Atheism, Burden of Proof, and Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument

[warpspeedpetey]

God never said anything to anyone.

the thousands of witnesses over the millenium that the various books, now called the Bible were being written, say otherwise. do you have some evidence they were lying or mistaken?

And the ontological attempt to prove God’s existence exclusively relies on the human version of “maximal greatness”.

and where do you think the human version of maximal greatness cam from? those may be modern words, but which attributes are maximal, has a lot to do with what G-d already told us. attempts to define them apart from that witness may lead one to think that they are somehow unrelated. but that clearly isnt the case.

As such it is fair game to rip it apart. If God wants to declare his version of his nature, all he has to do is come out of the closet. We are all eagerly awaiting his very own declaration. Straight from the horse’s mouth, as the saying goes.

youve had it, for millenia now, witnessed by thousands. he did exactly as you are asking. you just werent there for it. nor were you there to witness the revolution, the magna carta, alexanders conquests, or plato teaching. yet, i dont think you truly dounbt that they occured.

though the comment on “coming out of the closet”, just exposed the motivation for the vociferous opposition to Christianity. .

 

[JDaniel]

Well, I’m not an atheist but an agnostic. But anyway, you don’t seem to understand the problem.

The argument is straightforward. That doesn’t mean it is sound.

Yes there is a question that such a world can be. For instance, this world will end, and only a finite amount of greatness of being will have been achieved through evolution (if God doesn’t exist). More greatness would have been achieved in another possible world. In fact if maximal greatness is only finite there is not a possible world in which it is achieved, since for every world there’s always going to be another possible world in which greater greatness of being is achieved. It’s like asking what’s the largest positive integer. But the premise “there is a possible world in which infinite greatness is instantiated” why should anyone accept that? That’s the whole point which punkforchrist and I agree on. If you reply “well we can conceive of or imagine such a world” then you are confusing epistemic possibility with logical possibility.

That’s all fine, but doesn’t have to do with the objection I raised above.

That’s true only if “maximally great” means “infinitely great”.

The original argument did not sufficiently make the connection between maximal (infinite) greatness and necessary existence. Nevertheless such a connection can be made.

The conclusion is true given the premise. If it is logically possible that God (a necessary being) exists, then He exists. That’s what modal logic can say. The problem is that the first premise (God’s logical possibility) isn’t proven.

Well you can call that a dance if you like.

Nowagnostic:

Please accept my sincerest apologies. I mistook you for someone else who is an extreme atheist. You and I can philosophize together and perhaps come to terms on many things - if you wish. I have been an agnostic, and that turned into a fairly deep atheism that lasted a number of years. Now, I am a staunch theist.

I will watch your posts and intervene only when I have something profound to contribute. (How’s that for conceit?)

 

[JDaniel]

Well, I’m not an atheist but an agnostic. But anyway, you don’t seem to understand the problem.

If you would be so kind, re-explain the “problem”, please.

The argument is straightforward. That doesn’t mean it is sound.

Why would it be unsound, if, in fact, it is?

Yes there is a question that such a world can be. For instance, this world will end, and only a finite amount of greatness of being will have been achieved through evolution (if God doesn’t exist). More greatness would have been achieved in another possible world.

Well, would you agree that this world may end but only by entropy and perhaps millions of years from now?

In fact if maximal greatness is only finite there is not a possible world in which it is achieved, since for every world there’s always going to be another possible world in which greater greatness of being is achieved.

Do you think that “maximal greatness” = “finite greatness” due to some association with this world? Why?

It’s like asking what’s the largest positive integer. But the premise “there is a possible world in which infinite greatness is instantiated” why should anyone accept that?

And that’s the ultimate question. Why shouldn’t they? Our world is one in which we behold achieving more and more, and greater and great accomplishments almost daily. Except for the possibility of a continued entanglement with terrorism, or, the stray comet changing all life on the planet, science is providing us more and better realities and potentialities all the time. Doesn’t that seem to depict a world moving toward greater perfection - despite a few setbacks? And, doesn’t this imply a following-in-the-footsteps of that which is maximally great?

If the world was not proceeding toward more and more greatness, wouldn’t we be lingering in a stone age? So, if the world is proceeding on an ascasis of greatness what would be the impetus other than that we are following a being of maximal greatness already existing? It can’t be mankind, with our picayune existences, problems and selfishnesses. In general, we seek primarily creature comforts, not ethical betterness, or greater generosities.

That’s the whole point which punkforchrist and I agree on. If you reply “well we can conceive of or imagine such a world” then you are confusing epistemic possibility with logical possibility.

Yet, that is just so much mental pleasure. If we don’t take a larger look at the world, then we may miss the grounding for other possibilities of logical possibility. Does this make sense?

That’s true only if “maximally great” means “infinitely great”.

I should think that it does, don’t you? If not, why?

The original argument did not sufficiently make the connection between maximal (infinite) greatness and necessary existence. Nevertheless such a connection can be made.

I appreciate that.

The conclusion is true given the premise. If it is logically possible that God (a necessary being) exists, then He exists. That’s what modal logic can say. The problem is that the first premise (God’s logical possibility) isn’t proven.

Perhaps we’re stating the premises incorrectly? Can you see other ways of regarding P1?

Well you can call that a dance if you like.

As I said in my previous, this was not intended for you.

jd

 

[Areopagite]

From what I’ve skimmed, no one really has clearly defined what goodness, excellence, greatness, or perfection is, either among the Catholics, Atheists, Agnostics, or … Zoroastrians.

First of all, a brief note on “being.”

Being: that which can exist (this includes both actually existing things and mere potentially existing being)

Real Being: that which exists outside the mind

Ideal Being: that which exists in the mind

Logical Being: that which can exist only in the mind (but can have reference to reality)

Also, Real Being can be subdivided into Actual Being and Possible Being.

Also, Ideal Being can be subdivided into Subjective Being and Objective Being.

Subjective Being merely pertains to personal mental images of things. Objective Being pertains to the concepts abstracted from those images. Interesting, Possible Being and Objective Being can be equated, since anything that can be conceived of is a possible being.

The only way a being cannot be a Possible Being is if it has a contradictory essence. For example (classically) a square circle. Square circles cannot be fully conceived of but exist as a kind of dual concept (that is, an attempt but failure to combine two legitimate concepts). You could consider a square circle a logical being, as it as some remote existence only in the mind. Nonetheless, it is called a non-being, and it is very common to imply “real being” (as well as Objective Being) when you simply refer to “being.” It is also common to refer to “actual being” when you refer to “being” as well. So, oftentimes, misunderstandings can arise when one is not precise on this subject.

Now, real beings not only include substances (i.e. things that exist by themselves) but also include accidents (or attributes … things that can only exist in a substance). Also, real being is also positive being. This is different from negative being, which can only be part of logical being … not real being. Examples of negative being is “evil” and “nothing” and “non-existence” or even something like “non-dog” etc. It is the negation of some real existence. If one were to say that negative being is a kind of real being, the result would be absurd statements like “Nothing actually exists” which would not be true. However, we can say “Nothing exists as a purely mental concept” (i.e. a logical being). However, it is a logical being that can nonetheless have a foundation in reality in reference to certain real thing, but it itself cannot be a real being. I hope that makes some sense.

---

With that said, let’s move on to talking about goodness (and its vicious synonyms) …

Goodness very much pertains to Being. There are a few ways to divide goodness into its various kinds (and I’ll go into that if someone wants), but one such division may be the most useful in this case …

Ontological Good: anything that has real being (this is also called transcendental goodness … thus all real being is good in itself)

Natural Good: (also called Physical Good) anything that satisfies or fulfills the nature of something and thus helps to perfect it (e.g. having legs fulfills the nature of being a perfect human)

Moral Good: a thing that has everything demanded of it by moral law (e.g. natural law … pertains only to creatures with will … hopefully we don’t need to get into this in this thread)

Regarding ontological good, the more being a thing has, the more goodness it has. Remember, being is “that which can exist.” Thus, having more being/goodness involves possessing more of everything. A being that has all being/goodness (i.e. a being with maximal excellence … etcetcetc) would be a being that possessed everything that could possibly exist. This is the rationale for saying that God is omniscient (because He possesses ALL possible knowledge), and God is omnipotent (because He possess ALL power … i.e. ability to do stuff … that is, ability to do anything really possible … opposed to anything that has a contradictory essence).

Is this making some modest bit of sense?

 

[Areopagite]

Would a “maximally excellent” being be “perfectly fluffy” or “perfectly communist” along with the attributes listed in the argument? … Can a being be “perfectly good” and “perfectly selfish”?

Very good question. First of all …

Some perfections (i.e. possessed natural goods) are perfections that imply an imperfection. For example, for a human, the power of moving oneself is such a perfection. However, it implies an imperfection because humans can’t have an effect on certain places if they weren’t able to move. God on the other hand, does not need to move, and can still effect things at any place at any time. Does that kinda make sense?

The perfection of being fluffy is a perfection that implies an imperfection. The way to figure something like this out is to look at the final cause of things. What is the purpose of fluffiness, or, rather, what does it do? What does it contribute? It may be difficult to sum up its purpose, so I’ll just mention some attributes of it … it can feel good in a certain way. God can cause this exact effect on someone without being limited to existing as a limited to being light in texture. (I could go on, but I’ll only do so on request)

Can God be perfectly communist? Well, arguably, there are certain good aspects of communism, and God would possess those in some way, but there are bad or at least negative and limiting aspects to it, that God would not possess. Thus, God would not be communist (as it involves negative being).

Selfishness definitely implies an absence of being, namely lacking consideration of others. The positive aspect of selfishness is that it seeks one’s own good (I guess you could say), but it fails when it wrongly rejects the good of others. Thus, God would not be selfish (as it involves negative being).

Does the fact that purity and fairness are attributes mean that “pure love” or “fair justice” are beings?

Love and justice can exist, therefore they are beings. They are not, however, substances (that is, they do not exist by themselves but must exist IN something … particularly, a being with a will … but they can be considered in themselves in the mind).

By definition. “Perfectly innocent” implies no knowledge of evil. “Omniscient” implies knowledge of all things. A being that knows any evil might be omniscient, but it wouldn’t be perfectly innocent. A being that does not know evil would be perfectly innocent, but not omniscient. By definition, no being can posess both attributes at the same time.

The idea that “Innocence” necessarily pertains to “ignorance of evil” is not necessarily true. The essence of “Innocence” (at least how it’s used when applying to God) pertains to being morally perfect, that is, having one’s will free from malice but directed completely toward good. Oftentimes, however, when a humans learns of evil, he is said to “lose his innocence” but this is so because there is an understanding that perceiving the evil affects him in a bad way, that is, it influences his character, and oftentimes inclines him to be less innocent in his own actions. However, if one were morally perfect, one would not be affected by the knowledge of evil in this way, but continue to make perfect choices (and this is only possible with grace, so says the Church).

Thus, Innocence would not conflict with Omniscience, if Innocence is understood as being “morally perfect” and not “ignorance of evil.” Does that make sense?

No, not analogously. We actually do assign attributes to concepts, events, and other things that aren’t “beings”.

And there are plenty of descriptors that don’t work for beings.

No, actually, both of those describe relationships between things, not the things themselves.

I agree with you here. Attributes can exist in the mind. However, of course, they only actually exist in actually existing beings.

Quite so. For instance, in Judges 1:19, we learn that the Hebrew/Christian God can be thwarted by iron chariots. Therefore, the Hebrew/Christian God is not omnipotent, which would be that the “maximally excellent” being of the ontological argument is not the Hebrew/Christian God.

The understanding of this passage is that: even though the Hebrews had God on their side, they did not trust Him because they saw the enemy chariots.

God never said anything to anyone.

How do you know? Did God tell you this?

 

[NowAgnostic]

If you would be so kind, re-explain the “problem”, please.

Why would it be unsound, if, in fact, it is?

An unsound argument contains a false or unproven premise. And this one begins with the logical possibility of maximal (infinite) greatness being instantiated in a possible world. In fact, such a thing is not possible, the argument is unsound.

Well, would you agree that this world may end but only by entropy and perhaps millions of years from now?

Yes. So only a certain finite amount of greatness will have been achieved. It won’t have been “maximal” since another possible world could have contained more finite greatness. Unless “maximal” means “infinite”.

Do you think that “maximal greatness” = “finite greatness” due to some association with this world? Why?

I think we’re agreed maximal greatness must mean infinite greatness for the argument to make sense.

And that’s the ultimate question. Why shouldn’t they? Our world is one in which we behold achieving more and more, and greater and great accomplishments almost daily. Except for the possibility of a continued entanglement with terrorism, or, the stray comet changing all life on the planet, science is providing us more and better realities and potentialities all the time. Doesn’t that seem to depict a world moving toward greater perfection - despite a few setbacks? And, doesn’t this imply a following-in-the-footsteps of that which is maximally great?

If the world was not proceeding toward more and more greatness, wouldn’t we be lingering in a stone age? So, if the world is proceeding on an ascasis of greatness what would be the impetus other than that we are following a being of maximal greatness already existing? It can’t be mankind, with our picayune existences, problems and selfishnesses. In general, we seek primarily creature comforts, not ethical betterness, or greater generosities.

Yet, that is just so much mental pleasure. If we don’t take a larger look at the world, then we may miss the grounding for other possibilities of logical possibility. Does this make sense?

These things might lead us to conceive of an infinitely great being. It doesn’t show that being is logically possible, however.

Perhaps we’re stating the premises incorrectly? Can you see other ways of regarding P1?

Not really. If P1 is that there is a logically possible world in which infinite greatness is instantiated, then, given the necessary argumentation to connect infinite greatness with necessary existence, that God (infinite greatness) exists follows from modal logic.

If P1 states merely that there is an epistemically possible world (true for all we know) in which infinite greatness is instantiated the argument goes nowhere.

As I said in my previous, this was not intended for you.

OK.

 

[Matthias123]

An unsound argument contains a false or unproven premise. And this one begins with the logical possibility of maximal (infinite) greatness being instantiated in a possible world. In fact, such a thing is not possible, the argument is unsound.

NowAgnostic, I believe you are missing the big picture. This argument isn’t so much to prove the existence of God as it is to wedge the atheist into a more radical position. You are either to believe that it is impossible for God to exist, which is much more radical then “it is possible for a God to exist, but he doesn’t” or accept the conclusion that God exists. The fact that you confess that it is impossible to have an infinitely great being means that in a strategic sense the argument is successful. Even people like Richard Dawkins do not believe that it is impossible for God to exist.

Yes. So only a certain finite amount of greatness will have been achieved. It won’t have been “maximal” since another possible world could have contained more finite greatness. Unless “maximal” means “infinite”.

I would disagree that maximal means infinite, I would asset that it means complete. Maximal greatness would be complete/absolute greatness, or greatness per se (as greatness per se is the cause of all greatness in the genus)

These things might lead us to conceive of an infinitely great being. It doesn’t show that being is logically possible, however.

Please explain this position – do you reject axiom S5?

Considering that atheists claim that they cannot prove that God doesn’t exist, this really forces them into a position of Strong Atheism, or become theists.

To sum things up, I believe although you didn’t accept the argument, it prevents you from holding the notion that God could possibly exist.

Of course I bet you strongly object to what I have said, so I await your response.

 

[MindOverMatter]

I don’t support the ontological arguement, but allot of the arguments posed against it on this thread are to me very poor, if not embarrassing. Warpspeedpetey’s rebuttal was one of a few that interested me.

A maximally great being, is something which transcends addition, and thus by definition stands outside and apart from finite concepts and beings. It cannot be compared to that which has dimensions, limits and parts; since these can be added to, and anything that can be added to can never reach or embody absolute greatness. It follows therefore that being transcendent of finite reality necessitates maximal greatness, a being that is infinite in every extent, which in turn necessitates the attributes commonly understood to be associated with God. This is what it means to be a perfect being.

Premise 1. A perfect being cannot fail to exist, because this would entail a logical contradiction.

A perfect being, inorder to satisfy perfection, cannot fail to be perfect in every way, which includes its existence. A being cannot be perfect and yet not exist; since, if that were true, an actually real being however finite would be more perfect then that which is only perfect in the imagination. This is a logical contradiction, for the simple fact that a being that is not actually real cannot be attributed with the reality of “perfect being”, since it lacks being. In order for an actual being to be an actual being it has to be actually “real”, and even more so if it is to have the attribute of perfection. Therefore a perfect being necessarily includes actual existence, and therefore cannot fail to exist, for it is one with its existence.

Conclusion. Thus a perfect being must exist.

 

[MindOverMatter]

To sum things up, I believe although you didn’t accept the argument, it prevents you from holding the notion that God could possibly exist.

This is correct. As soon as one says that God is a possibility, they must admit Gods existence. However; how does one reconcile the fact that God is by definition the giver of possibilities, with the fact that in order for the arguement to work one must first describe God as a possibility? God by definition exists beyond all possibilities because God is existence/reality, which seems to cause a problem in the structure of the arguement; for what does it mean to say the reality is possible? This is why i have a tendency to agree with Aquinas on how one approaches the question of Gods existence. Perhaps you could get pass this problem by redefining the context in which you are using the word “possible”? I don’t know. Perhaps this is a false problem, but it is a problem for me nonetheless, and it is the very thing that is nagging me about the ontological arguement.

However, one can make an a-posterior arguement along the lines of saying that in order for there to be possibilities there has to be a perfect being that gives rise to those possibilities; for in absolutely nothing there is absolutely nothing. Neither can a possibility exist for no reason, for this is the same as saying that you can get something from absolutely nothing; thus the existence of perfection must be a reality; logically and metaphysically speaking. In which case it doesn’t seem that an a-prior arguement for God can work by itself, since it requires the back up of a-posterior considerations.

 

[gearhead]

Very good question. First of all …

Some perfections (i.e. possessed natural goods) are perfections that imply an imperfection. For example, for a human, the power of moving oneself is such a perfection. However, it implies an imperfection because humans can’t have an effect on certain places if they weren’t able to move. God on the other hand, does not need to move, and can still effect things at any place at any time. Does that kinda make sense?

I don’t think it does. I think it’s inherently contradictory to talk about a “perfection that implies an imperfection”.

And I’m trying to see how a human having the power to move himself is somehow in a different category of attribute from a god having the power to make things happen.

The perfection of being fluffy is a perfection that implies an imperfection. The way to figure something like this out is to look at the final cause of things. What is the purpose of fluffiness, or, rather, what does it do? What does it contribute? It may be difficult to sum up its purpose, so I’ll just mention some attributes of it … it can feel good in a certain way. God can cause this exact effect on someone without being limited to existing as a limited to being light in texture. (I could go on, but I’ll only do so on request)

Fluffiness feeling “good in a certain way” is a value judgement; I personally wouldn’t say it’s inherent in fluffiness itself. The more lightweight and less rigid a thing is while still being as elastic as possible, the fluffier it is.

Can God be perfectly communist? Well, arguably, there are certain good aspects of communism, and God would possess those in some way, but there are bad or at least negative and limiting aspects to it, that God would not possess. Thus, God would not be communist (as it involves negative being).

Selfishness definitely implies an absence of being, namely lacking consideration of others. The positive aspect of selfishness is that it seeks one’s own good (I guess you could say), but it fails when it wrongly rejects the good of others. Thus, God would not be selfish (as it involves negative being).

But would this hold true for God? If you subscribe to Divine Command theory of morality, God’s values are the objectively “best” values; this would imply that whatever characteristics God has, they would not be negative.

Also, I’m not sure why you say that these things would imply “negative being”, if by this you mean they’re contradictory or impossible. I agree that acting selfishly to the detriment of others would probably conflict with being “perfectly good”, but so far, we haven’t established that “maximal excellence” implies perfect goodness. My point before was that there were a range of attributes that could conceivably be included in “maximal excellence”, so we can’t assume that “perfect goodness” is one of them until we have determined that no attributes that conflict with “perfect goodness” are included.

The idea that “Innocence” necessarily pertains to “ignorance of evil” is not necessarily true. The essence of “Innocence” (at least how it’s used when applying to God) pertains to being morally perfect, that is, having one’s will free from malice but directed completely toward good. Oftentimes, however, when a humans learns of evil, he is said to “lose his innocence” but this is so because there is an understanding that perceiving the evil affects him in a bad way, that is, it influences his character, and oftentimes inclines him to be less innocent in his own actions. However, if one were morally perfect, one would not be affected by the knowledge of evil in this way, but continue to make perfect choices (and this is only possible with grace, so says the Church).

Thus, Innocence would not conflict with Omniscience, if Innocence is understood as being “morally perfect” and not “ignorance of evil.” Does that make sense?

I don’t think it does, though I chalk it up to the ambiguity of language. You describe one definition of innocence, but the definition I describe is also valid.

And I don’t think that you’re correct when you say that being “morally perfect” would mean that a being could know evil but still remain perfectly innocent. IMO, it’s the knowledge of evil itself, and not the negative effects, that is referred to when we talk of “loss of innocence”.

 

[Filius_Prodigus]

There are a great many resources on this argument already, but I’m interested in exploring it some here.

Plantinga’s version of the OA states this:

1. There is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated.
2. A maximally great being necessarily possesses maximal excellence in every possible world.
3. A maximally excellent being is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
4. Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in every possible world.
5. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists.

It may surprise some that premises (2) - (4) are relatively uncontroversial. If one accepts the so-called S5 axiom (if p is possibly necessary, then p is necessary), then the only premise under contention is (1).

So, let’s ask ourselves: is it even possible that God exists? If it is at least possible, then it seems to me that weak atheism is untenable, and that a proof must be offered in support of the claim that God cannot possibly exist. This theoretically can be done by demonstrating the contradiction inherent in the divine attributes, or that the problem of evil is inconsistent with such a being. Neither of these arguments has gained much support among philosophers (the evidential problem of evil is now most popular among atheologians).

Of course, (1) also appears to beg the question. One wouldn’t accept the premise, unless he or she already accepted the conclusion. This puts us at a bit of an impasse. However, if there are no compelling reasons to accept ~(1), then (1) can very well be rationally justified, even if it is itself not compelling.

Thoughts?

-1-
Yes, (1) begs the question. (2) and (3) together do not produce a Christian God, maybe a panentheist god. The Christian God is not of this world, His power is not natural but supernatural, etc.

Also, I’m not sure but I understand “maximally” to mean a being with all the omnis. I don’t see how it is necessary for every possible world to have one. For me, if there were a possible world of only men (and men come in different sizes naturally) there has to be one taller than the rest, but if you ae going to tell me that in that world there has to be a Superman with superpowers, cape and a curl on his forehead necessarily… well then I’d say no.

I don’t like the argument.

-2-
The thread’s title says “Burden of Proof”, and I don’t see that discussed in the initial post. In any case, I don’t agree with th atheologist stance on the BoP, because many abuse of that card whenever they don’t have an answer. Both positing the existence and positing inexistence have the BoP on them. If there is no sufficiently convincing proof (logical) based on evidence (empirical) for a posited entity, then at most we can say is “I don’t know” (from the personal point of view) and “it is not substantiated” (from the scientific point of view).

For me, belief boils down to an empirical issue, not purely philosophical. I want to indicate here that I said “belief” not “faith”… the forst one is an epistemological category, and the second a theological one.

 

[Areopagite]

I don’t think it does. I think it’s inherently contradictory to talk about a “perfection that implies an imperfection”.

Strange that you would say this, because you’ve been saying that “having innocence” and “having (full) knowledge” are contradictory. Each, in your view, would be a perfection that would imply an imperfection, for the perfection of innocence would imply the imperfection of ignorance, and, likewise, “having knowledge” would imply the imperfection of a loss of innocence. * You have to either accept that there are perfections that imply imperfections, or else you have to believe that something can theoretically contain all perfections.*

And I’m trying to see how a human having the power to move himself is somehow in a different category of attribute from a god having the power to make things happen.

I was saying that humans are limited in their power to cause effect in the universe because they often need to move somewhere in order to do something. God does not need to move anywhere … he can cause effects anywhere at anytime.

Fluffiness feeling “good in a certain way” is a value judgement; I personally wouldn’t say it’s inherent in fluffiness itself. The more lightweight and less rigid a thing is while still being as elastic as possible, the fluffier it is.

Sure. That sounds good. So, my point is that the operations that fluffiness can perform can also be performed by God, but God is not constrained by the particular limitations that fluffiness suffers from (and those are probably many).

But would this hold true for God? If you subscribe to Divine Command theory of morality, God’s values are the objectively “best” values; this would imply that whatever characteristics God has, they would not be negative.

Divine Command Theory should probably attend another thread, but, in short … I think either way, God would be perfectly moral … which was the point I was making. (I may have glossed over something … so I expect correction on this)

Also, I’m not sure why you say that these things would imply “negative being”, if by this you mean they’re contradictory or impossible.

No, no, no. I was rather unclear though. Negative being involves a mere absence of being at a particular place and time. For example, rocks have “sightlessness” … sightlessness is a negative being, as it describes an absence. Most things with the prefix “non-” usually works.

Contradictory or impossible beings have two or more conflicting parts of their essence (like square circles).

I don’t think it does, though I chalk it up to the ambiguity of language. You describe one definition of innocence, but the definition I describe is also valid.

And I don’t think that you’re correct when you say that being “morally perfect” would mean that a being could know evil but still remain perfectly innocent. IMO, it’s the knowledge of evil itself, and not the negative effects, that is referred to when we talk of “loss of innocence”.

Your definition of innocence, I think, does not capture the essence of what innocence is. You merely say that innocence is preserved when one is ignorant of evil. I would argue that one does not lose one’s ignorance simply by learning about evil but when one is affected by evil in some way (upon learning about evil). Conceivably, one could learn about evil and not have his character affected in any way … but learn about it like a math problem. It’s only when you take an experience of evil to heart when you lose innocence, and let it affect your outlook and possibly your behavior.

In any case, the dictionaries I looked in only stated that innocence had to do with “not being guilty” or “being pure” or “being free from corruption.” It stated nothing about being ignorant of evil. But if you insist on your definition, then I would simply say that they are different words with the same spelling.

What theologians mean when they call God innocent is being morally perfect (essentially, what the common dictionary definition is).

 

[wanstronian]

I don’t support the ontological arguement, but allot of the arguments posed against it on this thread are to me very poor, if not embarrassing. Warpspeedpetey’s rebuttal was one of a few that interested me.

A maximally great being, is something which transcends addition, and thus by definition stands outside and apart from finite concepts and beings. It cannot be compared to that which has dimensions, limits and parts; since these can be added to, and anything that can be added to can never reach or embody absolute greatness. It follows therefore that being transcendent of finite reality necessitates maximal greatness, a being that is infinite in every extent, which in turn necessitates the attributes commonly understood to be associated with God. This is what it means to be a perfect being.

Premise 1. A perfect being cannot fail to exist, because this would entail a logical contradiction.

A perfect being, inorder to satisfy perfection, cannot fail to be perfect in every way, which includes its existence. A being cannot be perfect and yet not exist; since, if that were true, an actually real being however finite would be more perfect then that which is only perfect in the imagination. This is a logical contradiction, for the simple fact that a being that is not actually real cannot be attributed with the reality of “perfect being”, since it lacks being. In order for an actual being to be an actual being it has to be actually “real”, and even more so if it is to have the attribute of perfection. Therefore a perfect being necessarily includes actual existence, and therefore cannot fail to exist, for it is one with its existence.

Conclusion. Thus a perfect being must exist.

Or:

Conclusion. There is no such thing as a perfect being.

Another point - if a perfect being is “infinite in every extent,” then that must mean that he is infinite in size. So how come there’s room for us?

Confirmation Conclusion: There is no such thing as a perfect being because if there were, we could not exist.

 

[Matthias123]

Because the Perfect Being is not material, therefore size is irrelevent.

and the dancing continues…

 

[tjm190]

1. There is a possible world in which maximal jolliness is instantiated.
2. A maximally jolly being necessarily possesses maximal jolliness in every possible world.
3. A maximally jolly being is necessarily bearded, a giver of presents, and perfectly jolly.
4. Hence, a maximally jolly being exists in every possible world.
5. Therefore, a maximally jolly being exists.

Voila, I just proved Santa Clause

 

[Matthias123]

1. There is a possible world in which maximal jolliness is instantiated.
2. A maximally jolly being necessarily possesses maximal jolliness in every possible world.
3. A maximally jolly being is necessarily bearded, a giver of presents, and perfectly jolly.
4. Hence, a maximally jolly being exists in every possible world.
5. Therefore, a maximally jolly being exists.

Voila, I just proved Santa Clause

hand/face Do you really believe that “maximal jollyness” as you define it, is possibly exemplified?

I don’t think you understand the purpose of this argument. It is to force you to claim that it is impossible for God to exist, which you must prove. What Plantinga is doing is shifting the burden of proof.

 

[gearhead]

hand/face Do you really believe that “maximal jollyness” as you define it, is possibly exemplified?

I don’t think you understand the purpose of this argument. It is to force you to claim that it is impossible for God to exist, which you must prove. What Plantinga is doing is shifting the burden of proof.

I’m really not sure why you say this. Even if the argument were logically sound (and I still feel it isn’t) and it just came down to the question of whether premise (1) was correct, a person could still say “I don’t know” and avoid having to take a position of strong atheism or strong theism.

 

[Matthias123]

I’m really not sure why you say this. Even if the argument were logically sound (and I still feel it isn’t) and it just came down to the question of whether premise (1) was correct, a person could still say “I don’t know” and avoid having to take a position of strong atheism or strong theism.

Well, then your holding that it is false on faith. Nothing wrong with that per se, but I would imagine that it wouldn’t sit well for some atheists.

The argument only begs the question if one disputes that the existance of God is possible. Most people only dispute this after they have already read through the argument once, and know where it is going.

 

[tjm190]

hand/face Do you really believe that “maximal jollyness” as you define it, is possibly exemplified?

I don’t think you understand the purpose of this argument. It is to force you to claim that it is impossible for God to exist, which you must prove. What Plantinga is doing is shifting the burden of proof.

The argument is silly- pick an adjective.
Say it is possible for that adjective to be manifest perfectly in some form in one possible universe.
Of course, that adjective is better exemplified by something that exists in every possible universe.
Therefore, there must be a superlative of every possible adjective in every possible existence, unless it can be proven that those things don’t exist?

 

[Matthias123]

The argument is silly- pick an adjective.
Say it is possible for that adjective to be manifest perfectly in some form in one possible universe.
Of course, that adjective is better exemplified by something that exists in every possible universe.
Therefore, there must be a superlative of every possible adjective in every possible existence, unless it can be proven that those things don’t exist?

You don’t understand the argument:

Axiom S5 states

* Possibly P implies Necessarily Possibly p
* Possibly Necessarily P implies Necessarily p

So if it is possible for God to be **necessary ** then it is **necessary
**

Santa Clause is not necessary