There are a great many resources on this argument already, but I’m interested in exploring it some here.
Plantinga’s version of the OA states this:
- There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.
- A maximally great being necessarily possesses maximal excellence in every possible world.
- A maximally excellent being is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
- Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in every possible world.
- Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists.
It may surprise some that premises (2) - (4) are relatively uncontroversial. If one accepts the so-called S5 axiom (if p is possibly necessary, then p is necessary), then the only premise under contention is (1).
So, let’s ask ourselves: is it even
possible that God exists? If it is at least possible, then it seems to me that weak atheism is untenable, and that a proof must be offered in support of the claim that God cannot possibly exist. This theoretically can be done by demonstrating the contradiction inherent in the divine attributes, or that the problem of evil is inconsistent with such a being. Neither of these arguments has gained much support among philosophers (the evidential problem of evil is now most popular among atheologians).
Of course, (1) also appears to beg the question. One wouldn’t accept the premise, unless he or she already accepted the conclusion. This puts us at a bit of an impasse. However, if there are no compelling reasons to accept ~(1), then (1) can very well be rationally justified, even if it is itself not compelling.
punkforChrist:
Aren’t you always astounded by the paucity of thought inscribed by atheists when presented by this modal argument? I mean, really, is it that difficult to comprehend? I will admit that I am not a modal logician. There are certain rules and laws, in this game, that I do not know, or know of. However, this argument seems rather straightforward, in fact, almost scholastic.
Let’s take the premises one by one:
First, premise one says:
There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated. There’s no question that such a world can not only be, but can come about. In fact, for evolution to have a chance in
hades of occurring, this must be so. Evolution is predicated upon the flora and fauna of this world proceeding toward greater and greater
greatness of being. Survival is dependent upon it; and, we know what it means. There’s no insipid arguments such as, "well, there’s no consensus of what “greatness” means, or, there’s no general understanding of what it means, or, it’s “undefined.” All of that silliness is nothing more than “reaching” in hopes of dislodging the argument along its path. But, a reasonable person will know that for what it is.
If anyone really wishes to know what the attributes impugned of God are, look them up. They’re on the internet. They are not vague. They do not lack verisimilitude. They have been said of our Hebrew/Christian God for some 35 centuries, by the majority of mankind and most of its best thinkers. Thus, we even know to whom these attributes are predicated.
Second, premise two says,
A maximally great being necessarily possesses maximal excellence in every possible world. This premise says, a maximally great being possesses
maximal great-ness in every possible world. Since we are using modal logic, the instantiation of possible worlds is part of it. “Excellence” = “great-ness”, very simple. Now, what on earth is an “attribute” other than
a characteristic or quality predicated of something? So, I surmise from this that there are no attributes free-floating in space. In fact, it seems that they adhere to something - a “being” of some sort.
Further, a being that possesses maximal greatness must also be
necessary, in that word’s widest sense, and thus extend to the “every possible world” scenario. Or else, it would be a being that did not possess maximal greatness, and we would be mistaken as to precisely whom, or what, we were referring to. That would be our failure, NOT the argument’s failure, or the failure of mankind.
Third, premise three says,
A maximally excellent being is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. Premise three may be re-stated as, “A maximally great being is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.” This is simply the short list. For the purposes of the discussion herein, it is a list that is sufficient. In fact, it is a list that is so sufficient that it contains its own possible defeater, from the point of view of one who believes the argument that because there are evils extant, God can’t possibly be maximally “good”. To those people the Church has an answer.
Fourth, premise four says,
Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in every possible world. IOW, a maximally great being exists in every possible world - for clear reasons heretofore iterated.
Fifth, premise five says,
Therefore, a maximally excellent (great) being exists. It is interesting to watch the atheists scamper about, desperately seeking to undo this conclusion. The absurd correlating of a
being of maximal greatness with a great
car is so ridiculous as to have been painful to write, much less post.
The premises all work. That being said, I can see where modal logic has its place - even Aquinas recognized that in certain circumstances. But, in general, it does not hold as much affinity with reality as does scholastic logic - and, Aquinas knew this as well.
In any event, it was enjoyable to watch what we have come to know as the “Atheist Dance.”
jd