But it is more than explanatory, which is the point. The incompatible position actually does more than explain, and as the fundamental efficient cause is actually actionable, as is required by transubstantiation, although it is incompatible with modern science, which is the problem.Additionally, as I’ve explained once already, the word “explanatory” there does not mean that substances are relative to a language. In fact, the “fundamental efficient cause” interpretation is also posited as explanatory.
The key element to this is that for Trent to be true, the substance of the bread and wine must be able to be converted.So perhaps you wouldn’t mind telling us where Trent says that substances are fundamental efficient causes.
If “substance” is only explanatory, there’s nothing to convert, so conversion is impossible.And because that Christ, our Redeemer, declared that which He offered under the species of bread to be truly His own body, therefore has it ever been a firm belief in the Church of God, and this holy Synod doth now declare it anew, that, by the consecration of the bread and of the wine, a conversion is made of the whole **substance **of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole **substance **of the wine into the substance of His blood; which conversion is, by the holy Catholic Church, suitably and properly called Transubstantiation.
But you’re using that outside of substance theory. You’re describing an action, an event, and substance theory deals with objects.Again, you seem to think that calling substances “explanatory” is the same as saying that they are language-relative or otherwise non-real, and I can’t for the life of me see why you think that. Look at some of the examples given in this article on scientific explanation, e.g.
The impact of my knee on the desk caused the tipping over of the inkwell.
“The impact of my knee on the desk” is explanatory, but it’s certainly real.
Edit: What you’ve added makes your interpretation of Trent particularly bizarre. What theologian has ever claimed that, with regards to efficient causation, a consecrated host behaves differently from an unconsecrated one?
So what? The point is that explanatory does not entail non-real.But you’re using that outside of substance theory. You’re describing an action, an event, and substance theory deals with objects.
You mean by speaking about it differently? No. By the same token, I cannot change anything intrinsic to an event by explaining it differently. But, once again, you’re just misunderstanding the SEP when you think the compatible position says we can change things by “explaining them differently.”Let me ask you this:
Is it possible to change the nature of an object simply by explaining it differently?
Well, you do seem to have confused the explanation with the event. The explanation of the event via the laws of physics doesn’t entail some actionable item that can be converted. It’s just explanatory.So what? The point is that explanatory does not entail non-real.
And this is the problem. If the substance is ONLY explanatory, then converting the substance (explanation) doesn’t achieve transubstantiation, even if that were possible while retaining the integrity of the substance (explanation.)You mean by speaking about it differently? No. By the same token, I cannot change anything intrinsic to an event by explaining it differently.
Actually, I’m trying to show the opposite, that the compatible position says that the substance only explains, and is incapable of the conversion of the bread and wine as the doctrine of transubstantiation in Trent requires.But, once again, you’re just misunderstanding the SEP when you think the compatible position says we can change things by “explaining them differently.”
The event is the explanation. What explains the tipping-over of the inkwell? An event, and some laws of physics specifying what that event entails. Again, the point is that the event is 100% real and causal and also that it explains the tipping-over of the inkwell.Well, you do seem to have confused the explanation with the event. The explanation of the event via the laws of physics doesn’t entail some actionable item that can be converted. It’s just explanatory.
I don’t know where you’re getting this talk about “only” explanatory. That’s certainly not what the compatible interpretation means. No change can be “only” explanatory, since it also entails in change in whatever it explains. For example, the impact of my knee on the desk is explanatory and it entails the tipping-over of the ink well. That entailment is why it is explanatory. Likewise, the substance of the host explains why at one moment it is true of the host that it is the body of Christ, that it contains the whole Christ, etc., while at a previous moment these things were not true of the host. The substance is not “merely” explanatory: it entails other facts about the host, and that entailment is why the substance is explanatory.And this is the problem. If the substance is ONLY explanatory, then converting the substance (explanation) doesn’t achieve transubstantiation, even if that were possible while retaining the integrity of the substance (explanation.)
Again, since this isn’t an object, the analogy fails.The event is the explanation. What explains the tipping-over of the inkwell? An event, and some laws of physics specifying what that event entails. Again, the point is that the event is 100% real and causal and also that it explains the tipping-over of the inkwell.
You’re seriously confusing this whole thing.I don’t know where you’re getting this talk about “only” explanatory. That’s certainly not what the compatible interpretation means. No change can be “only” explanatory, since it also entails in change in whatever it explains.
Since you’re outside of substance theory, the terms of your argument are incorrect and the analogy fails. You’re describing cause and effect, and objects don’t have causFor example, the impact of my knee on the desk is explanatory and it entails the tipping-over of the ink well. That entailment is why it is explanatory.
Substances don’t explain “why”. They explain “what.” They certainly don’t explain how they become something else. The substance of a rock (in the compatible interpretation) explains the rock. It doesn’t explain why the rock falls onto your hand and breaks it. It just explains the rock.Likewise, the substance of the host explains why at one moment it is true of the host that it is the body of Christ, that it contains the whole Christ, etc., while at a previous moment these things were not true of the host. The substance is not “merely” explanatory: it entails other facts about the host, and that entailment is why the substance is explanatory.
Well, that’s something that, if we want to have an explanation beyond simple mystery, will have to be worked out to be compatible with modern science.By the way, if you believe in the Real Presence you need something like this no matter what. Prior to consecration, Christ is not present in the host; afterwards it is. What explains this change? Any explanation you can give will have to be an explanation that does not make a difference for efficient causation, unless you want your own doctrine of the Real Presence to be incompatible with modern science.
It’s not really an analogy. It’s counterexample to your claim “Explanatory means non-real.” If you want to make some other claim, like “Explanatory means non-real when it comes to objects but events are unique and special and different,” you could defend that claim, but right now you’re just pointing to the difference between events and objects ad hoc.Again, since this isn’t an object, the analogy fails.
You’re seriously confusing this whole thing.
No, it does not say that. Such a view would be incoherent, as I have already explained: nothing can be “only explanatory” since an explanation entails an explanandum. It would be like saying that someone is “merely eating” without eating anything.The compatible interpretation say that substance is only explanatory.
Bizarre interpretation. This would be hair-splitting if it were right, but it isn’t even right. If substances aren’t meant to explain anything at all beyond the identity of an object, where do you get the incompatible interpretation? To the contrary, as the SEP says, “It would be universally agreed by scholars that substantial forms are real in the sense that they play an irreducible and ineliminable explanatory role in the behaviour of the things in which they are the form.”Substances don’t explain “why”. They explain “what.”
Right, and my point is that by parity of reasoning with the argument you’re trying to make here, no doctrine of the Real Presence could be compatible with modern science. Either the Real Presence entails a change in the behavior of the fundamental particles of the host, or it does not. In the first case, the Real Presence is incompatible with modern science. In the latter case, you have to allow for real, non-causal changes regardless of whether you adopt substance theory. Thus you cannot adopt any doctrine of the Real Presence and adopt modern science while rejecting the possibility of changes that are real but non-causal.Well, that’s something that, if we want to have an explanation beyond simple mystery, will have to be worked out to be compatible with modern science.
You say some very curious things. First, what do you mean when you say " … This makes substance actionable…" ?The view compatible with modern science is incompatible with Trent, as the “substance” is only an explanation of the thing itself, and thus there is nothing actionable about the substance.
The view incompatible with modern science is compatible with Trent, as it has an essential role, being an efficient cause and not merely an explanation. This makes the substance actionable, but it fails the test of reality, as it is incompatible with modern science.
It’s not really an analogy. It’s counterexample to your claim “Explanatory means non-real.” If you want to make some other claim, like “Explanatory means non-real when it comes to objects but events are unique and special and different,” you could defend that claim, but right now you’re just pointing to the difference between events and objects ad hoc.
If I were making an analogy, say “A is to B as X is to Y,” I would of course already know that A and B are different from X and Y. That’s what makes it an analogy. But you can’t defeat an analogy just by pointing out that there’s a difference. You’d have to explain why the difference is relevant to the point being made.
No, it does not say that. Such a view would be incoherent, as I have already explained: nothing can be “only explanatory” since an explanation entails an explanandum. It would be like saying that someone is “merely eating” without eating anything.
The compatible and incompatible interpretation simply disagree about what substances explain: whether they explain the movements of fundamental particles, or something else.
I don’t see how you can hope to persuade anyone of your view when all you have to go on is a severe misinterpretation of a couple of paragraphs on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bizarre interpretation. This would be hair-splitting if it were right, but it isn’t even right. If substances aren’t meant to explain anything at all beyond the identity of an object, where do you get the incompatible interpretation? To the contrary, as the SEP says, “It would be universally agreed by scholars that substantial forms are real in the sense that they play an irreducible and ineliminable explanatory role in the behaviour of the things in which they are the form.”
Right, and my point is that by parity of reasoning with the argument you’re trying to make here, no doctrine of the Real Presence could be compatible with modern science. Either the Real Presence entails a change in the behavior of the fundamental particles of the host, or it does not. In the first case, the Real Presence is incompatible with modern science. In the latter case, you have to allow for real, non-causal changes regardless of whether you adopt substance theory. Thus you cannot adopt any doctrine of the Real Presence and adopt modern science while rejecting the possibility of changes that are real but non-causal.
Does a robot have a “for itself”?Do a robot have a “for itself”?
Historic questionL when the Council of Nicaea used the term “substance,” in connection with the person of Jesus, did it “adopt,” or “adapt” the philosophical term?The knock against the use of it is that it is NOT a Biblical term. So did the Church invest it with a connotation that contributes to to the meaning of “transubstantiation.”?It seems that the discussion of transubstantiation in another thread has intruded on this thread which initially was intended to explore Aristotle’s notion of substance.
Just to clarify. Aristotle listed 4 types of cause: material, formal, efficient and final.
“Substance” pertains first and foremost to the formal cause (the “what”, the to ti en einai, the id quod, the gist or meaning of an individual entity). But, in living beings, where there is some kind of self-motion, e.g., assimilation of food, locomotion, etc., the “substance” may also involve efficient causality. More precisely, efficient self-causality (like an animal moving itself to eat some food that it then assimilates into itself).
In Hegelian language, this is called the “for itself” character of living things.
Talk about compatible and incompatible does raise an important issue. Do a robot have a “for itself”? This is the question that arose in modern philosophy and we must respond to.
But before getting into this question, I would like to ask a different question. How can the motion of atoms (or the motion of whatever basic material particle or string) account for “bread” or any other meaning (not just as a signifier but as a signified that can be “shared” by other minds).
There seems to be an abyss here. For example, how can the motion of atoms cause the “meaning” of atoms?
This is the issue I’d like to explore further. Let’s leave transubstantiation in the other thread for the time being.
Do you mean a robot like the character “Data” in Startrek?Does a robot have a “for itself”?
The term”cause” is loaded when you use it in connection with modern physics. As it see it, we have got to the point where the “atom,” which starts out in Greek Philosophy at an almost observable level (dust in the air exhibiting Brownian motion) has now disappeared from view, or into a cloud of electronic orbits which are quite different from planetary models. I recall reading a conversation between Dick Feynmann and his very bright father in which he struggles to explain to his father what the science says and what an ordinary person can grasp.It’s not really an analogy. It’s counterexample to your claim “Explanatory means non-real.” If you want to make some other claim, like “Explanatory means non-real when it comes to objects but events are unique and special and different,” you could defend that claim, but right now you’re just pointing to the difference between events and objects ad hoc.
If I were making an analogy, say “A is to B as X is to Y,” I would of course already know that A and B are different from X and Y. That’s what makes it an analogy. But you can’t defeat an analogy just by pointing out that there’s a difference. You’d have to explain why the difference is relevant to the point being made.
No, it does not say that. Such a view would be incoherent, as I have already explained: nothing can be “only explanatory” since an explanation entails an explanandum. It would be like saying that someone is “merely eating” without eating anything.
The compatible and incompatible interpretation simply disagree about what substances explain: whether they explain the movements of fundamental particles, or something else.
I don’t see how you can hope to persuade anyone of your view when all you have to go on is a severe misinterpretation of a couple of paragraphs on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bizarre interpretation. This would be hair-splitting if it were right, but it isn’t even right. If substances aren’t meant to explain anything at all beyond the identity of an object, where do you get the incompatible interpretation? To the contrary, as the SEP says, “It would be universally agreed by scholars that substantial forms are real in the sense that they play an irreducible and ineliminable explanatory role in the behaviour of the things in which they are the form.”
Right, and my point is that by parity of reasoning with the argument you’re trying to make here, no doctrine of the Real Presence could be compatible with modern science. Either the Real Presence entails a change in the behavior of the fundamental particles of the host, or it does not. In the first case, the Real Presence is incompatible with modern science. In the latter case, you have to allow for real, non-causal changes regardless of whether you adopt substance theory. Thus you cannot adopt any doctrine of the Real Presence and adopt modern science while rejecting the possibility of changes that are real but non-causal.
It did both, adopt and adapt. But this was not an innovation of Nicaea. The Catholic Church has never been fideistic. We don’t find this sort of fideism emerge until the Enlightenment and Protestant Reformation. Christianity has always sought the good in all systems of knowledge, including Greek philosophy, on the firm conviction that the dignity of human reason, and that the image of God in man is the image of reason, should seek to know God as much as reason will allow. Hence, we find, for example, the language of substance (ousia, substantia) in Titian the Syrian (ca.165AD), St Irenaeus (ca.140), who defends the substantiality of the Trinity in his Against Heresies, Tertullian (ca.197), Origen (ca.220), and many others in both the East and West.Historic questionL when the Council of Nicaea used the term “substance,” in connection with the person of Jesus, did it “adopt,” or “adapt” the philosophical term?The knock against the use of it is that it is NOT a Biblical term. So did the Church invest it with a connotation that contributes to to the meaning of “transubstantiation.”?