When I refer to “knowledge” I am using it in the broadest sense possible, including perception. I understand you view the term differently, but this is only a matter of linguistics.
Language, yes, but I’m striving for precision, here, to the extent we can achieve it, rather than just making “six-of-one-half-dozen-of-another” distinctions. A big part of what I identify as problematic in theism is very sloppy use of language and little rigor in applying concepts. That may appear to be pedantics around semantic exchanges, but I suggest it’s not. The devil is in the details on this.
Yes, I was generalizing it a bit. My point is that all the necessary skills used in soccer are directly selected for by evolution. Soccer is simply another application of abilties conferred by natural selection.
OK, great. Conceptualizing the mind bending phenomena of quantum mechanics – something we certainly do not see as a direct pressure point for natural selection – is just like soccer that way. Humans have powerful evolutionary advantages in the basic capabilites of abstraction, mathematical reasoning, and analysis, and these are the “running, kicking and balance” of thinking about quantum mechanics.
The thrust here is that the basic capabilities man has developed in terms of reasoning, observation and analytical thinking as means to survival and prosperity in survival provide a
wealth of other applications that are not directly relevant to the process of survival.
For a parellel comparision to exist for our reasoning ability, we have to assume that the ability to reason to a specific level was directly selected for by evolution. We can’t say that because evolution has selected for some simple reasoning abilities in regards to survival, we can by extention use this reason for more complex reasoning that is not selected for. To say otherwise would be like saying that because evolution has selected for running ability, we can by extention run 500 MPH.
You are confusing the
algorithm with the program’s
output here. Reasoning is reasoning, and “algorithmically” it’s self-similar accross all applications, whether that’s coordinating a team strategy for bringing down a mammoth, or devising hadron experiments to provide some empirical validation or falsification of string theory. String theory is vastly more complex than the most nuanced strategy ever developed for Mammoth hunting, but the
algorithm that drives both is the same. The capabilities to do one imply the capabilities to do the other.
Knowledge – real knowledge – is cumulative, and this means that concepts and ideas of mind-boggling scale and complexity arise. That’s what cumulative processes do, they produce staggering amounts of complexity at scale. But just like evolution is a fairly simple set of core dynamics that produces fantastic complexity due to accumulation over time, human knowledge and reasoning is a simple core that also produces fantastic complexity due to accumulation over time.
Some very, very simple algorithms produces extraordinary structures when the accumulate over time. Man, through collaboration with peers and standing on the accumulated works that came before him, can apply the rudimentary algorithms of reasoning – critical analysis of evidence and observation combined with testing and validation – and interact with fantastically complex and abstract concepts, having no more instrinsic abilities than what nature developed in man as one who needed to locate, plan and execute the hunt for mammoths to feed the tribe.
If evolution has selected for an extraodinarily high level of reasoning ability, then sure we could use it for idle games which have no survival advantage.
As above, I think the cognitive abilities implied by man as a social animal with the capabilities of using experience, tools and language sufficient to survive as “mammoth hunters” or some such is all that’s needed to produce a Richard Feynman in the population. The algorithm is not that demanding. What is demanding is the time and resources
dedicated to the algorithm to let it run and accumulate over time. We’ve had lots of that, now.
I see no reason why evolution would have selected for such an ability. The other question is how we know what level evolution has selected for without a third-party observation. After all, there is not necessarily a penalty for going beyond our philosophic ability, especially for abstract ideas like the God question. We know the level of our running ability because our body will physically stop us from exceeding it. I see no parallel thing to stop our minds from venturing into harmless nonsense.
Exactly, and this is a compelling argument for the phenomenon of theism as a pervasive worldview in a world without any gods. There’s a distinct asymmetry at work – the downside of ‘false positives’ is nil to negligible in most cases. The downside of ‘false negatives’ is often catastrophic, lethal.
Take for example, the human disposition toward intentionality. Evolution punishes mercilessly those that fail to identify local threats – a predator nearby looking to eat you, for example. Those whose mental models are not sufficiently alert and vigilant become food for something else. But the converse doesn’t hold. Those whose mental models are “too alert” have little to no penalty associated with the ‘false positives’ that come up. A skittish deer who hears something suspicious and moves out of the meadow to somewhere else incurs the cost of movement; if there was no predator behind the snap of that twig, the energy to move and find new grass is a cost, but a very small one, given the cost of
not moving and being set upon by a predator.
Humans, then, have very little cost associated with indulging their imaginations in this way. And humans do, ubiquitously, venture into “harmless nonsense”, although “harmless” becomes a cynical euphemism at the point these ideas end up catalyzing something like burning a witch at the stake, or flying a 757 into a skyscraper.
We do not, and should not grant validity to our conjectures just because we have bigger, more highly develoepd brains than chimps or any other species. We accept knowledge as knoweldge based on its performance against the real world, or, in the case of disciplines like mathematics, against the axiomata and constrainst of a formal, analytical system.
Exactly. I do not see any way to determine the limits of the general capability of the mind, as I do with running (my body will stop accelerating)
Demanding performance, justification, liability to falsification and prediction (where applicable) is a proven means of qualifying the capabilities and output of the mind. You seem to want to qualify thoughts by their ‘pedigree’. I say that’s an intractable proposition, and thoughts are qualified by their performance.
Of course, but the question remains: what are and how do we know the abilities of the mind in the first place? It seems to me that the level of ability selected for by evolution would be relatively low, and that much our our thinking, mostly in regards to abstract ideas, is nonsense (per atheism).
I don’t know why it would seem that way. If we do an inventory of what it takes to team-hunt a mammoth, or to cultivate grains in a field, we would have all the mental pieces we need to explore, say, quantum physics, or determine that “God” is quite likely a very convenient invention for human psychology.
Think of a calculator. With just a very small set of intrinsic functions(add, subtract, multiply, divide, etc.), you can do extremely complex calculations. The sky really is the limit, even with a very primitive calculator. It may take longer than using a MacBook Pro + Mathematica, but all the needed functions are there. The human brain is something similar, equipped with a “chip set” of intrinsics that provide untold wealths of exotic and complex applications, if enough effort and energy are invested.
What I mean is that reason is not a single, undividable ability. If one organism evolves the ability to use reason to some degree, it does not follow that that organism can use reason for anything beyond that degree.
Reasoning is a method, an algorithm. Certainly one algorithm (form of reasoning) may be more sophisticated than another – my dog likely doesn not have the ability to reason in the way I can do to her lack of linguistic prowess, for example – but the method is uncoupled from the data on which it acts. A calculator that can add, subtract, multiply and divide can be used calculate basbeball batting averages or probabilities for isotope decay.
As you have it, you seem to think the algorithm is tied to some discrete set of data. As if our ‘calculator’ only worked with positive integers less than 20, for example.
For example, if one organism evolves the ability to “run”, it does not follow that that single capability of “running” means that any speed and distance of running become possible to that organism. It can only run in regards to the degree that evolution has selected for.
OK, but that doesn’t seem a problem. If the cognitive faculties of a hunter working in a team-hunt to bring down a mammoth is enough “running speed” to produce Albert Einstein eventually, then what is the objection? In this case, reasoning about, say, general relativity isn’t so much running
faster, but running
farther, and as part of a collective, group run. Knowledge is cumulative, remember.
-Touchstone