[Mr. GKC: I repeat my statement that I admire your historical research postings. But now you are venturing to speak for our leaders of 65 years ago. You can , of course, do that if you wish, but I respectfully submit that I don’t believe that it is valid. Please allow me to say again: Japan was a ruined nation in August of 1945 and presented no threat to any US territory. The US invasion was not scheduled (and then only tentatively) until November 1st. The only logical reason to force a surrender in August was the threat of Soviet domination in Asia. If the bombs had not been dropped it is likely the the Russian offensive (which, as you know, had cut though the Imperial Army in Manchuko like a hot knife though butter) would have completely defeated Japan before November 1st, 1945.
In hindsite (it’s a wonderful thing,) with nuclear weapons, the US had really nothing to fear from the Soviets. It would have been better to have kept the A-bomb secret for as long as possible, and then used it only to prevent the Russians (and others) from developing this technology.
I honestly appreciate your appreciation of my historical knowledge. It has been developed over many years, from many sources, primarily many books. I cannot say anything like the same of yours.
I do not speak for the leaders of the nation, 65 years after the event. I speak of them. I am able to do this because I possess an informed opinion. One gets things like that by lots of reading, from many perspectives.
Japan was a defeated nation, but not one prepared to surrender. To grasp the difference (I probably won’t make this suggestion again) read DOWNFALL, or THE LAST MISSION. That the Allies were not going to accept less than the basic Potsdam conditions (a form of surrender with terms) is quite appropriate for the aims of the war, in terms of final goals of the Allies. Which was not to repeat the errors of 1918, in the ETO or the PTO. A negotiated peace had not worked well in WWI. It was not going to be tried, in WWII. Restructuring of the society of the aggressor nations was the aim. And was achieved.
Operation Olympic was quite firmly scheduled for 1 Nov, not tentatively. Even when the threat level perceived raised some question of moving the site (and that was rejected), the date was not changed.
The reason for using the bombs was to force that surrender of the Japanese in the shortest time possible. Many reasons lay behind that, the nature of Russian totalitarianism and expansionism being one. And the nature of the Japanese strength on Kyushu (Drea/MACARTHUR’S ULTRA) had placed the concept of an invasion in jeopardy. The options of invasion, with additional nuclear weapons used in tactical support, invasion without them, expanded conventional bombing from a B-29 force increased from 1002 to roughly 1700, aimed at the 180 cities of population over 30,000, and at the national transportation system to foster starvation, did not have to be tried. The bombs caused the surrender, as of the 10 August
gozen kaigan, and the Japanese acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. At which point the Russian assault into Manchuria/China had been ongoing for one day. The bombs ended the war, by demonstrating, even to the Anami clique on the Supreme Council, that there was no method at all to achieve a more favorable negotiated peace.
Using your desired scenario, of bringing the Home Islands behind the Eastern version of the Iron Curtain, merely substitutes Russian invaders for American ones, and results in hundreds of thousands of additional casualties, in the Home Islands alone, as
ketsugo opposes the Russians. Which yields an advantage, in the end, only to the Russians, a situation not likely to commend itself to anyone other than a Russian.
As I have pointed out, the Russians, in the roughly two weeks they fought actively in the East (beyond the Japanese surrender, of course, since they had not yet taken the territory that they wanted) caused approximately 92-93 thousand deaths. And this, as noted, was not a *ketsugo *defense, of the Home Islands. The butcher’s bill for such an extended battle, had it been against American or Russian invaders, would have been horrendous. And to think that it would have occurred by Nov is a pipe dream. The Russians didn’t have the sealift capability/experience to invade Hokkaido in massive numbers. The only thing they had taken by sea was the Kuriles.
The amount of time such a battle would have taken, to force a surrender, in the case of either invader, would have been in terms of months. And to the butcher’s bill in the Islands, huge as it would have been, is to be added the on-going casualties in the rest of the PTO, in the range of 200,000 per month. To which would be added that of the British Operation Zipper, scheduled for early Sep (Mountbatten/Slim/14th Army in Burma). Plus the scheduled executions of the 100,000+ POWS in that theater. Extending the war beyond mid August, even to an imaginary Nov, raises the death and casualties by an unnecessary million or so. Bad show.
The aim of the bombs was to end the war, as quickly as possible. To end the deaths, return the nation to a peace time footing, to began the restructure of the Japanese polity, extirpating the militarists, freeing the POWs, and, not incidentally, to keep the ravages of Soviet Stalinism from one corner of the world. And so it was. Fewer Japanese die. Fewer Americans die. Fewer Russians die. Fewer everybodys die. Good show.
There was no method possible to keep the Russians from developing nuclear technology. Or to keep the bombs secret. I surely don’t have to tell you why.
GKC
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