Atheism, Burden of Proof, and Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument

[Areopagite]

Define “free will.” If you mean “the ability to act based on one’s decisions or desires” then the question is still “Was it determined from the very beginning that we would act based on X decisions or Y desires?” I don’t dispute that we have willpower, I just dispute that it’s “free” in the sense of the word Christians seem to prefer.

Would “choice” then exist? Because when people say, “You have a choice” … whereas really it’s been chosen for you … by the laws of determined physics.

Also, the Aristotelian and Thomistic understanding is that we have two distinct desires: a rational desire and a sensual desire. The rational desire is the will, and the sensual desire is the emotions. Our will can choose to follow what the intellect believes is best or it can decide to follow what the emotions are inclining the person to do (sometimes, the intellect and the emotions agree … which is awesome).

However, would I be correct to say that you don’t really believe there’s a will at all in that sense … that there is only emotion? All desire is just sensual desire?

I’m sure you just wanted to take a jab at Spock, but I’ll answer: the computer would have possessed data revealing your intention of being a contrarian and would have factored that into its calculation (remember that knowledge of the mental conditions of people was part of the hypothetical).

No, you see, the computer would explode. For example, let’s say I check what the determined future will be in five seconds (particularly … what I’d be doing). Two possible things I would see… 1) I’ll be sitting by the computer still, or 2) I won’t be. If I see that I will be sitting by the computer, I’ll be a contrarian and walk away from it, thus proving that the future is not determined, or, if I’m not sitting by the computer in the next 5 seconds, I’ll be the contrarian and remain sitting there for the next 5 seconds, thus proving the future is not determined. The computer couldn’t possibly calculate that because it would go into a infinite programming loop. See?

 

[Oreoracle]

if thats what youre hoping.

I know this will be hard for you, but you have to move past your preconception that I have some sort of agenda. This has nothing to do with what I’m hoping for.

there is nothing saying that this particualr universe must be actualized.

All too true. I don’t think we have evidence for or against determinism, and so it follows that much of metaphysics is simply guesswork: the science of what sounds right, but may or may not be the case.

assuming a closed system, yes. if you know the starting state perfectly, you can predict the state of a closed system at any point along its trajectory.

Since you seem to be so well read on the subject: is the universe considered closed, or open? Or is this not known?

i wouldnt say that free will throws a wrench in it. thats my “warpspeedpeteys’ proof”, considering a deterministic universe, if free will is an illusion, then the starting state of the system (the universe) would need to be such as to fake free will trillions of times per day, for the entire history of humanity.

This depends on what you mean by “free will.” (See my post to Areopagite above.) I don’t contest that humans have willpower, I just dispute that this willpower is “free.” Anything that has form, identity, etc., possesses qualities, which are exclusive in nature (a coarse object is not “free” to be smooth). So if I possess mental qualities, there are some qualities I cannot possess, which limits my actions to being caused only by the qualities I may possess. Now it is true that my mental state can change, and so my actions may change, but this mental change would be caused by my previous mental state, and would thusly be determined by previous factors. Hence, determinism.

Again, I’m on the fence when it comes to this matter. But I just don’t see any reason to dismiss determinism.

the only defense is that the universe is not deterministic. only that goes against what we know of the universe.

I’m beginning to wonder if we have different ideas of what “determinism” is. If determinism is true, then there is only one possible world that will be actualized in the next five seconds. That world will have been wholly caused by current factors, and those factors couldn’t have cooperated in a different way.

what in the world would make you fear being right and being ignored?

Knowing the truth is useless if you can’t spread your knowledge. I’m afraid that I won’t have the opportunity to share my musings with others. Actually, it could be more basic than that–it might be the case, also, that I simply want recognition for my astuteness. But then, who doesn’t?

now youre moving the goal posts to what you consider decent. that aside. modal logic wasnt formalized until the early 20th century. a little late to ascribe all arguments for G-d to that position. yet, even were they, what would be the problem?

Well, I have a lot of problems with metaphysics in general. If you don’t mind, I’ll elaborate tomorrow.

 

[JDaniel]

If the “infinite greatness” is not on the material level, then the argument does not demonstrate that the “maximally great” being materially exists.

Gearhead:

We’re speaking of a possible infinitely great being, not an actual infinitely great being. Now, while an infinitely great being does exist, IMO, for the purposes of this discussion, we were only talking about demonstrating possibility herein. I do not need to demonstrate that the maximally great being actually exists through this argument. I’d much rather borrow from St. Thomas for that.

jd

 

[gearhead]

For anyone who is following, I’ll rephrase the question in context: why can a maximally great being not possess attributes that contribute to its maximal greatness?

Almost: it’s more like "why can a maximally great being not possess attributes that do not contribute to its maximal greatness?

The reason for this is that any attribute that is not maximally excellent (and by extension, does not add to a thing’s maximal greatness) need not exist in every possible world. Given that a maximally great being must exist in every possible world, any attribute that is not maximally great would not be predicated of this being.

This makes no sense. Just because some of a beings attributes are necessary doesn’t mean that all of them have to be.

Well, if a being’s maximal greatness is subordinated to another’s standard, it wouldn’t actually be maximally great. I’m also inclined to think that a “different standard” would result in the kind of contradictions we explored earlier. A “maximally great island” is an incoherent concept, meaning its existence is impossible. Maybe you could give me an example of what you have in mind?

Maybe I can re-phrase: for the moment, let’s assume that there’s some objective standard of “greatness” against which a “maximally great” thing could be measured. Why is there necessarily only one way in which this “maximal greatness” could be acheived?

Let’s make this more concrete. If we have a set of apples and a set of oranges, we could count the members of each set. If both sets contain ten, then the number of apples and oranges is identical. However, that’s where the identity stops. Apples are distinct from oranges. The only instance in which they are identical is in their quantity.

Look at just the oranges: you have ten of them, and they’re all very similar… nearly identical, in fact. Tweak that scenario a bit so that they’re all exactly identical, and that’s what I’m talking about.

 

[gearhead]

Fine, it either pushes the atheist into theism, a radical posistion, or a position of self-induced ignorance. Come on, how long is he going to say “I don’t know” for?

Until compelling evidence for or against God presents itself. He could be waiting quite a while.

He could exist in all possible woulds, but I do not beleive that it is possible for him to be nessecary in all possible worlds.

If Santa Claus exists in all possible worlds, then by modal logic he necessarily exists.

 

[Areopagite]

If Santa Claus exists in all possible worlds, then by modal logic he necessarily exists.

Dude! No! Santa doesn’t have existence as part of his nature! A maximally great being does! You have to address that issue or else stop with the Jolly Old St. Nick!

 

[gearhead]

If a being can interact with material then it’s “in some sense” material itself? Where do you get this?

“Material” is the term we use to describe things that physically exist. If a thing can interact with material things, then it physically exists.

First of all, gravity is not material, yet it affects matter. If you say, “Well gravity is caused by a material thing, and thus no force is caused by an immaterial thing” (an inductive leap of logic indeed), then you have to prove that all forces are caused by material things. Good luck.

Two points:

• energy is a material thing.
• if the folks at CERN are successful in finding the Higgs boson, then we’ll have a material basis for gravity.

Also, “being composed of matter” is a perfection that implies an imperfection. God has all the positive being that matter has (e.g. being able to affect other matter), but not the negative being that matter necessarily has as well (e.g. being limited to specific points in space at a time, being destructible). Thus, God is not composed of matter.

I didn’t say that God was a “being composed of matter”; I don’t mean to suggest that any hypothetical god must be made up of matter as we know it. What I’m saying is that anything that can interact with the physical, material universe is itself material.

It is not possible that Santa Claus necessarily exists because the essence of Santa Claus does not include existence.

It doesn’t? What attributes does the “essence” of Santa Claus include?

If there were two maximally great beings, that would imply that one has something the other doesn’t have. However, as previously defined, a maximally great being has all being and thus has … everything. Thus, two maximally great beings are impossible. Hence, there can only one maximally great being.

Wait… “a maximally great being has all being”? So, we’re part of God?

Once again, a maximally great being possesses all being (and as said before, all real being … and all real being is positive being). Thus, a being does not possess more being (and hence does not become greater) if another one like it comes into existence. And as shown before, only only maximally great being is possible.

Let’s back up a bit and go back to the argument: premise (1) referred to “maximal greatness”, not a “maximally great being”. There’s nothing in (1) that suggest that this maximal greatness must be instantiated in a single being. However great one being can be, a second being like it would still be greater in total.

And something occurs to me along a similar line: not only does the argument allow for many “maximally great” beings, it also doesn’t exclude the possibility that “maximal greatness” is instantiated in several beings, none of which are “maximally great” themselves, but together posess “maximal greatness” between themselves: maybe one being is omnipotent, one is omniscient, one is perfectly good, and so on… and the whole set of them are all exist in all possible worlds.

I can also say:

Imagine 7 x 8 = 54

See how easy it is? (this is wrong by the way)

The truth or falsehood of arithmetic equations is not based on what is “conceivable”.

However, if I really understand the terms and what’s going on, it doesn’t make sense. Likewise, if you really understand what a maximally great being is (which has been defined several times throughout the thread), then saying that there could be two doesn’t make sense.

So far, the only concrete definition of “maximally great” that we have is that it includes omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness. I see no reason why these characteristics can’t be posessed by multiple beings at the same time.

What? Where’d you dig this up?

Existence is a thing that a maximally great being possesses by nature (because it possesses everything). Thus, it necessarily exists.

If a thing has no pink existence whatsoever, then in pink terms, its existence would be indistinguishable from its non-existence.

What I’m trying to say is … what exactly are you talking about?

“Material aspect” is very vague indeed. If you mean “the power to affect matter” then yes I guess God would have a “material aspect.” If you mean “being composed of matter” then no God would not have a material aspect.

That which can affect matter is itself material by definition.

All attributes that require a negation of some being are attributes that God does not have. However, all the positive being possessed by such attributes are possessed by God.

Are you really suggesting that saying “God is non-material” doesn’t require a negation?

Because if they were different then SOMETHING would be possessed by one that the other didn’t have (and vice versa). However, if they had all being in them, then they would have everything, and not have something the other didn’t have … and thus they would be the same thing.

And why do you assume that this SOMETHING is something that would make one less great than the other?

Wha? Could you give a concrete example of what you’re talking about?

Okay… here’s one: sub-atomic particles. Electrons, for example.

Electrons are identical. One electron is completely indistinguishable from another. However, we can distinguish between two electrons and one electron, because the two electrons together have a different total charge than one by itself.

 

[Areopagite]

“Material” is the term we use to describe things that physically exist.

From what I understand, that’s not the proper use of word. Forces are physical but they aren’t made of matter.

That which can affect matter is itself material by definition.

I don’t think that’s a very sensible definition. That seems to argue from the premise “If A can affect B, then A must be of the same nature as B.” But then, if I poke a rhinoceros, then I myself am a rhinoceros.

But once again, if you want to go with your rather strange definition of material then, yes, I guess God’s material in that sense. What we mean by material is “having at least part of one’s being exist as body.” So in that sense, God is not material. I guess we could be using “material” with different definitions, in which case, there is no disagreement (perhaps).

• if the folks at CERN are successful in finding the Higgs boson, then we’ll have a material basis for gravity.

What about the other forces? Magnetism? The strong force? Stuff like that.

It doesn’t? What attributes does the “essence” of Santa Claus include?

Having a white beard, being fat, being jolly, giving presents, riding a slay, etc. There is nothing about him having “necessary existence.”

Wait… “a maximally great being has all being”? So, we’re part of God?

Very good.

Once again, “being” means “that which can exist.” This includes … well … everything (i.e. everything that does not have a contradictory essence).

Now a single being (or thing) can have different kinds and different amounts of being in it. For example, a human has rationality as part of its being (for “rationality” is part of being because it rationality can exist). A rock lacks being in this area … as it does not have rationality. But just because one person has rationality, doesn’t mean that no other human can have it. Humans share in being regarding rationality.

God has all being, but that doesn’t mean things that share in His being (in smaller allotted portions of His being) have to exist as part of God, just as two humans who share in similar being don’t have to exist as part of each other. Even though God has all being, and all things share in God’s being, that doesn’t mean that all those things are a part of God (in the pantheist sense). Does that make any sense?

The reason why there can be different things of the same kind is because of negation. There can be different humans because all of them only share in a limited amount and different portion of being. Two people are different because they one lacks being in the place where the other is at, for example. There are other differences as well.

God has everything and thus nothing can have something that He doesn’t have. Thus, there can only be one God, one maximally great being.

Let’s back up a bit and go back to the argument: premise (1) referred to “maximal greatness”, not a “maximally great being”. There’s nothing in (1) that suggest that this maximal greatness must be instantiated in a single being. However great one being can be, a second being like it would still be greater in total.

And something occurs to me along a similar line: not only does the argument allow for many “maximally great” beings, it also doesn’t exclude the possibility that “maximal greatness” is instantiated in several beings, none of which are “maximally great” themselves, but together posess “maximal greatness” between themselves: maybe one being is omnipotent, one is omniscient, one is perfectly good, and so on… and the whole set of them are all exist in all possible worlds.

This has been answered in the argument above.

The truth or falsehood of arithmetic equations is not based on what is “conceivable”.

Not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that we can’t conceive of arithmetic equations?

So far, the only concrete definition of “maximally great” that we have is that it includes omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness. I see no reason why these characteristics can’t be posessed by multiple beings at the same time.

Well, I have offered another definition, namely “that which has all being” (and once again, I mean real, positive being … as opposed to logical negation kind of being, for example)

Could God create another being that could do anything, know everything, and be perfectly good? Well, that’s a good question. I have no idea. However, He certainly can’t make another being exactly like Himself in every way because there would be no distinction between that thing and God.

Are you really suggesting that saying “God is non-material” doesn’t require a negation?

Good question. As I said before, materiality is a perfection that implies an imperfection. So it is technically a negative term. Thus, “non-material” is a double negative, and hence it is a positive being. Same deal with “infinite.” “Finite” is actually a negation of “infinite.” But the conventional prefixes confuse things.

And why do you assume that this SOMETHING is something that would make one less great than the other?

As I said before, being maximally great is when one has all being. If a thing has something that God does not have, then God is not maximally great … and hence not God. Thus a maximally great being must have everything.

Electrons are identical. One electron is completely indistinguishable from another. However, we can distinguish between two electrons and one electron, because the two electrons together have a different total charge than one by itself.

So, you’re saying that since electrons are the same in every way and yet still distinguishable, thus it’s possible for any two beings to be the same in every way and yet distinguishable (including maximally great beings).

Right, well, first of all, (and I may be wrong here) that there must be something distinguishing the two electrons that is causing the change in charge, otherwise there would just be one electron. I don’t know if it they’re occupying different points in space or even time … but if we really want to say there are two different electrons … there has to be something that’s different about them because otherwise they wouldn’t be giving off the charge of two electrons. Face it, if there’s no difference between the electrons in any way … it’s the same electron. Since we know they’re different because the charge indicates 2 electrons, then there has to be 2 electrons and hence there must be something different about each electron. Right?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

All too true. I don’t think we have evidence for or against determinism, and so it follows that much of metaphysics is simply guesswork: the science of what sounds right, but may or may not be the case.

what? youre making some giant leaps here.

actualization of any particular universe is a separate subject from determinism, and then determinism and metaphysics only interact in the free will question, at least thats all i can think of this late. btw, you do know that scientism is false and science is a branch of metaphysics originally called natural philosophy? you seem to be accepting scientism.

its things like this that lead me to believe you do have an agenda. you seem to be looking for any reason to dismiss anything in favor of G-d.

Since you seem to be so well read on the subject: is the universe considered closed, or open? Or is this not known?

geometrically it depends on the value of omega (density of the matter in the universe), thermodynamically it seems to be closed as the laws of thermodynamics seem inviolable, though that may be a local phenomenon, i dont know. metaphysically, it seems to be open, i.e. it can explain its own existence, it cant explain free will, etc.

so i guess the best answer is, it depends and we dont really know for sure.

This depends on what you mean by “free will.” (See my post to Areopagite above.) I don’t contest that humans have willpower, I just dispute that this willpower is “free.” Anything that has form, identity, etc., possesses qualities, which are exclusive in nature (a coarse object is not “free” to be smooth). So if I possess mental qualities, there are some qualities I cannot possess, which limits my actions to being caused only by the qualities I may possess. Now it is true that my mental state can change, and so my actions may change, but this mental change would be caused by my previous mental state, and would thusly be determined by previous factors. Hence, determinism.

Again, I’m on the fence when it comes to this matter. But I just don’t see any reason to dismiss determinism.

for my proof it only matters that it seem we have free will. whether it be illusory or not, it indicates G-d, either by design, in that a universe perfectly faking trillions of free will tests a day would need to be designed to do that. or in that we really have free will and that violates physical determinism. ergo, there is a G-d.

though this is admittedly a work in progress. it seems to me that the very idea of free will indicates G-d, whether we have actual free will or not.

I’m beginning to wonder if we have different ideas of what “determinism” is. If determinism is true, then there is only one possible world that will be actualized in the next five seconds. That world will have been wholly caused by current factors, and those factors couldn’t have cooperated in a different way.

there is a misunderstanding here. determinism refers to causal determinism, and an actualized world refers to this entire universe. separate from other possible worlds. this world has been actualized for 14 or so billion years.

 

[Matthias123]

Until compelling evidence for or against God presents itself. He could be waiting quite a while.

If Santa Claus exists in all possible worlds, then by modal logic he necessarily exists.

On the contrary, if Santa Claus is neccesary in all possible worlds, then it is possible for him to be neccesary in all possible worlds. If he exists in all possible worlds, it does not mean he is neccesary

Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p
Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p

If it is possible for Santa Clause to be in all possible worlds, then it is **necessary for him to be possible **in all possible worlds.

If it is **possible for Santa clause to be neccesary **in all possible worlds, then it is necessary for Santa clause in all posible worlds.

necessary for him to be possible and possible for him to be neccesary are not the same things.

The former means he has to be possible, the later means it is possible for him the be neccesary. I do not believe it is possible for Santa Clause to be neccesary in all possible worlds

Let me ask you, what is possible to be neccesary in all possible worlds?

I believe **it is possible for God to be neccesary **in all possible worlds, therefore I believe it is neccesary for God to be in all possible worlds.

 

[gearhead]

From what I understand, that’s not the proper use of word. Forces are physical but they aren’t made of matter.

Yes, but that’s not how the word is being used when you make statements like “God is non-material”… unless you do mean to say that God isn’t composed of protons, neutrons and electrons but we might still be able to affect him with physical forces like gravity or magnetism.

If you want to re-do everything with the word “physical” in place of “material”, that would be fine with me.

I don’t think that’s a very sensible definition. That seems to argue from the premise “If A can affect B, then A must be of the same nature as B.” But then, if I poke a rhinoceros, then I myself am a rhinoceros.

I didn’t say that this is a general principle. However, I think you’re getting hung up on the word choice. Like I said before, we can use “physical” if it makes you feel better.

But once again, if you want to go with your rather strange definition of material then, yes, I guess God’s material in that sense. What we mean by material is “having at least part of one’s being exist as body.” So in that sense, God is not material. I guess we could be using “material” with different definitions, in which case, there is no disagreement (perhaps).

Maybe a hypothetical scenario would help:

Say you have an object in front of you. Through various tests, you determine that it is not made up of normal matter - no protons, neutrons, electrons, etc. Nevertheless, you can interact with it: you see it, you can touch it, you can move it around… is it “material”? How do you know?

What about the other forces? Magnetism? The strong force? Stuff like that.

I’m not sure where you’re going with these. Magnetism and the strong nuclear force are both properties of matter.

Having a white beard, being fat, being jolly, giving presents, riding a slay, etc. There is nothing about him having “necessary existence.”

Wait… so the “essence” of Santa Claus includes having a white beard and being fat, but it doesn’t include existence? How can a non-existent being have a white beard or be fat?

Very good.

Once again, “being” means “that which can exist.” This includes … well … everything (i.e. everything that does not have a contradictory essence).

Now a single being (or thing) can have different kinds and different amounts of being in it. For example, a human has rationality as part of its being (for “rationality” is part of being because it rationality can exist). A rock lacks being in this area … as it does not have rationality. But just because one person has rationality, doesn’t mean that no other human can have it. Humans share in being regarding rationality.

God has all being, but that doesn’t mean things that share in His being (in smaller allotted portions of His being) have to exist as part of God, just as two humans who share in similar being don’t have to exist as part of each other. Even though God has all being, and all things share in God’s being, that doesn’t mean that all those things are a part of God (in the pantheist sense). Does that make any sense?

No, because it leads to a major problem. If we take this argument as correct, we see that your line of reasoning has a few very interesting implications:

1. God is a singular being.
2. God has “all being”.
3. therefore, all being is God.
4. therefore, no beings exist that are not God.
5. however, I am a being and I exist.
6. therefore, I am God.
7. God has “all being”.
8. God’s being is perfect.
9. therefore, all being is perfect.
10. therefore, no imperfection exists.

I hit the character limit. Hang on for part 2.

 

[gearhead]

continued from above

The reason why there can be different things of the same kind is because of negation. There can be different humans because all of them only share in a limited amount and different portion of being. Two people are different because they one lacks being in the place where the other is at, for example. There are other differences as well.

But does a difference of location necessarily imply a difference in “greatness” or level of perfection?

Not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that we can’t conceive of arithmetic equations?

No, I’m just referring to the fact that “maximal greatness” was presented as a level of greatness above which is not conceivable.

Personally, I don’t like using the notion of “what is conceivable” in proofs - to me, it smacks of an argument from ignorance. However, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

Well, I have offered another definition, namely “that which has all being” (and once again, I mean real, positive being … as opposed to logical negation kind of being, for example)

But that’s not the definition used in the original argument. The argument defines “maximal greatness”… or at least, it defines it in part and is silent on the rest. However, because it’s defined its terms, we could be talking about gophers in tutus instead of maximal greatness as long as the term “gophers in tutus” was defined in the argument as the name for a set of attributes that includes omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness.

Could God create another being that could do anything, know everything, and be perfectly good? Well, that’s a good question. I have no idea. However, He certainly can’t make another being exactly like Himself in every way because there would be no distinction between that thing and God.

Why is that a limitation?

And if this is something that God can’t do, then doesn’t this speak to the contradictory nature of omnipotence? And if the attribute itself is self-contradictory, then it would be reasonable to declare premise (1) in the original argument false right off the bat.

Good question. As I said before, materiality is a perfection that implies an imperfection. So it is technically a negative term. Thus, “non-material” is a double negative, and hence it is a positive being. Same deal with “infinite.” “Finite” is actually a negation of “infinite.” But the conventional prefixes confuse things.

I agree for “infinite”, but not for “non-material”, because it would imply a set of things that God could not be.

As I said before, being maximally great is when one has all being. If a thing has something that God does not have, then God is not maximally great … and hence not God. Thus a maximally great being must have everything.

But as I mentioned in my later reply, the argument makes a leap from “maximal greatness” to “a maximally great being” without explanation or support. I don’t think it’s been shown yet that “maximal greatness” has to be manifest in a single being. The argument defines “maximal greatness” as omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness. A collection of beings where one is omnipotent, one is omniscient and one is perfectly good would fit that bill. Add beings as needed as other attributes of “maximal greatness” are added.

So, you’re saying that since electrons are the same in every way and yet still distinguishable, thus it’s possible for any two beings to be the same in every way and yet distinguishable (including maximally great beings).

I have no idea about the properties of maximally great beings. I was addressing something else:

When I asked whether two maximally great beings could possibly exist, the response was that things that are indistinguishable from each other are the same thing. This was given as a general principle, therefore, any example where this is false would negate the general principle and therefore the stated rationale for why two or more maximally great beings could not exist.

It’s kinda like the old line about the claim “all swans are white” - it only takes one black swan to refute it. If you argue that a specific bird is white because it’s a swan and all swans are white, then if I produce a black swan, I can negate your argument. This doesn’t mean your swan isn’t white; it just means that if it is white, it’s white for reasons other than your claim that all swans are white.

Right, well, first of all, (and I may be wrong here) that there must be something distinguishing the two electrons that is causing the change in charge, otherwise there would just be one electron. I don’t know if it they’re occupying different points in space or even time … but if we really want to say there are two different electrons … there has to be something that’s different about them because otherwise they wouldn’t be giving off the charge of two electrons. Face it, if there’s no difference between the electrons in any way … it’s the same electron. Since we know they’re different because the charge indicates 2 electrons, then there has to be 2 electrons and hence there must be something different about each electron. Right?

Wrong. Look at it this way: say you’ve got a neutral helium atom: two protons, two neutrons, two electrons. You know there are two electrons because you can measure the charge of the atom and see that it’s neutral: the two positive charges in the nucleus must be balanced by two negative charges.

Now, imagine that I strip the electrons away from the nucleus, put one in each hand and invite you to name them. You call them “Al” and “Bob”. I then hide the electrons, shake them up, and put one in each hand again. Which one’s Al and which one’s Bob? You have no way to tell them apart. Still, you can look at them, count them and see that there are two separate, distinct electrons… this is confirmed when I put them back into the helium atom and observe that the atom’s charge goes from +2 to 0; if there were only one electron, the net charge would be +1.

 

[gearhead]

On the contrary, if Santa Claus is neccesary in all possible worlds, then it is possible for him to be neccesary in all possible worlds. If he exists in all possible worlds, it does not mean he is neccesary

Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p
Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p

If it is possible for Santa Clause to be in all possible worlds, then it is **necessary for him to be possible **in all possible worlds.

If it is **possible for Santa clause to be neccesary **in all possible worlds, then it is necessary for Santa clause in all posible worlds.

necessary for him to be possible and possible for him to be neccesary are not the same things.

The former means he has to be possible, the later means it is possible for him the be neccesary. I do not believe it is possible for Santa Clause to be neccesary in all possible worlds

Let me ask you, what is possible to be neccesary in all possible worlds?

AFAICT, nothing at all.

 

[Oreoracle]

actualization of any particular universe is a separate subject from determinism, and then determinism and metaphysics only interact in the free will question, at least thats all i can think of this late.

Determinism would seem to entail fatalism, which dictates that the future set of events can only elapse in one possible way. Thus, there is only one possible world for any given point in the future. At least that’s what I make of it.

btw, you do know that scientism is false

I don’t support scientism, but I don’t believe we can prove it false. Scientific discoveries have led to surprising twists before, so who knows? Humanity used to think almost everything in reality was inexplicable and left questions open-ended, relying entirely on gods instead of explanations. As time went on, the mystery of the universe began to ebb, and people who made assertions such as yourself had to backpedal furiously to find the next “inexplicable” thing.

So you’re right: we don’t know that science can explain everything. But we don’t know that it can’t, either.

and science is a branch of metaphysics originally called natural philosophy?

Yes, I know this. Philosophy hasn’t helped us much since the formulation of science, though. We use it for everyday inductions and for the occasional deduction, but not for much else.

you seem to be accepting scientism.

I assure you that you’re imagining things.

so i guess the best answer is, it depends and we dont really know for sure.

I can always appreciate an honest “I/We don’t know.”

for my proof it only matters that it seem we have free will. whether it be illusory or not, it indicates G-d, either by design, in that a universe perfectly faking trillions of free will tests a day would need to be designed to do that. or in that we really have free will and that violates physical determinism. ergo, there is a G-d.

Firstly, probabilistic arguments are even more misleading than statistical arguments. It basically boils down to the fact that nearly everything is infinitely unlikely to have occured upon examination, but you’ve singled out something important to you (free will) and claimed that it’s somehow more significant. For example, you can pick up any item in your house and ask, “What are the odds that, out of all the things these atoms could have formed, out of all the spaces they could have occupied, they just so happened to form the object that’s in my hands now?” If we were to calculate the odds that each individual atom of the object would occupy the spaces they did so as to form the object, it would be off the charts. Is this proof of God? Even if it were convincing, referring to odds or probabilities is not “proof.” If there’s even a sliver of a chance that you’re wrong, it’s not a proof. Proofs are meant to establish certainties…certainties like “A-B=A-B.”

And secondly, you still haven’t defined “free will.”

there is a misunderstanding here. determinism refers to causal determinism, and an actualized world refers to this entire universe. separate from other possible worlds. this world has been actualized for 14 or so billion years.

Really? I thought possible worlds worked something like this: Oreoracle is hungry, and wants to eat Oreos to sate his hunger. Now, there’s a possible world in which Oreo eats the Oreos, and a possible world where he does not. If he proceeds to consume his chocolate brethren, the former possible world will be actualized. If he does not, then the latter will be actualized.

Is my metaphysical jargon off?

 

[Oreoracle]

Would “choice” then exist? Because when people say, “You have a choice” … whereas really it’s been chosen for you … by the laws of determined physics.

It’s misleading to say that you don’t have a choice. Determinism makes perfect sense if you simply look past the preconception of what “you” actually are. You make decisions, but it could be that you were “destined” to make those decisions. You could be an object whose course is determined like that of a projectile.

So yes, you have choices to make, but whether you are free to make any choice is debatable.

Also, the Aristotelian and Thomistic understanding is that we have two distinct desires: a rational desire and a sensual desire. The rational desire is the will, and the sensual desire is the emotions.

Desires are emotional by definition. It seems to me that Aristotle and Aquinas were in the business of complicating otherwise simple ideas and definitions (which was necessary for their outrageous “proofs”). As a result, I avoid them as much as possible, and certainly wouldn’t look to them for philosophical guidance.

Our will can choose to follow what the intellect believes is best or it can decide to follow what the emotions are inclining the person to do (sometimes, the intellect and the emotions agree … which is awesome).

The problem here is that you’re creating a false dichotomy; you’re saying that emotions and the intellect work individually (but may agree). But if you do a little introspection, you’ll find that every decision is ultimately an emotional one*. We simply have the choice of whether we eant reason to accompany our emotions, but the emotions can’t be absent in decision-making.

*In ethics, for example, a common axiomatic value is “I should uphold life.” Though this sounds intellectually sound, there is an undeniable desire for life involved. Without that desire, the ethic would not be asserted to begin with.

No, you see, the computer would explode. For example, let’s say I check what the determined future will be in five seconds (particularly … what I’d be doing). Two possible things I would see… 1) I’ll be sitting by the computer still, or 2) I won’t be. If I see that I will be sitting by the computer, I’ll be a contrarian and walk away from it, thus proving that the future is not determined, or, if I’m not sitting by the computer in the next 5 seconds, I’ll be the contrarian and remain sitting there for the next 5 seconds, thus proving the future is not determined. The computer couldn’t possibly calculate that because it would go into a infinite programming loop. See?

This is interesting…I’ll have to think about it for a while. Methinks that we’re overlooking something, though: the computer itself would be affected by determinism, and so it could be determined that it would make an incorrect calculation, that you would view the calculation, and that you would attempt to act contrary to it. It could be paradoxical, but I don’t know if this is a problem for determinism per se.

The problem, then, seems to lie with our use of hypotheticals–by positing that a being could know the future, we’re effectively removing that being from the determined system (which is cheating).

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Determinism would seem to entail fatalism, which dictates that the future set of events can only elapse in one possible way. Thus, there is only one possible world for any given point in the future. At least that’s what I make of it.

one of the operators to possibly world semantics, is “possible”. its not a momenet to moment situations that define a world, but rather a universe sytem in its entirelty geometrically and temporally. maybe you are talking about a different school or something?

I don’t support scientism, but I don’t believe we can prove it false.

i suppose you can exclude it in any situation that deals with non-empirical data. free will, ontology, etc.

if a subject extends beyond the empirical then it seems that scientism is disproved.

Scientific discoveries have led to surprising twists before, so who knows? Humanity used to think almost everything in reality was inexplicable and left questions open-ended, relying entirely on gods instead of explanations. As time went on, the mystery of the universe began to ebb, and people who made assertions such as yourself had to backpedal furiously to find the next “inexplicable” thing.

there are limitations, specifically to what is empirical. the laws of physics rule out certain things like pre-planck observations, etc.

So you’re right: we don’t know that science can explain everything. But we don’t know that it can’t, either.

sure we do, as above, there are certain limits, within reason of course.

Yes, I know this. Philosophy hasn’t helped us much since the formulation of science, though. We use it for everyday inductions and for the occasional deduction, but not for much else.

yet without it, no science would exist, without some training in it a man generally has poor critical thinking skills, without it we wouldnt have government, without it we wouldnt have rights. i suggest you rely on philosophy everyday.

Firstly, probabilistic arguments are even more misleading than statistical arguments. It basically boils down to the fact that nearly everything is infinitely unlikely to have occured upon examination, but you’ve singled out something important to you (free will) and claimed that it’s somehow more significant. For example, you can pick up any item in your house and ask, “What are the odds that, out of all the things these atoms could have formed, out of all the spaces they could have occupied, they just so happened to form the object that’s in my hands now?” If we were to calculate the odds that each individual atom of the object would occupy the spaces they did so as to form the object, it would be off the charts. Is this proof of God? Even if it were convincing, referring to odds or probabilities is not “proof.” If there’s even a sliver of a chance that you’re wrong, it’s not a proof. Proofs are meant to establish certainties…certainties like “A-B=A-B.”

you are thinking mathematical proofs. like in geometry. needless to say this isnt geometry.

if 100% certainty is your level of evidence you simply fall back into solipsism. nothing is real but what you can be certain of, which is only cogito ergo sum.

so, let me ask, are you a solipsist? i suppose not or you wouldnt belive that animals have emotions.

so do you have an onjection to the argument that doesnt rely on solipsism?

And secondly, you still haven’t defined “free will.”

i mean libertarian free will.

Really? I thought possible worlds worked something like this: Oreoracle is hungry, and wants to eat Oreos to sate his hunger. Now, there’s a possible world in which Oreo eats the Oreos, and a possible world where he does not. If he proceeds to consume his chocolate brethren, the former possible world will be actualized. If he does not, then the latter will be actualized.

Is my metaphysical jargon off?

i think so. each way the world could have been is said to be a seperate possible world.

 

[Areopagite]

Say you have an object in front of you. Through various tests, you determine that it is not made up of normal matter - no protons, neutrons, electrons, etc. Nevertheless, you can interact with it: you see it, you can touch it, you can move it around… is it “material”? How do you know?

I guess that would work. However, in that case, we definitely don’t use “material” in that sense when talking about God. We say that God can affect matter but matter can’t affect God.

Are you claiming that if something can affect matter then necessarily it must be able to be affected by matter? If so, do you claim this based on the discoveries of an inductive science (reasoned from sense observation), or do you reason this based on a deductive science (based on first principles and general metaphysics). If it is the latter, then prove it, and I will agree. If it is the former, then it’s no real proof at all, because there might be some thing you haven’t observed that can affect matter but not be affected by it.

I’m not sure where you’re going with these. Magnetism and the strong nuclear force are both properties of matter.

My point was that forces, even if they are properties of matter, are not made of matter themselves. They have a definite immaterial quality about them. But no matter … just address the argument I have above.

Wait… so the “essence” of Santa Claus includes having a white beard and being fat, but it doesn’t include existence? How can a non-existent being have a white beard or be fat?

In the mind, my friend. In the mind.

For more info, you can consult the discussion Spock and I are having on the Omni-Max thread. There I go into detail about the necessary distinction between essence and existence. Without that distinction, all science can go out the window.

No, because it leads to a major problem. If we take this argument as correct, we see that your line of reasoning has a few very interesting implications:

1. God is a singular being.
2. God has “all being”.
3. therefore, all being is God.
4. therefore, no beings exist that are not God.
5. however, I am a being and I exist.
6. therefore, I am God.

You’re messing with the pure copula (the syncategorematic word and logical operator “is” … or “am” or “are”). Let’s re-write each proposition in the argument in proper propositional form (getting rid of the misleading pseudo-copula “has”):

1. God is a singular being
2. God is a thing that has “all being”
3. therefore, a thing that has all being is God

And so we have …

1. therefore, no beings exist that are things that have all being, except God
2. I am a being and I am an existing thing
3. But that doesn’t mean that I am God … because it was never disproved that something could be a thing that doesn’t have all being but just some being

I may have made a mistake somewhere … but I hope not.

1. God has “all being”.
2. God’s being is perfect.
3. therefore, all being is perfect.
4. therefore, no imperfection exists.

As said before imperfection is a kind of non-being. That is, it doesn’t exist in actuality, but can be called a logical being … that is a concept that can only exist in the mind but can have foundation in reality. An example of this would be “non-red” … this is a logical being. “non-red” doesn’t exist in reality. However, it is true that in reality that some things are not red. That is, with some actually existing things, they do not possesses some kinds of being (such as “red”). But what they positively have is perfect, but if they don’t have all being, then there is negation, and thus they have imperfection.

I hope that kinda made sense. It’s a good question. Since the very beginning of philosophy, this question has been argued over. Aristotle has given the only sensible explanation (which is the one I gave).

But does a difference of location necessarily imply a difference in “greatness” or level of perfection?

It may not imply a difference in level of perfection, but can imply another perfection. If something exists in California, it has the perfection of existing in California. If something exists in Africa, it has the perfection of existing in Africa. These are different perfections, but can be said (I suppose) to be on the same level of perfection (at least, I think … hypothetically at least).

No, I’m just referring to the fact that “maximal greatness” was presented as a level of greatness above which is not conceivable.

Yeaaaah … not sure what you’re saying here.

Personally, I don’t like using the notion of “what is conceivable” in proofs - to me, it smacks of an argument from ignorance. However, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

Well, if you can prove that it’s an invalid argument, then you’ll have a point. Otherwise, this “smacking” doesn’t have any rational weight in a rational discussion.

But that’s not the definition used in the original argument. The argument defines “maximal greatness”… or at least, it defines it in part and is silent on the rest.

It definitely does not give a definition of it but says some of the stuff it has (unless I’m misreading it). In any case, I have provided the full definition based on what the Scholastics said (and which I assume that the proof is using). I am, of course, open to correction on this.

However, because it’s defined its terms, we could be talking about gophers in tutus instead of maximal greatness as long as the term “gophers in tutus” was defined in the argument as the name for a set of attributes that includes omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness.

I confess that I do not understand what you’re talking about. I feel that it may be obvious though.

 

[Areopagite]

And if this is something that God can’t do, then doesn’t this speak to the contradictory nature of omnipotence? And if the attribute itself is self-contradictory, then it would be reasonable to declare premise (1) in the original argument false right off the bat.

Omnipotence is defined as being able to do anything. Now the technical definition of “thing” in metaphysics (and I’m not making this up) is any “real being” (that is, anything that does not have a contradictory essence and has intrinsic possibility). Now sometimes “thing” is used to describe absurdities like “square circles” but that’s not how it’s used in the definition of omnipotence.

So, I was just asking (myself … or anyone who knows) whether giving a created thing (a thing that does not have all being) omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness would end up in a logical absurdity. Frankly, I’m not sure. (however, “perfect goodness” can be synonymous with “having all being” … unless you’re simply talking about “perfectly morally good” … either way, it applies to God, but not necessary both ways to creatures).

I agree for “infinite”, but not for “non-material”, because it would imply a set of things that God could not be.

Once again “being composed of matter” is a perfection that implies an imperfection. It entails some non-being. God is all being, thus it would be a logically absurdity that God would be composed of matter (in his divine nature itself). I could explain how the Incarnation nonetheless works … if you want to go there.

But as I mentioned in my later reply, the argument makes a leap from “maximal greatness” to “a maximally great being” without explanation or support.

Once again, only one thing can have maximal greatness, because the thing would have all positive being … and if there could be something else with all positive being that wasn’t God, then God wouldn’t have something that the other thing did have … which would imply God didn’t have some being … which would be a contradiction given that God has maximally great being.

It’s kinda like the old line about the claim “all swans are white” - it only takes one black swan to refute it. If you argue that a specific bird is white because it’s a swan and all swans are white, then if I produce a black swan, I can negate your argument. This doesn’t mean your swan isn’t white; it just means that if it is white, it’s white for reasons other than your claim that all swans are white.

Correct. However the claim “All swans are white” was said based on an inductive argument. The argument for a maximally great being is a deductive argument, as it uses metaphysical principles. Thus, if you were to find an exception to valid deductive argument, you would effectively disprove the principle of non-contradiction. This is the claim at least.

Just read on … I’ll show you.

Wrong. Look at it this way: say you’ve got a neutral helium atom: two protons, two neutrons, two electrons. You know there are two electrons because you can measure the charge of the atom and see that it’s neutral: the two positive charges in the nucleus must be balanced by two negative charges.

Now, imagine that I strip the electrons away from the nucleus, put one in each hand and invite you to name them. You call them “Al” and “Bob”. I then hide the electrons, shake them up, and put one in each hand again. Which one’s Al and which one’s Bob? You have no way to tell them apart. Still, you can look at them, count them and see that there are two separate, distinct electrons… this is confirmed when I put them back into the helium atom and observe that the atom’s charge goes from +2 to 0; if there were only one electron, the net charge would be +1.

Okay, however, if you really want to say that there are no differences between the electrons … then … then when I put one in each hand and tell you to choose one of the two, you have to say, “There’s not two electrons … there’s one electron.” I respond, “But there’s one in each hand … they’re not the same electron, otherwise I can’t hold them in different hands.” You respond, “Nope … just one electron … in fact, only one electron exists in the whole universe.”

Oh please. The fact is there are many electrons in the universe. And although they share the same essence (same substantial form, as Aristotle would say) they are distinguished by their accidents/attributes. And what accident in particular makes them different from each other? Well, I’d say their location in space. Matter is like that.

God, as said before, is not limited by the confines of space. In fact, because God is all being by his very definition and essence, he doesn’t have any accidents (that is, he does not have attributes that are changeable … unlike the attribute of electrons being able to change locations, for it is not intrinsic that an electron has to be in one particular space). Change always implies some negation, some ability to take on new being and discard being. But if something by its very definition/essence is a thing with all being, then there is no negation.

Hence (and this is important!) no two things with all being can exist, because the only two reasons why two things of the same essence can exist is:

• They’re essences are different (but here each has the same essence, so this can’t be the reason)
• They have the same essence but different accidents (but if they have all being in their essence, they would necessarily have no accidents, because accidents by definition are changeable things and change implies negation and thus implies the lack of having all being)

There. I hope that made sense. But I have a feeling it’s unreadable. Oh well.

 

[Areopagite]

Desires are emotional by definition. It seems to me that Aristotle and Aquinas were in the business of complicating otherwise simple ideas and definitions (which was necessary for their outrageous “proofs”). As a result, I avoid them as much as possible, and certainly wouldn’t look to them for philosophical guidance.

“Desire” as talked about by Aristotle and Aquinas has also been translated as “attraction” or “inclination.” You would agree that not all attractions or inclinations are emotional, right? You would say that there are such things as magnetic attractions and gravitational attractions. Aristotle and Aquinas called these things “natural attractions” (or “natural desires” … which is, I confess, an archaic and very misleading translation). Now, of course there is much difference between emotional and gravitational attraction, as Aquinas definitely acknowledged too. Nonetheless, “attraction” is used for both of them (analogously, not univocally, but there is enough similarity enough to keep the same word). Likewise, Aquinas and Aristotle said the will is a kind of attraction, but one that is rationally controllable that we can freely choose in incline in one direction or the other (and the more we choose something, the greater the will inclines toward it). That’s the claim anyway.

And by the way, sometimes truth is complicated. And just because something is complicated doesn’t mean it should be avoided.

Also, most people would disagree with your view on the will (or rather your view of the non-existence of the will) so I wouldn’t say they were changing simple ideas or definitions, but actually keeping them. There is a hugely prevalent idea that “true love” is not merely emotional but something beyond that. It is a choice … a choice of the will. If you disagree with that, you’re definitely in the minority. And you’d be the one changing the ideas and definitions, not Aristotle and Aquinas.

But if you do a little introspection, you’ll find that every decision is ultimately an emotional one*. We simply have the choice of whether we eant reason to accompany our emotions, but the emotions can’t be absent in decision-making.

No, I’ve made some very unemotional decisions. I think most people have at least once in their life. And also I’ve done plenty of things that I didn’t feel like doing.

This is interesting…I’ll have to think about it for a while. Methinks that we’re overlooking something, though: the computer itself would be affected by determinism, and so it could be determined that it would make an incorrect calculation, that you would view the calculation, and that you would attempt to act contrary to it. It could be paradoxical, but I don’t know if this is a problem for determinism per se.

The problem, then, seems to lie with our use of hypotheticals–by positing that a being could know the future, we’re effectively removing that being from the determined system (which is cheating).

Yeah, I agree. My argument doesn’t disprove determinism, but I think it does disprove that such a computer (or whatever) could exist because it would have to be outside the determined system. It would have to take into account itself and what’s its doing … and what it’s doing about what it’s doing … and about what’s it doing about what it’s doing about what it’s doing … and you would have a infinite loop. A programming error. Boom!

 

[gearhead]

Note: I’ve cut some of your quotes down to get under the character limit.

Are you claiming that if something can affect matter then necessarily it must be able to be affected by matter? If so, do you claim this based on the discoveries of an inductive science (reasoned from sense observation), or do you reason this based on a deductive science (based on first principles and general metaphysics). If it is the latter, then prove it, and I will agree. If it is the former, then it’s no real proof at all, because there might be some thing you haven’t observed that can affect matter but not be affected by it.

That wasn’t what I was claiming but now that I think about it, in terms of forces, Newton’s Third Law says that if you impart a force on a mass, then the mass imparts a force right back.

My claim was that anything that affects the material universe is itself material (though maybe “physical” might be a better term to use).

My point was that forces, even if they are properties of matter, are not made of matter themselves. They have a definite immaterial quality about them. But no matter … just address the argument I have above.

In the mind, my friend. In the mind.

IOW, Santa Claus exists, just not “materially”.

You’re messing with the pure copula

…]

I may have made a mistake somewhere … but I hope not.

I think I added in (but now that I look at it didn’t explicitly state) your idea that two beings that share all the same attributes are the same being. If God is “all being”, then no other beings are distinguishable from God… or at least from a component or aspect of God. Therefore, no beings other than God exist, right?

As said before imperfection is a kind of non-being.

…]

Aristotle has given the only sensible explanation (which is the one I gave).

Personally, I don’t think that talking about colours and “perfection” really works. Why is it more “perfect” for light to have a wavelength that’s closer to one value than another?

And I don’t agree that imperfection necessarily implies non-being. I think the conclusion that my argument reached shows a flaw in the original premises.

For example, consider the emotion of anger: in some circumstances, God is described as being justly angry. Does “righteous anger” have being while “irrational anger” does not? If so, why?

It may not imply a difference in level of perfection, but can imply another perfection. If something exists in California, it has the perfection of existing in California. If something exists in Africa, it has the perfection of existing in Africa. These are different perfections, but can be said (I suppose) to be on the same level of perfection (at least, I think … hypothetically at least).

Right. But terms like “maximal greatness” only refer to the level of greatness. If two approaches both acheive the same level of greatness, then they’re equally great regardless of whether they accomplish it in different ways.

Yeaaaah … not sure what you’re saying here.

Never mind. It’s not important.

It definitely does not give a definition of it but says some of the stuff it has (unless I’m misreading it). In any case, I have provided the full definition based on what the Scholastics said (and which I assume that the proof is using). I am, of course, open to correction on this.

My point was just that the way the original argument is structured, it doesn’t matter whether “maximal greatness” includes “all being”; the argument doesn’t rely on that specific attribute.

I confess that I do not understand what you’re talking about. I feel that it may be obvious though.

In one way of approaching the argument, “maximal greatness” is just the label for a set. The members of the set are all attributes, and the argument states that omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness are all members of the set.

My point was just that the label for the set doesn’t really matter. We don’t have to worry about what to include in the set or not because this is given in the argument. In the argument, the set “maximal greatness” includes the specified attributes. If you had labelled the set “groundhogs in tutus”, it would still include the specified attributes, because the attributes are explicitly stated in the argument.

However, I think this approach isn’t the only way of looking at the argument. It’s kinda fallen out of the discussion so far… roughly:

Q: What’s “maximal greatness”? The term is vague.
A: It’s defined right here: “maximal greatness” is maximal excellence.
Q: But “maximal excellence” is vague, too. What do you mean by it?
A: That’s in the argument as well: “maximal excellence” necessarily includes omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness.

IOW, there’s two approaches that we can take:

1. Fight over the meaning of the vague terms “greatness” and “excellence” as well as the implications of those meanings.
2. Treat “maximal greatness” and “maximal excellence” as placeholder terms and mentally drop the given meaning into the argument in their places.

But you know what? A light bulb just went on in my head. Consider the second approach: what we’d be dropping into premise (1) in place of “maximal goodness” isn’t just “omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness”, it’s “necessary omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness”. When we take this approach, it really breaks down to a statement that’s a tautology in modal logic: necessary things exist in all possible worlds. All the stuff about omnipotence and the other properties of God just devolves into irrelevant hand-waving.

The alternative to this is approach 1, where justification has to be made for these implicit premises:

• “goodness” exists as an objective measure (maybe there are no objective standards at all by which to measure "goodness).
• a “maximal” value for goodness exists (maybe there’s no upper limit to “goodness”).
• “excellence in every possible world” is more “good” than excellence in only one world or a finite set of worlds.
• “maximal excellence” can be be manifest as a “maximally excellent being”.
• “maximal excellence” necessarily implies omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness.