Atheism, Burden of Proof, and Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument

[Oreoracle]

Hey, here’s an exercise for you all: Prove that the universe could possibly be any different than it is, has been, or will be. Go on, I’m waiting.

Many of you talk about this “possible worlds” nonsense as though it’s something worthy of being assumed, but I’m not buying it. How about theists try to concoct an argument for God that, ya know, relies on the actual world and not possible ones for a change? That would be infinitely more effective.

 

[tjm190]

You don’t understand the argument:

Axiom S5 states

* Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p
* Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p

So if it is possible for God to be **necessary ** then it is **necessary
**

Santa Clause is not necessary

As pedantic as this may seem, define necessary if you will.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

You don’t understand the argument:

Axiom S5 states

* Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p
* Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p

So if it is possible for God to be **necessary ** then it is **necessary
**

Santa Clause is not necessary

you know i always thought that plantingas placing s5 in there was a bit of a kowtow. heirachichally or not, ICR leads to a non-existent chain. the equivalent of a POOF! theory. every element came into being in a self supporting manner, for no reason. no difference between that and G-ddidit.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Hey, here’s an exercise for you all: Prove that the universe could possibly be any different than it is, has been, or will be. Go on, I’m waiting.

sure, symmetry could have broken differently, the baryonic preference could have been different, to name a few. those would have created entirely different universes. different laws of physics. different matter antimatter ratios, or a pure EM universe among other possibilities.

Many of you talk about this “possible worlds” nonsense as though it’s something worthy of being assumed, but I’m not buying it.

why do you have a problem with modal logic? thats like saying you have a problem with mathematics, which is just another school of logic. maybe you dont like it because it means you might be wrong, there is a G-d after all?

How about theists try to concoct an argument for God that, ya know, relies on the actual world and not possible ones for a change? That would be infinitely more effective.

you mean like Aquinas 5 ways, the ontological argument, the contingency argument, the argument from design? yeah, we got plenty of those.

 

[Oreoracle]

sure, symmetry could have broken differently, the baryonic preference could have been different, to name a few. those would have created entirely different universes. different laws of physics. different matter antimatter ratios, or a pure EM universe among other possibilities.

Could you dumb that down a bit?

What I’m saying is that, strictly speaking, we have no way of knowing that things could have played out differently than they have. Sure, we can speculate and say, “If factor X was changed then Z would have resulted instead of Y.” But we have no way of knowing if factor X could have been changed.

Let me put it this way (forgive me if you’ve already answered this before): if we knew the location, energy, and all other significant factors of all the atoms in the universe, would we be able to predict the exact conditions of the universe 5 seconds from now? And before you say that free will throws a wrench in that possibility, consider: If we knew the cognitive, emotional, and intellectual tendencies of human minds, the genetics, etc., of all humans, could we predict the next actions of all humans? These are interesting to consider, and I wouldn’t be willing to toss determinism without reason.

maybe you dont like it because it means you might be wrong, there is a G-d after all?

I’m not afraid of being wrong. I’m afraid of being right and being ignored.

you mean like Aquinas 5 ways, the ontological argument, the contingency argument, the argument from design? yeah, we got plenty of those.

Well, Aquinas’ first three ways are more or less identical, with slightly different wording (all of which mention or allude to possible worlds). Arguments from design abuse subjective notions such as “order” and “beauty” (just ask an artist what counts as being orderly or beautiful!). And “contingency” includes possible worlds in its very definition. No, I haven’t seen a decent argument for God that doesn’t use “possible worlds.”

 

[Areopagite]

1. There is a possible world in which maximal jolliness is instantiated.
2. A maximally jolly being necessarily possesses maximal jolliness in every possible world.
3. A maximally jolly being is necessarily bearded, a giver of presents, and perfectly jolly.
4. Hence, a maximally jolly being exists in every possible world.
5. Therefore, a maximally jolly being exists.

Voila, I just proved Santa Clause

You have to explain what “maximal jolliness” means/entails. I have already offered what “maximal greatness” or “maximal excellence” mean (based on what Aristotle and the Scholastics meant by it) on these posts:

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5808023&postcount=44
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5808024&postcount=45

Jolliness would (correct me if I’m wrong) be an emotion. All emotions are perfections that imply an imperfection. This is because the purpose/function of emotion is to assist human action … or at least to incline one to do something so that it may be easier to do (as anger helps one fight in battle … or as fear helps one move away from danger … of course emotion can incline one to do the opposite of what one intends unfortunately), but God can do everything just fine without sensual reinforcement. We on the other hand, are not omnipotent, but very limited, but emotions can provide facility to get things done (and yes, can impede us to if we lack the virtue to turn the emotions in the right direction). Hence, emotion (including jollity) is an perfection implying an imperfection.

Now, you say that a maximally jolly being would necessarily exist in all possible worlds. However, this is not true, because maximal jolliness is contingent and does not have of its nature necessary existence. The argument here is that a maximally great being (as I explained in the previous posts) has all being … that is, it has every perfection, everything that can possibly exist in it. With that, it must also exist in another possible world, otherwise it would not have some existence (which would be a contradiction).

Correct me, philosophers, if I misspoke here. I might have.

You said “A maximally jolly being is necessarily bearded, a giver of presents, and perfectly jolly” but of course this must be proved.

I gave an argument in the previous posts why a maximally great being would be omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good.

With #2 and #3 being flawed (and #1 needing explanation), your argument doesn’t seem to hold. It has yet to be clearly shown that Plantinga’s ontological argument has these flaws or any similar flaws such as these.

This does not mean Santa Claus doesn’t exist.

Hey, here’s an exercise for you all: Prove that the universe could possibly be any different than it is, has been, or will be. Go on, I’m waiting.

Many of you talk about this “possible worlds” nonsense as though it’s something worthy of being assumed, but I’m not buying it. How about theists try to concoct an argument for God that, ya know, relies on the actual world and not possible ones for a change? That would be infinitely more effective.

I have often heard atheistic scientists talk about possible worlds. It’s not just “nonsense” unique to Christian philosophers.

Would I be correct then that if one were to believe in free will, that the question of “possible worlds” would be okay?

Personally, (I may off) the belief in free will is on par with the belief in the reliability of the mind’s power to grasp reality and to reason correctly. It may not be provable (I may be wrong), but it is certainly something that we experience. You could say, “No, it just seems like we’re experiencing free will, but really it’s all deterministic processes in our brain that make us feel that way.” Likewise, it could be said, “No, we don’t perceive reality at all, because … it’s all subjective, we can’t confirm that the brain works because that would involve going outside the brain, or there is a Cartesian evil genius deluding our mind every step of the way.”

It’s just a leap of very reasonable, intuitive faith that we accept the reliability of the mind, as it is in accepting the existence of free will. Those are my thoughts. I may be wrong.

I would pose a similar doubt and ask, “Even if free will doesn’t exist, how do we know the laws of physics are really consistent? There may be exceptions here and there.” The fact is, we can’t prove they are consistent. It’s by way of induction that we say they are.

Let me put it this way (forgive me if you’ve already answered this before): if we knew the location, energy, and all other significant factors of all the atoms in the universe, would we be able to predict the exact conditions of the universe 5 seconds from now? And before you say that free will throws a wrench in that possibility, consider: If we knew the cognitive, emotional, and intellectual tendencies of human minds, the genetics, etc., of all humans, could we predict the next actions of all humans? These are interesting to consider, and I wouldn’t be willing to toss determinism without reason.

I’ve thought about this and then wondered … what if someone was looking at the big super-computer that calculated the deterministic outcome of the universe in the next 5 seconds … but what if that person was intending to be a contrarian and plans to contradict the computer’s prediction? Hmm. Seems like there might be a huge cosmic contradiction on our hands … possibly leading to the universe’s annihilation.

This question is in partial homage to Spock.

 

[punkforchrist]

We may need to rethink what it means for an argument to be “sound.” Obviously, we’re going to include logical validity, but does the argument have to be rationally compelling? What I have suggested is that one is within his or her epistemic rights of accepting (1), which in combination with the S5 axiom, gives us the conclusion that God exists. The term, “sound,” is applied equally to those arguments that are merely rationally acceptable (and not necessarily compelling). If the MOA were unsound, then it would be irrational to accept it.

With that said, one cannot, in my opinion, legitimately maintain that the argument is unsound apart from some kind of defeater for (1). In the past there were some atheologians who held that the reality of evil was inconsistent with God’s existence, but ever since Plantinga’s assessment of the logical problem of evil in God, Freedom, and Evil, the general consensus is that God’s existence is perfectly consistent with evil. Of course, I think other attempts at reconciling the two were successful, e.g. Augustine’s, Thomas’, and so forth. However, Plantinga’s refutation is what actually persuaded many to abandon the logical problem of evil. Even atheist Michael Martin admits, “the conjunction of the following three statements [1. God is all-powerful and all-knowing; 2. God is all-good; 3. Evil exists] is not inconsistent” (emphasis in original).*

To my mind, the logical problem of evil is the best argument that would establish the logical impossibility of God’s existence (a deistic or pantheistic God, notwithstanding). So, if this argument fails, then it seems to me that there is no difficulty in accepting (1) and maintaining one’s proper rationality.

*Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Temple University Press, 1990, p. 341.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Another point - if a perfect being is “infinite in every extent,” then that must mean that he is infinite in size. So how come there’s room for us?

A sufficient Answer to your question is already given in the post that you just quoted.

If you find it difficult to comprehend logic, then i am sorry about your misfortune; but i for one cannot help you.

 

[wanstronian]

A sufficient Answer to your question is already given in the post that you just quoted.

If you find it difficult to comprehend logic, then i am sorry about your misfortune; but i for one cannot help you.

Ah - a base insult rather than a lucid and reasonable response. Why aren’t I surprised, coming from you?

Your post that I quoted contradicted itself, hence my question. Initially you stated, “It cannot be compared to that which has dimensions, limits and parts” (an assertion of dubious justification btw, but that’s you all over) but you then went on to say, “a being that is infinite in every extent.” Well, physical dimensions are extents - you can’t have it both ways.

 

[gearhead]

Because the Perfect Being is not material, therefore size is irrelevent.

If the “Perfect Being” is not material, then the “Perfect Being” does not posess omnipotence. Omnipotence is defined in terms of interaction with the material; if a being can interact with the material, then in some sense, that being is material itself.

Well, then your holding that it is false on faith. Nothing wrong with that per se, but I would imagine that it wouldn’t sit well for some atheists.

What exactly do you think the answer “I don’t know” holds on faith.

The argument only begs the question if one disputes that the existance of God is possible. Most people only dispute this after they have already read through the argument once, and know where it is going.

Well, as we’ve established in this thread, the terms used in the first premise are defined later on in the argument, so I would think that anyone who accepts the first premise without reading the argument all the way through had already decided that God exists before reading it.

And what exactly is wrong with disputing whether the existence of God is possible?

The “possible worlds” language muddies the waters in this. Maybe it would help if you understood that the phrase “God might exist” can be taken in one of two ways:

• “there is a possible world in which God exists.”
• “there may be a possible world in which God exists.”

The first way matches with premise (1) from the argument. The second doesn’t, but doesn’t necessarily declare premise (1) to be false… only undefined.

You don’t understand the argument:

Axiom S5 states

* Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p
* Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p

So if it is possible for God to be **necessary ** then it is **necessary
**

Santa Clause is not necessary

Are you sure? By the logic of the argument, if there’s a possibility that Santa Claus is “necessary”, then he exists.

 

[gearhead]

BTW - I brought up a point earlier, but it kinda got lost in the discussion. Anyone want to deal with it now?

Multiple “maximally great” entities would together be greater than a single “maximally great” entity. Therefore, if all the premises of the argument hold true and “maximal greatness” is necessary in all possible worlds, then an infinite number of “maximally great” beings exist, since for any finite number of “maximally great” beings, a higher degree of “greatness” could be acheived with one more of these beings, which would imply that any finite number of “maximally great” beings is not itself “maximally great” in the sense that it’s less great than another conceivable possibility.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Ah - a base insult rather than a lucid and reasonable response. Why aren’t I surprised, coming from you?

Not really an insult; but a fact. I am concerned about your incapacity to understand certain things which are to me very simple. You are either incapable of understanding, or you are trying very hard not to. Its not only frustrating to me, but there are many good fruits of knowledge that you are missing out on, and thats a real shame.

Your post that I quoted contradicted itself, hence my question. Initially you stated, “It cannot be compared to that which has dimensions, limits and parts” (an assertion of dubious justification btw, but that’s you all over) but you then went on to say, “a being that is infinite in every extent.” Well, physical dimensions are extents - you can’t have it both ways.

Your claim about my arguement lending itself to contradiction is quite simply bogus. When i say “extent”, i mean that it is infinite in “every way” as in to say there is nothing in it that is finite, which should really be obvious to you in so far as the context in which i wrote the word “extent”. Another poster was charitable enough to point out to you a very reasonable fact, that to say that something is infinite in “every way” explicitly implies that it is transcendent of physical beings, dimensions or existential limits, since it cannot be added to or multiplied. A being that no greater can be thought of cannot be something which has potentiality in it; since it is absolute and transcendent of time. A perfect being cannot begin to exist or fail to exist. I have already given my justifications for this, and so, if you are still having problems, you will just have to work it out for yourself. As for the other assertions you make, you do not go any further in justifying them, and so they are irrelevant to the discussion. I advise that you save the energy in your figures for when you finally decide to make a real arguement.

 

[MindOverMatter]

BTW - I brought up a point earlier, but it kinda got lost in the discussion. Anyone want to deal with it now?

Multiple “maximally great” entities would together be greater than a single “maximally great” entity. Therefore, if all the premises of the argument hold true and “maximal greatness” is necessary in all possible worlds, then an infinite number of “maximally great” beings exist, since for any finite number of “maximally great” beings, a higher degree of “greatness” could be acheived with one more of these beings, which would imply that any finite number of “maximally great” beings is not itself “maximally great” in the sense that it’s less great than another conceivable possibility.

1. A maximally great being is greater then all other beings.
2. Two maximally great beings are really the same being. They have no distinction, and so there is no reason to make a numeration or an implication of difference. When you begin making numerations you imply parts or dimensions that are distinct from one other, which makes no sense if both dimensions or beings are in fact infinite realities. An infinite being cannot be an individual among individuals. When something is infinite this means that it transcends all numerations, which also means that nothing can be compared to it or exist outside of it. If something is infinite in “every way”, then this itself implies that it is itself by definition “existence”, since a necessary being is by definition the difference between existence and absolute non-reality. So how can there be two necessary existences? To imply a difference makes no sense.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Perhaps i am being a little bit hasty with Wanstronian, as i did use a word that implies “extension”, as in, a being extended in space/time. All though i meant it in a very different sense as was implied the word “infinite”, it is understandable that my unfortunate wording would lead to confusion, if the opponent doesn’t have the necessary education in metaphysical truths. And so i apologize to my debating partner in regards to this particular mistranslation.

 

[wanstronian]

Not really an insult; but a fact. I am concerned about your incapacity to understand certain things which are to me very simple.

Your concern is touching but unnecessary, I’m quite cabale of grasping the concepts you discuss. In fact, I’d go further - I’m also capable of spotting the logical inconsistencies in your arguments, of which you seem blissfully unaware.

You are either incapable of understanding, or you are trying very hard not to. Its not only frustrating to me, but there are many good fruits of knowledge that you are missing out on, and thats a real shame.

Apologies for causing such frustration - perhaps if your posts were more logically robust we could avoid such situations? For instance, if you could refrain from making bare assertions (which, let’s be fair, constitute most of what you write), then maybe a proper discussion could be held. Just a thought.

Your claim about my arguement lending itself to contradiction is quite simply bogus. When i say “extent”, i mean that it is infinite in “every way” as in to say there is nothing in it that is finite, which should really be obvious to you in so far as the context in which i wrote the word “extent”. Another poster was charitable enough to point out to you a very reasonable fact, that to say that something is infinite in “every way” explicitly implies

“explicitly implies???” - there’s an indication of what I mean!

that it is transcendent of physical beings, dimensions or existential limits, since it cannot be added to or multiplied. A being that no greater can be thought of cannot be something which has potentiality in it; since it is absolute and transcendent of time. A perfect being cannot begin to exist or fail to exist. I have already given my justifications for this, and so, if you are still having problems, you will just have to work it out for yourself.

I think the problem is that there is nothing of any note to be worked out.You are confusing assertion with justification, so your posts are empty of substance.

As for the other assertions you make, you do not go any further in justifying them, and so they are irrelevant to the discussion.

Again, apologies if I have failed to justify my assertions - if you point out which ones you mean I will rectify.

I advise that you save the energy in your figures for when you finally decide to make a real arguement.

Ha ha! Very good! I like the way you state that I never present an argument, along with the subtext being that you consistently do! Such delicious irony, given the actuality.

Until now I have felt compelled to point out the deep inconsistencies and contradictions in your assertions. But maybe we should just ignore each other from now on, given your disproportionate reaction when your errors are exposed?

 

[MindOverMatter]

I’m quite cabale of grasping the concepts you discuss.

I certainly don’t know what you could possibly be implying here.

I’m sorry. I couldn’t help my self. Just joking.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Your concern is touching but unnecessary, I’m quite cabale of grasping the concepts you discuss. In fact, I’d go further - I’m also capable of spotting the logical inconsistencies in your arguments, of which you seem blissfully unaware.Apologies for causing such frustration - perhaps if your posts were more logically robust we could avoid such situations? For instance, if you could refrain from making bare assertions (which, let’s be fair, constitute most of what you write), then maybe a proper discussion could be held. Just a thought.“explicitly implies???” - there’s an indication of what I mean!I think the problem is that there is nothing of any note to be worked out.You are confusing assertion with justification, so your posts are empty of substance.Again, apologies if I have failed to justify my assertions - if you point out which ones you mean I will rectify.Ha ha! Very good! I like the way you state that I never present an argument, along with the subtext being that you consistently do! Such delicious irony, given the actuality.

Until now I have felt compelled to point out the deep inconsistencies and contradictions in your assertions. But maybe we should just ignore each other from now on, given your disproportionate reaction when your errors are exposed?

What a shame. You have not made one reflective philosophical arguement. You have not made one sufficient rebuttal among this sea of wasted words. All you have done is make accusation; and you haven’t back up one them. How sad that it had to end on this note.

The only thing you seem to be good at is making yourself look intelligent by the mere coupling of assertions. I wouldn’t call that a talent; but you are certainly consistent:thumbsup:.

 

[gearhead]

1. A maximally great being is greater then all other beings.

Wait one minute. I think we have to define our terms here. How are we defining “maximal” for this argument? I see two possibilities:

• “maximal” just means “more than anything else”, not necessarily “as much as could possibly be”. If that’s the case, then yes, you can only have one “maximally great” being, but “maximal greatness” would not necessarily imply perfection in any sense.
• “maximal” means “as much as is possible” or “so much as to be perfect”. If that’s the case, then there’s no limitation on number.

1. Two maximally great beings are really the same being. They have no distinction, and so there is no reason to make a numeration or an implication of difference.

We might not be able to distinguish between them, but the two beings certainly could distinguish between themselves… after all, we’ve defined them as omniscient.

When you begin making numerations you imply parts or dimensions that are distinct from one other, which makes no sense if both dimensions or beings are in fact infinite realities.

And? You imply a numeration as well (or rather, the argument does): one.

An infinite being cannot be an individual among individuals. When something is infinite this means that it transcends all numerations, which also means that nothing can be compared to it or exist outside of it.

Not quite. There are different types of infinity. Look at it this way: imagine a graph with “greatness of a being” along the x-axis and “number of beings” along the y. The total greatness of the system would be the area of the graph.

For a single “maximally great” being, the area of the graph would be infinitely long, but only one unit high. For an infinite number of “maximally great” beings, the graph would be infinitely high as well as infinitely long.

In both cases greatness is infinite, but the greatness of the infinite system of beings is always greater than the greatness of the single being… infinitely greater, in fact.

If something is infinite in “every way”, then this itself implies that it is itself by definition “existence”, since a necessary being is by definition the difference between existence and absolute non-reality. So how can there be two necessary existences?

I’m not sure how your implication makes any sense, and I’m not sure why you think “infinite” means “infinite in every way”… especially since there’s been quite a bit of discussion about ways in which a “maximally excellent” being would not be infinite in every way, such as size, fluffiness and jolliness. Also, just above you in your own post, you argued that such a being is not infinite in number.

To imply a difference makes no sense.

Only if you assume *a priori *that only a single god exists.

 

[wanstronian]

I certainly don’t know what you could possibly be implying here.

I’m sorry. I couldn’t help my self. Just joking.

I know - I typed it all out once, then the stupid website blank-screened me, I couldn’t get it back. So my second attempt was somewhat rushed.

 

[wanstronian]

What a shame. You have not made one reflective philosophical arguement. You have not made one sufficient rebuttal among this sea of wasted words. All you have done is make accusation; and you haven’t back up one them. How sad that it had to end on this note.

The only thing you seem to be good at is making yourself look intelligent by the mere coupling of assertions. I wouldn’t call that a talent; but you are certainly consistent:thumbsup:.

Okay then, let’s leave it. My head hurts from all this wall-butting.