Ask the materialist...

[IvanKaramozov]

That is one strange post. “Desperately”? “Seem to be”? “Almost certainly”? “Dogma”? “Feeble attempt”? “Unscientific”? “Silly”?

I wonder what kind of an answer were you expecting?

One that told me WHY materialists seem to feverishly defend a view that seemes as clearly absurd as dualism

as said in post

 

[brycelaliberte]

Interesting thread.

Since I have a question, I wonder, how does the materialist explain consciousness? Individuality? Indeed, if we are of the same matter, how then should matter have an ‘awakening’ of consciousness in a cyclic loop?

Simply, I’m asking how there is individual conscious? I understand we are not connected to our parents by any physical means, but how then does individuality occur?

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Mornin Ateista,

I made it to the weekend, but just barely.

I still don’t think that the dichotomy of “necessary” vs. “contingent” truth has any value. Or, putting into a different format, the separation of truths into the buckets of “necessary” and “contingent” is not “necessary”.

No, these categories are indispensible to philosophy and metaphysics, as I know them anyway.

A metaphysical proposition attempts to say something true about everything. IOW, something that is unavoidably and in all circumstances true. That’s necessity.

The contrary to necessity is contingency. Propositions that are only conditionally necessary (given certain stipulated axioms, defintions, rules, etc) or about concrete realty which can be proven true of false by facts (black swans exist) are contingent.

That there must be some metaphysical (necessary) truths is shown by examining the proposition “No truth is necessary.” IOW, it is necessarily true that no truth is necessary, or, it is necessarily true that all truth is contingent. Self-contradictory nonsense.

The contrary, “All truth is necessary,” is obviously false.

But we haven’t exhausted all logical possibilities with “all” or “none.” We still have “Some truths are necessary,” which contradicts the polar opposites of all and none.

Now that there must be some metaphysical truths seems to me very reasonable, if not conclusively demonstrated. Whether or not a given metaphysical proposition is true can be debated, but not whether or not there are some metaphysical truths or other.

Yet very respectable folks deny it. Russell (Whitehead’s former collaborator), for example, did not believe it. He and other logical positivists believe that no truth is necessary. They would put it this way; “All meaningful propositions are contingent.” IOW, only propositions dependent on either factual circumstances (merely empirical) or definitional circumstances (merely rational) make sense.

So with this in mind, what camp do you belong to?

 

[ateista]

No, these categories are indispensible to philosophy and metaphysics, as I know them anyway.

Some philosophers think so. Others do not. Personally I am a pragmatic guy, who considers philosophy an interesting mind-game.

A metaphysical proposition attempts to say something true about everything. IOW, something that is unavoidably and in all circumstances true. That’s necessity.

Right. And since we are limited in our perspective we cannot know “all the possible circumstances”.

The contrary to necessity is contingency. Propositions that are only conditionally necessary (given certain stipulated axioms, defintions, rules, etc) or about concrete realty which can be proven true of false by facts (black swans exist) are contingent.

Very true.

That there must be some metaphysical (necessary) truths is shown by examining the proposition “No truth is necessary.” IOW, it is necessarily true that no truth is necessary, or, it is necessarily true that all truth is contingent. Self-contradictory nonsense.

Here we deal with a meta-proposition, a proposition about propositions, so we have to be careful about the rules which apply here. The problem was scruitinized by Betrand Russell in his famous paradox. The problem comes from using the universal operator. Its usage can easily lead to nonsensical propositions.

This is why I say that the necessary-contingent dichotomy is just a word-game. I have never seen a good reason to take it seriously. Maybe you can demonstrate why should it be considered important.

The contrary, “All truth is necessary,” is obviously false.

But we haven’t exhausted all logical possibilities with “all” or “none.” We still have “Some truths are necessary,” which contradicts the polar opposites of all and none.

Agreed.

Now that there must be some metaphysical truths seems to me very reasonable, if not conclusively demonstrated. Whether or not a given metaphysical proposition is true can be debated, but not whether or not there are some metaphysical truths or other.

I would say that “everything is itself” is such a proposition.

Yet very respectable folks deny it. Russell (Whitehead’s former collaborator), for example, did not believe it. He and other logical positivists believe that no truth is necessary. They would put it this way; “All meaningful propositions are contingent.” IOW, only propositions dependent on either factual circumstances (merely empirical) or definitional circumstances (merely rational) make sense.

So with this in mind, what camp do you belong to?

I think that there are propositions that are true under any circumstances, like “everything is itself” but they are quite trivial.

As the old adage went: “we can say nothing about everything”.

 

[ateista]

Interesting thread.

Since I have a question, I wonder, how does the materialist explain consciousness? Individuality? Indeed, if we are of the same matter, how then should matter have an ‘awakening’ of consciousness in a cyclic loop?

Simply, I’m asking how there is individual conscious? I understand we are not connected to our parents by any physical means, but how then does individuality occur?

Consciousness is the activity of brain, and it comes from the complexity. Animals, whose brain is much simpler, exhibit a limited form of consciousness. They lack self-consciousness, though some higher ones, apes and dolphins may have some limited version of it.

Individuality comes from the difference in the brain structures. Having billions of neurons (as physical infrastructure) and different pathways will make sure that our reactions to the same stimuli will be different.

However, there were some studies of maternal twins separated at birth, who showed an amazing similarity in their pschological profile, indicating that nature vs. nurture is a very fuzzy problem.

 

[brycelaliberte]

Consciousness is the activity of brain, and it comes from the complexity. Animals, whose brain is much simpler, exhibit a limited form of consciousness. They lack self-consciousness, though some higher ones, apes and dolphins may have some limited version of it.

Individuality comes from the difference in the brain structures. Having billions of neurons (as physical infrastructure) and different pathways will make sure that our reactions to the same stimuli will be different.

However, there were some studies of maternal twins separated at birth, who showed an amazing similarity in their pschological profile, indicating that nature vs. nurture is a very fuzzy problem.

Ok, but what ‘sparked’ thought? The ‘I think therefore I am’ sort of idea? Consciousness doesn’t arise simply out of the complexity of the brain, for otherwise we should be able to create computers that attain consciousness, but that is impossible. (At least it should be, I would think) If the brain is merely a chemical/biological computer, then how do we progress farther than an if/then complex? Our logic may presume a this/therefore path, but we have opinions and emotions which certainly aren’t rational.

 

[ateista]

Ok, but what ‘sparked’ thought? The ‘I think therefore I am’ sort of idea? Consciousness doesn’t arise simply out of the complexity of the brain, for otherwise we should be able to create computers that attain consciousness, but that is impossible. (At least it should be, I would think)

I think the opposite. I think that in a sufficiently complex organism (be it neurological or silicon-based) consciousness will emerge. Naturally I cannot prove it - yet.

When we consider that the brain contains literally billions of “processing units” - neurons, and our most complex computers have a few hundred, that is hardly surprising. But the whole computer technology is a few dozens of decades old, so it would be premature to expect that we could have someting that took nature a few hundred millions of years to achieve.

Based upon the speed of development I would think that in a few hundred years that obstacle will be circumvented. Maybe even sooner.

If the brain is merely a chemical/biological computer, then how do we progress farther than an if/then complex? Our logic may presume a this/therefore path, but we have opinions and emotions which certainly aren’t rational.

There is a lot we don’t know about the brain yet. We know very little, as a matter of fact. But what we do know proves that certain parts of the brain are “responsible” for the personality, some parts deal with visual information, other parts deal with auditory information, yet another parts deal with reason and logic, while some parts deal with emotions, etc. If certain parts of the brain get damaged, some of the functionalty simply disappears.

We do know that there is a “pleasure” center and there is a “pain” center. If the pleasure center is stimulated through a mild electric current, the subject will feel incredible pleasure. Lab rats who were allowed to press down a pedal and administer the necessary stimulus, kept on pushing that pedal until they literally collapsed from exhaustion. When the pedal was wired to the pain center, they only tested it once.

 

[OTavern]

There is a lot we don’t know about the brain yet. We know very little, as a matter of fact. But what we do know proves that certain parts of the brain are “responsible” for the personality, some parts deal with visual information, other parts deal with auditory information, yet another parts deal with reason and logic, while some parts deal with emotions, etc. If certain parts of the brain get damaged, some of the functionalty simply disappears.

What we know is that certain parts of the brain are co-existent with personality (personal identity), but the cause-effect relationship may go both ways. In other words, conscious states may effect changes in brain chemistry and brain chemistry may affect conscious states. That they exist together does not necessarily mean one always causes the other, just that they are “connected” together in some kind of symbiotic relationship. Absolute dependence is far from determined.

 

[brycelaliberte]

Ok, well, I can see that consciousness can’t really be explained then by material means. The conceptual and material don’t mix very well…

I believe computers can only go really fast, as fast as you want, but that speed/processing power doesn’t = consciousness. Certainly, our brains do do a fair bit of processing, but it is only with the consciousness that we understand what we are sensing.

So, another question, what defines consciousness? How would there be limited-conscious? Is it possible for something to gain consciousness, lose it, but then have it back?

 

[FrankSchnabel]

the Schnobble guy sed to the pragmatic guy:

That there must be some metaphysical (necessary) truths is shown by examining the proposition “No truth is necessary.” IOW, it is necessarily true that no truth is necessary, or, it is necessarily true that all truth is contingent. Self-contradictory nonsense.

to which Ateista replied;

Here we deal with a meta-proposition, a proposition about propositions, so we have to be careful about the rules which apply here. The problem was scruitinized by Betrand Russell in his famous paradox. The problem comes from using the universal operator. Its usage can easily lead to nonsensical propositions.

This is why I say that the necessary-contingent dichotomy is just a word-game. I have never seen a good reason to take it seriously. Maybe you can demonstrate why should it be considered important.

I must plead ignorance here. Why is this argument for necessary truth problematic from Russell’s POV? What is the “universal operator” here? What nonsensical propositions does it lead to here? Please 'splain yerself.

cordially

Frank

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Regarding metaphysical statements being trivial, I don’t find them to be so. Here are some that have been suggested:

Concrete realities must exhibit both internal and external relationships (Hartshorne)

Sumptin’s always gotta exist. IOW there can never be absolutely nuttin. (Schnable)

God exists (Anselm)

there are many more. See esp. Whitehead

 

[ateista]

What we know is that certain parts of the brain are co-existent with personality (personal identity), but the cause-effect relationship may go both ways.

Ok, this is a hypothesis. What can you bring up to substantiate it?

In other words, conscious states may effect changes in brain chemistry and brain chemistry may affect conscious states.

Actual experiments show that introducing chemicals into the brain will cause changes in brain-states (or minds). There can be no doubt about this. What kind of experiment can be done to indicate a “reverse” causation?

That they exist together does not necessarily mean one always causes the other, just that they are “connected” together in some kind of symbiotic relationship. Absolute dependence is far from determined.

In that case, how can you substantiate that they simply coexist - independently? They are both there, but neither one “causes” the other?

The experiments indicate a causal relationship: electro-chemical changes → brain-state changes. Sure, you can stipulate a different model, but then you have to bring up arguments why this different model is to be contemplated, and you should be able to create experiments which substantiate this model.

 

[ateista]

Ok, well, I can see that consciousness can’t really be explained then by material means. The conceptual and material don’t mix very well…

I believe computers can only go really fast, as fast as you want, but that speed/processing power doesn’t = consciousness. Certainly, our brains do do a fair bit of processing, but it is only with the consciousness that we understand what we are sensing.

The speed is not what matters. It is the “operating system” that matters. And we do not understand the “operating system” of the brain well enough that we could emulate it in a silicon environment. The question is simply open.

So, another question, what defines consciousness? How would there be limited-conscious? Is it possible for something to gain consciousness, lose it, but then have it back?

Sure. You can see it every time we sleep. We “lose” or suspend consciousness, and regain it when we wake up. When we sleep our operating system goes into a different mode. Just like when you load a different operating system into the same hardware.

 

[OTavern]

In that case, how can you substantiate that they simply coexist - independently? They are both there, but neither one “causes” the other?

The experiments indicate a causal relationship: electro-chemical changes → brain-state changes. Sure, you can stipulate a different model, but then you have to bring up arguments why this different model is to be contemplated, and you should be able to create experiments which substantiate this model.

I didn’t say they co-exist “independently.” Perhaps they are mutually dependent in some way, but both may alter the other in certain ways or within specific parameters. The impetus for change may operate in either direction. Changes in brain chemistry may appear as changes in consciousness, but willed changes in consciousness may cause changes in brain chemistry.

Example, meditation may bring about change in brain / body states. Fire walkers in India/Indonesia can consciously control the reception of pain and therefore over-ride its effect on behaviour, so they can painlessly walk on burning coals.

You can see it every time we sleep. We “lose” or suspend consciousness, and regain it when we wake up. When we sleep our operating system goes into a different mode. Just like when you load a different operating system into the same hardware.

Sure but conscious states can control when you go to sleep. I know of people who haven’t slept for days or weeks because of issues that are social in origin, and hence outside of “brain chemistry.”

We know stress can have major impact on physical functions. You can even “work” yourself into panic attacks or a state of calm by consciously willing one or the other – try is some time.

In some sense, sleep doesn’t just “overtake us” beyond our control, akin to shutting down a computer. In many ways, we can allow or disallow when it does. Some things are within conscious control, some may not be.

 

[ateista]

I must plead ignorance here. Why is this argument for necessary truth problematic from Russell’s POV? What is the “universal operator” here? What nonsensical propositions does it lead to here? Please 'splain yerself.

Well, this is going to be fun. This is what you said:

FrankSchnabel:

That there must be some metaphysical (necessary) truths is shown by examining the proposition “No truth is necessary.” IOW, it is necessarily true that no truth is necessary, or, it is necessarily true that all truth is contingent. Self-contradictory nonsense.

First, we can transform this statement into “All truths are contingent” - and the universal operator is now plainly “visible”. The problem partially arises from “sloppiness”: what does it mean that something is “true” in such a generic fashion? We already agreed that “truth” can cover either correspondence to some physical object or event (P-truth, if you will), or it comes as a corollary of certain axioms (C-truth).

There is no such thing as “truth” as an ontological object, and we already agreed on this, too. The concept of “metaphysical truth” is obviously not physical, therefore it is conceptual - which is obvious, since we deal here with conceptual entities.

So the veracity of the proposition “All truths are contingent” must be evaluated as a corollary of some axioms - or it must be accepted as an axiom. Question: which one will it be? If it is accepted as an axiom, then the veracity is established - axiomatically. If it is not an axiom, then it should be shown as the result of a logical chain, stemming from some axioms. What are those axioms?

Now, **in a very good sense **we can say that “All truths are contingent”.

Since “truth” is not an ontological entity, its existence relies on some agent who is able to compare reality to a mind-model of reality and establish if the model properly reflects reality - and in this sense - it is contingent upon the existence of such agent.

If the “truth” is a conceptual truth, then it presupposes the existence of an agent, who is able to conceptualize and follow a logical chain from some axioms. This also presupposes the existence of such agent, and as such it is contingent.

No contradiction arises. Observe that the proposition “No truth is necessary” precisely equals to “All truths are contingent”.

All this reminds me of the claim that empiricism is self-contradictory. The argument usually runs like this:

“Empiricism states that the veracity of any proposition can only be established through empirical methods. Therefore this can be applied to this proposition, which is clearly nonsense, since it cannot be empirically verifed.”

Looks good, doesn’t it? Yet, it is a false argument. It is incorrect, because empiricism is incorrectly defined. Properly stated empiricism says that “all propositions **about ontological reality **must be evaluated via empirical ways”. Since empiricism says nothing about propositions of axiomatic systems, it cannot be applied to itself.

As I said I agree that there are propositions which are always true (as long as there is an agent who can state the proposition) but those propositions are axiomatic and as such pretty trivial. The ones you quoted belong to the duh! category - at least for me.

 

[ateista]

I didn’t say they co-exist “independently.” Perhaps they are mutually dependent in some way, but both may alter the other in certain ways or within specific parameters. The impetus for change may operate in either direction. Changes in brain chemistry may appear as changes in consciousness, but willed changes in consciousness may cause changes in brain chemistry.

Example, meditation may bring about change in brain / body states. Fire walkers in India/Indonesia can consciously control the reception of pain and therefore over-ride its effect on behaviour, so they can painlessly walk on burning coals.

I understand what you mean. I think you take the “chemistry” too literally. When one “inserts” chemicals into the brain (any mind-altering drug will do) it certainly will result in changing brain-states. As you correctly said, meditation will result is changing of chemical “production”. But meditation is also the activity of the brain.

It would be more precise to speak of the electro-chemical activity of the brain. When it comes right down to it, chemical reactions are also just a “dance” of electrons.

Sure but conscious states can control when you go to sleep. I know of people who haven’t slept for days or weeks because of issues that are social in origin, and hence outside of “brain chemistry.”

We know stress can have major impact on physical functions. You can even “work” yourself into panic attacks or a state of calm by consciously willing one or the other – try is some time.

In some sense, sleep doesn’t just “overtake us” beyond our control, akin to shutting down a computer. In many ways, we can allow or disallow when it does. Some things are within conscious control, some may not be.

Very true. Our conscious activity is by far not the whole picture. I saw once an analogy which describes “consciousness” as a ship on a stromy sea. It may be “above”, but it does not “rule”. The subconscious activity is even less understood than the conscious one.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Schnobble sed:

That there must be some metaphysical (necessary) truths is shown by examining the proposition “No truth is necessary.” IOW, it is necessarily true that no truth is necessary, or, it is necessarily true that all truth is contingent. Self-contradictory nonsense.

Ateista replied:

First, we can transform this statement into “All truths are contingent” - and the universal operator is now plainly “visible”. The problem partially arises from “sloppiness”: what does it mean that something is “true” in such a generic fashion? We already agreed that “truth” can cover either correspondence to some physical object or event (P-truth, if you will), or it comes as a corollary of certain axioms (C-truth).

There is no such thing as “truth” as an ontological object, and we already agreed on this, too. The concept of “metaphysical truth” is obviously not physical, therefore it is conceptual - which is obvious, since we deal here with conceptual entities.

Why must it be “either/or”? According to Whitehead, metaphysical truths have both an empirical (P-truth) and a rational ((C-truth) aspect. Any ultimate generalization, to be sure, is rational in that it is logical and coherent. And any ultimate generalization is also empirically adequate and applicable. So metaphysical truths are not merely rational or merely empirical. They are a truth of third kind, embracing both aspects.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Now, in a very good sense we can say that “All truths are contingent”.

Since “truth” is not an ontological entity, its existence relies on some agent who is able to compare reality to a mind-model of reality and establish if the model properly reflects reality - and in this sense - it is contingent upon the existence of such agent.

If the “truth” is a conceptual truth, then it presupposes the existence of an agent, who is able to conceptualize and follow a logical chain from some axioms. This also presupposes the existence of such agent, and as such it is contingent.

No contradiction arises. Observe that the proposition “No truth is necessary” precisely equals to “All truths are contingent”.

Here is good quote from quote from Voskuil (ch. 3, page 26):

Metaphysical propositions are abstractions that are universally exemplified. They are necessary principles, not because of some outside agency, choosing to make them so, but because no agent could be anything at all without displaying these principles. They are not necessary by definition. They are necessary because any attempted denial turns out to be impossible. Seeming denials of metaphysical propositions can only be maintained because of confusion or vagueness. Since metaphysical propositions have always been as they are, we do not define them or create them. We can only discover or become aware of them.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

As I said I agree that there are propositions which are always true (as long as there is an agent who can state the proposition) but those propositions are axiomatic and as such pretty trivial. The ones you quoted belong to the duh! category - at least for me.

Even the one attributed to Anselm?

 

[brycelaliberte]

Sure. You can see it every time we sleep. We “lose” or suspend consciousness, and regain it when we wake up. When we sleep our operating system goes into a different mode. Just like when you load a different operating system into the same hardware.

Ok, perhaps we need a definition of ‘consciousness’ that would offer up a better idea of what I’m meaning to ask. Let me avoid ambiguity;

Consciousness, in this case, would be referring to the ‘existence of self-knowledgeable thought,’ or, knowledge of knowledge. The ability to objectively know that you know, to know that you exist and are as such, the objective thinker.

Could I ask again, with that definition? How do we know we have consciousness, then? Is it some sort of ‘base assumption’ that can’t be denied nor proved? For to deny it would be asserting it, yet to prove it would be impossible objectively.

And I would still like to know, how does this consciousness arise?