Aristotle's notion of substance

[hicetnunc]

Very informative hicetnunc! Is this your field?

VC

Thanks VC…yes, I teach philosophy here in the Uk.

I love your motto under your name. Who’s it by?

 

[Verbum_Caro]

And, might I also add a request to discuss further the point of the non reducibility of substance? Is it a misunderstanding to conceive of a material substance as matter and form? And if so, why?

VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Thanks VC…yes, I teach philosophy here in the Uk.

I love your motto under your name. Who’s it by?

Wonderful. DIY philosophy seems as dangerous as DIY electrical work! I’m glad you are here.

Thank you regarding the motto. It is actually my own. Truth be told, there is another possibility that I left out, namely, that I might be willfully misleading. But, God forbid!

VC

 

[hicetnunc]

I hope they publish some of the papers.

This is the problem with applying “substance” to “person”. A substance is defined by a genus and a specific difference. But we can’t do this with a person. Granted that John Doe is a rational animal - so he is a substance.

But the person we know as John Doe, John Doe qua John Doe, cannot be defined by genus and specific difference. Because there is no species for John Doe qua John Doe.

Another way of putting this is to say that “John Doe” is not a sortal noun. John Doe is not an instantiation of a class. Rather, John Doe qua John Doe is a singularity (outside Aristotle’s traditional categories).

Sometimes matter is invoked to account for the “individuality” of the person. But I think this misses the deeper reality of person.

I apologize for this digression but it may help us understand (by contrast) what Aristotle meant by substance, by ousia.

So let’s continue with exploring the history of “substance” as a philosophical concept.

I’ll try to work up something in my own words. Do you know of some good extended discussions of “substance”?

It’s great digression Levinas… I think you hit on something really important here….maybe we can weave it in to the broader discussion.

I agree with you that, on face value, the inability to place the individual John Doe in any genus or difference seems to make the application of substance to person problematic. But I also find that Thomas insists on using the term ‘substance’ analogically, and not univocally. In his Commentary on Metaphysics VII, where he deals a lot with the notion of substance, he criticises Averroes for failing to consider ‘substance’ analogically. In the Summa, he says that the use of the term ‘substance’ in relation to an individual person “is expressive of an intention”. In that same question (ST 1a, 29, a2) he explains the different senses in which substance can be used of the person. I think his use, even of the term genus, is a lot more flexible than he is generally given credit for. Ultimately, he sees the human person as a participation in the Divine, which lies outside any genus or univocal notion of being altogether.

As for good discussions on the notion of substance in Aquinas, two really good ones come to mind: The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas by John F. Wippel and Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas by Rudi te Velde. I will also have a dig around for you to see if I can find some published articles from the colloquia.

Do you come at the question from a phenomenological point of view? I’d be interested to hear it.

 

[levinas12]

Do you come at the question from a phenomenological point of view? I’d be interested to hear it.

I do come from a phenomenological perspective. One of my favorite books on persons, beside the one by Spaemann, is Father Robert Sokolowski’s Phenomenology of the Human Person.

 

[Love4All]

It would only be theologically/philosophically. And while possible, I would venture to say that it is unlikely because there would be no reason for God to change the substance of your toaster to your pet dog.

I disagree. It is not possible. Unless we are now extending the category of possible to include absurd.

 

[hicetnunc]

I do come from a phenomenological perspective. One of my favorite books on persons, beside the one by Spaemann, is Father Robert Sokolowski’s Phenomenology of the Human Person.

Fr Sokolowski is great. In fact, have you read his “Eucharistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure”? He comes at the doctrine of the real presence from a phenomenological point of view. He also tackles the question we touched on above, namely the Boethian definition of the person as substance from a phenomenological point of view. It’s a good read.

 

[hicetnunc]

And, might I also add a request to discuss further the point of the non reducibility of substance? Is it a misunderstanding to conceive of a material substance as matter and form? And if so, why?

VC

Yes VC: two very important distinctions to consider in the discussion of substance.

Substance is non-reducible to anything else strictly speaking when we consider a thing in itself. To use a physical analogy, all material being can be reduced to something beyond which no further reduction can take place (whatever this turns out to be: quarks or strings, etc). Substance is that “irreducible ground of being” (in another sense, all created being is reducible to God as its cause).

For that reason, substance cannot be equated with matter or form. Matter is prior to form in terms of time (generation), because form “arranges” existing matter. But form is prior to matter from the point of view of substance which is the end and perfection of a thing.

Both matter and form are preceded both in time and generation by substance, which is the subject of both (and all of the other Categories, such as relation, quantity, quality, etc).

Thomas explains the relationship between substance, matter and form, etc, in his De Principiis Naturae.
dhspriory.org/thomas/DePrincNaturae.htm

 

[Just_Lurking]

So neither philosophy nor theology can, simply by a discursive process, know whether or not bread is truly Christ’s body. This is a revealed truth. I’m not sure if this is what you were getting at, or if it helps at all, but let me know if I’ve missed your point.

Thanks, this is exactly what I was asking.

I’ve got a follow-up question. Now suppose I have an exceptional individual in front of me who claims to be able to perceive the underlying substance of objects, even when that substance is (supernaturally) at variance with its accidents. Philosophically or theologically, could this even be true? If so, could the truth of this particular claim be known scientifically, or only theologically?

 

[Muze]

Discussion of “substance”, including Aristotle’s

link

 

[levinas12]

Discussion of “substance”, including Aristotle’s

link

Thank you. Believe it or not, I was just about to post this link.

 

[levinas12]

Fr Sokolowski is great. In fact, have you read his “Eucharistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure”?

Yes, I’m reading it right now.

The theology of disclosure outlined in this book (as well as in “Faith and Reason” and other publications) has major ramifications.

Sokolowski should be required reading for anyone interested in philosophy.

 

[hicetnunc]

Yes, I’m reading it right now.

The theology of disclosure outlined in this book (as well as in “Faith and Reason” and other publications) has major ramifications.

Sokolowski should be required reading for anyone interested in philosophy.

Yes, I agree. He has an excellent persepctive on things philosophical, and in a way which does justice to Thomistic philosophy. He does not throw the baby out with the bathwater, but uses his take on phenomenology (and there are many “takes”) in a way which does not dismiss Aristotle or Thomas, but which aims to understand them for a different perspective.

 

[hicetnunc]

Discussion of “substance”, including Aristotle’s

link

I must say Muze, I am a bit puzzled by your posting a link to this very good article by Howard Robinson on Substance. Howard taught at Oxford before moving to CEU, and he has a very good approach to analytical philosophy of mind. What is it in the article you want to draw attention to? Very little of what you have argued in your other dissembling thread is supported in either this article, or by the broader context of Howard’s work. You have argued for the bizarre and unsubstantiated claim in which you announced, “I am describing the theory so as to show that it is not held by anyone anymore as modern science has shown it to be false.” Nowhere in the Stanford article does Howard make this claim—nor does Howard make this claim in any of his discussions of substance, and in fact, he says much to the contrary. While he does discuss the modern controversies surrounding discussions of substance, none of them take your absolutist dismissal. Nor does the article support your claim that the “Church’s statement about transubstantiation is base in a rejected philosophical ontology.” In fact, Howard argues in favour of a revisiting of the ontological claim. He writes that “all non-relativist philosophical systems acknowledge substances in the most generic sense of that term…most, if not all, philosophers acknowledge that we cannot function without using substance concepts” in at least a narrow sense, and, in a great many other cases, in a broader epistemological sense.

 

[levinas12]

Discussion of “substance”, including Aristotle’s

link

FYI, the Stanford encyclopedia has a related article on sortals:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/sortals/

 

[levinas12]

And, for the more scholarly inclined among us, this is a nice bibliography on substance:

ontology.co/biblio/substance-biblio.htm

 

[levinas12]

FYI, the Stanford encyclopedia has a related article on sortals:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/sortals/

See also articles on “species”, “identity”, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics”, “relative identity”, and probably much more in the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.

All these articles are a segue into a good discussion on substance. Not because they are all 100 percent “on target” or “deep” - indeed, some of the statements in the articles reflect “errors” or “omissions” or “superficial interpretations” – but all these detours can be a foil for a better understanding of substance.

 

[levinas12]

FYI, this is an interesting article on Aristotle’s metaphysics:

iep.utm.edu/aris-met/

Some, but not all, of the discussion below was prompted by this article.

Aristotle’s word for “substance”, i.e., “ousia”, may have originally (in everyday usage) referred to “real estate” e.g. land, buildings, wealth that lasts a long time (as opposed to consumer goods that come and go, and get used up or wear out in a relatively short period of time). The consumer goods are analogous to the “accidents” that change frequently.

“Ousia” may not be too far from what we might mean when we say that so-and-so is a “man of substance”,

The emphasis here is on the way estates might stay in the same family over many generations, i.e., on “constant presence”.

You can see where this is heading.

“Time” understood as “constant presence” is the horizon of “ousia” (Heidegger).

This is reenforced by the fact that Aristotle sometimes described earthly “substance” (as opposed to celestial “substance”) in terms of “what it was to be this kind of thing” (the Greek for this is much shorter - to ti en einai). The meaning here might be paraphrased as “what this thing was over its whole lifetime” - i.e., “what it was constantly”).

 

[Muze]

I must say Muze, I am a bit puzzled by your posting a link to this very good article by Howard Robinson on Substance. Howard taught at Oxford before moving to CEU, and he has a very good approach to analytical philosophy of mind. What is it in the article you want to draw attention to? Very little of what you have argued in your other dissembling thread is supported in either this article, or by the broader context of Howard’s work. You have argued for the bizarre and unsubstantiated claim in which you announced, “I am describing the theory so as to show that it is not held by anyone anymore as modern science has shown it to be false.” Nowhere in the Stanford article does Howard make this claim—nor does Howard make this claim in any of his discussions of substance, and in fact, he says much to the contrary. While he does discuss the modern controversies surrounding discussions of substance, none of them take your absolutist dismissal. Nor does the article support your claim that the “Church’s statement about transubstantiation is base in a rejected philosophical ontology.” In fact, Howard argues in favour of a revisiting of the ontological claim. He writes that “all non-relativist philosophical systems acknowledge substances in the most generic sense of that term…most, if not all, philosophers acknowledge that we cannot function without using substance concepts” in at least a narrow sense, and, in a great many other cases, in a broader epistemological sense.

It would be universally agreed by scholars that substantial forms are real in the sense that they play an irreducible and ineliminable explanatory role in the behaviour of the things in which they are the form. There are two interpretations of what Aristotle meant by this, one of which seems compatible with modern science and the other not. First the compatibilist one.

…

There are interpreters of Aristotle who think that this kind of irreducibility is all that Aristotle means—or needs to mean—by postulating an **explanatory **role for substantial form.

…

The stronger, incompatibilitist interpretation is

…

The substantial form plays, therefore, an essential role, not merely in certain kinds of scientific explanation, but by being a** fundamental efficient cause** in its own right.

(emphasis mine)

The view compatible with modern science is incompatible with Trent, as the “substance” is only an explanation of the thing itself, and thus there is nothing actionable about the substance.

The view incompatible with modern science is compatible with Trent, as it has an essential role, being an efficient cause and not merely an explanation. This makes the substance actionable, but it fails the test of reality, as it is incompatible with modern science.

 

[Eleve]

So perhaps you wouldn’t mind telling us where Trent says that substances are fundamental efficient causes.