Aquinas's First Way

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No, you’re not understanding what they are saying. If you break water down into its parts, you no longer have water anymore, but hydrogen and oxygen. So a substance really is something that cannot be broken down and modern science seems to support this since you cannot explain the behavior of oxygen and hydrogen in water without reference to the structure and properties of water as a whole. You are assuming that the hylemorphist is committed to the absurd view that a substance is absolutely not divisible into any other thing at all. No hylemorphist, ancient, medieval, or modern, has ever asserted such a thing. They were aware that substances are composed of parts since they considered organic things to be substances and organic things quite obviously have disparate parts.

Since you are committed to the view that “rocks don’t exist” because they are really “nothing but” a bunch of atoms, how do you recognize that the objects outside your house are rocks? Because those atoms are arranged “rock-wise”? Can’t say that because then you’ve just made reference to the whole and applied a form to it which you argued is “crazy”. Because those atoms and no others are casually involved in your experience of the rock? Well that doesn’t work either since the atoms in your eyes and brain are part of this casual process yet you would not consider them part of the rock, and the atoms on the interior of the rock are not involved in this process yet are generally considered part of the rock. So why do you recognize those objects as rocks?
That is why I don’t believe in objective physical substances like a rock. It is a rock only because you think so. If it was a rock even if you didn’t think so, then there would have to be some objectively existing “aura” around the particles which made it a rock, and of course I don’t believe in that.
 
No, the problem is that the the philosophers of science of today have succumbed to scientism. They are telling Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophers " there is no room at the table. " It began with Hume and Descartes and Bishop Berkley and now philosophy has become the forgotten science for the most part, though it is making a slow come back. There is much more interest in both philosophers than there was in the latter part of the 20th century. In other words, if a branch of knowledge doesn’t make something useful, if it doesn’t lead to something that produces a predictive theory then it is useless, and being useless in the productive or predictive sense then it isn’t true 🤷.

Linus2nd

Linus2nd
It is one of the good things that has come out of modern science. Apart from whatever philosophy scientists follow, I am thankful that we have a better understanding of matter now, as opposed to the strange philosophy developed before real deep study of matter began.
 
Guess what. As soon as someone says that there are genuine, unitary substances, a substance denier comes crawling from beneath a rock, which of course he denies exists! 😃

Its just a pile of atoms ( which no one has actually seen ). So man is just a pile of " something " no one has actually seen. Long live substance deniers, may they always have their shorts tied in a knot. :bounce:

Linus2nd
 
That is why I don’t believe in objective physical substances like a rock. It is a rock only because you think so. If it was a rock even if you didn’t think so, then there would have to be some objectively existing “aura” around the particles which made it a rock, and of course I don’t believe in that.
It is one of the good things that has come out of modern science. Apart from whatever philosophy scientists follow, I am thankful that we have a better understanding of matter now, as opposed to the strange philosophy developed before real deep study of matter began.
Please help me to understand how these two views are compatible. On the one hand, you say that objective substances do not exist, that nothing is really there but it’s just our mind fleshing out irrational stuff (Immanuel Kant’s view), but then go on to say that we “have a better understanding” of matter. Yet you deny that any stable form of matter really exists apart from our mind so how can we have a “better understanding” of it? What you have a better understanding of is the way your mind just so happens to play tricks on you.

Traditionally it has been the East that was committed to idealism and the West that was committed to realism. Yet modern science arose in the West and not the East and has only continued to develop because it has relied on stably existing things actually being real. I’m sure that’s just a massive coincidence though…
 
That is heretical. This is not a normal substantial changte where an old form disappears and a new form appears. That is why it is not called a substantial change but a Transubstantiation. It is the whole substance of the bread and wine, their matter and their form which has been changed. And this does not happen in a substantial change.

From the Cannons of the Council of Trent, Session 13

onetruecatholicfaith.com/Roman-Catholic-Dogma.php?id=24&title=Denzinger+801±+901&page=1

884 Can. 2. If anyone says that in the sacred and holy sacrament of the Eucharist there remains the substance of bread and wine together with the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and denies that wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the body, and of the entire substance of the wine into the blood, the species of the bread and wine only remaining, a change which the Catholic Church most fittingly calls transubstantiation: let him be anathema [cf. n. 887 ]

Notice that the conversion of the whole substance of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood is called singular denotes this conversion as something entirely different from normal substantial changes and that is why the Church defines this change not as a substantial change but as a transubstantiation, that is a total change where the matter and the form of both the bread and wine and not just the form.

So since matter is physical, the physical aspects of the matter of the species has been changed. What is left are accidents of that matter, size, weight, mass, shape, color, etc.

Linus2nd .
The only logical conclusion for you is that the accidents are illusions only **after **consecration. A substantial change happens when the atoms are mixed with new atoms are separate. This does not happen here. The accidents-physical matter remain, but it is a substance beyond it that is changed.

The Catechism of Trent says:
“Here pastors should observe that we should not at all be surprised, if, even after consecration, the Eucharist is sometimes called bread. It is so called, first because it retains the appearance of bread, and secondly because it keeps the **natural quality **of bread, which is to support and nourish the body.”

What you quoted in no way interferes with what I said. The “out there” substance of bread ceases to be. I’ve quoted to you before Cardinal Ratzinger’s agreement with me on all this. Let me ask you this: can accident alone, as an illusion as you must say, be touched with touching the substance? Having Descartes position, you must (as you admitted in the past) believe that your tongue touches every part of Jesus’s Body. Are you going to stand there and assert such a grossly sacrilegious thing?

Take the smallest particle of bread. Imagine it like a tiny host, half matter one and half matter two, together making a piece of bread. Where is Jesus’s head, arms, legs, ect. Your position is absurd. The Catechism of Trent says:

If, after consecration, the true body of Christ is present under the species of bread and wine, since it was not there before, it must have become present either by change of place, or by creation, or by the change of some other thing into it. It cannot be rendered present by change of place, because it would then cease to be in heaven

YOU believe Jesus bilocates over and over again, don’t you?
 
Great stuff Balto - this is just the direction Linus needs to go if he wants to engage and influence people!

I’ll check that link out. Here’s one for you:
aquinasonline.com/Topics/chemical.html
I don’t find the reasoning particularly strong but at least its a start.

There’s not much out there on applying hylomorphic principles to the Philosophy of Chemistry.

Re your insights into water and that quote from Aquinas I need to reflect more.
I tend to agree that Aristotle probably sees water/vapour/ice as but accidental changes of the same pure substance. But is it merely because one can identify most things as having 3 states? How does that reconcile with the vastly different sets of characteristics besides that of state? What about allotropes (soot and charcoal) where its the same thing but no change of state (eg charcoal and diamond). Something else is going on in his analysis. I bet Aristotle considered them different substances.

Regardless, if we can say water and steam are the same substance despite very different charcteristics how can an Aristotelian disagree with Chemists who rightly say that nascent hydrogen (H), natural hydrogen (H2), hydrogen ions (H+) and hydrogen Isotopes (D,D2,D+) with an extra neutron in the nucleus are all the same substance?

An Aristotelian surely has no problem with a Chemist who defines the formal cause of Hydrogen as: an atom having exactly 1 proton in its nucleus. It doesn’t matter how many neutrons it may have, it doesn’t matter how many electrons it might lose or share because these are only accidental changes to the hydrogen atom.

To say that billions of such defined structures do not exist individually that glass of clear liquid on my kitchen bench is untenable.

Do these hydrogen atoms get their existence in any way by being bonded to oxygen as a tight water molecule? I do not see how. Rather its the other way around - water gets its existence by two atoms of hydrogen being bonded to one of oxygen.

(This description does not seem to fit with how we are to separate accidental forms from substantial forms above. I do not deny water is also a substance.)

Sure the hydrogen undergoes an accidental change in sharing its electron with the oxygen atom (as does by mutuakl definition the oxygen atom) and these two substances interpenetrate.

Aristotle of course was convinced that two different substances cannot interpenetrate which means he prob never exactly conceived of such a “mixture” as we see in compounds.

Indeed two substances cannot share the same space at the same time if they are “solid contiguous matter”. But we now know that what Aristotle in many cases referred to as “matter” is not solid in this way. So separate pure substances can inter-penetrate each other’s electron clouds … a form of substantial “mixing” I do not believe Aristotle ever thought would be possible.
“the substance of water has the form of water in prime matter”

What does that mean?
 
The only logical conclusion for you is that the accidents are illusions only **after **consecration. A substantial change happens when the atoms are mixed with new atoms are separate. This does not happen here. The accidents-physical matter remain, but it is a substance beyond it that is changed.

The Catechism of Trent says:
“Here pastors should observe that we should not at all be surprised, if, even after consecration, the Eucharist is sometimes called bread. It is so called, first because it retains the appearance of bread, and secondly because it keeps the **natural quality **of bread, which is to support and nourish the body.”

What you quoted in no way interferes with what I said. The “out there” substance of bread ceases to be. I’ve quoted to you before Cardinal Ratzinger’s agreement with me on all this. Let me ask you this: can accident alone, as an illusion as you must say, be touched with touching the substance? Having Descartes position, you must (as you admitted in the past) believe that your tongue touches every part of Jesus’s Body. Are you going to stand there and assert such a grossly sacrilegious thing?

Take the smallest particle of bread. Imagine it like a tiny host, half matter one and half matter two, together making a piece of bread. Where is Jesus’s head, arms, legs, ect. Your position is absurd. The Catechism of Trent says:

If, after consecration, the true body of Christ is present under the species of bread and wine, since it was not there before, it must have become present either by change of place, or by creation, or by the change of some other thing into it. It cannot be rendered present by change of place, because it would then cease to be in heaven

YOU believe Jesus bilocates over and over again, don’t you?
I’ve tried to explain what the Church teaches and what it means. You insist that the Church does not mean what it teaches. It’s your soul, do with it what you will.

Linus2bd
 
An example that might help you Linus is when Pius XI said that marriage was the “principle of society”. That can be misunderstood to mean that non-married people are not part of society, or that non-married people can’t form a society of their own. Same with this Eucharest discussion. Many people explain it the way you are trying to, but it is so fuzzy and let’s to absurd conclusions as I showed
 
Please help me to understand how these two views are compatible. On the one hand, you say that objective substances do not exist, that nothing is really there but it’s just our mind fleshing out irrational stuff (Immanuel Kant’s view), but then go on to say that we “have a better understanding” of matter. Yet you deny that any stable form of matter really exists apart from our mind so how can we have a “better understanding” of it? What you have a better understanding of is the way your mind just so happens to play tricks on you.

Traditionally it has been the East that was committed to idealism and the West that was committed to realism. Yet modern science arose in the West and not the East and has only continued to develop because it has relied on stably existing things actually being real. I’m sure that’s just a massive coincidence though…
The experience of objective matter does exist. But we do not directly experience “substances” like water, rocks, air, etc. We just find that their matter exhibits similar aspects throughout their location, so we assign substances to those things in our mind. There is the philosopher’s “substance” and then there is the common person’s “substance”. I am fine with the common man’s “substance” being used to describe the physical world. But it leads to logical absurdities when we decide that those substances must necessarily exist on their own.
 
Guess what. As soon as someone says that there are genuine, unitary substances, a substance denier comes crawling from beneath a rock, which of course he denies exists! 😃

Its just a pile of atoms ( which no one has actually seen ). So man is just a pile of " something " no one has actually seen. Long live substance deniers, may they always have their shorts tied in a knot. :bounce:

Linus2nd
Sounds like you don’t really understand my position. So then unless you attempt at some point to see the logical coherency in my argument, I am wasting my time with you.
 
The experience of objective matter does exist. But we do not directly experience “substances” like water, rocks, air, etc.,
Yes, we do, and you admit that in the very next sentence you wrote. It’s not a sensible experience but an intellectual one. You abstract to the common nature using the sense data. The problem is that you are committed to the empiricist view that “all knowledge is sense knowledge” yet you contradict yourself in making that statement because the knowledge that all knowledge is sense knowledge is not itself sense knowledge. Rational knowledge is also available to human beings.
We just find that their matter exhibits similar aspects throughout their location, so we assign substances to those things in our mind.
By virtue of what are they similar if not by a common nature? We classify all breeds of dog as “all dogs” because they have a common intelligible nature and differ only in their accidents. To deny this seems to lead to the incoherent position that they have nothing in common at all, since they are all particular.
But it leads to logical absurdities when we decide that those substances must necessarily exist on their own.
I don’t think anyone has defended that view on this thread. Aquinas did not defend that view. Aristotle did not defend that view. You are referring to Plato’s view that forms are objects in their own right. The Aristotelian conception of a form is that a form is one of the principles by which a thing is anything at all, the other principle being matter. All the Aristotelian is committed to saying is that part of what it means to be a thing in the first place is that it is this kind of thing and not that kind of thing, and that this observation is an objective fact about the way things actually are. It seems to be the common-sensical golden mean between Platonic realism, which posits that the forms are objects in their own rights (what would that even mean?) and the nominalist view that everything is particular (which is a contradiction because it says that the common nature of everything is that it is all particular).
 
Yes, we do, and you admit that in the very next sentence you wrote. It’s not a sensible experience but an intellectual one. You abstract to the common nature using the sense data. The problem is that you are committed to the empiricist view that “all knowledge is sense knowledge” yet you contradict yourself in making that statement because the knowledge that all knowledge is sense knowledge is not itself sense knowledge. Rational knowledge is also available to human beings.
Actually, I do believe that not all knowledge is sense knowledge. But the only objective knowledge I can attest to about a “rock” is that I experience an arrangement of matter which I think of as being a “rock”. You cannot sense the nature of “rock”. But you can ascribe that nature to qualities of matter you experience.
By virtue of what are they similar if not by a common nature? We classify all breeds of dog as “all dogs” because they have a common intelligible nature and differ only in their accidents. To deny this seems to lead to the incoherent position that they have nothing in common at all, since they are all particular.
I do agree with the last statement in a sense. The “common nature” is a mental classification of things which are entirely different except in that they are physical matter.
I don’t think anyone has defended that view on this thread. Aquinas did not defend that view. Aristotle did not defend that view. You are referring to Plato’s view that forms are objects in their own right. The Aristotelian conception of a form is that a form is one of the principles by which a thing is anything at all, the other principle being matter. All the Aristotelian is committed to saying is that part of what it means to be a thing in the first place is that it is this kind of thing and not that kind of thing, and that this observation is an objective fact about the way things actually are. It seems to be the common-sensical golden mean between Platonic realism, which posits that the forms are objects in their own rights (what would that even mean?) and the nominalist view that everything is particular (which is a contradiction because it says that the common nature of everything is that it is all particular).
I am not a student of philosophy, I just go off of what makes sense to me. That seems better than reading about the thoughts of some philosophers who contradicted each other.
 
Actually, I do believe that not all knowledge is sense knowledge. But the only objective knowledge I can attest to about a “rock” is that I experience an arrangement of matter which I think of as being a “rock”. You cannot sense the nature of “rock”. But you can ascribe that nature to qualities of matter you experience.
Okay, thank you for clarifying. But now you are subscribing to the conceptualist view: natures are real but they only exist in your mind. But your mind is not only active but passive as well: it is affected by outside data. Yet all the data just happen to regularly agree with our concepts, even though our concepts were invented by us and in no way actually describe reality? I suppose that technically doesn’t generate a logical contradiction, but it seems to commit you to an essentially magical or superstitious understanding of reality: that everything behaves according to our rational understandings even though there is literally no reason for them to do so. It’s not offering an explanation of this correlation but merely raising the possibility that there may be none at all and then asserting it as a brute fact about reality and/or our minds.
I do agree with the last statement in a sense. The “common nature” is a mental classification of things which are entirely different except in that they are physical matter.
So if I have a Labrador retriever and a beagle, there is nothing in common between the two of them except the fact that they are made out of physical stuff? That seems to be very easily falsified empirically. All the same difficulties are raised as in the last paragraph. It’s just a bunch of fundamental particles or stuff that happens to appear to behave according to higher patterns such as “dog” or “tree” or “rock” but there is literally no reason they do so and no reason they should continue to do so. That’s not offering an explanation of anything but refusing to give an explanation. On the other hand, you could go with the Aristotelian and say that the nature of dog is such that all the powers of its material makeup are harnessed specifically to produce an instance of the universal type “dog.” That at least gives a rational basis for reality instead of simply refusing to give one.
I am not a student of philosophy, I just go off of what makes sense to me. That seems better than reading about the thoughts of some philosophers who contradicted each other.
I am not a student of philosophy either, but you were making philosophical claims earlier, and there’s nothing wrong with that, but they are claims that the Aristotelian would dispute. I happen to think that Socrates was probably right: no one has an absolute claim on Truth (except God I guess) and the best way to discover truth is to dialogue with people who think differently such that the truth can be educed from the dialogue and both parties are enriched.
 
Okay, thank you for clarifying. But now you are subscribing to the conceptualist view: natures are real but they only exist in your mind. But your mind is not only active but passive as well: it is affected by outside data. Yet all the data just happen to regularly agree with our concepts, even though our concepts were invented by us and in no way actually describe reality? I suppose that technically doesn’t generate a logical contradiction, but it seems to commit you to an essentially magical or superstitious understanding of reality: that everything behaves according to our rational understandings even though there is literally no reason for them to do so. It’s not offering an explanation of this correlation but merely raising the possibility that there may be none at all and then asserting it as a brute fact about reality and/or our minds.
Everything behaves the way we expect it to because we assign things to categories which intentionally fit patterns. That doesn’t prove that some objects all behave a certain way because they share an objective nature.
So if I have a Labrador retriever and a beagle, there is nothing in common between the two of them except the fact that they are made out of physical stuff? That seems to be very easily falsified empirically. All the same difficulties are raised as in the last paragraph. It’s just a bunch of fundamental particles or stuff that happens to appear to behave according to higher patterns such as “dog” or “tree” or “rock” but there is literally no reason they do so and no reason they should continue to do so. That’s not offering an explanation of anything but refusing to give an explanation. On the other hand, you could go with the Aristotelian and say that the nature of dog is such that all the powers of its material makeup are harnessed specifically to produce an instance of the universal type “dog.” That at least gives a rational basis for reality instead of simply refusing to give one.
They behave similarly because they are composed similarly. The composition of matter which appears as the combination of two hydrogen atoms with one oxygen atom behaves a certain way, but the atoms in one molecule are entirely different from those in another. But it does not become an objectively real substance apart from perception.
 
Yes, we do, and you admit that in the very next sentence you wrote. It’s not a sensible experience but an intellectual one. You abstract to the common nature using the sense data. The problem is that you are committed to the empiricist view that “all knowledge is sense knowledge” yet you contradict yourself in making that statement because the knowledge that all knowledge is sense knowledge is not itself sense knowledge. Rational knowledge is also available to human beings.
Rational knowledge are also sense data if you abstract yourself well as a sole consciousness which can only experience and create.
By virtue of what are they similar if not by a common nature? We classify all breeds of dog as “all dogs” because they have a common intelligible nature and differ only in their accidents. To deny this seems to lead to the incoherent position that they have nothing in common at all, since they are all particular.
I think what is matter is that we all share common essence so called consciousness.
I don’t think anyone has defended that view on this thread. Aquinas did not defend that view. Aristotle did not defend that view. You are referring to Plato’s view that forms are objects in their own right. The Aristotelian conception of a form is that a form is one of the principles by which a thing is anything at all, the other principle being matter. All the Aristotelian is committed to saying is that part of what it means to be a thing in the first place is that it is this kind of thing and not that kind of thing, and that this observation is an objective fact about the way things actually are. It seems to be the common-sensical golden mean between Platonic realism, which posits that the forms are objects in their own rights (what would that even mean?) and the nominalist view that everything is particular (which is a contradiction because it says that the common nature of everything is that it is all particular).
Very well said.
 
An example that might help you Linus is when Pius XI said that marriage was the “principle of society”. That can be misunderstood to mean that non-married people are not part of society, or that non-married people can’t form a society of their own. Same with this Eucharest discussion. Many people explain it the way you are trying to, but it is so fuzzy and let’s to absurd conclusions as I showed
Off the cuff remarks by a Pope are not Doctrine. Besides, you have not documented your remark. As far as I know it is nothing but your fertile imagination.

Linus2nd
 
Because the word “substance” implies something which cannot be broken down into parts. For example, you think a rock is an objectively real object, but if you look closer it is just a combination of atoms, which are combinations of smaller parts, etc. This shows that the rock does not objectively exist, because that would imply that there was some pseudo-spiritual identity of the rock of which the atoms were parts. But as crazy as the previous idea sounds, you still believe in it.
Blase6 I understand your observation but it may not be comprehensively correct.

I think the discussion will be clearer if we stick to examples of Aristotles “pure substances”. (Talking about accidental aggregates like a “rock” is at best called a substance analogically or relatively, not absolutely. Living things are different in this regard as their is a substantial unity in the living body, though prob still not the same as a pure substance).

As I understand it he holds that pure substances (eg copper) are indeed divisible and still the same substance. In factr he holds you can keep cutting bits of copper in half for ever and what you get will still be exactly the same kind of stuff - copper.

Living substances seem to be different. As you say they are not infinitely divisable because we already have the smallest complete example of a substance in its body.
(I don’t think Aristotle is completely right. Take a morer simple life-form like a fungal colony. The line between the colony and the individual seems blurred, a bit like bamboo I suppose. What exactly are the borders of the individual?)
 
Blase6 I understand your observation but it may not be comprehensively correct.

I think the discussion will be clearer if we stick to examples of Aristotles “pure substances”. (Talking about accidental aggregates like a “rock” is at best called a substance analogically or relatively, not absolutely. Living things are different in this regard as their is a substantial unity in the living body, though prob still not the same as a pure substance).

As I understand it he holds that pure substances (eg copper) are indeed divisible and still the same substance. In factr he holds you can keep cutting bits of copper in half for ever and what you get will still be exactly the same kind of stuff - copper.

Living substances seem to be different. As you say they are not infinitely divisable because we already have the smallest complete example of a substance in its body.
(I don’t think Aristotle is completely right. Take a morer simple life-form like a fungal colony. The line between the colony and the individual seems blurred, a bit like bamboo I suppose. What exactly are the borders of the individual?)
I don’t even think that copper is a “pure substance”. If it can be broken down into distinct parts, it is not a substance. That is my position.

There is no distinct difference between the matter of dead things and the matter of living things. I can’t stress this enough. The carbon in your body has similar properties to the carbon in a rock.

If an animal does not have any non-physical processes (perhaps thought or memory, but that is a different argument) then it does not need a soul to be alive.
 
Everything behaves the way we expect it to because we assign things to categories which intentionally fit patterns. That doesn’t prove that some objects all behave a certain way because they share an objective nature.
What patterns are they fitting? You are claiming that there are none objectively.
They behave similarly because they are composed similarly. The composition of matter which appears as the combination of two hydrogen atoms with one oxygen atom behaves a certain way, but the atoms in one molecule are entirely different from those in another. But it does not become an objectively real substance apart from perception.
I don’t know what you are trying to say here. No one claimed that the atoms in two molecules are the same. If you are trying to say that multiple water molecules in one body of water don’t all get assumed into one gigantic substance of water, then I think you would be correct because the Aristotelian would refer to quantity as an accident.
 
What patterns are they fitting? You are claiming that there are none objectively.
Patterns are also based on perception.
I don’t know what you are trying to say here. No one claimed that the atoms in two molecules are the same. If you are trying to say that multiple water molecules in one body of water don’t all get assumed into one gigantic substance of water, then I think you would be correct because the Aristotelian would refer to quantity as an accident.
Because one water molecule is a different instance from another water molecule, then the only thing they have in common is our perception of them belonging to one substance.
 
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