fragile and those analogies and other “logical” conclusions need to be constantly informed by testing and re-testing, with our senses, the link (what I below called a relation/interaction) between 3D reality and our 2D representations of them.

This sort of “relation” is something Linus’s eternal philosophy appears to trivialise.
He thinks the most important “relation” is only the one’s between the 2D representations themselves. That is an apriori approach to certitude.

I believe the sciences can find corrective insight into these 2D relations by good hypothesis and experimentation that can, by this means, get actual insight into the actual 3D relations that exist between real 3D substances in the real world. This is an aposteriori approach to certitude.

Anyways,
its av ery small point I am making here and below.
One either gets it or one doesn’t.

I don’t really have time to pursue it further with you - but thankyou for teasing all this out.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Most of us assume solid bodies lean on solid walls.
In fact what is really happening is that the repulsive forces across largely “empty” space is reliably producing this effect.

Blue! You must know that “repulsive forces” or “attractive forces” or simply “force” are “mental constructs”. Whatever happens at a microscopical level, the fact is that we cannot go through the concrete wall without producing serious damage to our head!

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I assumed you understood Aristotelian/Thomistic Cognition Philosophy where “phantasm” is a technical word. (I learnt this in my first year of philosophy in 1978 Linus.)

Nevermind - the point is significant “intellectual” construction goes into converting the raw information of the senses into a “sensible species” and then a phantasm which is present in the imagination which makes much more sense of “reality” - but this is still pre-conceptual so far as human intellection goes.

It is the way animals “think”.

Nevermind.

Dear Blue,

I wanted to be soft at it! I understand the use of the term, but I consider it useless and missleading. When you are doing your daily activities you are interacting with objects directly, not through “phantasms”.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio